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Abstract 
 
 
To induce tax compliance, two opposite approaches are used: the coercive and the persuasive: 
firm action versus collaboration. Little attention has been paid to the comparative success of 
these two approaches – a situation this thesis seeks to remedy by investigating the 
effectiveness of three coercive and three persuasive instruments among large corporate 
taxpayers registered with the LTU of Bangladesh. Following an analysis of survey data using 
binary and multilevel logit and CHAID models, and an analysis of elite interviews employing 
an interpretivist approach, the findings suggest that coercion or persuasion are less likely to 
improve tax compliance when used separately than when used in combination, although 
coercion seems the more powerful of the two. Factors underlying the power of the coercive 
approach are the rationality and regularity of its application, along with its legal and financial 
imperatives. Reasons contributing to the appeal of the persuasive approach are a reduction in 
tax compliance costs, an improvement in accountability and a reduction in knowledge gaps 
between taxpayers and tax administrators, and coordination of the various tax laws. 
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1  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
 
 
Securing income tax compliance is a commonly experienced challenge in the economics of 
taxation  (Slemrod,  2004;  Brondolo,  2009);  and  as  a  result  of  the  extensive  economic 
recession in many countries, the risk of tax non-compliance has shot up in recent times. On 
the one hand, tax non-compliance is distortionary and inequitable for the tax system; on the 
other, it is detrimental to the growth of fiscal consolidation (Hanlon et al., 2005; Brondolo, 
2009). In order to improve tax compliance, tax agencies have introduced diverse techniques 
and approaches, depending on the risks and revenue characteristics associated with their 
taxpayers. Two opposite approaches that have dominated the tax compliance debate are the 
coercive and the persuasive approaches (James and Alley 1999; Torgler, 2007; Doyle et al., 
2009; Kagan and Scholz, 1984; Frank, 2006).  A slightly different approach from these two is 
the structural approach, which strives to secure tax compliance by increasing the use of 
withholding  taxes  and  improving  information  reporting  (Dressler,  2002).  The  common 
feature of these compliance techniques is that they rely on the voluntary payment of taxes by 
taxpayers. 
 
The coercive tax compliance approach, also called the deterrence or stick-based approach, 
attempts to promote tax compliance mainly through a mix of civil penalties and tax audits; 
whereas the persuasive approach, also called the collaborative, cooperative or carrot-based 
approach, addresses tax compliance by influencing tax morale through increased taxpayer 
services, simplified tax law and enhanced mutual understanding, among the others. 
2  
The basic philosophy of the coercive approach (interchangeably referred to as the deterrence 
or stick-based approach) is that a criminal act like tax non-compliance is a rational economic 
behaviour (Becker, 1967; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). As rational 
economic actors, individuals and corporate taxpayers conduct a cost-benefit analysis and take 
compliance decisions on the basis of the comparative weights of the benefits of non- 
compliance and the cost of punishment (Kornhauser, 2007). Deterrence theory argues that 
non-compliance decisions can be prevented if the cost of punishment exceeds the benefits 
they produce. Taxpayers under this theory are treated as „subjects‟ and are forced to take a 
 
compliant approach to their tax liabilities. However, in many cases coercive enforcements are 
found to be counterproductive, and sometimes they alienate taxpayers from the tax 
administration (Murphy, 2002). This implies that non-compliance is not simply a cost-benefit 
choice; rather, there are non-rational cognitive issues and personal norms that influence 
compliance behaviour. It is therefore argued that tax compliance can be better handled by the 
other stream of forces, loosely described as tax morale and comprised of taxpayer attitudes 
and beliefs (Kornhauser, 2007). 
 
The persuasive approach, as a process-based model of regulation, is less expensive to 
administer (Chung and Trivedi, 2003) and according to Murphy (2007), is more influential in 
deterring non-compliance decisions. Murphy (2007:14) states that, “a process-based 
enforcement approach may be particularly effective for those who have weaker respect for 
the law than for those who have a strong commitment to do the right thing.”  There is a strong 
argument that respectful treatment of taxpayers and easy procedural just ice received from tax 
agencies encourage taxpayers to go beyond their materialistic interests and leverage higher 
tax compliance (Morris and Lonsdale, 2004;Chung and Trivedi, 2003; Cowell, 2004; 
Frey,2002).  Braithwaite (1995: 191, cited in Wu, 2005) claims that, “the fear of disapproval 
by others has more [of an] effect on crime than the fear of formal punishment.”  Frey (2002) 
3  
points out that respectful relations between the taxpayers and the tax agencies crowd in tax 
morale while punishment measures crowd it out and reduce the incentives to tax compliance. 
This raises the fundamental questions of what should be the nature of interaction between the 
tax authorities and the taxpayers: „cops versus robbers‟ or „service providers versus clients‟, 
as argued in the new-liberal view of public administration and tax governance (Tuck, 2004). 
Kirchler (2007) argues that taxpayers‟ idea of fairness of taxes is so diverse that it can be 
better achieved if governments change their attitudes from a “cops and robbers” to a service- 
oriented  approach.  In  Kirchler‟s  (2007:4)  own  words,  “Whereas  a  „cops  and  robbers‟ 
approach is assumed to evoke mistrust and non-cooperation, a „service and client‟ approach is 
 
assumed to excite cooperation and voluntary compliance.” 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that persuasive appeals to conscience have been found to be effective in 
some cases (Schwartz and Orleans, 1967, for example), this strategy has had many failures as 
well  (Blumenthal  et  al.,  2001;  McGraw  and  Scholz,  1991).  In  a  comparison  between 
normative and sanction appeals among sole proprietorship businesses, Hasseldine et al. 
(2007:172) find that, “the sanctions letters are generally more effective than the normative 
citizenship letters for reported turnover.” In many cases, persuasive instruments have, 
however, produced mixed results (Hasseldine and Kaplan, 1992; Hite, 1997; Violette, 1989). 
The inconsistent outcomes of persuasive appeals may be attributable to data and 
methodological differences among the studies (Hasseldine et al., 2007), or to the fact that the 
success of the persuasive approach relies, to some extent, on the existence of the coercive 
approach (Hamilton, 1994). 
 
Against this backdrop, one of the innovations developed to address the tax compliance issues 
of large corporations is the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU). LTUs have adopted a compliance 
approach that combines both the coercive and the persuasive approaches, although it depends 
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more on the persuasive paradigm than the coercive (Mann, 2004; Braithwaite, 2003).1 Tax 
compliance by large corporations in LTUs is managed under the self-assessment system that 
provides the bulk of the tax revenues. 
 
However,  as taxpayers,  the  large  corporations  are  not  only  unique  in  terms  of the  tax 
revenues they provide, but also in terms of the level of risk they impose on the tax system. 
Large  corporations  hold  instrumental  financial  and  political  power  and  a  range  of 
professional expertise to influence the “service provider versus customer‟ relationship” (Tuck, 
 
2004). In addition, large corporations withhold taxes for individuals and work as the main 
point of tax collection, which Bird (1996:10) regards as “the equivalent of the customs barrier 
at the border.” 
 
Managing the income tax compliance of large corporations is particularly difficult, for they 
are engaged in harmful tax competition2, and tend to under-report their income tax liabilities 
more than their VAT liabilities (Bergman, 2003). In nurturing the tax compliance of such an 
important, powerful and risky segment of taxpayers, it is worthwhile asking a basic question 
– are coercive or persuasive instruments more important? Traditionally, coercive techniques 
have tended to dominate tax compliance literature, and tax-morale-based persuasive policies 
are still nascent. Tax agencies must decide whether to rely on coercive instruments or to 
depend  on  persuasive  and  often  less  costly  methods,  such  as  motivation  and  respectful 
communication with taxpayers (Doyle et al., 2009; Blumenthal et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Ninety per cent of corporate taxes in the US and 70% in the UK are provided by large corporations (OECD, 
2009), although the share of corporate taxes, as a percentage of total tax revenues, is relatively small in both 
these countries – 8% in the UK and 9% in the US (Auerbach et al., 2008). In developing countries, their 
 
2 Harmful tax completion refers to a situation where, through preferential tax rules - for example, tax under-cuts 
or tax holidays - countries try to attract mobile capital and, as a result, resources do not flow to the places where 
they might be most productively used (Harris and Oliver, 2010). 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 
 
As identified in the above-mentioned debate in tax compliance literature, the main objective 
of the study is to understand the contribution of coercive and persuasive tax compliance 
instruments in creating income tax compliance among corporate taxpayers in LTUs. The 
specific objectives are: 
 
1.   To measure the degree of tax compliance achieved by large corporate taxpayers in 
 
LTUs; 
 
2.   To determine the contribution of coercive and persuasive instruments to achieving tax 
compliance by large corporate taxpayers; and 
3.   To identify the underlying reasons why some instruments are important, and others 
are not, in the tax compliance process. 
With this purpose in mind, the research will first review related literature on income tax 
compliance approaches in general and approaches to tax compliance by large corporations in 
particular.   The  study  hopes  to   make  a  contribution  to  the  current  debate  on  the 
appropriateness of these often-conflicting techniques of tax compliance, looking particularly 
at the case of Bangladesh. 
 
1.3 Main Research Question and Methodology 
 
 
The study looks at how coercive and persuasive instruments contribute to an understanding of 
tax compliance by large corporations. It will explore the underlying reasons why some 
instruments are important, and some are not, in managing the compliance of the group of 
taxpayers cited. Obviously, the overall research question of this thesis is: are coercive or 
persuasive tax compliance instruments more important for the tax compliance of large 
corporate taxpayers in the LTU of Bangladesh, and why? In order to answer this question, 
the following specific research questions were formulated: 
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1. To what extent are large corporate taxpayers compliant? 
 
 
 
2. What contributions do coercive instruments make to the tax compliance of large 
corporations? 
 
3. What contributions do persuasive instruments make to the tax compliance of large 
corporations? 
 
4. Why do some instruments contribute more to the tax compliance of large corporations 
than others? 
 
The above overall and specific questions are set out in this section after a review of the 
related literature and identification of a gap in the knowledge produced so far by tax 
compliance studies. They are repeated here to maintain the logical flow of the research 
process. A detailed discussion takes place in section 3.2 of how data for each of these 
questions will be collected and analysed to provide evidence in support of the answer to the 
question. The questions are answered in chapters 5 to 7. Specifically, the first question 
measuring the tax compliance levels of large corporations is answered in chapter 5. The 
second and the third specific questions investigating the significance of selected coercive and 
persuasive instruments are dealt with in chapter 6. And the final question on why they are 
important is discussed in chapter 7. 
 
Methodologically  this  study  employs  a  mixed-method  approach.  First,  a  quantitative 
approach in the form of empirical analysis will be employed: a questionnaire survey of 
sample corporations will be conducted to collect data; and a statistical analysis of the data 
will be made through binary and multilevel logistic regressions and CHAID algorithm. 
Second, a qualitative enquiry will be made through elite interviews to look for a probable 
explanation of the statistically significant compliance instruments. Data will also be collected 
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through document analysis, mainly using tax office databases and corporate tax files. The 
study will investigate the research questions mainly from tax policy and public finance points 
of view. Other perspectives will be taken into full consideration in exploring probable 
explanations for the problem. A detailed discussion of the research perspectives is provided 
in section 3.9. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
 
The  study examines  the  role  of coercive  and  persuasive  tax  compliance  instruments  in 
creating income tax compliance among large corporations. For this it uses large corporate 
taxpayers from the LTU of Bangladesh, engaging with these large taxpayers‟ perceptions of 
 
the effectiveness of selected tax compliance instruments in achieving tax compliance. For a 
deeper understanding of compliance issues, the tax agency point of view is also investigated. 
 
It is worth noting that this study will not assess the success or failure of LTUs as a unit of tax 
administration. Nor will it focus on the effectiveness of the LTU compliance model as a 
whole. Rather, it will review selected coercive and persuasive instruments employed in 
securing tax compliance from large corporations whose tax affairs are administered by the 
LTU.  Therefore  the  study  requires  a  review  of  LTU  administrative  and  compliance 
techniques if the reader is to understand the process of large corporations‟ tax compliance in 
 
practice. The thesis presents a brief introduction to the tax compliance of large corporations 
in chapter 4 based on data collected from fieldwork. The study also focuses on corporate 
sector characteristics as the context variable that has an influence on compliance generation. 
This makes the study robust in the conclusions it presents, although its generalizability is 
undermined by this because a different context would influence the study findings differently. 
The other limitations of the study are that it concentrates on the large corporations of one 
LTU  and  some  study  variables  are  measured  through  the  stated  preferences  of  the 
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respondents.  A detailed  discussion on the limitations of the study has been provided  in 
section 3.13. 
 
1.5    Relevance of the Study 
 
Historically, economic theories of tax compliance have dominated the complia nce literature, 
modelled first by Allingham-Sandmo (1972) based on Gary Becker‟s (1967) seminal work on 
the economics of crime and punishment. The economic theory advocates hard actions, for 
 
example, penalty and audit, as the common deterrent to tax non-compliance. A limitation of 
the economic theory is that it completely ignores the fact that beyond the economic issues 
there are personal and social issues that have a strong bearing on tax compliance behaviours 
(Sheffrin and  Triest,  1992; Fehr  and  Schmidt, 2007).  As a result  of this,  the economic 
theories of tax compliance have been revised on the basis of psychological and sociological 
theories that argue that taxpayers are not only selfish, but are also responsible and honest 
(Alm et al., 1992b; Braithwaite, 2002; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Smith and Stalans, 1991; 
Roth et al., 1989; Baldry, 1986; Webley et al., 1991). Beyond punishment, as Kornhauser 
(2007:138) posits, there are “procedural justice, trust, belief in the legitimacy of the 
government, reciprocity, altruism, and identification with the group” that profusely affect 
compliance behaviours. 
 
Non-economic theories of tax compliance, therefore, advocate softer measures, for example, 
trust building, cooperation, service provision and so on, in improving compliance behaviours 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). To treat taxpayers respectfully, high quality taxpayer service, 
mutual understanding and simplified tax law come to the forefront of tax compliance 
management.  Although  empirical  evidence  illustrates  that  punishment  in  many  cases 
produces negative results or cooperation produces positive outcomes for tax compliance, no 
compliance research has examined hard and soft measures together to see how they impact on 
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the compliance generations of large corporations (Kamdar, 1997; Baer et al., 2002; OECD, 
 
2009; CATA, 2006). 
 
 
 
Against  this  background  of tax  compliance  research,  this  study  is  important  because  it 
employs both sets of compliance tools simultaneously. The effectiveness of these compliance 
tools will be observed from the perspectives of large corporate taxpayers, whose tax 
compliance performance is believed to be more influenced by collaborative soft action than 
by threats and punishments, as reflected in the Responsive Regulatory Approach (RRA). 
Responsive regulation takes the view (see sections 2.91 and 2.92) that tax agencies should 
increase tax compliance not through punishment but through education, encouragement and 
assistance  (Braithwaite,  2007).  For  sustainable  and  socially  beneficial  sources  of  tax 
revenues, the PRA argues for a major shift from stick-based compliance techniques to carrot- 
based techniques. Only a handful of studies have explicitly studied the impact of such a shift 
on tax compliance behaviour. 
 
The examination of coercive and persuasive tax compliance issues among large corporations 
will not only fill a gap in the tax compliance literature but will also add new dimensions to 
tax policy and development intervention. It is argued that large corporations are the most 
influential of all taxpayers for the financial and political power they hold. They are also the 
most risky taxpayers for the complex local and international transactions they make.  Perry et 
al. (2007:18) point out that, “underreporting of sales and incomes are even common in large 
firms... to deal this there is a need for an integrated approach consisting both of sticks and 
carrots.” 
 
This study is important because the tax compliance approaches and models used for large 
corporate taxpayers in developing countries are mainly replicated from those of developed 
countries, with very little understanding of their applicability and relevance in a different 
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context. Tax compliance research is mostly confined to the US or Australian context (Frey, 
 
2002), and the vast majority of the research is conducted on hypothetical data, due to the 
difficulty of accessing actual tax office data (Witte et al.,1987; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Gupta 
and Mukherjee, 1998).  An important contribution of this study is to tackle this problem by 
achieving access to the real tax office records of large corporate taxpayers in Bangladesh. 
 
The study will consider the impact of corporate context on tax compliance behaviour. It will 
take corporate sector characteristics as a context variable to measure the real contribution of 
the selected coercive and the persuasive instruments. These issues will give the reader a 
deeper understating of the tax compliance behaviour of large corporations. 
 
The outcomes of this study should not only contribute to the literature o n tax compliance but 
should have a practical bearing on the achievement of higher tax revenues, equity, reliability 
and flexibility in the tax system. Assessment of payment compliance will provide evidence of 
whether corporations in similar circumstances bear the tax burden equally (i.e., horizontal 
equity) and corporations in dissimilar circumstances bear the tax burden unequally (i.e., 
vertical equity). Studying tax law simplification as an instrument will demonstrate how 
reduction in tax complexity improves tax compliance – an essential step to ensuring certainty 
in the tax system. Lymer and Oats (2010) argue that achieving certainty becomes difficult 
under complex tax rules, especially for grey areas in the law, and where these rules are 
continually changed. The study of significant compliance instruments will enable the tax 
authorities to reduce their operational costs and increase the efficiency and convenience of 
tax payment (Tran-Nam et al., 2000). Moreover, better knowledge of large corporate 
compliance behaviours will provide flexibility in the application of the compliance 
instruments during economic boom and bust periods (Lymer and Oats, 2010). 
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However, an exclusive focus on large corporate tax compliance may reduce tax collection 
from small and medium taxpayers (Terkper, 2003; Phillips, 2008) and thus may affect equity 
in the tax system. Baer (2002) and McCarten (2004) argue that the tax compliance strategies 
for large corporations do not fit with the needs of small taxpayers and therefore suggest 
establishing a simplified tax regime for small taxpayers to make the tax system equitable. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
 
This thesis consists of 8 chapters. Each chapter touches upon certain aspects of the study. The 
chapters are designed so as to produce a logical flow towards answering the research question. 
 
Chapter 1 outlines the research context, its objectives and main arguments. It frames the basic 
research questions and research methodology, and discusses the justification and the research 
perspective of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the current state of knowledge on coercive and persuasive tax compliance 
paradigms and identifies gaps to be studied. It has two sections. The first section covers 
general tax compliance theories with a specific focus on large corporate taxpayers.  The 
second looks at the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) compliance model, its strategies and 
approaches. The main research problems and the research questions used in the study emerge 
from this review. 
 
Chapter 3 constructs an analytical framework for the study by identifying major instruments 
of coercion and persuasion and linking them to the research question. It sets out the 
methodological approaches, sampling and data analysis methods for the study. 
 
Chapter 4 provides the fieldwork plan implemented in Bangladesh. It sets out a detailed time 
frame and lists the activities carried out in the field. It also makes a brief presentation on the 
compliance performance of large corporate taxpayers in Bangladesh. 
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Chapter  5  aims  at  measuring  the  level  of  tax  compliance  achieved  by  large  corporate 
taxpayers in the LTU. To answer it effectively, tax compliance will be divided into two levels: 
component level and overall level. At component level, tax compliance is measured by its 
components, namely, filing, reporting and payment. At overall level, individual components 
are summed up to measure total tax compliance. 
 
Chapter 6 identifies the instruments significant in the achievement of tax compliance by large 
corporations. Two separate sets of instruments, deterrence or coercion-based versus 
motivation or persuasion-based, will be taken into account for this study. This will answer the 
question of which set of measures contributes more to our understanding of tax compliance 
by large corporations. 
 
Chapter 7 addresses the probable explanations for why some compliance instruments are 
more important than others in understanding tax compliance by large corporations. A wide 
range of interrelated tax administration, social, economic, political and psychological issues 
will be analysed in finding the explanations. 
 
Chapter 8 spells out the conclusion of the thesis and highlights its contribution to the relevant 
field of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
COERCIVE AND PERSUASIVE TAX COMPLIANCE 
INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LARGE CORPORATIONS 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review current knowledge on coercive and persuasive tax 
compliance paradigms, with a special focus on large corporate taxpayers. For this, 
understanding tax compliance theories in general, and large corporate tax compliance issues 
in particular, is essential. The chapter investigates empirical evidence in tax compliance 
literature in a wide range of fields – for instance, economics, psychology and sociology – and 
focuses on tough and soft tax compliance instruments. To see how tough and soft tax 
compliance issues are prioritized or balanced in managing the tax compliance of large 
corporate taxpayers, LTU compliance techniques and processes are presented. Teasing out 
coercive and persuasive tax compliance instruments and their comparative positions in the 
existing literature will help to identify a gap in the current body of knowledge, and is likely to 
generate the research question for this thesis. The identification of a knowledge gap in the 
extant literature is expected to inform the analytical framework, methods of data collection 
and data analysis.  The chapter begins with a definition of tax compliance, tax avoidance and 
tax evasion. Next, it examines tax compliance theories and determinants, in order to 
dichotomize them in the light of punishment and service paradigms. Then, the chapter defines 
large corporate taxpayers and LTUs, with an account of the latter‟s compliance models and 
 
techniques, to conclude with the implications of the reviewed literature. 
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2.2 Tax Compliance: A Conceptual Review 
 
 
In its simplest form, tax compliance means paying tax liabilities according to tax laws and 
conventional accounting practices (James and Alley, 1999; Braithwaite and Wirth, 2001). In 
other words, it  means filing returns for all taxes at the appropriate time, as required by 
income tax laws (Roth et al., 1989). According to Brown and Mazur (2003:2), “taxpayer 
compliance ... is analogous to measuring the net profit for a privat e sector business. Both are 
summary, bottom-line measures of the effectiveness of the organization.” Brown and Mazur 
(2003) divide tax compliance into three segments – filing compliance; reporting compliance; 
and payment compliance – which are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and which taken 
together measure overall compliance. 
 
Defining tax compliance, however, is not easy. Andreoni et al. (1998) point out that tax 
compliance is a fluid concept that has different meanings from different perspectives. In 
public finance theories, tax compliance relates to equity and efficiency issues. In 
organizational theories, it relates to the principal-agent problem, where corporations and their 
advisors continually provide asymmetrical information about their income and tax liabilities. 
Psychological theories assert that a sense of shame and guilt may force a taxpayer to be 
compliant, whereas sociological theories claim that taxpayers‟ perceptions of how others 
 
obey social institutions influence tax compliance (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). Alm and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2003) suggest that developing social institutions relies to a great extent 
on “the presence of an effective but service-oriented tax administration.”  This shows that tax 
compliance is an interdisciplinary topic requiring a good understanding of law, accounting, 
economics, public policy and political science (Lamb, 2004). 
 
There is however a dispute as to whether psychological theories fit  into tax compliance 
studies of corporate taxpayers in the same way as they do into those of individual taxpayers. 
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For some academics, corporations can be considered moral agents, like individuals, but in a 
very different way. For example, Henriques (2006: 45) states, “The conduct and state of the 
mind of the company‟s senior management is regarded as the conduct and state of mind of 
the company.”  This analogy – linking the founder‟s or chief executive‟s mind to the mind of 
the corporation – seems plausible for small, privately owned companies; but for publicly 
owned corporations such a comparison seems over-complex.   Perhaps, the most conscious 
 
part of the corporate mind, as Henriques maintains, is product brand, to which corporations 
have vast emotional or psychological attachment. Quoting analytical psychologist Andrew 
Samules, Henriques points out that to have an emotional or psychological attachment, it is not 
essential for the subject to have human form; non-human corporate entities may also 
experience  psychological  attachment.  That  is  why  corporations  spend  huge  amounts  of 
money for non-corporate purposes: to convince people that they are not merely corporations 
but something more.  Brooks and Dunn (2009) consider that corporate directors provide the 
social conscience of corporations. They are an integral part of the corporate social contract, 
and corporate profit maximization is a function of the directors‟ physical and psychological 
 
interest. According to Webley et al. (2006), corporate tax compliance is affected by how 
good a corporation is as a corporate citizen, which is measured by its reputational or social 
standards. However, Zaleznik and Vires (1982) disagree with this proposition and argue that 
the corporate mind only calculates benefit, without any feelings; it values means over ends; 
and it tends to hold power even at the cost of public policy and interest. 
Understanding tax compliance is particularly important because it has serious efficiency and 
equity implications (Hanlon et al., 2005). For instance, the effects of corporate taxes may be 
passed on to shareholders,  managers, workers or customers. Corporations that don‟t find 
 
compliance  laws encouraging  may  be  interested  in tax avoidance,  either  through taking 
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shelter in tax havens3 or reducing real corporate activity, i.e., investment.  Three issues that 
are particularly important for an understanding of corporate tax compliance are corporate size, 
corporate sector, and corporate location. Morris and Lonsdale (2004) argue that business type, 
size – sole-proprietor, partnership or corporation – and industry location influence tax 
compliance.   Erard (1997) finds that the cost of tax compliance to business taxpayers is a 
function of business size and the nature of production. He provides empirical evidence that 
tax compliance costs increase with firm size, but less than proportionately. 
 
Tax compliance costs mean all costs involved in record-keeping and in filing returns. 
According to Lymer and Oats (2010:51), “Compliance costs… include any costs related to 
the need to keep records for tax purpose, costs of employing tax related staff, costs of 
collecting data… and so on.” As Lymer and Oats indicate, tax compliance costs do not refer 
to financial costs alone; they involve psychological costs, including stress, anxiety and 
frustration (Tran-Nam et al., 2000) that constitute 50% of the legal compliance costs among 
the corporate taxpayers in India (Chattopadhyay and Gupta, 2002). Hall (1994) argues that 
frequent change in tax law is one of the key reasons for high tax compliance costs, because 
complexities create uncertainties in the tax system and an increase in uncertainties requires 
the taxpayer to spend more on tax planning. Survey results of 365 large corporate taxpayers 
in the US show that complex tax laws account for 30% of large corporate tax compliance 
costs (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 1993). According to Gupta (2004), reducing compliance 
costs should be the major policy prescription for inducing filing compliance in India. 
 
As regards the regressive nature of tax compliance costs, Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002: 4) 
comment  that,  “Compliance costs were regressive  in  the sense that  smaller  firms  faced 
greater compliance costs as a proportion of sales than medium-sized and large firms. Second, 
 
 
3 Tax havens are those countries where tax rates are non-existent or low and information-sharing is restricted for 
some income categories with or without the aim of attracting capital (Gravelle, 2009). The OECD (2000) has 
listed 50 countries across the world as having various levels of tax haven characteristics. 
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larger firms spent a greater proportion of their total compliance expenditures on tax planning 
than did smaller firms.” Hasseldine (1995) provides evidence that tax compliance costs are 
very large and regressive among the business taxpayers in New Zealand and such costs fall 
more severely on small businesses than on others. Similarly, tax compliance costs are linked 
to location. Big corporations with foreign affiliates are found to bear greater tax compliance 
costs than national corporations (Hanlon et al., 2005; Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002). 
 
Two common approaches to measuring tax compliance are the tax-gap approach and the 
economic approach (James and Alley, 1999; James and Alley, 2002), and the implications of 
coercive and persuasive instruments on these approaches are different. The tax-gap approach 
attempts to reduce the gap between taxes actually paid and taxes that should have been paid 
according to tax rules. The economic approach, on the other hand, attempts to maximize 
revenues in a way that makes the distortionary effect of revenue generation minimal. If tax 
agencies employ coercive approaches, the tax gap will reduce; but the obvious problem is a 
negative  effect  on  taxpayers‟ willingness  to  work,  save  and  invest.  Therefore,  Phillips 
 
(2008:132) reminds us that, “the actual level of tax compliance is the combined outcome of 
the...  willingness to pay tax.... and the effectiveness of enforcement.”    Slemrod (2004: 9), 
however, questions this view by saying that, “taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary 
contributions” and warns that, “if the taxes are so, then how much the tax authority can 
expect voluntarily.” 
 
2.2.1 Tax Evasion and Avoidance 
 
 
Tax compliance seems quite clear when it means filing returns on time for all taxes. In 
practice, however, complying with tax liabilities requires taxpayers to keep extensive records, 
remit money to the exchequer, and submit all evidence to the tax office. As part of this huge 
monetary  and  personal  involvement  in  the  tax  compliance  process,  without  any  direct 
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benefits,  taxpayers  make  intentional  (i.e.,  fraudulent)  or  unintentional  (i.e.,  errors  or 
ignorance) mistakes, some of which are called tax evasion and some tax avoidance. The 
accounting fraud and use of tax havens by the Enron and Tyco corporations are examples of 
tax evasions in recent times (Slemrod, 2004). 
 
Tax evasion refers to cases where corporations intentionally take action to cheat on their tax 
liabilities,  with the help  of those who  help  them with their  tax returns (Murphy,  2004; 
Klepper and Nagin, 1989a; Schisler, 1994; Tooley, 1992).  The cheating plan may take one or 
more of the following actions: 1) non-filing of tax returns; 2) tax returns filed but income not 
declared fully or expenses over-claimed; and 3) tax returns filed with full income declaration 
but taxes not paid accordingly. There is no concrete evidence as to the comparative frequency 
of these non-compliances. Plumley (1996) found that among US individual taxpayers, the 
reporting non-compliance rate is higher than that for filing non-compliance. 
 
Tax avoidance, on the other hand, is a planned course of action to reduce tax liabilities in a 
way that does not contravene tax law. Tax avoidance in that sense is legal. There is however 
disagreement about this liberal view of the definition of tax avoidance. Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(2002) point out that whether done intentionally or not, if an action by a taxpayer causes a 
loss of revenue, it should be treated as tax evasion. For example, if a highly profitable 
corporation invests huge amounts of money in an employee provident fund, in order to get 
tax credits and reliefs, so that their effective tax rate becomes zero, then this tends to be a 
case of tax evasion rather than tax avoidance (House of Commons, UK, 2008). In the 
examples mentioned, taxes are avoided by violating the spirit of the law. This has caused UK 
HM Revenue and Customs to define tax avoidance as an activity that reduces tax liability 
against  the  spirit  of  the  tax  law,  although  not  strictly  illegal.  This  suggests  that  tax 
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compliance, like any compliance program, should focus on the four Es–Educate, Encourage, 
Enable and Enforce. 
 
Efforts to reduce tax liability by breaking tax law in fact or in spirit are so ambiguous that 
Seldon (1979) offers the term “avoision” to describe abusive tax practices. He argues that 
taxpayers who start with avoidance eventually end in evasion, thus the practices would be 
better called tax „avoision‟– rather than „evadance', which implies the other way round. 
 
Slemrod (2004) comments that nothing is gained by distinguishing between tax evasion and 
tax  avoidance,  as  in  both  cases  the  net  effect  is  loss  of  revenue.  For  these  reasons, 
corporations follow a creative compliance approach so that they “fall beyond the ambit of 
disadvantageous, or within the ambit of advantageous law”, as Slemrod (2004: 9) points out. 
 
2.2.2 Types of Tax Compliance: Filing, Reporting and Payment 
 
 
According to Brown and Mazur (2003), as stated in the preceding section, tax compliance has 
three levels: filing, reporting and payment. Filing compliance refers to the proportion of 
registered taxpayers submitting returns. In calculating the percentage of filing, the 
denominator is always the number of registered taxpayers, because some potential taxpayers 
may lie off the radar of the tax authorities. A related calculation is the non-filing tax gap, 
which  measures  how  much  tax  has  been  lost  through  non-filed  returns.  In  calculating 
payment compliance, we measure the percentage of taxes paid by the due date. There are two 
sub-measures for this: the voluntary payment compliance rate (VPCR), measuring the 
percentage of total tax paid timely relative to total tax reported on a return submitted timely; 
and the cumulative payment compliance rate (CPCR), measuring the percentage of tax paid 
up to a given date relative to tax reported on a return submitted timely. These measures, as 
their names suggest, relate more to payment due dates than to taxes paid, because some 
taxpayers may not have payment obligations on the date of filing, either because tax has been 
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deducted at source, i.e. withheld, or because tax has been paid in advance. Finally, reporting 
compliance measures whether income is concealed or expenses are overcharged or any 
inadmissible expenses are claimed as admissible. 
 
These three compliance measures are complementary to one another and designed in a way 
that avoids double counting. From each category, the extent of compliance is measured to 
find  the  cumulative  extent  of  compliance.  Thus,  measuring  overall  compliance  is  only 
possible by adding together the degrees of compliance for each of the three components. 
 
A hypothetical presentation of 10 taxpayers, each with a tax obligation of $1000, can be seen 
in Table 2.1 below. The first column demonstrates a case of 100% tax compliance, with each 
taxpayer filing their return timely, reporting all incomes, and paying taxes fu lly. In this case, 
the filing rate is 100%, since all taxpayers submitted returns on time. The voluntary reporting 
rate (VRR), which measures the ratio of taxes reported to taxes liable, is 100%. 
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Table: 2.1 Hypothetical presentation of tax compliance by 10 taxpayers, each with a tax 
obligation of $1000 
 
Baseline case Filing 
compliance 
Reporting 
compliance 
Payment 
compliance 
Cumulative effects 
Each taxpayer files, 
pays and reports 
timely and accurately 
 
Filing Rate = 10 filed 
timely / 10 required 
to file = 100% 
One taxpayer 
fails to file 
 
 
Filing Rate = 
9/10 = 90% 
One taxpayer 
under-reports tax 
liability by $150; 
another by $300. 
Filing Rate = 
10/10 = 100% 
Three taxpayers pay 
only $900 of their 
$1,000 liability 
 
Filing Rate = 10/10 
= 100% 
One non-filer, two 
under-reports, three 
under payments 
 
Filing Rate = 9/10 = 
90% 
 
 
Voluntary Reporting 
Rate 
(VRR) = $10,000 
reported / 
$10,000   liability   = 
100% 
VRR = 
$9,000/$9,000 
= 100% 
VRR = 
$9,550/$10,000 = 
95.5% 
VRR = 
$10,000/$10,000 = 
100% 
VRR = 
$8550/$9,000 = 
95.0% 
 
Voluntary Payment 
Compliance Rate 
(VPCR) = 
$10,000 paid timely / 
$10,000 , reported = 
100% 
Treasury receives 
$10,000 of potential 
$10,000. 
 
Voluntary 
Compliance Rate 
(VCR) = 
$10,000/$10,000 = 
100% 
VPCR = 
$9,000/$9,000 
= 100% 
 
 
 
Treasury 
receives $9,000 
of potential 
$10,000. 
VCR = 
$9,000/$10,000 
= 90% 
VPCR = 
$9,550/$9,550 = 
100% 
 
 
 
Treasury receives 
$9,550 of 
potential $10,000 
 
VCR = 
$9,550/$10,000 = 
95.5% 
VPCR = 
$9,7000/$10,000 = 
97% 
 
 
 
Treasury receives 
$9,700 of potential 
$10,000. 
 
VCR = 
$9,700/$10,000 = 
97% 
VPCR = 
$8,250/$8,550 = 
96.7% 
 
 
 
Treasury receives 
$8,250 of potential 
$10,000. 
 
VCR = 
$8,250/$10,000 = 
82.5% 
Tax Gap = $0 Filing non- 
compliance= 
$1,000 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brown and Mazur (2003) 
Reporting non- 
compliance = 
$450 
Payment  non- 
compliance = 
$300 
Non-filing =$1,000 
Underreporting = 
$450 
Underpayment  = 
$300 
Total = $1,750 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the voluntary payment compliance rate (VPCR), measuring whether taxes are paid 
within or beyond the deadline, is 100%.Together these three rates, filing rate, VRR and 
VPCR,  make up the voluntary compliance  rate (VCR), which  is also  100%.The second 
column shows what happens to compliance rates when a taxpayer does not file a return. The 
immediate effect is that the filing rate goes down to 90%, but the VRR and VPCR are still 
100%, because the other nine filers have reported and paid taxes fully. The third column 
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shows how compliance levels change when all ten taxpayers submit their returns on time, but 
two of them underreport income. The fourth column measures compliance levels when three 
taxpayers fail to pay the required taxes in time. And the fifth column measures the cumulative 
effect of all the three levels of non-compliance. 
 
2.3 Do We Need a Different Framework to Study the Tax 
 
Compliance of Large Corporations? 
 
 
At  this  stage,  an  important  question  is  whether  the  tax  compliance  issues  of  large 
corporations diverge from, or converge with, those of non-large or non-corporate taxpayers. 
Slemrod (2004) gives three main reasons why a different conceptual framework is needed to 
study the tax compliance behaviour of large publicly-traded corporations. First, the risk 
preferences  of  individuals  and  public  limited  corporations  are  different:  individuals  and 
closely-held small businesses are risk averse, as they don‟t usually possess a diversified 
 
income and wealth portfolio. Large corporations, on the other hand, have a diversified 
portfolio and therefore have a risk-neutral attitude. 
 
Second  is  the  separation  of  ownership  and  management  in  public  corporations.  The 
individuals involved in management or ownership may be influenced by the potential cost or 
benefit of non-compliance, or by a sense of civic duty or a perception of fairness. In such 
cases, respectful treatment of corporate managers or shareholders may increase tax 
compliance. But it remains an open question whether large corporations will be motivated by 
a sense of civic duty or by respectful treatment, because of the artificiality of their entity 
(Slemrod, 2004).  The separation of ownership and management also affects the effectiveness 
of coercive instruments. If managers, for instance, incur a penalty for corporate non- 
compliance, the shareholders may offset the loss by altering their compensation contract. 
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This  raises  the  question  of  whether  punitive  measures  should  be  taken  against  the 
shareholders or against the managers of large corporations. 
 
Third, public corporations and individual taxpayers are different in their income reporting 
procedures and standards. Public corporations have to report income in financial reports 
audited by certified public accountants, whereas individual taxpayers are not required to 
submit  audited  financial reports. As a result, the chance of underreporting  is higher  for 
individual taxpayers than for corporations. Another factor that may affect large corporations‟ 
 
compliance is whether the tax savings generated through non-compliance accrue directly to 
the shareholders or to the corporation. Corporations are thought to be less non-compliant if 
the tax savings accrue to their shareholders. 
 
Similarly, sociologists assert that corporations are organizations, not individuals and therefore 
organizational dynamics may have an influence on individual decision-making.  For instance, 
Clinard and Yeager (1980: 43) say that, “the first step in understanding corporate illegality is 
to  drop  the  analogy  of  the  corporation  as  a  person  and  analyse  the  behaviour  of  the 
corporation in terms of what it really is: a complex organization.” 
 
Despite the above arguments, there are strong justifications for studying corporate tax 
compliance through studying the tax compliance behaviours of the individuals within the 
corporations. Cowell (2004) argues that the tax compliance of a corporation ultimately 
depends on the choice of the person having the power to declare the financial accounts of 
corporation. Conley and O‟Barr (1997: 6) assert that, “to say that the corporation has engaged 
in misconduct is to say that some of the people have misbehaved in ways that the law chooses 
to attribute to the corporate entity.”   Conley and O‟Barr also argue that a corporation is a 
summation of few individual actions, or in some cases may be little different from this as far 
 
as corporate cultural issues are concerned. Joulfaian (1999:1) states that, “corporations, as 
24  
fictitious  entities,  do  not  cheat  on  their  income  tax  returns:  their  managers  do.  These 
executives manage the operations of the firm and decide on the magnitude of profits to 
declare.” Joulfaian argues that managers are paid by the shareholders to represent their 
interests, which largely depend on managerial preferences for evasion. 
 
The overriding importance of understanding the role of individuals within corporations for 
understanding corporate tax compliance caused Gruber and Rauh (2007) to use the Gruber 
and  Saez  (2002)  individual  taxpayers‟ model  in  determining  the  influence  of  corporate 
 
marginal tax rate on corporate taxable income. To assess the success of risk rating approach 
among  large corporate taxpayers in the UK, Freedman et  al. (2009) conducted a survey 
among corporate directors, while Oats and Tuck (2008) interviewed civil servants from the 
UK Large Business Service (LBS) to study the role of financial accountants in large 
companies. Given the importance of the individual tax compliance model to the study of 
corporate tax compliance, Slemrod (2004:6) emphasises “looking through the legal entity to 
the individuals within the corporation.” 
 
Therefore this study attempts to understand corporate tax compliance behaviours based on the 
attitudes of corporate directors, accountants and tax professionals within large corporations. 
However, to better formulate the framework, the study will take full account of the 
organizational and administrative dynamics around which the LTU tax compliance process 
revolves (discussed in sections 2.9 and 2.10). 
 
2.4 Tax Compliance Theories:  Do They Advocate Coercion Or 
 
Persuasion? 
 
 
Broadly, tax compliance theories can be categorized into two classes: risk-based and non- 
risk-based. Leading risk-based theories include the expected utility theory (Von Newman and 
Morgenstern, 1944), the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and the expectancy 
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theory (Lewin et al., 1944). Risk-based theories are more suggestive of a coercive approach 
 
to tax compliance. Non-risk based theories include the intentions theory (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
 
1975), norms of compliance (Schwartz and Orleans, 1967), and the inertia model (Festinger, 
 
1957), and these models advocate a persuasive approach to tax compliance. 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Expected Utility Theory 
 
 
The expected utility theory (EUT) states that taxpayers decide between risky or uncertain 
conditions by comparing their expected utility values. Expected utility values are measured 
by weighted sums found by totalling the utility values of different outcomes multiplied by the 
respective probabilities of the latter (Mongin, 1997).Expected utility may vary according to 
factors such as the measurement scale of utility and the weighted sum procedure. It may also 
vary according to the degree of uncertainty and according to the degree of risk. Due to this, 
the best-perceived versions of this theory are the subjective expected utility theory (in the 
case of uncertainty) and the Neumann-Morgenstern theory (in the case of risk). 
 
Applying this theory in tax compliance studies, it is argued that taxpayers carefully examine 
the available options for evasion and choose the one with the highest probability of utility and 
the lowest probability of detection. Gary Becker (1967) was the first to apply the utility 
theory in explaining tax non-compliance. Becker (1967: 08) argued that, “a person commits 
an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and 
other resources at other activities.” Becker suggested applying these views in explaining all 
violations, including “murder, robbery, and assault” along with “tax evasion, the so-called 
white-collar crime” (ibid: 03). Based on Becker‟s theory, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
 
developed a complete tax compliance model for the individual taxpayer, which was further 
extended by Srinivasan (1973), Yitzhaki (1974) and Pencavel (1979). The basic model is: 
 
E (U) = (1-p) U [y (1-t) + (y-x)] +PU [y (1-t)- s (y-x)] 
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Where, 
 
y is the exogenous true fixed income; 
 
t is the constant tax rate; 
 
x is the declared income; 
 
y (1-t) is the true after-tax income; 
 
p is the probability of being detected; and 
s is the penalty, which is a constant. 
 
 
The model predicts that an individual will report zero income whenever the audit probability 
he faces is less than t/ (t+s). However, there will be greater compliance if there is stricter 
enforcement  by raising  either  p  or  s.  These  arguments  lay  the  basic  foundation  of the 
economic perspective on tax compliance that dominates most of the works on individual and 
corporate tax compliance. Arguably, this theory tends towards coercive compliance 
instruments and suggests audit action, imprisonment, penalties and increased marginal tax 
rates as the potential determinants of tax compliance. 
 
2.4.2 Prospect Theory 
 
The expected utility theory failed in some cases to provide an acceptable explanation for 
decision-making under risk. In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky, through experimental studies, 
found  that  the  individual‟s  response  to  risk  is  not  based  on  maximum  utility.  Rather, 
 
individuals are risk-averse when facing gain and risk-seeking when facing loss (Kornhauser, 
 
2007). In other words, the individual will avoid risk when gains are certain but will take a 
risk when facing losses. For instance, presented with options of (a) a cert ain gain of $500 and 
(b) a gain of $1000 with probability .6, the individual will choose the first one. But presented 
with options of (a) a loss of $500 and (b) a loss of $1000 with probability .6, the individual 
will chose the second one. As a consequence, the probabilities of expected utility are replaced 
by decision weights in this theory. Chang (1984) and Jackson and Jones (1985) have applied 
this  theory  in  tax  compliance  studies.  Jackson  and  Jones  (1984)  designed  a  laboratory 
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experiment to test the relationship between risk of detection and the magnitude of penalty in a 
tax evasion case. They found that the subjects focussed more on the magnitude of loss than 
on the probability of detection when the probability of detection was small. The authors‟ 
 
findings are consistent with the proposition of the prospect theory. Similar to the expected 
utility theory, this theory advocates that punitive measures, including penalty and 
investigation, are the best way to handle tax non-compliance. 
 
2.4.3 Deterrence Theory 
 
 
Another  extension  of  the  expected  utility  theory,  the  deterrence  theory,  explains  that 
taxpayers will not do certain things if (1) there is a legal sanction; (2) there is a probability 
that sanctions will be imposed; and (3) the costs of the sanctions exceed the potential benefits 
accruing. This theory assumes that all individuals are intelligent, informed and can calculate 
the costs and benefits of a choice (Varma and Doob, 1998). There are substantial literatures 
on tax compliance that supports the idea that taxpayers‟ attitudes towards sanctions, towards 
 
the probability that the sanctions will be imposed, and towards the net gain from non- 
compliance are interrelated (Jackson and Jones, 1985; Grasmick and Scott, 1982; Andreoni et 
al., 1998; Mason and Calvin, 1978). 
 
This theory has practical implication for coercion-based compliance measures. Grasmick and 
Scott (1982: 213) argue that, “deterrence theory posits three mechanisms of social control, in 
the form of threatened punishments, which might inhibit illegal behaviour: legal sanctions 
(state-imposed  punishment),  social stigma  (peer-imposed  punishment),  and  guilt  feelings 
(self-imposed punishment).”   In their work, Rossi and Grasmick (1985) note that legal 
sanctions and probability of audits are the most important enforcement tools by which tax 
departments can control evasion. 
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However, Jackson and Milliron (1986) urge caution in considering the neutralization effect of 
coercive  instruments,  since  individuals  have  their  own  rationalizations  for  being  no n- 
compliant and negating guilty feelings. Thus how much impact legal sanctions will have on 
compliance attitudes depends on how much of a neutralization effect the sanctions have 
created.  For  example,  if  taxpayers  perceive  legal  sanction  as  too  severe,  they  do  not 
experience much sense of guilt if they break the law; whereas if they find the law quite fair, 
their sense of guilt in breaking it is greater. Jackson and Milliron suggest that deterrence 
theory as a means of inducing tax compliance may bring success if there is certainty that 
violators will face punishment. Any chance that sanctions will be loosely implemented tends 
to increase the chances of non-compliance. 
 
2.4.4 Intention Theory 
 
 
The fundamental proposition of the intention theory is that the attitudes and intentions of 
individuals are important to tax compliance. This theory was primary developed by Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975) and applied in studying compliance behaviour by Lewis (2008), McGill 
(1988), and Jackson and Milliron (1986). These researchers found that individual attitudes 
towards tax evasion were being affected by age, level of education, income level and several 
other demographic features. Trivedi et  al. (2005:2)  claim that, “the attitude of taxpayers 
varies considerably. Some comply with the fullest extent ...other taxpayers essentially play 
the audit lottery with the hope of avoiding the imposition of penalties.” Kirchler, Hoelzl and 
Wahl (2007) argue that taxpayers‟ attitudes are a reflection of their tax morale, which must be 
 
taken into account in the conceptual framework of tax compliance and be reviewed on the 
power and trust continuum of compliance behaviour. Tax morale, as a concept, is defined as 
taxpayers‟ moral compulsion or inherent tendency to pay taxes (Torgler, 2007), alt hough its 
exact components are not fully described (Kornhauser, 2007). To Frey (2002), tax morale is a 
black box, since its operational mechanisms and measurement processes differ widely; while 
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to Orviska and Hudson (2003), tax morale is linked to taxpayers‟ sense of civic duty. Very 
often it is not clear whether the concept of tax morale applies to national or individual tax 
 
payment behaviour. Kirchler (2007:102) clarifies the concept thus: “While the concept relates 
to the social and national level, it is measured by assessing knowledge and attitudes borne by 
individuals”.    Similarly,  Lago-Penas  and  Lago-Penas  (2010:1)  define  tax  morale  as  a 
“function of individual and context level variables” which involves “socio-demographic, 
political and ethnic issues.” 
 
Obviously, this theory draws generously on persuasive tax compliance instruments. It argues 
that establishing mutual trust and understanding with taxpayers will influence tax compliance 
decisions. Mere imposition of penalties and legal sanctions may sometimes backfire in 
creating tax compliance. 
 
2.4.5 Norms of Compliance 
 
 
This is not a theory as such, but a model of tax compliance that highlights the social 
dimensions of tax compliance.  The basic argument is that if a society considers evasion to be 
wrong and immoral, taxpayers will be less non-compliant (Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993). A 
society with a strong tradition of non-compliance tends to encourage tax evasion to continue. 
Also, for social and cultural reasons, individuals compare their own tax payment behaviour 
with that of others. If a taxpayer sees that others are not paying their taxes properly, or the 
government is not making proper use of tax revenues, he/she will tend to evade taxes. 
 
Chau and Leung (2009) have put special emphasis on social and cultural issues, and have 
proposed modifications to tax compliance models. They critically examined the tax 
compliance model of Fischer et al.(1992) and classified key compliance factors into four 
groups: (i) demographic (e.g., age, gender and education), (ii) income-led opportunism (e.g., 
income level, income source and occupation), (iii) attitudes and perceptions (e.g., fairness of 
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the tax system and peer influence), and (iv) tax system/structure (e.g., complexity of the tax 
system,  probability of detection  and  penalties,  and  tax  rates). This  model also  includes 
cultural and ethical values. In approach, this model is mixed in its acknowledgement of the 
contribution of coercive and persuasive factors. 
 
2.4.6 Inertia Model 
 
 
Subscribers to this model assert that once an individual is habituated to certain behaviour or 
states of mind, it is difficult for him/her to suddenly withdraw from such practices. Similarly, 
a taxpayer who has a longstanding history of tax compliance does not suddenly become a 
violator (Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993). And the reason for this is not the fear of detection but 
the old compliance habit. This theoretical proposition is based on the psychological theory of 
Festinger (1957, quoted in Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993: 4), which states that, “when an 
individual holds inconsistent beliefs or acts in a way inconsistent with his beliefs, unpleasant 
feelings arise. In turn, these feelings push the individual to change either his beliefs or 
behaviour, so that one is consistent with other.” The proposition of this model is more 
consistent with persuasive policy than coercive policy. The model implies that taxpayers hold 
certain beliefs, which may not vary with the potential threat of punishment and sanctions, but 
rather with the ethical and moral standards of the taxpayers. It argues that it is through 
services to taxpayers and education that ethical issues can be best tackled, rather than through 
fear of imprisonment. 
 
2.4.7 Expectancy Theory 
 
 
This theory is proposed by Lewin et al. (1944) and Vroom (1964). According to this theory, 
two basic facts governing tax compliance behaviours are: a) the expectations that the 
behaviour will produce a specific result; b) the sum of personal satisfaction the taxpayers 
derives from such action. This theory differs from the expected utility theory on the point that 
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“expectancy” is an output of motivation and “utility” is a product of cost-benefit, irrespective 
of one‟s motivational level, as Vroom (1964) clarifies. 
 
Accordingly, the first condition is that a taxpayer must have an intention to evade taxes. In 
real world, however, not all taxpayers are habituated to tax evasion; there are taxpayers who 
may not evade taxes even though there are no chances of being caught (Andreoni et al, 1998). 
Again, having an intention is not enough; there must be available means to translate the 
intention into a successful action – the second condition towards non-compliance decision. 
Finally, there must be the probability that the act of non-compliance produce the desired 
outcome that was intended. 
 
 
2.4.8 The political economy model of tax compliance 
 
 
According to this model, state-society relations and social contract are the main drivers to tax 
compliance (Moore, 2004; Barany, 2008). This model argues that the more efficient and 
legitimate the government actions and the political system are, the higher the potential for tax 
compliance is (Aymer, 1999).  Political systems and institutions – democratic or authoritarian 
– determine the nature of interaction between taxpayers and governments. In democracies, 
government cannot act coercively towards taxpayers due to the fear of losing popularity 
(Musgrave,  2000).  In  autocracies,  regulation  and  controls  are  usually  coercive,  since 
taxpayers cannot raise voice against government actions. However, Aymer‟s (1999) findings 
of positive relationship between coups d‟état and tax compliance in developing countries 
shows that coercive actions under a military rule can increase tax compliance. Bräutigam 
(2008) claims that in some countries democracy or dictatorship did not have any effect. This 
 
convinces Sandmo (2005), the co-author of the Allingham-Sandmo model (see section 2.4.1), 
to emphasize that low tax compliance in some countries may be an outcome of political 
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failure. In addition, the institutional arrangement within the democratic system, parliamentary 
or presidential, has effects on tax compliance (Bräutigam, 2008). 
 
In summary, it can be said that along with economic theories/models of tax compliance, there 
are socio-political and psychological theories. While the economic perspective considers 
taxpayers as rational beings who make economic calculations, the sociological perspective 
views tax compliance as a product of taxpayer interaction with social norms, values and 
institutions. The psychological point of view suggests that tax compliance is a function of 
taxpayer motivation, intention and personal attitude towards fulfilling an obligation. Some 
theoretical  bases  (e.g.,  deterrence  theory)  have  attempted  to  combine  both  social  and 
economic issues. The central observation of these theories, as Timmons (2004: 27) argues, is 
that, “most theories hinge on the coercive model of tax compliance, but tax compliance 
cannot be explained by coercion alone in most cases.” 
 
2.5 Do Coercion and Persuasion Conflict or Complement? 
 
 
A review of tax compliance theories shows that the tax compliance literature is broadly 
divided into two parts: coercive and persuasive.  By coercion, Commons et al. (1996:86) refer 
to “a command, express or tacit, issued by a determinate person to enforce obedience on 
others by means of external material”, where persuasion does not induce compliance by 
material means but by “direct psychic influence.” Commons et al. argue that coercion and 
persuasion both work through motives, and the difference in such motives is related to class- 
feeling, prejudice and self-interest. It is also argued that coercion does not mean an obvious 
force; rather, it is the maintaining of force to use when needed. Freedman (1998:18) argues 
that, “coercive activity is not inherently defensive or offensive it depends on the objectives 
being perused.” 
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Theorists and scholars are sharply divided about the influence of these conflicting compliance 
paradigms. Neoclassical economists argue that coercion as a polic y cannot exist for long; in 
the long run, only consensual exchange of resources will prevail (Tool and Samuels, 1989). 
Market  economists,  on  the  other  hand,  think  that  the  exchange  of  resources  between 
economic agents is not fully coercive because individuals enjoy freedom of action within a 
limited  set  of choices.  And  in  a  quite  different  vein,  institutional  economists  state that 
coercion is inevitable and ubiquitous in every economy (Tool and Samuels, 1989) and both 
the state and the market work as the repository of coercion. Thus we see that neoclassical 
economists seem to agree with the voluntary and persuasive distribution of resources, and 
institutional economists seem to challenge this. Evidently, the coercive school of thought 
posits that tax payments are not made willingly and the economic rationality of tax non- 
compliance makes the taxpayer a gambler or a thief (Cowell, 2004; Timmons, 2004). 
The persuasive theory of tax compliance, which expects taxpayers to self-assess their taxes, 
relies on trust and taxpayers‟ behavioural co-operation. This approach assumes that taxpayers 
are not merely interested in utility maximization. There is empirical evidence that taxpayers 
 
are honest and disclose their tax liability correctly, even when there is no chance of being 
caught (Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; James and Alley, 1999). 
Scholz and Lubell (1998:412), testing Levi's (1988) concept of “conditional consent” and 
Scholz and Pinney's (1995) concept of “duty heuristic”, empirically proved that, “trust in 
government and trust in other citizens significantly influence tax compliance, even after 
controlling for the influence of any internalized sense of duty and of self-interested fear of 
getting caught.” There are also studies that claim that the inherent motivation to comply with 
taxes can be crowded out by coercion-based extrinsic motivations (Deci and Ryan, 2002; 
Frey, 2002). 
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There is abundant evidence that this theory works on the ground. Maxwell (2008) finds that 
the revenue authority of Guatemala reduced its penalty rate for tax non-payment and earned 
huge voluntary tax payments from its taxpayers. In contrast, as Maxwell notes, the Costa 
Rica revenue authority increased its tax penalty and the probability of audit, and ended up 
with  reduced  compliance.  And  in  Germany  research  concludes  that  factors  other  than 
coercion improve tax compliance (Maxwell, 2008). Scholz (1998: 137) points out that, 
“without trust there is little basis for social cooperation and voluntary compliance with laws 
and regulations that could potentially benefit everyone.” 
 
However, in some ways, coercion and persuasion as compliance approaches carry equal 
weight, since both of them produce results through affecting the cost and consequences of 
non-compliance  activities  (Imbeau,  2009).  For  instance,  persuasive  theory  posits  that 
taxpayers cannot be influenced towards tax obligations until they are convinced that the 
benefits they receive from tax compliance are higher than the costs they incur for it. The 
benefits taxpayers receive from paying taxes take both a direct and an indirect form. The 
direct benefit is the amount of punishment taxpayers avoid by not reneging on a state 
obligation; and the indirect benefit is the goods and services supplied by the state free o f 
charge. Because of an information asymmetry, many taxpayers fail to perceive the benefits 
they derive from state-provided goods and services. Thus the working of persuasive policies 
depends on facts and knowledge of how taxpayers benefit from state-provided services. 
 
Imbeau (2009) argues that despite the fact that taxpayers benefit from the payment of tax, 
they need to be coerced because they do not like to lose the instrumental power they hold 
over their wealth. Legal compulsion may ensure that taxpayers sacrifice some of their wealth; 
but it is unlikely that a complete sacrifice will be made. The conflict between the taxpayers‟ 
 
instrumental power over their wealth and the coercive power of the state is well reflected in 
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the Laffer curve (Gwartney et al., 2008): the state can only increase revenues up to a certain 
point.  If the  tax  rate  is  exorbitantly  high,  taxpayers  will either  work  less  or  take their 
economic activities away from the state, and revenues will fall.  To overcome this difficult 
situation, the state has either to draw resources from a different source, by borrowing at a rate 
of interest, or printing  money; or it  has to  persuade its taxpayers of the need  for more 
revenues. 
 
2.6 How to Balance Coercion and Persuasion? 
 
 
The apparent dilemma discussed above shows that there are two ways of increasing revenues: 
increasing coercion to make non-compliance a costly decision; or increasing persuasion to 
demonstrate the benefits to taxpayers. A third option, which is argued to be the most 
practicable, is to blend these two, taking account of the nature of taxpayers and the needs of 
the tax administration (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001; DFID, 2009).  According to the 
DFID (2009:9), for building an effective and legitimate state, it is important „not just to be 
able to compel but to persuade.‟ DFID states that the question of how to tax is more important 
 
than the questions of what and how much to tax. Braithwaite and Braithwaite (2001) suggest 
that a balance between enforcement and respectful treatment will foster trust in the tax system 
and create more compliance. Imbeau (2009) also supports the idea that coercion or persuasion 
as standalone measures cannot fully incite tax compliance. Persuasion alone secures less tax 
compliance than coercion alone, but when persuasive instruments are mixed with coercive 
instruments, they yield better results than coercion alone (see Figure 2.1). The explanation for 
this is that coercion becomes costly because of the huge surveillance it requires. A rational 
way to reduce cost and to replace coercion is to give taxpayers a voice in taxation and offer 
them services that open up the possibility of an exchange-based relationship (Timmons, 2004; 
Levi, 1988; Hendrix, 2008). 
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between tax compliance, coercion and persuasion 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance achieved 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercion and persuasion 
 
Coercion alone 
 
 
Persuasion alone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercion and persuasion in action 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Imbeau, 2009 
 
 
The common core that brings taxpayers and tax administrations close, according to the 
persuasive compliance scheme, is trust and a sense of civic duty. Kenneth Arrow (1972, 
quoted  in  Slemrod  and  Katuscak,  2005:3),  in  his  seminal  work  on  gift  and  exchanges, 
remarks: “Every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust … much of the 
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.” 
Knack and Keefer (1997) provide evidence that a trust-based society spends less in protecting 
people from exploitation by economic transactions and can produce more physical and social 
capital for the state. Harsh measures taken to make taxpayers compliant may completely 
erode the tax base. Kagan and Scholz (1984) argue that irrational actions by regulators 
engender resistance to compliance in citizens. Tyler and Huo (2002) opine that taxpayers 
paying taxes under coercion may revert to their prior behaviour once the threat of punishment 
is reduced or they get used to it. 
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However, it may be difficult to distinguish whether taxpayers are complying due to the fear 
of coercion or the appeal of persuasion. Moreover, a sense of civic duty and trust are not 
equally present among taxpayers. Reliance on taxpayers‟ sense of civic duty and trust may 
 
create problems of free-riding and horizontal inequality in the tax system (Wagner, 2002; 
Timmons, 2004). This causes Hendrix (2008: 49) to suggest that, “tax compliance is in no 
sense voluntary; therefore the ruler has no incentive to deviate from a coercive equilibrium.” 
There is also a reverse causation to this argument in that taxpayers‟ trustfulness and sense of 
 
civic duty depend on how trustful the state is to the taxpayers (Maxwell, 2008; Moore, 2008). 
 
 
 
Considering the arguments of both sides, Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2007) suggest a 
pragmatic compliance framework, called “the slippery slope” (see Figure 2.2 below). These 
authors contend that in framing compliance policy it is important to consider whether 
taxpayers and tax agencies are in an antagonistic or a synergic relationship. In an antagonistic 
relationship, tax authorities consider taxpayers to be evaders and impose coercive measures 
to collect tax. This causes a sense of persecution among taxpayers and therefore they feel 
justified in breaking trust and being non-compliant. Self-persuaded compliance in these 
circumstances is reduced to the minimum. 
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Figure 2.2: The slippery slope framework: enforced versus voluntary tax compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2007 
 
 
 
 
By contrast, in a synergistic relationship the tax authorities view themselves as a service 
provider. The “client service” approach makes the tax authority respectful towards taxpayers, 
which encourages willing payment of taxes. Seen from this perspective, the tax compliance 
framework has two major dimensions: power and trust. Power refers to the capacity of the tax 
authority to detect evasion and punish, whereas trust means the capacity to provide beneficial 
services to taxpayers. Tax authorities may use power to threaten taxpayers into compliance, 
or they may trust taxpayers and build a relationship of mutual understanding and cooperation. 
However, none of these is successful as a single measure. Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2007) 
for this reason argue that increasing power and trust are equally likely to improve tax 
compliance. 
 
Finally, the "trust heuristic", according to Scholz and Pinney (1995), can provide the basis for 
a contingent compliance strategy capable of sustaining cooperative solutions to the collective 
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action problems of governance if two conditions are met. First, compliance with laws must be 
conditional on levels of trust in specific legal arenas. Second, a citizen's trust in government 
and trust in other citizens' willingness to obey the law must reflect the costs and benefits 
associated with obeying laws. 
 
2.7 Instruments of Coercion and Persuasion in Managing Tax 
 
Compliance 
 
 
Most tax compliance instruments emerge from the traditional, coercive school of thought that 
begins with penalty and audit (Dubin et al., 1990). The other streams of instruments, the 
persuasive ones, are still nascent in the compliance literature and mainly involve issues like 
service to taxpayers, mutual understanding and trust, cooperation and simplified tax laws. 
There are, however, several demographic and cultural features that contribute to tax 
compliance  issues  (Plumley,  1996;  Fischer  et  al.,  1992;  McGill,  1988).  This  section 
highlights the prominent instruments of coercion and persuasion that affect tax compliance. 
 
2.7.1 Tax Audit 
 
 
Tax audit has strong direct and indirect effects on tax compliance (Plumley, 1996; Andreoni 
et al., 1998; Alm et al., 1992a; Erard, 1997; Dubin et al., 1990). Beyond the few taxpayers on 
whom it is conducted, it has a general deterrent effect on all taxpayers, called “the ripple 
effect”,  and  an effect  in  succeeding  tax  years,  called  “the  subsequent  year  effect.” The 
question  is:  what  matters  in  tax  compliance  –  the  possibility  of  audit  or  the  book-tax 
difference 4  and  audit  adjustment? The extant  literature covers both  issues.  On the audit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Book-tax difference refers to the excess of book income of corporations over their taxable income reported in 
tax returns (Mills, 1998). 
40  
possibility  side,  it  is  argued  that  endogenous 5 audit  rates  have  stronger  effects  on  tax 
compliance  than  exogenous  audit  rates,  provided  that  the  threat  of  audit  action  is  real 
(Kamdar, 1997; Witte et al., 1987; Plumley, 1996).  On the other hand, the use of real tax 
audit data in determining the book-tax difference and audit adjustment is comparatively rare 
in tax compliance studies (Mills, 1998; Mills and Sansing, 2000; Mills and Newberry, 2001). 
Book-tax differences are used as a measure of the deficiency of financial statements in 
reporting income and liabilities (Gleason and Mills, 2002). Among large corporate taxpayers 
in the manufacturing sectors of the US, Mills (1998) finds a positive relationship between 
excess of book income over taxable income and proposed audit adjustment. Cloyd (1995) 
finds that audit probability increases when there is a higher book-tax difference, and as a 
result the success of defensive action against the IRS decreases. Desai and Dharmapala (2005) 
also  measure  tax  avoidance  by  inferring  the  gap  between  income  reported  in  financial 
statements submitted to the capital markets and taxable income shown in tax returns. 
 
The impact of tax audit also depends on how audit information is passed down to taxpayers – 
 
by tax agencies or by the peer groups, through official channels o r unofficially (Appelgren, 
 
2008; Alm et al., 1992b). On a similar yet different note, Andreoni et al. (1998) state that 
audit rates or audit probability are a function of reported income: the higher the income, the 
higher the audit rate or probability. When it comes to tax audit impact, there are both positive 
and negative outcomes. Beron et al. (1988) found a positive relationship between audit and 
tax compliance, although the deterrent effect was weak. Frey and Feld (2002), using cross- 
sectional time series data, found that penalty and audit based detection probability had an 
unexpected  positive  relationship  with  tax  evasions,  although  this  was  statistically  non- 
 
 
 
5 Audit rates are endogenous when audit decisions are made on the basis of past records and return information 
(Witte et al., 1987).  Audit rates become exogenous when audit decisions are made randomly, without any 
consideration of the tax return. 
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significant.  In  Torgler‟s  experimental  test  (2007),  audit  probability  does  not  have  a 
statistically  significant  impact,  and  the  penalty  rate  even  has  a  negative  impact  on  tax 
 
compliance. As a result of these opposing relationships between tax audit and tax compliance, 
ensuring taxpayer consultation and education gets profuse importance in the compliance 
generation process (DFID, 2009). 
 
2.7.2 Tax Penalty 
 
 
The fear that delinquencies will be dealt with through penal action puts the latter at the 
forefront of compliance action (Hoekema, 1986). As regards the impact of penalties on tax 
compliance, conflicting evidence has been found in the literature. Minor (1978), Tittle (1980) 
and Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), in their survey research, found that penalty had no impact 
on tax compliance; while Grasmick and Scott (1982) found it had a great effect. Friedland 
(1982), in experimental research, found that low and high penalties at a given probability of 
detection had approximately the same level of impact on tax compliance. However, Friedland 
et al. (1978) found that large fines with a low probability of detection had a greater impact on 
tax compliance than low fines with a high probability of detection. Friedland et al. (1978) 
confirm that penalties are more significant than frequent tax audits in detecting non- 
compliance. This is also supported by the finding of Jackson and Jones (1985) that the 
magnitude of penal sanctions has a comparatively stronger effect than increased probability 
of detection. Jackson and Jones (1985:12) argue that, “penalty plays a more important part in 
the tax evasion decision than the risk of detection when the risk is very small.” Jackson and 
Jones‟ findings in one way strengthen the proposition of Kahneman and Tversky‟s (1979) 
 
prospect theory, which states that subjects make their compliance decisions based on the 
magnitudes  of  potential  losses.  Finally,  experimental  research  with  real  taxpayers  by 
Schwartz and Orleans (1967)  illustrates that the threat of penal sanctions influences tax 
compliance  positively,  but  the  magnitude  of  the  influence  of  a  persuasive  appeal  is 
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comparatively high. Therefore, the coerciveness of penal action makes both positive and 
negative contributions to the achievement of tax compliance. 
 
2.7.3 Imprisonment 
 
Imprisoning taxpayers for failure to comply is the toughest deterrence that a tax authority can 
apply. The Run After Tax Evaders (RATE) program instigated by the Tax Administration of 
the Philippines in 2007 was one of the most successful of its kind in raising tax collection. 
Under this programme, tax collection increased by 43.6% compared to that of the previous 
year  (ADB,  2009).  The  reasons  attached  to  such  an  increase  in  tax  collection  are  the 
fierceness of imprisonment as a policy instrument and the fear it spreads among taxpayers. 
The possibility of being imprisoned for tax cheating makes the whole process of non- 
compliance highly risky and poorly yielding. Non-compliers are under serious pressure to 
change their  behaviours accordingly.  However,  the core goal of imprisonment  is not to 
punish or detain the taxpayers, but to ensure an increased flow of taxes to the exchequer, as 
the RATE program stated. Clearly, the two immediate objectives of imprisonment are to 
criminalize tax non-compliance and to increase voluntary compliance. It is argued that 
criminalizing non-compliance requires an adequate and efficient institutional infrastructure, 
along with the political will and motivation (ADB, 2009). 
 
In relation to the debate on severity versus probability of punishment, Klepper and Naggin 
(1989b) argue that it is always the frequency or the probability of detection that makes an 
impact, rather than the size of the penalty, because the size of the penalty is the same for all 
corporations, small or big. Looking at the experience of Ecuador, Aparicio et al. (2010) argue 
that weak institutional capacity weakens the credibility of imprisonment. So the first thing the 
Ecuadorian Government did was to increase its prison capacity. This action had a tangible 
impact on the hearts of the evaders. However, the outcome of imprisonment or its tangible 
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impact on evaders depends on how corrupt the tax administration is. In a corrupt tax 
administration, the severity of imprisonment further increases the opportunity for corruption 
because of the tax inspectors‟ increased capacity to solicit bribes. 
 
There is also evidence that criminal prosecution has no significant impact on recidivism in 
comparison with fines or other coercive actions. With reference to Weisburd et al. (2001), 
Levi (2009:14) argues that, “imprisonment had no significant effect on recidivism compared 
with  fines  or  probation”.  This  “no  difference”  finding  applies  irrespective  of  timing, 
frequency or type of recidivism.  Levi claims that if the criminal prosecution is pursued as a 
sporadic action, then the evaders rationalize evasions as non-serious and non-harmful action. 
Therefore criminal actions, once initiated, should be prosecuted in order to give a message 
that non-compliance is a serious offence and will not remain unprosecuted (Henry, 1978; 
Shover and Hochstetler, 2006). 
 
2.7.4 Simplified Tax Law 
 
 
Tax law simplification remains the tax authorities‟ “single greatest tool to encourage tax 
compliance” (OECD, 2006) that emerged from Adam Smith‟s canon of certainty and 
convenience  of  taxation.  Lymer  and  Oats  (2010:55)  state  that,  “Simplicity  was  not 
specifically mentioned as one of Adam Smith‟s canon of taxation, but…the idea of simplicity 
as a goal for tax and tax system design is linked to certainty and convenience.”   Smith 
 
(1776:415) in his book, The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, puts that, “The time of 
payment, manner of payment, quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the 
contributor, and to every person.” 
 
The importance of simplified tax laws makes this the central focus of the integration of the 
coercive and persuasive paradigms (Perry, 2007). But tax laws are not faultless, nor are their 
explanations always clear (Carnes and Cuccia, 1996). The grievance that tax law is complex 
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is a valid reason for taxpayers to be non-compliant. Many argue that reducing uncertainty and 
perfecting justice breeds much of the complexity and tax non-compliance (Slemrod, 1985). 
Measuring  tax  complexity  however  is  difficult,  as  it  involves  measuring  the  resources 
consumed by the tax agencies in collecting taxes, which include the value of taxpayers‟ time 
 
and money and all other hidden (e.g., psychological) and obvious costs (Slemrod, 1985). 
Three major factors in explaining tax law complexity are the misapplication of laws, 
aggressive tax planning and the complexities of commercial transactions (Adam et al., 2010; 
Krever, 2000; Bird and Jantscher, 1992). Adam et al. (2010) add that simplification may be 
impeded for three further reasons: technical, structural and compliance complexities. 
 
The drive for tax law simplification therefore, as Kaplow (1995) argues, is linked to the 
“compliance  costs,  and  enforcement  difficulties”  that  can  be  reduced  by  co-operation 
between taxpayers and governments (Schmolders, 1959). Simplification makes it easier for 
taxpayers to comply (Morris and Lonsdale, 2004) and enhances the relationship between 
taxpayers and tax agencies (Brondolo, 2009).  The simplification mechanism is explained in 
the following  New Zealand  Tax Compliance  model,  which demonstrates that taxpayers‟ 
 
attitudes to compliance are of four kinds, starting with “very willing to comply” and ending 
with “decided not to comply”(see Figure 2.3 below). 
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Figure 2.3:  Components of the compliance model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Morris and Lonsdale, 2004 
 
 
The above Figure 2.3 shows that with taxpayers who are willing compliers, simplified tax law 
is the best way to achieve compliance. Deterrence measures are needed when the taxpayers 
are unwilling to comply. According to Short (1997), 56% of the tax audit cases of large 
corporations in the US are appealed in the higher courts for tax law complexity. In Tanzania, 
for example, many large corporations have litigated against the tax system for lack of 
simplicity and constructive dialogue with the tax administration (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008). 
However, there is a potential danger in simplifying tax law: marginal taxpayers may go out of 
the tax base and the tax burden, as a result, may fall more on large corporations (Fjeldstad 
and Moore, 2008). Also, for some corporations, simplification may be an uneconomic option 
because in a complex tax regime corporations can pass a higher percentage of their tax 
burden on to customers than in a simplified tax regime (Kireeva and Rudy, 2008). 
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2.7.5 Taxpayer Service 
 
 
Taxpayer service is one of the leading instruments for tax compliance, although it is difficult 
to prove in many cases (LeBaube and Vehorn, 1992). In general, taxpayer service refers to 
extending outreach and tax education activities, for example hosting tax fairs (Durand and 
Thorp, 1998), and to improving response time and communication facilities with the purpose 
of reducing compliance costs (Delta and Matsuura, 2008). In the case of large corporations, 
taxpayer service, to a large extent, refers to the interpretation of complex tax laws and the 
refund of taxpayers‟ money (Brondolo  et  al., 2008). Taxpayer service for US taxpayers 
means a decrease in dependence on walk-in service centres and an increase in reliance on 
telephone and internet services (US Congress, 2005). In the IRS most transactions with the 
large corporations are done through e-service (Powner and White, 2005). E-provided 
information on the tax administration‟s website increases the credibility of taxpayer service 
 
and the satisfaction that services have resulted in time and resource savings (Soukhovtseva, 
 
2006). 
 
 
 
A survey conducted among taxpayers in South Africa reports that the demand for a service 
helpdesk is higher than that for tax law simplification or other motivational things (Abrie and 
Doussy, 2006). Bird (2004:141) states that, “adequate service in the form of information, 
pamphlets, forms, advice agencies, payment facilities, telephone and electronic filing, and so 
on must be provided to taxpayers to facilitate and make as easy as possible taxpayer 
compliance with the system.” Similarly, Barbone et al. (1999) propose that in evaluating the 
performance of revenue administration, delivery of taxpayer service is the most significant 
factor. Taxpayer service delivery can be judged in terms of service quality, called 
effectiveness, and in terms of the unit cost of service provision, called efficiency. 
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However, Bird (2004) reminds us that creating a positive image of tax officials is more 
important than the mere provision of taxpayer services. Prichard (2010) notes that taxpayer 
outreach services have not only contributed to high revenues, but also changed the arbitrary 
behaviour and negative image of tax officials. In the same vein, Fjeldstad (2004: 555) points 
out that,  “the trustworthiness of the revenue enforcement  mechanisms and  the penalties 
imposed on defaulters affect citizens‟ compliance behaviour.”  On this point, Sparrow (1994) 
 
argues that in most cases service delivery by the tax administration is not different from 
fulfilment by the latter of its obligations. Unless service delivery goes beyond fulfilment of 
obligations, it is unlikely that the attitudes of taxpayers will improve and taxpayer service 
will bring a major change in compliance levels (Snavely, 1990). 
 
2.7.6 Mutual Understanding 
 
 
In the tax compliance literature, mutual understanding refers to the expectation that all related 
parties will behave themselves according to the tax laws. The purpose of developing 
understanding is to promote the level of trust between parties and lessen the need for tax 
policing (Sparrow, 1994; Murphy, 2002; Braithwaite, 1998). The underlying philosophy of 
mutual understanding is not to hit taxpayers for any of their innocent mistakes and to address 
non-compliance through non-traditional approaches. This requires, as Alink and Kommer 
(2011:275) state, “better understanding of, and addressing the expectations of, large taxpayers, 
including commercial awareness, impartiality, openness and dialogue, consistency and 
certainty and early settlement and speedy resolution of issues.”  If there is good conduct 
between the parties, trust and transparency will grow between them and compliance costs will 
be minimal (Kucher and Goette, 1998). Viewed from these perspectives, transparency, trust 
and mutual understanding are reciprocal in the tax administration-taxpayer relationship. The 
main argument of the Australian Tax Office compliance models for working with large 
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corporations is to enhance mutual understanding and taxpayer-tax administration cooperation 
 
(Donnelly and Heneghan, 2010; ATO, 2007). 
 
 
 
The OECD (2009:108) points out that mutual understanding and cooperation between large 
corporate taxpayers and their tax authority is needed “to discuss areas of mutual concern and 
improve  tax  compliance.”  The  Large  Business  Office  of  HM  Revenue  and  Customs 
acknowledges understanding business as one of the leading issues, along with “ringmastering” 
and “sectorisation” in the case of tax compliance by large corporations (Tuck, 2004). Kirchler 
(2007:49)  proposes  that,  “the  similarity  of  views  is  related  to  the  parties‟  mutual 
 
understanding of each other and the law, leading to the willingness to cooperate.” In the same 
vein, Brem and Tucha (2007) mention that the success of advance pricing arrangements on 
transfer pricing depends to a large degree on the extent to which the parties have some 
common understanding of the problem. 
 
The concept of mutual understanding, by and large, is based on the horizontal monitoring 
model developed by the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (CIAT, 2009; 
Burgemeestre et al., 2009; Murphy, 2002).  Mutual understanding and control, however, are 
not mutually exclusive, in the sense that control can be achieved through coordination, 
transparency and relationship-building. Scholz and Lubell (1998) tested the specific link 
between trust – the basis of mutual understanding–and its impact on tax compliance. They 
point out that trust in tax administrations and in government systems significantly influences 
tax compliance levels. This is because inconsistencies in compliance behaviours are often the 
outcome of a lack of confidence and limited understanding of tax issues (Elffers et al., 2006). 
The LTU compliance models, as a result, have focused on the need for understanding each 
other‟s business and operational mechanisms as an essential step to boosting tax compliance 
 
(HMRC, 2006; ATO, 2007; OECD, 2009; Deloitte, 2005). 
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2.8. Who are the Large Corporate Taxpayers? 
 
 
This research is aimed at examining the role of coercive and persuasive tax instruments 
among the large corporate taxpayers dealt with by LTUs. This necessitates a clear 
understanding of who the large corporate taxpayers are, and how their tax compliance is 
managed in the LTUs. 
 
In general terms, big taxpaying corporate entities are treated as large corporate taxpayers. 
Watts (1978: 22) comments that, “defining a large industrial enterprise is beset with problems. 
Size, for example, can be measured in several ways – number of staff employed, net assets 
(capital employed), value added (net output), turnover, issued capital and market 
capitalization.”   Using tax payments as a basis for identifying large corporate taxpayers is 
risky. Corporations may successfully underreport income to remain outside LTUs; or use tax 
holidays to end up with zero tax liability. This leads Baer et al. (2002:14) to suggest that, 
“taxpayers who regularly underreport or underpay tax, large firms who enjoy a tax holida y 
and large exporters with significant amounts of refunds” should be excluded from LTUs.” 
 
The OECD (2009:6) states that, “the definition of large business or large taxpayer differs 
from one tax administration to another” as “the identification criteria for large businesses 
vary from country to country.” The most frequently used criteria, according to the OECD 
(2009:7) are: “gross business turnover or sales; value of assets; amount of taxes paid; 
businesses belonging to certain industrial categories (banks, petroleum etc.); volume of 
international trade; and number of employees.”  For Joulfaian (1999) the simple measure for 
firm size is revenue receipts. 
 
However, the development of trade and commerce and the shifting state of tax revenues have 
generated a set of criteria that guide the definition of corporate taxpayers as large. These are 
net worth, i.e. owners‟ claim on the business; number of foreign affiliates; weighted average 
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of all taxes – income tax, employment tax and VAT. The problem that still remains is that a 
corporate taxpayer may not remain large forever. In its life cycle, it may drop down to a 
medium or small taxpayer due to changes in business activities or changes in the set of 
defining criteria. Hamilton (1994:6) mentions that, “large taxpayers are not simply a large 
version of small taxpayers and large taxpayers continually evolve.”  Watts (1978) identifies 
six characteristics by which large corporate taxpayers can be distinguished from small and 
medium businesses in the non-corporate sector: separation of ownership and control; formal 
organizational structure; special influence on the national economy; multi-national exposure; 
varied outputs; and control from overseas. 
 
2.8.1 Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) and Large Corporate Taxpayers 
 
 
The concept of a Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) is comparatively new in the field of tax 
administration.  In general, an LTU is a self-contained tax administration office, parallel to or 
embedded in the tax system, which provides one-stop services to settle the tax liabilities of 
the  largest  taxpayers.  The  broad  consensus  among  researchers  and  academics  on  the 
definition of an LTU is that it deals only with the largest taxpayers. In Perry‟s (2004:382) 
 
view, large taxpayer units are “designed to provide full management of a small percentage of 
the biggest taxpayers in the country …a subset of taxpayer-segment-based organizational 
structure.” Some researchers view LTUs as a nucleus for tax administration reform. Their 
existence brings a complete change in the tax administration and opens up new windows for 
modernization. McCarten (2004: 2) describes an LTU as “a potential Trojan horse for reform 
in tax administration … an institutional reform substitute for a semi- autonomous revenue 
agency” and as a public sector analytical tool to manage public revenues. In the changing 
regulatory environment, LTUs are a glaring example of how power-based techniques can be 
supplanted by soft approaches that reduce the cost of compliance and increase compliance 
(Tuck, 2004). 
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The concept of the LTU was generated in Argentina in the late 1970s (McCarten, 2003). In 
their early stages, LTUs used to audit high turnover corporations to increase reporting 
compliance. At the beginning of the 1980s, the concept of the LTU was adopted in Bolivia 
and Peru, with the sole aim of increasing filing compliance. Later, in the early 1990s, 
Argentina introduced accounting software to monitor both filing and payment compliance. 
Vazquez-Caro (1994) emphasizes two issues in the spread of the LTU in Latin America: 
close monitoring of those taxpayers with the highest revenue concentrations; and a shift of 
assessment  and  collection  responsibilities  from  the  public  to  the  private  sector.  LTU 
expansion got its momentum in the early 1990s, under IMF patronage. McCart en (2003:18) 
states that, “with the encouragement of the IMF and some bilateral donors it spread to several 
smaller African countries in the early 1990s, to transitional economies in the mid-1990s, 
starting with Hungary, and finally to South and East Asia in the first decade of the 21st 
 
century.” By 2002, 50 countries, and by 2006, 67 countries, had established LTUs as 
independent units or as a special wing within semi-autonomous tax administrations (Baer et 
al., 2002; CATA, 2006). Table 2.2 below shows that in the 1980s there were only five LTUs, 
but in the 1990s this increased to 42, concentrated mainly in Africa and in Latin America. 
During the same period, central European countries established the highest number of LTUs, 
and Australia and New Zealand started their LTU operations. 
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Regions Year of Inception 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2010s 
 
Table 2.2 Global expansion of large corporate taxpayer units 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin America 1 2 9 - 
Africa - - 12 3 
Central Europe - 2 7 - 
North America 1  1  
Baltic & CIS - - 7 1 
Asia-Pacific - 1 4 7 
Middle East 
Others 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2 (Aus, NZ) 
5 
1(Trinidad  & Tobago) 
 Total (67)  2  5  42  18   
 
Source: Baer et al. (2002) & CATA (2006) 
 
 
 
One of the reasons LTUs came into being was immense socio-political pressure for increased 
tax compliance by the most affluent taxpayers (Hamilton, 1994; Brautigam, 2008). Brondolo 
(2009: 15) argues that large corporations need top priority from tax agencies because “a 
decline in compliance by just a few large taxpayers can lead to large amounts of foregone 
revenue.” Large or wealthy taxpayers not only provide the resources to develop state capacity 
but also have a strong influence in moulding the representational and accountability issues of 
governance. Moore‟s (2004:302) comment is worth noting: 
 
 
Members of these three intersecting groups (bondholders, large taxpayers, and 
legislators) will be well informed about fiscal issues; high levels of trust might exist 
between them and the state apparatus; and (absent major conflicts within the political- 
cum-economic elite) the right atmosphere is created for positive-sum decisions that 
strengthen the state, benefit the elite, and enhance the accountability of the state to the 
propertied elite over fiscal and policy issues. 
 
In many developing countries LTUs are set up as an enclave tax administration unit, and later 
rolled out across the entire tax administration. This renovates existing tax policies and 
taxation, spearheads the unification of VAT and income tax, and introduces modern auditing, 
electronic filing and the functional organization of work. In broadening the base of self- 
assessment  and  withholding  taxes,  LTUs  play  a  pioneering  role.  A  review  of  revenue 
collection in selected OECD countries (see Table 2.3) shows that LTU corporate taxpayers‟ 
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Country Tax collected 
(Figures in billion 
Euros) 
Percentage 
of tax 
collected 
Taxes administered 
 
share of corporate income tax revenues ranges from a minimum of 16% (Norway) to a 
maximum of 90% (the US). 
 
Table 2.3: Tax collection by large taxpayer units in OECD countries for 2006-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia €29.3 64.5% corporate income tax (CIT) 
Canada €12.9 53% CIT 
France €118 33% CIT &Business local tax, VAT, Local Tax 
Ireland €18.8 41.3% CIT, VAT, Employment tax, Excise, Customs, 
 
Netherlands 
 
€80 
 
60% 
Vehicle registration tax, Stamp duties 
CIT, VAT, Employment withholding tax 
Norway €1.25 16% CIT 
UK €160.8 70% CIT, VAT, Employment tax, Petroleum tax 
US €228.4 90% CIT 
 
Source: OECD, 2009 
 
 
 
The US Large Business Unit collected 228.4 billion euros of corporate income tax in the tax 
year 2006-2007, which equals 14.6% of national tax revenues. Australia collects 64.5% of 
corporate income taxes from LTUs and Canada 53%. In some countries, for instance the UK 
and France, LTUs collect more than one tax, including income tax, VAT, customs, excise and 
employment taxes. Seventy per cent of the aforementioned taxes in the UK and 60% in the 
Netherlands are provided by LTUs. As specialised tax administration units, LTUs stand out 
because of their sophisticated record keeping and risk management strategies. Almost all 
LTUs have computerized data management and information systems, even in developing 
countries. LTUs have a comparatively efficient and less corrupt workforce, and their 
organization follows a functional design. In particular, their collection efforts through 
intensive monitoring of filing, and their collection of arrears, make LTUs an essential organ 
of tax administration (Bodin, 2003; Santos, 1994). 
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2.8.2  Challenges and Benefits of Managing Large Corporate Tax 
 
Compliance 
 
This research will be conducted in the context of developing countries‟ tax administration, 
whose common features are: a small revenue base, low tax compliance, high collection costs 
and  a  huge   informal  sector  (Joshi  and  Ayee,  2008).  In  developing  countries,   tax 
administrations suffer from serious problems of poor record-keeping, inefficiency and 
bureaucratically designed corporate governance systems. Moore‟s (2008: 41) findings on 
developing  countries‟ tax  administrations  are  that,  “the  taxable  units  are  small,  so  the 
 
overhead cost of collection tends to be high ... the dearth of records of economic transactions 
and the limited use of banking systems encourage face-to-face interaction between taxpayer 
and tax assessor/tax collector, and oblige the latter to make discretionary decision about tax 
liabilities that can easily be independently validated.” 
 
In addressing the above issues, the assessment, collection and enforcement of the taxes of 
large corporate taxpayers in LTUs have been separated through the functional distribution of 
the work. In most cases, enforcement actions towards large corporate taxpayers are weak 
compared  to  the other  functions.  For  instance,  the  Uganda  Large  Taxpayer  Department 
(LTD), established as a special wing within the SARA, failed to achieve its monitoring and 
enforcement goals after an initial success, like other sub-Saharan revenue authorities (DFID, 
2001; Kangave, 2005). In evaluating the performance of the Ugandan LTD, the DFID 
(2001:34) states that, “it is still too soon to judge the impact on revenue of t he Large Tax- 
payer Department in Uganda, but so far this appears to have been limited.” It is argued that 
the explicit focus on large corporations may have an adverse effect on small taxpayers and 
weaken the LTUs‟ capacity to raise tax compliance in a socially cohesive manner (Terkper, 
 
2003; Phillips, 2008).  Phillips (2008: 129) reiterates that, “state-building … is undermined 
when  developing  country  governments  depend  on  narrow  tax  base  and  coercive  tax 
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collection … dominant  enterprises may use political influence to secure tax exemptions. 
Micro and small firms can go into informality.” 
 
In addition to the above, large corporate taxpayers‟ view of tax law complicates the 
compliance issues further. McBarnet (1992) argues that the tendency of large taxpayers is to 
 
follow tax law by its intention, not by letter of the law. Large taxpayers actively try to 
transform the law into routes of tax avoidance, or finally break the law in such a way that 
they are not  caught  (Braithwaite and  Wirth, 2001) with the help of  hired expertise and 
political contacts (Brondolo, 2009; Phillips, 2008). Braithwaite and Wirth (2001) point out 
that managing large corporate tax compliance is more daunting than managing that of 
individual taxpayers because of the differences in their compliance patterns. The individual 
tax compliance pattern (see Figure 2.4) is pyramidal, with most of the taxpayers lying at the 
bottom,  whereas  the  large  corporate  tax  compliance  pattern  is  oval,  with  most  of  the 
taxpayers in the grey area in the middle. What is needed, according to Braithwaite and Wirth 
(2001), is for tax compliance strategy to push the middle group towards the bottom to make 
the compliance pattern pyramidal and to deal with their compliance by self-regulation instead 
of command and enforcement. 
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Figure 2.4: Patterns of individual (left) and corporate (right) tax compliance 
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Source: Braithwaite and Wirth, 2001 
 
 
A further challenge for corporate tax compliance management is a continued lack of 
professionalism, widespread corruption and political intervention. Many large taxpayers 
successfully hide income by setting up “shell” offshore corporations or having a partnership 
with their parent corporation instead of a subsidiary relationship (Easter, 2008), or enjoying 
tax holidays through undue political intervention (McCarten, 2004). According to the OECD 
(2009), some of the major compliance issues faced with respect to the tax compliance of large 
corporations are: parent-subsidiary and related-party cross-border transactions (e.g. transfer 
pricing); tax havens and  offshore entities transactions; claims  for  foreign tax credit  and 
captive insurance; entity misclassification and distortion of market valuations; differential 
accounting practices for parent and subsidiary corporations; inter-corporation financing 
arrangements and thin capitalization; and tax avoidance through foreign currency option 
accounts,  complex  arbitrage  pricing  and  valuation  of  derivatives.  A  survey  of  US 
corporations shows that nearly all large corporations and more than half of medium sized 
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corporations have been offered safe transfer of money by tax shelter promoters (Slemrod, 
 
2004). 
 
 
 
The good side of managing large corporations is that, due to the requirement of high-quality 
financial and accounting standards by the local and international accounting bodies, large 
corporations have to fulfil strong reporting and compliance requirements with respect to their 
investment and international trade (Kieso et al., 2011:6). These control requirements ensure 
access to the transaction records needed to make the auditing process transparent. Large 
corporate taxpayers are particularly helpful in collecting taxes from other taxpayers under the 
withholding tax arrangement. Their role in increasing FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and 
employment in developing countries is also acknowledged. 
 
 
2.9 Large Corporate Tax Compliance Models: Are They Coercive 
or Persuasive? 
 
The tax compliance philosophy as a whole assumes that taxpayers are not homogeneous in 
their  risk  and  revenue  characteristics.  Each  group of taxpayers  poses  different  risk  and 
revenue potentialities to the tax base, and therefore requires a different set of compliance 
tools to address them. The ultimate objective of these strategic tools is to increase the level o f 
self-assessed voluntary compliance. 6 The leading compliance models employed to induce 
large corporate tax compliance are examined below. 
 
2.9.1 Co-operative Compliance Model (CCM) 
 
This compliance model is an innovation by the Australian Tax Office (ATO).   The unique 
feature of the model is that it can be tailored according to the risk and revenue characteristics 
 
 
 
6Under a self-assessment compliance scheme, the taxpayer-tax authority relationship is fundamentally based on 
mutual trust and cooperation, where a taxpayer functions as his/her own assessor. But under an administrative 
assessment scheme, the tax authorities assess all returns, irrespective of their revenue and risk characteristics. 
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of the taxpayer (Braithwaite, 2007). To control compliance, the CCM encourages self- 
regulation through consultation and taxpayer services on the one side and audit and 
prosecution on the other (Brondolo, 2009). The idea that this model restricts the capacity of 
tax agencies to examine tax compliance through coercive actions is therefore not correct. In 
practice, audits are conducted on a random basis and prosecutions are used as a last resort. 
The basic philosophy of this compliance approach is to prioritize community cooperation and 
confidence-building. In developing this approach, the major categories into which taxpayers 
are classified, as Morris and Lonsdale (2004) present them are: 
 
a)  Commitment: Willing to do the right thing 
 
These are taxpayers who: are prepared, eager, and able to comply; are dedicated to achieving 
their obligations; have accepted that they have a responsibility and are ethically obliged to 
comply; and control their own compliance. 
 
b)  Capture: Try to, but don’t always succeed 
 
This group represents those who do not aggressively oppose tax payment but sometimes need 
assistance to fulfil their obligations due to lack of skills. They make mistakes unintentionally 
and acknowledge them. 
 
c)  Resistance: Don’t want to comply 
 
This group includes those clients who aggressively resist the self-regulatory system and 
attempt to avoid their compliance obligations. They believe that tax agencies are actively 
trying to police taxpayers rather than help them. 
 
d)  Disengagement: Have decided not to comply 
 
This group represents those clients who  are committed not to participate in the taxation 
system. They do not care that they are not fulfilling their tax obligations and will never 
attempt to change their decisions. 
 
e)  Game Players 
 
This group represents taxpayers who accept the challenge of outsmarting the tax agencies and 
do not essentially think they are non-compliant. They often believe that they are honouring 
their social obligation and operating within the bounds of the law. 
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The compliance pyramid presented below (see Figure 2.5) shows that the huge majority of 
taxpayers are managed at the bottom by motivational procedures, and the non-compliant at 
the top are managed by coercive procedures. 
 
Figure 2.5: Regulatory practice of ATO cooperative compliance model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Braithwaite, 2003 
 
 
 
The  main  driver  of  this  model  is  the  committed  professional  relationship  between  tax 
agencies and large corporations that reduces compliance costs, increases voluntary 
compliance, and improves the clarity of the law. Seven principles underlie the functioning of 
the model: understanding taxpayers; building partnerships; increasing flexibility and 
responsiveness towards taxpayers; reviewing tax law; liaising with the judiciary; responding 
to global business situations; and escalating enforcement when necessary. To organize the 
compliance model these principles again encompass five processes, i.e. understanding 
business; assessing risks; planning strategies; implementing strategies; and reviewing and 
improving compliance performance. 
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2.9.2 Horizontal Monitoring Approach and Compliance Covenants 
 
 
Developed by the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA), this compliance 
model focuses on corrective measures to improve large taxpayer compliance and assumes 
that risk-based approaches do not solve all compliance problems. Based on findings about 
risk-based approaches, changing social norms and values, and the behaviour of taxpayers, the 
following have been quoted as the essentials of the horizontal monitoring approach (CIAT, 
2009: 2): mutual trust; understanding and transparency; shared responsibility; real-time 
working; advance ruling; cooperation with other authorities; and focus on outcome rather 
than output. 
 
In effecting its changes, this approach replaces the traditional vertical approaches of 
compliance monitoring. It decides which compliance instruments are to be used to change 
particular compliance behaviour. It emphasizes pro-active rules and taxpayer services instead 
of audits and investigations. The pro-active tools attempt to avert non-compliance before it 
happens to bring long-term improvements in tax compliance. The approach is successful 
where taxpayers have been persistently failing to comply because of a lack of knowledge of 
tax laws, enhanced communication or quality taxpayer services. But in some cases the 
approach  demonstrates  the  need  for  audit  measures  to  increase  awareness  among  the 
taxpayers. 
 
During compliance supervision, this approach proceeds thematically through tax and non-tax 
issues. For example, during the measurement of tax risks in the labour market, issues of 
illegal labour, including human trafficking, are studied in order to underst and the problem 
comprehensively. In the supervision mechanism for tax compliance, the roles and 
responsibilities of all partners are well-defined, and issues of transparency, equality, and 
mutual trust are acknowledged. The most significant aspect of this approach is mutual trust, 
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which is embedded in the compliance framework through the Internal Control Framework 
 
(ICF). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The Onion Model of the Horizontal Monitoring Approach 
 
 
Source: CIAT, 2009 
 
 
The ICF influences the business process by placing tax assurance and tax audit strategies at 
the top of the model, as shown in Figure 2.6. The internal control statement is prepared in 
response to the corporate governance codes and laws that large corporations have to comply 
with. The ICF designed by businesses organizations must ensure that tax liabilities and their 
timing are properly reflected in the Tax Control Framework (TCF). According to the NTCA 
(2008:4), the term TCF refers to, “an internal control instrument that focuses especially on 
business‟s tax processes.” The ICF and the TCF are both products tailored for their own use 
by business organizations and subject to change based on business needs and characteristics. 
The tax administration‟s job is to check whether or not the design and operation of the model 
is effective (Bette, N.D).  This approach is called the onion approach, since all the layers of 
control surrounding the business processes are stripped away first and then the work is done 
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by third parties – for example, an external accountant and tax auditor and an internal auditor. 
 
The tax department‟s role is to judge whether an organization has developed sufficient tax 
expertise to be capable of maintaining an adequate standard of work (CIAT, 2009). 
 
 
As shown above, mutual trust lies at the centre of this compliance approach, and is nurtured 
through transparency and understanding between large corporations and tax agencies. For the 
most part, the role of the tax agencies is corrective, motivational and persuasive in the 
actualization of higher tax compliance. 
 
2.9.3 Real Time Compliance Approaches 
 
 
In terms of genre, this approach belongs to the cooperative compliance model. The essence of 
this approach is to address a compliance problem before it arises and resolve it immediately. 
The approach is different from others in that it does not depend on post -facto analysis of risk. 
Some of the methods and programmes commonly in use are as follows. 
 
2.9.3.1 Forward Compliance Agreement (FCA) 
 
 
This model was developed by the Australian Tax Office to offer early resolution of 
compliance issues. It allows taxpayers to discuss return-filing and tax payment issues easily, 
in order to avoid penalties and interest. The method is expensive and time-consuming, and 
has recently been replaced with the Annual Compliance Agreement (ACA). The only 
difference between the FCA and the ACA is the requirement to conduct discussions annually, 
with the opportunity to hold open dialogues throughout the year. Through discussion and 
continuous disclosure, the ATO makes a list of the potential risk areas for tax compliance and 
draws up a plan to be addressed throughout the year to minimize those risks and gear up 
compliance. 
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2.9.3.2 Advance Ruling 
 
 
Slightly different from the above, this approach interprets tax laws, and their revenue and 
non-compliance implications, for specific business transactions by large corporations, usually 
cross-border transactions. The major objective of this approach is to cut the high cost of 
forward compliance agreements and at the same time solve real compliance issues. For 
example, in order to handle potential compliance risks in transfer pricing, the tax agency may 
define  the  pricing  methodology  in  consultation  with  the  concerned  parties  through  an 
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) (Arnold and Mclntyre, 2002). The rulings frame the 
transaction procedure to be followed under certain terms and conditions for a certain period, 
failing which sanctions and penalties will be attracted. 
 
Agreed documentation created under the ruling allows taxpayers to avoid penalties, provided 
the  transfer  pricing  documentation  is  correct.  There  are  however,  variations  in  the 
arrangement and use of this method across countries. In France, the taxpayer submits a 
transfer pricing agreement for the approval of the tax administration that has been prepared 
on the basis of pre-set questionnaire designed by the tax authority. This brings greater 
certainty in dealing with compliance risks related to transfer pricing arrangements. In the 
Netherlands, the tax agency approves the pricing agreements taking into consideration how 
well the tax control framework (TCF) has been followed in conducting business transactions. 
In  some  cases,  for  example  the  Compliance  Assurance  Program  (CAP)  in  the  US,  an 
interview is arranged prior to return filing to identify the risks. In Australia, APAs are found 
to be more effective than audit investigations in plugging revenue leakages from transfer 
pricing arrangements (Braithwaite and Wirth, 2001). 
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2.9.3.3 Customer Relations Manager 
 
 
The UK version of a real-time arrangement involves a customer relations manager. In this 
arrangement a tax official, supposedly a specialist, is assigned to manage the compliance 
issues of one or several corporations. Usually, the tax agency expert and the corporation(s) 
jointly review the compliance risk and make a plan to address it. A risk summary framework 
concerned with business systems, processes, transactions and behaviours is prepared for 
monitoring purposes. In the customer service approach, the HMRC builds a quasi-partnership 
relationship with large corporations to avoid confrontations and power-based regulatory 
relationships  (Clarke  et  al.,  2007).  The  customer  discourse,  however,  may  not  be  well 
received by large corporations. The tax director of a UK large corporation had this to say 
about resisting the customer-service provider relationship (Tuck, 2004: 12):  “I just struggle 
to understand the product they are giving to me as a taxpayer.... I‟m quite happy for them to 
 
be [HMRC] and collect the tax and I respect that and understand that and that‟s their job and I 
 
want them to do it properly. They don‟t have to pretend I‟m a customer.” 
 
 
2.9.4 How Effective Are the CCM and Other LTU Compliance Approaches? 
 
 
A concern at this point in the study is how well large corporate compliance models are 
working on the ground. To start with the CCM model, as Shover et al. (2003) argue, despite 
the ATO providing sufficient resources to implement the model, there was huge ambivalence 
among field-level tax officials about its long-term effect on tax compliance.  Moreover, the 
model was introduced at a time when there were other changes in the tax agencies, which 
made it difficult to isolate its impact on large corporate tax compliance. In order to improve 
large corporate tax compliance, Shover et al. (2003) suggest that a supportive legal and 
regulatory framework is essential. Shover et al. (2003) particularly state that the effectiveness 
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of any tax policy or approach depends on the degree of bureaucratic influence and on the 
flexibility of the tax administrative framework. 
Poor payment compliance by large Australian corporations gives some evidence of the 
model‟s shortcomings. Sixty percent of large corporations in Australia were found to be 
underpaying taxes in the 1990s and their compliance seemed to be below the OECD average 
 
(Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001). A recent ATO report shows that almost half of the 1100 
largest corporations, of which 20% made a profit, did not pay any taxes between the tax years 
2005 and 2008.  In terms of taxes not paid by large corporations, the ATO levied $2.1 billion 
in 2009, $3.3 billion in 2008 and $2.5 billion in 2007 through its tax audits actions – about a 
third of which were made up of penalty payments (ATO report, 2009). 
 
Not only the ATO, but also members of the Australian large taxpayer community, have 
criticized this compliance model for its poor responsiveness and lack of consistency in 
providing private rulings and informal advice to the taxpayers (Shover et al., 2003). On the 
other  hand,  small  and  medium  taxpayers  criticise  the  model  as  specially  designed  to 
safeguard the interests of large corporations. These resentments by taxpayers, and the evasive 
tax culture among large corporations, call into question the contribution of cooperatio n and 
gentle persuasion to improving tax compliance (CATA, 2006). 
 
There is concern not only about the ATO model, but also about the large corporate tax 
compliance approaches of the UK and US. It is reported that of the 700 largest business 
taxpayers with the Large Business Service (LBS) of the HMRC, 181 did not pay any taxes in 
the tax year 2005-2006 (House of Commons, UK, 2008). The report states that, “businesses 
pay little or no corporation tax because, for example, they have made a loss, or had losses i n 
previous years, or they are using tax reliefs, or engaging in tax avoidance (ibid: 1).”  It is also 
reported that UK multinational corporations largely avoid and underpay their taxes. In 2007, 
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the LBS estimated a tax evasion of £8.5 billion by large businesses and successfully detected 
 
£2.7 billion of false claims for capital allowances and tax relief. To deal with tax evasion, the 
LBS has found it necessary to introduce a new penalty regime and extensive investigations 
into high-risk corporations. Under the new penalty regime, not only negligence or detected 
fraud,  but  also  any  attempt  at  non-compliance,  will  be  penalised.  This  reflects  the 
significance of coercive measures rather than persuasion in managing tax evasion by large 
corporate taxpayers. 
 
A similar situation was found among large multinational corporations in the US (ICFTU, 
 
2004). Records show that one third of the 275 largest multinationals in the US did not pay 
any taxes from 2001 to 2003. In 2003, 46 of these corporations paid no taxes or were entitled 
to a refund, despite the fact that they disclosed profits of US$ 42.6 billion. Other 
multinationals paid taxes at a falling effective tax rate during the period mentioned. The 
ICFTU found that large multinationals paid an effective federal tax rate of 26.5%, in 2001 
and 21.4% in 2003. 
 
2.10 Large Corporate Tax Compliance Process 
 
 
The  administrative  and  legislative  procedure  of  an  organisation  plays  a  pivotal  role  in 
creating tax compliance (Pashev, 2005). For large corporate taxpayers in LTUs, this fact 
applies even more strongly. The purpose of this section is to identify the large corporate 
compliance process and focus on how this may be relevant to understanding compliance 
issues further. By tax compliance procedure we mean the process and syst em designed to 
control the activities of taxpayers. 
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2.10.1 Return Submission and Tax Payment 
 
 
A simple and convenient system of filing and paying tax is one of the main objectives of 
large  corporate  tax  compliance  models  (Shome,  2004).  The  filing  and  tax  payment 
procedures for large corporate taxpayers in most developed countries are electronic, which 
allows them to submit their returns online and save time and money. Electronic filing ensures 
accurate records of return submissions and prompt appraisal of taxpayers‟ liability.  Returns 
 
and taxes in most countries are submitted directly to an LTU. In some countries, however – 
for example, Latvia, Uganda and El Salvador – returns are first submitted to designated 
commercial  banks  and  then  the  banks  send  the  returns  to  an  LTU.  Banks‟ role  as  an 
intermediary may slow down the compliance process, because large corporations may not get 
priority over the banks‟ other customers. Moreover, there is a delay whilst information is 
passed from the banks to the tax office. Evidence shows that the filing rate is higher when 
 
returns are directly submitted to LTUs rather than to banks. Baer et al. (2002) find that El 
Salvador and Honduras, where returns are filed through banking channels, experience a 
significant amount of filing non-compliance. 
 
Returns in most LTUs can be submitted online or in paper form. This complicates the filing 
procedure and adds to compliance costs. Some countries, for example Kenya, have a 
centralized  return  filing  procedure,  which  helps  effective  monitoring  of  large  corporate 
compliance.  As regards tax payment, taxes are directly debited from the corporations‟ bank 
 
accounts, while in developing countries most large taxpayers pay their taxes through banks. 
To expedite tax payments and to collect unpaid tax arrears, a major concern in large corporate 
tax compliance (Baer et al., 2002), the IMF recommends streamlining filing and payment 
compliance by electronic filing and automated debit card payment. 
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2.10.2 Audit Operations 
 
 
The heavy concentration of tax revenues among large corporate taxpayers requires that tax 
audit is robust and regular. This is all the more the case given the ability of large taxpayers to 
siphon off domestic resources by shifting profits abroad so as not to pay any tax on them. The 
OECD  (2009)  proposes  that  a  standard  auditing  body  should  have  a  three-level  audit 
operation. The first level lies with local offices, which conduct verification and issue-oriented 
audits. At the second level, tougher, in-depth, comprehensive audits are conducted by more 
expert auditors. At the third level, audit planning and monitoring issues are dealt with. LTUs 
in most countries have audit operations combining these three tiers: issue-based, desk-based, 
and comprehensive audits. Baer et al. (2002) find that in most countries, LTUs have 
specialized audit operations suited to the industrial clients they deal with. In many countries 
large taxpayers have more sophisticated tools for accounting and internal auditing systems 
than the tax agencies. To make the audit process effective, LTUs need more efficient staff 
with expert knowledge of auditing, international trade and accounting. 
 
2.10.3 Enforcement and Collection Activities 
 
 
The necessity for enforcement activities in relation to large taxpayers arises mainly from the 
need to ensure timely collection of taxes and prevent arrears. Easter (2008) states that a 
strong indication of non-compliance is tax arrears. Easter finds that tax arrears from large 
industrial enterprises in Poland in 1998 totalled three per cent of GDP and in Russia five per 
cent. In order to deal with arrears, an important function of the enforcement wing of LTUs is 
to take punitive measures against delinquent taxpayers. According to the IMF (cited in Baer 
et al., 2002), the following facilities should exist within an LTU to streamline delinquent 
taxpayers. 
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• Regular  and  visible procedures to  determine payment  schedules,  collect  advance 
taxes and punish delinquent taxpayers; 
• Sufficiently skilled enforcement officers and effective logistics; 
 
• An arrears monitoring system to allow the LTU to classify arrears into recoverable 
and non-recoverable, and to identify which arrears could be the subject of payment 
agreements and which could be written off; 
• Tough legal backing with experts to enable the LTU to go for search and seizure, 
freezing of bank accounts, detaining goods and commodities, and to take legal action 
in the courts to recover revenues from delinquent taxpayers; 
• A fitting system of penalties, interest and other sanctions to facilitate easy collection 
of taxes from non-compliant large taxpayers. 
 
 
Trends in arrears collection through enforced actions are found to  be different across the 
LTUs in different countries. In Europe, for example, in Hungary and Bulgaria, the collection 
of tax arrears from large corporate taxpayers has increased during the LTU period. On the 
contrary, in Latin American, for example in Bolivia, collection of arrears dropped to 4.4% in 
1995 from 12.4% in the 1990s. Tax arrears in the Baltic States and in the CIS countries also 
increased during the tenure of LTU administration.   Similarly, in Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Moldova tax arrears owed by large taxpayers increased as a percentage of LTU collections 
during the period 1997 to 1999 (Ebrill and Havrylyshyn, 1999). 
 
2.10.4 Risk Profiling and Compliance Management 
 
 
Managing risk is a key issue in the realization of optimum tax compliance. According to 
HMRC (2006: 9), “the concept of risk reviews arises from the New Compliance Process and 
is the cornerstone of our approach to service and tax compliance.”   Risk analysis ensures 
benefits  for  both  tax  agencies  and  large  taxpayers.  Tax  agencies  assess  the  level  of 
confidence they place in corporations; and corporations, on the other hand, can influence tax 
agencies by changing the level of revenue risk they pose. 
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A joint approach to risk analysis by a tax authority and taxpayers involves client profiling and 
identification conducted from the point of view of the whole market or a specific market 
segment (e.g., for a specific client or clients in a specific industry).  In the UK, New Zealand, 
Canada and South Africa best practice is based on risk profiles (e.g., sector risk profiling). 
The sector focus is made using a mixture of factors including the complexities of the 
legislation, the difficulties of particular industries or businesses, and/or the probable revenue 
at risk. Risk focus may be based on a special activity, for instance, a merger or acquisition7, 
 
which is considered to offer a potential threat of non-compliance. 
Figure 2.7: Risk Profiling Framework for Large Corporate Taxpayers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Deloitte, 2005 
 
 
 
 
7 A corporation is said to be merged with another when, by agreement, they are combined into one corporation 
by  a  legal  procedure;  whereas  in  an  acquisition  a  corporation  acquires  substantial  control  over  another 
corporation but the legal status of both as entities remains unchanged (Gu, 2010). Mergers and acquisitions can 
cause increased tax liability through changes in the amount of stock or the par value of the stock, among other 
considerations (Vines, 1996). 
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According to Deloitte (2005), as illustrated in Figure 2.7, large corporate risk profiling starts 
with identifying the potential risks for different corporate sectors. Then the identified risks 
are assessed and prioritized in order of their potential impact on revenues and compliance. 
Since all large corporations are not equally risky, they are classified into different groups. 
Appropriate treatment i.e., whether carrot or stick measures have to be applied, is decided on 
based on their risk characteristics (Morris and Lonsdale, 2004). The South African Revenue 
Service Annual Report 2004 shows that risk profiling was applied to all the corporate sectors 
to enhance the quality of the tax audit. Thus the final step of risk profiling action is to 
evaluate the outcomes of that action measured in terms of filing, payment or reporting 
compliance. 
Risk analysis approaches involve a wide range of financial and tax-specific indicators, which 
may include frequent changes in banks, attorneys or auditors; significant related party 
transaction; changes in management structure and ownership; taxpayers‟ knowledge of tax 
 
law and tax policy; and internal auditing and governance systems. These criteria are applied 
irrespective of the nature and the source of income of corporations. To decide whether a 
corporation should be put in the high-risk category, the following criteria are considered: 
 
• The extent to which the financial and tax indicators of the taxpayer in question differ 
from the industry average. A huge gap suggests a thorough examination of the 
taxpayer‟s financial reports; 
• Past records are always considered to be a strong measure of compliance risk. A 
 
corporation deviating enormously in terms of its shown income and tax payments 
from previous years indicates a high risk of reporting non-compliance; 
•  Economic productivity,  e.g., turnover or sales  has been  huge,  but  corresponding 
taxable income or tax payment has been questionably low; 
• Evidence of aggressive tax planning and avoidance policies, and involvement in huge 
non-arm‟s-length transactions with related corporations. In the case of non-related 
corporations, the opportunity for under-or over-invoicing of import prices; 
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• The nature of corporation ownership – whether public or privately incorporated and 
whether listed on the stock market or not. Privately incorporated corporations are 
more risky in general than public limited corporations, since the check on 
accountability in the latter is higher. 
 
 
It is recognized that the risk management functions performed in relation to large corporate 
tax compliance are important to ensure corporate good governance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002  in the US  and  tax  legislation  in a  number  of other  countries have resulted  as an 
increased awareness of effective tax risk management as an inevitable part of good tax 
governance. 
2.11 Use of Coercive and Persuasive Instruments among Large 
 
Corporate Taxpayers 
 
 
In achieving greater control over large corporate taxpayers, both coercive and persuasive 
approaches are employed by tax agencies. There is no concrete evidence of whether these 
compliance tools have succeeded or failed in creating tax compliance. The huge book-tax 
differences among large corporations causes Hamilton (1994) to argue that tax compliance 
cannot be purely voluntary and therefore a matter for persuasion. If tax payment were really 
persuasive and voluntary, there would not be any need for penal measures in the tax system. 
In practice, there are strong punitive measures in tax laws, which taxpayers have to take 
account of. Hamilton (1994) proposes that the effect of legislation and its link to fairness 
have to be taken into account in understanding large corporate tax audits. In an IMF study of 
the Philippines Bureau of Revenue (BIR), it was found that coercive measures were less 
strongly pursued, which raise questions as to whether coercive actions are crowded out by the 
use of persuasive actions in the case of large corporate taxpayers (IMF, 2002). 
 
Moore (2008) points out that large corporate taxpayers enjoy huge bargaining powers in 
relation to the tax authorities and force tax agencies to be persuasive in their disposition. 
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Persuasive working ensures a certain flow of revenues to the tax authorities, and in exchange 
large corporations feel safe of their investments (Easter, 2008).  A coercive, uninformed and 
one-sided approach to taxation by a tax authority may induce large corporations to disinvest 
and to shift capital elsewhere. Moore (2008) argues that negotiating with the largest taxpayers 
becomes a more necessary choice for a state when the state has few internal and external 
sources of revenue. This is particularly the case for developing countries, where the informal 
sector is large, and import revenues are shrinking due to international pressure for tariff 
reductions. Because of the huge contractual power of large corporations, the governments of 
developing countries even tend to spare these corporations when they break local labour and 
environmental laws (Steinmann and Kumar, 1998). 
 
Easter (2008)  argues that  in order to  pay off public debts with tax revenues,  the post - 
communist tax administration in Russia applied a coercive approach to large corporations. 
Unfortunately, this attempt ended in fiasco in terms of the intra-elite conflicts that arose in the 
process of state formation, where the bargaining power of the taxpayer was one of the pivotal 
considerations. Easter (2008: 67), in comparing the post-communist state building processes 
of Russia and Poland and their impact on revenue generation, comments that: 
 
In  Russia…  post-communist  state  building  took  place  amid  a  protracted  and 
polarizing  intra-elite  conflict  over  the  direction  of  the  transition.  ….  unlike  in 
Poland …protest claims over local revenue resources. Elite bargaining produced a 
tangled web of special favours that ultimately undermine the efforts of the state to 
build the capacity to extract sufficient funds. 
 
 
Similarly, Tanzi (1995) points out that coercive corporate marginal tax rates may affect the 
competitiveness of large business investments.   As a result, large businesses may relocate 
their business. Clausing (2009: 703) argues that, “decisions of governments regarding 
corporate taxation  affect  the  decisions  of  multinational  firms  regarding  where  to  locate 
74  
economic activity and where to book profits. Yet, multinational firm decisions also impact 
governments, affecting the amount of revenue that they receive and ultimately the types of 
tax policies that they choose.” Clausing (2009, quoted in Mooij and Ederveen, 2005) states 
that a one percent reduction in the host country tax rate raises foreign direct investment by 
2.9%. Supporting this, McCarten (2004) reminds us that the process of globalization plays an 
active role in the creation and recreation of large business investment. In other words, forced 
taxation anywhere engenders a threat of reduced tax compliance and reduced public revenues. 
In an open international economy the practice of attracting foreign capital by reduced or 
concessional tax rates is found to be stronger (Radaelli, 1997; Tanzi 1995). However, how 
cuts in tax rates affect the competitiveness of foreign investments depends on the nature of 
the  large  taxpayer-tax  administration  relationship.  In  a  welfare  state,  tax  cuts  result  in 
increased capital and business, whereas in an interventionist state, things may go in the 
opposite direction, as Leroy (2004) argues. 
 
2.12 Chapter Conclusion and Summary 
 
 
Coercive tax compliance techniques are the antithesis of persuasive tax compliance 
techniques, as demonstrated in the above review of the literature. Contemporary tax 
administrations, LTUs in particular, have employed both techniques in addressing the tax 
compliance  issues  of  large  corporations,  with  a  greater  tendency  towards  persuasive 
techniques.  LTUs‟  mission  statements  and  procedures  categorically  declare  trust  and 
 
cooperation as the main compliance mantra to be pursued among their large corporate 
taxpayers.  Persuasive  instruments  and  mutual  co-operation  are  fully  exhausted  before 
resorting to coercive practices. A range of socio-economic reasons has been attached to this 
marked shift from the stick to the carrot approach in dealing with large corporate taxpayers. 
Despite more emphasis being given to persuasive instruments than to coercive ones, little is 
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known  about  the  comparative  effectiveness  of  these  techniques  with  respect  to  the 
compliance behaviours of large corporate taxpayers. This gap in the knowledge of tax 
compliance literature needs to be filled. This research is an attempt to fill the gap by finding 
an answer to the problem of how these two antithetical compliance techniques are implicated 
in the income tax compliance issues of big corporate taxpayers in the context of a developing 
country‟s tax agency. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
3.1    Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter provided a survey of coercive and persuasive tax compliance theories 
and  instruments  in  relation  to  large  corporate taxpayers,  and  it  identified  a  gap  in  the 
literature. This study aims to fill that gap, and the present chapter presents its analytical 
framework, which includes the research problem, the items for analysis, and the underlying 
research logic. The chapter will show how the research design was built up to identify 
important research variables, translate them into observable items, and indicate the key data 
to be collected from the field. It will cover the research method, so as to describe data sources, 
sampling and collection techniques, and the means of data triangulation. It will set out the 
data analysis techniques and the structure followed in order to produce significant evidence 
from which conclusions could be drawn. It will provide a guide to the fieldwork to be carried 
out in Bangladesh and the potential problems in researching large corporate tax compliance. 
Kramer  (2007:17)  defines  an  analytical  framework  as  “a  construction  of  theoretical 
ingredients to tackle specific question” that is “used for selecting data and interpreting 
patterns.” 
 
This  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  we  follow  the  development  of the  research 
question.  Second,  the  study  perspective  and  variables  are  identified.  Third,  the  design, 
content, and validation of the research instruments are discussed. Fourth, data sources and 
sample procedures are outlined. Fifth, the data analysis techniques are reviewed. 
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3.2    Research Questions 
 
 
The main research question of this thesis, as already discussed in section 1.3, was formulated 
after a review of the relevant body of knowledge as presented in chapter 2. The literature 
reviewed showed that empirical evidence on the impact of coercive and persuasive tax 
compliance measures was sparse. The very few works focusing on the effects of coercive and 
persuasive instruments on individual and sole proprietor tax compliance included the works 
of  Murphy,  2005;  Hasseldine  et  al.,  2007;  Doyle  et  al.,  2009;  Frey  and  Feld,  2002; 
Kornhauser, 2007; Torgler, 2005; Chung   and Trivedi, 2003; and Blumenthal et al., 2001. 
The few works that focused on large corporate taxpayers studied only the influence of 
selective coercive tools, such as penalties, audits and tax rates. These included works by 
Kamdar, 1997; Short, 1997; Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002; Okike, 1998 and Aparicio et al. 
2011. Only Taliercio (2004) had looked at the taxpayer service issues of large corporations. 
Although the persuasive paradigms provoked strong arguments, the empirical research had 
focused exclusively on coercive instruments (Jacobsen, 2010). Hasseldine et al. (2007:173) 
state that, “although persuasive communications have been examined in some accounting- 
related studies (Kadous, Koonce and Towry, 2005), to date none of those studies has used 
persuasive communications to encourage compliant reporting behaviour and to deter 
noncompliant reporting.” 
 
None of these studies had looked at how these contrasting compliance paradigms contributed 
to higher tax compliance among large corporations. Another of their limitations was that they 
had been conducted in developed countries using survey data, due to a lack of access to real 
tax office data (Gupta and Mookherjee, 1998; MacLaren, 2003). Some researchers had used 
real tax office data for behavioural studies of taxpayers, but these data were not very good for 
generalization (Hasseldine et al., 2007). To date, the comparative effects of motivational and 
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sanctions-based enforcements had not been examined in studying the tax compliance of large 
corporations, which triggered the following research question: 
 
Are coercive or persuasive tax compliance instruments more important for the 
tax compliance of large corporate taxpayers in the LTU of Bangladesh, and why? 
 
 
The research question was divided into several sub-questions, each of which focused on a 
particular aspect of the study. The first aspect of the problem was to measure the level and 
pattern of tax compliance. The second was to find how much of the achieved compliance was 
attributable to coercive, and how much to persuasive compliance techniques. And the final 
aspect of the study was to investigate potential explanations as to why coercive or persuasive 
compliance techniques were important. The following important as well as intriguing sub- 
research questions were to be attempted: 
 
Research sub-questions 
 
 
1. To what extent are large corporate taxpayers compliant? 
 
 
 
2. What contributions do coercive instruments make to the tax compliance of large 
corporations? 
 
3. What contributions do persuasive instruments make to the tax compliance of large 
corporations? 
 
4. Why do some instruments contribute more to the tax compliance of large corporations 
than others? 
 
Once the research questions had been formulated, the next challenge was how they would be 
answered. The next section describes the creation of a theoretical structure to define coercive 
and persuasive instruments and how they might influence tax compliance. It gives a summary 
of the research process and the tax compliance environment. 
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3.3    Research Logic to Tackle the Research Questions 
 
 
Explaining the tax compliance performance of large corporations in terms of coercive and 
persuasive instruments is the key theme of the questions raised in this study. The number and 
nature of coercive and persuasive tax compliance instruments is varied, and depends on the 
nature and class of taxpayers. This study, based on previous tax compliance research and on 
LTU compliance models and approaches (see sections 2.7 and 2.9), identifies three coercive 
and three persuasive instruments. The coercive instruments are: tax penalty, tax audit, and 
imprisonment. The persuasive instruments are: taxpayer service quality, simplified tax law, 
and mutual understanding.  Operational definitions of each of these instruments have been 
placed in Appendix A. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, box 3, tax compliance instruments can be classified into two groups, 
persuasive and coercive, and these groups are placed in boxes 4 and 5 respectively. These 
boxes are further elaborated to specify the coercive and persuasive instruments to be studied 
in this research, which are placed in boxes 6 and 7 respectively. The influence of these 
instruments on tax compliance is to be tested through statistical modelling (elaborated in 
section 3.12). In the statistical models, the coercive and persuasive instruments are treated as 
independent variables, and tax compliance as the dependent variable. Tax compliance, the 
dependent variable, is shown in box 8, and has three components – filing, reporting and 
payment. The three components together form overall compliance (see sections 5.4.1 and 
5.5.1). 
 
 
 
Theoretically speaking, a large corporate taxpayer may fail or succeed in all three compliance 
components, or may fall somewhere in between these extremes. This means that a large 
corporate taxpayer may be fully compliant, partially compliant or not at all compliant. 
Similarly, a tax compliance instrument may not affect any of the compliance components or 
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may affect one or more components. Thus the level of influence may be of three kinds: zero, 
partial or full. A coercive or persuasive instrument influencing all three components – i.e., 
affecting overall compliance – is more important than one influencing a single component. 
The links from boxes 6 and 7, for this reason, lead to box 8, indicating influence on the 
compliance components. The final link is drawn between boxes 8 and 9, as box 9 contains the 
cumulative effect of the changes occurring in box 8. Boxes 1 and 2 show the broad socio - 
economic and tax administrative environment within which the large corporations and tax 
agencies operate. 
 
The two-way arrow in the figure implies that there exists an interactive and mutual 
reinforcement between coercive and persuasive instruments. The effectiveness of a coercive 
instrument in producing higher tax compliance may depend on the effectiveness of a 
persuasive instrument, or vice versa. For instance, a huge financial penalty can only be 
justified and  may only bring a successful outcome if an attempt  has first  been made to 
persuade the taxpayer with quality services. Again, the coercive force of a tax audit or 
imprisonment may be less necessary if tax laws are really simple and communicable. The 
complex interactions between tax compliance and attitudinal measures (Sheffrin and Triest, 
1992) and between friendly persuasion and a taxpayer‟s gender (Chung and Trivedi, 2003) 
are considered a potential factor in the compliance literature. Although considering gender, as 
a compliance factor, is confined to the study of individual taxpayers‟ compliance,  it has 
significant  bearing  on  understanding  corporate  tax  compliance.  Ayres,  1991  (quoted  in 
Conley and O‟Barr, 1997) empirically examined the impact of gender and race on corporate 
misconduct in the automobile industry. He found that the car dealers‟ expected profit from 
female customers was much higher ($504) than that from male customers ($362), and 
customer discrimination was high when the salesperson‟s gender was the same as that of the 
 
customer. To explain this finding, Ayres, proposes a „revenue based‟ theory that posits that 
81  
peoples’ willingness to pay depends on their gender and race. Thomson et al. (2005) claim 
that to turn corporations into good citizens, a better gender balance is needed on corporate 
boards, because female directors tend to make better decisions on tax and ethical matters 
than male directors. Thomson et al. (2005:18) state, “Woman are more interested than man in 
ethical and corporate social responsibility issues …or the presence of woman limits the 
power of the male …to…creating policies that are ethically questionable.”  In support to this, 
Klenke (2011) shows that the involvement of woman directors in large corporate audit and 
compensation issues has a positive correlation with corporate financial performance.   This 
suggests that the gender of corporate managers and directors is important for corporate 
investment and tax payment decisions. 
 
The interaction between the coercive and the persuasive instruments, as represented by the 
two-way arrow however is not fixed over time. Rather, they change due to changes in the 
environment and external agents in the form of taxpayer services or mutual understanding 
(Kornhauser, 2007). 
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Figure 3.1: Summary of Research Logic 
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At this stage, the obvious question is: what might be the underlying reasons for a coercive or 
persuasive instrument to be important or unimportant? This is the fourth or the final research 
sub-question  of the  study.  Answer  to  this  question  is  explored  by  examining  the  links 
between created tax compliance (box 9) and the extant compliance environment (box 1). To 
put it differently, large corporate taxpayers are an integral part of the broad socio -economic 
and tax administrative environment and their compliance behaviours are likely to have direct 
and/or  indirect  links  to  these  perspectives.  Therefore,  understanding  the  complex  socio - 
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political network and seeking answers in the light of these realities will make the research 
arguments convincing. Based on this theoretical structure and argument, the next section 
spells out the steps to be followed in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data with 
respect to each research sub-question. 
 
3.4    How to Answer the Research Questions? 
 
As demonstrated in section 3.2, the main research question was broken down into four sub- 
questions. The approach taken to answer a research question depends on the type of research 
design and the methods employed for the research (O‟Leary, 2009). For this study it was 
 
decided that a mixed method approach would be the best for answering its research question. 
Detailed  explanation  about  why  mixed  method  approach  best  fits  to  this  study  has  be 
presented in section 3.7. The survey questionnaire would mainly provide data for answering 
questions 1 to 3, and the elite interviews would feed into question 4. Survey data would be 
summarized, analysed and interpreted by regression methods, and the interview data would 
be analysed through an interpretivist approach (see section 3.12.4). 
 
3.4.1  Answering the First Research Sub-Question 
 
 
The objective of the first research question, as Table 3.1 shows, was to measure the level of 
tax compliance among large corporate taxpayers, which would also be used as the dependent 
variable in the statistical models. First, tax compliance as a variable would be divided into 
three components: filing, reporting and payment; Second, the components would be added to 
measure  overall  compliance.  Data  needed  for  tax  compliance  measurement  would  be 
collected from the real tax returns of large corporate taxpayers. However, data for some of 
the predictor variables would be collected from a questionnaire survey (see section 3.12.1.3). 
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To measure whether a corporation was filing compliant, the date of its return submission 
would be collected from the returns register (see Panel A, Table 3.1). Data on reporting 
compliance would be available from the audit register, and this would show whether a 
corporation had received any audit demands or adjustments. Corporations without audit 
demands would be treated as reporting-compliant, and corporations with audit demands as 
reporting-non-compliant. Similarly, corporations without any shortfalls in payment would be 
payment-compliant, and corporations with shortfalls in payment would be payment-non- 
compliant. Collected data would be analysed through frequency distribution and percentages 
to measure the component and overall compliance of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
3.4.2  Answering the Second Research Sub-Question 
 
 
 
The objective of the second research question was to investigate the contribution of coercive 
instruments to tax compliance. The summary logic, as outlined in the previous section, charts 
these instruments and provides reasons for including them in this study. Required data on the 
effect of coercive instruments would be collected both by survey and from tax office 
records(see Panel B, Table 3.1). Data on audits would be gathered from real sources – tax 
audit records. For penalties and imprisonment – the other two coercive instruments – data 
would be gathered by a questionnaire survey among large corporations (see Appendix C for 
the survey questionnaire and section 3.11 for sampling techniques). The reason for this was 
that tax penalties and imprisonment as coercive actions were not frequently applied by the 
LTU, and relevant data were not well managed. It might also be that some taxpayers were 
more affected by a particular type of coercive action than others, and the frequency of using 
the various coercive  measures  might  differ  across taxpayers.  Moreover,  for a regression 
model to work, variation across observations was an essential requirement, and this could be 
ensured in survey data reflecting different opinions from different respondents. 
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Table 3.1:  Evidence needed to answer research questions 
 
Sub-questions Dependent 
(outcome) variable 
Data sources Analysis Output Interpretation 
Panel A 
 
Question 1 
Filing compliance Return register Descriptive 
univariate 
statistics 
Frequency, 
crosstab, ratio 
 
To what extent are large 
corporate taxpayers 
Reporting 
compliance 
Audit register Descriptive 
univariate 
statistics 
Frequency, 
crosstab, ratio 
Interpreting 
compliance levels 
for component 
compliant? Payment compliance Tax payment register Descriptive 
univariate 
statistics 
Frequency, 
crosstab, ratio 
and overall 
compliance 
Overall compliance Combining data from 
filing, reporting and 
payment registers 
Descriptive 
multivariate 
statistics 
Frequency, 
crosstab, ratio 
Panel B 
Question 2 
What contributions do 
coercive instruments make 
to the tax compliance of 
large corporations? 
Penalty Survey data Binary logistic 
regression, 
CHAID, and 
multilevel 
logistic 
regression 
with statistical 
controls 
S.E, Wald stat, 
sig., pseudo r- 
square, CHAID 
models, fixed 
and random 
effects 
 
 
 
Question 3 
 
What contributions do 
persuasive instruments make 
to the tax compliance of 
large corporations? 
Audit                             Tax office data                  As above              As above 
Imprisonment                Survey data                       As above              As above 
Taxpayer service          Survey data                       As above              As above 
 
Simplified tax law         Survey data                       As above              As above 
 
Interpreting 
regression 
outputs- level of 
significance, Beta 
values, S.E., 
CHAID models, 
fixed and random 
effects etc. 
 
 
Mutual 
understanding 
Survey data As above As above 
 
 
Panel C 
 
Question 4 
 
 
 
Why do some instruments 
contribute more to the tax 
compliance of large 
corporations than others? 
 
 
Regressions 
outputs ,interviews 
and other 
documents are used 
as the basis to 
answer sub-question 
4 
Interview themes and 
document analysis 
+ 
Own experience and 
judgment (ad-hoc 
reasoning) 
+ Theoretical 
plausibility (priori 
reasoning) 
= 
 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretation 
and arguments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causal 
pattern 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining, 
interpreting and 
exploring 
interview excerpts 
and other 
documents to 
establish links 
 
 
Comparison 
 
 
 
Proposition 
 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own figure 
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Survey data on tax penalties and imprisonment would be dummied to fit into logistic 
regression models (see sections 3.12.1.1 and 3.12.1.2) and to show likely association between 
instruments and tax compliance. 
 
However, it is difficult to get a robust estimate of the significance of instruments without 
looking at the corporate context. Large corporations in the LTU are grouped into fina nce, 
manufacturing and service sectors. Again, they are grouped as private versus public and local 
versus multinational.  This grouping or clustering of the corporations into different corporate 
sectors or ownership patterns might itself be a strong reason for the generation of tax 
compliance (see section 3.12.3 for detailed discussion). Therefore to answer this and the next 
research sub-question dealing with the significant persuasive instruments, considering the 
effects of corporate context would be important. Once the significant instruments were 
identified, the next job would be to explain why the instruments were found significant. In 
doing this, it would not be necessary to carry on the discussion on context variable (i.e., either 
corporate sector or ownership pattern or location status) in the work reported on in chapter 7. 
But chapter 8, which summarises and concludes the thesis, will recapitulate on the issues of 
corporate sector and its influence. 
 
3.4.3 Answering the Third Research Sub-Question 
 
 
The objective of this research question was to tease out the role of persuasive instruments in 
the compliance measured in question one. Data on all persuasive instruments would be 
collected by survey and would be dummied to fit into the regression model, as was to be done 
in the case of coercive instruments. Technically, this question would be answered in the same 
way as the second research question (see Panel B, Table 3.1). It is important to note that the 
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statistical measurements for both sets of instruments would be compared to identify which 
one was more significant in understanding large corporate tax compliance. For this reason, 
their coefficients and statistical significance would be compared. 
 
3.4.4. Answering the Fourth Research Sub-Question 
 
 
The purpose of this question was to explain why some instruments were more important than 
others in the achievement of tax compliance. This would be done mainly in three phases: first, 
in the data analysis stage, where statistical control would be applied to get rid of intervening 
or  confounding  variables  between  the  independent  and  dependent  variables  (see  section 
3.12.1.4 on control variables). Second, the research contexts and perspectives would be taken 
into account through elite interviews, and observations would be generated from there (see 
Panel C, Table 3.1). Observations might turn into a valid and acceptable proposition if they 
could  be  supported  by  empirical  evidence  or  by  reasoning  from  the  works  of  other 
researchers.  This  necessitated  looking  at  similar  work done  by other  researchers,  which 
would be the third step towards making claims about causality. Systematic comparison of 
links observed between tax compliance and the selected instruments would make it possible 
to produce a causal pattern. As the third and final step, to arrive at the causal pattern, the 
judgement of the researcher himself would be a strong resource (this is called ad-hoc 
reasoning).  The next section describes the creation of the research design to be used for the 
study. 
 
3.5    Research Design 
 
 
The nature of a research question, whether descriptive or explanatory, informs its design. 
Guifree (1997:1) points out that, “the only clear rule in selecting a design is that the question 
dictates the design.” The exploratory nature of this study required it to ensure two attributes: 
logical structure and sufficient evidence (Yin, 1989). From this perspective, several designs 
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could fit the study. These included a laboratory experiment, a field experiment, and a survey. 
Laboratory experiments offer good control over variables and the random assignment of 
variables, yet they lack realism and generalizability. Kornhauser (2007:142) argues that, “one 
of the more important limitations of empirical research regarding compliance is the fact that 
much of the research has been conducted in a controlled laboratory situation. Although this 
allows researchers to isolate individual effects, it also weakens the results. In any controlled 
experiment, there is always the question of whether what the subject does in the controlled 
environment represents what he or she would do in the real world.”  On the other hand, the 
field survey is strong on realism and possesses theory orientation, though it lacks control over 
independent variables and thus lacks precision (Anderson, 1988). 
 
It was decided that this study would use a cross-sectional design – a kind of correlation 
research – to contrast different people or issues at a point in time (Barlow and Durand, 2011). 
Using a cross-sectional design, measures from two different sets of issues (e.g., coercive and 
persuasive instruments) or people can be collected at a point in time and the degree to which 
they differ over the dependent variable (e.g., tax compliance) can be compared (De 
Vaus,2009). In defining cross-sectional design, Ruane (2004:93) points out that, “it is the 
research design equivalent of the „Polaroid moment‟ ... a snapshot freezes a moment in time ... 
 
obtains information from a single group of respondents without any attempt to follow up.” 
 
 
 
The major concern of this type of design, as opposed to a randomized control or experimental 
trial, is the issue of causation. Cross-sectional research design, which is highly dependent on 
regression-based quantitative analysis, can define the independent variables, but fails to 
manipulate them in the way an experimental design does (Kumar, 2005).  Bryman (1989:87) 
points out that, “survey designs in which data are collected at a single juncture are frequently 
referred to as „correlational‟ or „cross-sectional‟ survey designs.” Bryman adds that finding a 
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relationship between variables is the main focus of a cross-sectional design, not causality. 
Causality, in general terms, refers to “the regularity or the succession of one kind of events 
and another of the kind which usually follows” (Harré and Secord, 1972, cited in Bryman, 
2004). Since cross-sectional design lacks a time dimension, involving only one-off data, it 
cannot focus on changes in an observed relationship over time (Ruane, 2004). 
 
However, Marsh (1982) disagrees with Bryman and argues that cross-sectional designs rather 
take a passive approach to establishing causal conclusions by correlating variables. Marsh 
claims that correlated variables in a cross-sectional design do not establish direct causation as 
such, but they do not indicate that finding causation is impossible. As an example, Marsh 
(1982:73) states that, “finding a correlation between smoking and lung cancer in no way 
proves that smoking causes cancer, but it does mean that the hypothesis cannot be ruled out.” 
Likewise, Blalock (1964, cited in De Vaus, 2009) argues that time-ordered variation between 
two variables, as we see in panel or experimental design, does not confirm causal links. This 
is because there may be intervening or confounding variables in the causal chain. 
 
3.6 Establishing Causality in a Cross-Sectional Research Design 
In tax compliance research, the use of cross-sectional surveys was not new. Slemrod had used 
cross-sectional  analysis  to  measure  the  complexity  of  US  income  tax  law,  with  the 
acknowledged limitation that the independent variables might be confounded with absent 
variables. Other prominent and early tax compliance research based on cross-sectional design 
 
had included the work of Blumenthal et al. (2001) and that of Clotfelter (1983). 
 
 
 
Inferring causation between tax compliance and chosen tax compliance instruments required 
the  fulfilment  of  two  basic  criteria:  first,  there  should  be  a  co-variation  between  tax 
compliance  and  the  tax  compliance  instruments;  and  second,  the  co-variation  must  be 
explainable by logic (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The first condition could be fulfilled by 
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conducting a standard correlation and regression model. The test for co-variation could be 
made stronger by controlling the variables at the data analysis stage; and through multilevel 
modelling the influence of contextual variables on co-variation could be reduced (Guo and 
Zhao, 2000; Wong and Mason, 1985; Hayes, 2006). But establishing logical sense in a co - 
variation would be difficult without information on its temporal order. 
 
There is, however, a strong argument that temporal order does not necessarily mean trend 
analysis or measurement of some phenomenon over time. Temporal order in cross-sectional 
design can be imputed in terms of the work of other researches and current theories (John 
Stuart Mill, quoted in Cook and Campbell, 1979). Imputations can also be drawn from our 
common-sense understanding or ad hoc reasoning of a fact. De Vaus (2009: 179) argues that, 
“a priori reasoning involves proposing on the basis of theoretical considerations and ... on the 
other, ad hoc reasoning on the basis of observed correlation on the data.” For example, a 
causal relationship between sex and income can only be in the direction of sex affecting 
income. The opposite proposition, that income affects sex, does not make sense and can be 
plausibly denied without any empirical examination (Davis, 1985; De Vaus, 2009; 
Tashakkhori and Teddlie, 2003; Bryman, 2004). 
 
Lack of contextual reasoning is another impediment to making causal claims in cross- 
sectional designs (Kumar, 2005; Yin, 2003; De Vaus, 2009). Improper understanding of 
study contexts creates difficulty in the allocation of meaning to a participant observation. 
Without  considering  the  actor‟s  interpretation  of  the  situation,  it  may  be  difficult  to 
 
understand the intervening process that may lie between variables. However, there are three 
ways to improve the level of meaning in social sciences (Creswell, 2009; Hakim, 2000): first, 
by taking an adequate number of factors relating to the economic and social exposure of the 
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participants; second, by asking people to provide a meaning for certain behaviour or for a 
phenomenon; third, the researcher may also give a meaning to the behaviour or phenomenon. 
 
Reducing  ambiguity  of  meaning  and  capturing  the  unique  context  of  corporate  tax 
compliance issues would thus demand an in-depth discussion with the respondents in addition 
to survey data.  In recognition of this fact, the study would gather evidence by interviewing 
the relevant individuals in and around the large corporate taxpayer community. 
An advantage of cross-sectional design is that the external validity or generalizability – the 
possibility of generalizing a study‟s results to other times, places or persons – is better than 
 
that of experimental or panel studies (Bryman, 2004).  This is because the design is free from 
common threats to internal validity, for example, maturation, history and attrition (Cook and 
Campbell, 1979). Again, ensuring a representative sample from the population is easier for a 
cross-sectional design because it does not have a time dimension. 
 
Cross-sectional designs can also be better in terms of construct validity and statistical 
conclusion validity (Campbell and Stanely, 1963; Bryman, 2004; De Vaus, 2009). Construct 
validity confirms whether the measures employed in a study essentially measure what they 
claim to measure. And statistical conclusion validity shows the capacity of the model to 
ensure co-variation between/among variables at a given level of probability and dispersion 
for a sample size (Gorard and Taylor, 2004; Cook and Campbell, 1979).  Bryman (2004) 
argues that, following the above techniques, cross-sectional designs can also strengthen the 
internal validity – the causal links between and among independent and dependent variables – 
of the study. 
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3.7    Data Collection: Mixed-Method 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to set out the research method chosen for the study. Research 
method informs the techniques by which data are collected (De Vaus, 2009). A mixed- 
method  research uses several sources of information  from several approaches to  get  an 
insight into the research question (Babbie, 2004; Becker, 1996). Axinn and Pearce (2006:1) 
put  forward  the  idea  that,  “mixed  method  data  collection  strategies  are  those  t hat  are 
explicitly designed to combine elements of one method, such as structured survey interviews, 
with  elements  of other  methods,  such  as  unstructured  interviews,  observations  or  focus 
groups, either in a sequential or simultaneous manner.”  Varying data sources enables the 
researcher to collect information that one approach can provide but another cannot, to reduce 
non-sampling error, and to make sure that the potential bias of one approach does not affect 
the other(s) (Green and Browne, 2005). Therefore a mixed-method approach uses both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, which helps to counterbalance the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method. 
 
In view of the above benefits, this study would employ a mixed-method approach, also called 
an eclectic or a triangulated research method. This would involve the use of a survey 
questionnaire, unstructured interviews and document analysis as the major sources of data 
collection. Another important benefit of this study would be its bridging of the quantitative- 
qualitative divide, a long-standing debate in social science research. 
 
The quantitative method claims that only science can lead us to know the objective world, 
which is independent of social, political and cultural influences (Bamberger, 2000). The 
qualitative approach, on the other hand, argues that to understand the world is to know how 
people see and define it and attempt to unfold the world through interpretation and contextual 
reasoning. Each approach has strong logic on its side, and drawbacks as well. Quantitative 
93  
investigations sometimes produce an answer that may not make sense. Qualitative research, 
on the other hand, may pay too close attention to individual behaviour, or give results that fail 
to establish a connection with larger probable causes of behaviour. To make the division clear, 
Kalof et al. (2008) and Harding (1987) state that the differences between the two approaches 
emerge from our understanding of epistemology and ontology. By ontology, according to 
Harding (1987), we mean the theory of what exists in the real world, whereas epistemology 
informs us what we can know, who can know and what tests our beliefs should pass through 
to make a legitimate claim to knowledge. 
 
According to mixed-method research, on the other hand, the quantitative-qualitative divide is 
not meaningful, because in understanding a fact, numbers and words can play similarly 
significant roles (Bazeley, 2003). Methodological pluralism can also reduce much of the 
epistemological tension and the anti-quantitative or anti-qualitative views (Kalof et al, 2008; 
Harding, 1987; Sechrist and Sidiani, 1995). A further reason for choosing mixed-method 
research for this study was the multidisciplinary and multi-perspective nature of tax 
compliance research (Lamb, 2004; Norris et al., 1995). Tax compliance research needs both 
numbers and words to grapple with its perspectives and its multifarious disciplinary issues. 
Raabe et  al. (2012: 54) argue that, “tax research process requires  mechanical skills and 
critical thinking. Mechanical techniques are gained and sharpened through knowledge and 
experience. Experience is obtained through working in the field and dealing with real tax 
problems on a recurring basis.” 
 
3.8    How to Integrate the Methods? 
 
 
A common question in mixed-method research is how to integrate the quantitative and 
qualitative data. The integration process depends on the sequence, priority and function of the 
data  collected  (Morgan,  1998;  Morse;  1991).The  timing  of  collecting  quantitative  and 
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qualitative data can be simultaneous or sequential, and one set of data may have priority over 
the other. Similarly, the function and objective of integration may be triangulation or 
explanation, which may take place at the data collection, analysis or interpretation stage. 
Based on these variations, the common purposes of integration may be offsetting, 
completeness, explanation or processing (Creswell, 2009; Grene et al., 1989; Bryman, 2006). 
No research method is flawless. A valid reason for integration, therefore, may be to offset the 
weakness of one method by using the other(s). Researchers may be interested in taking a 
more comprehensive view of the research problem. It is difficult for a single research method 
to provide a comprehensive view of a problem (Tashakkhori and Teddlie, 2003). Among 
other purposes, integration is needed to answer different research questions, explain the 
findings generated by other questions, or to provide a contextual meaning for the variables 
uncovered through surveys. Mixing both datasets can have an illustrative purpose, which is 
often referred as, “the meat on the bones” of “dry” quantitative findings (Bryman, 2006). 
 
The purpose of integration for this research was to answer different research questions by 
different methods. To answer the first to third research sub-questions, quantitative data would 
be collected through a survey; and to answer the final research sub-question, semi-structured 
interviews would be conducted. The findings of the quantitative analysis derived through 
descriptive and inferential statistics would be interpreted or explained by the qualitative data. 
In explaining the qualitative data, an interpretive approach would be followed (see section 
3.12.4). Therefore the purpose of integration for this research was to offset the weakness or 
complete the findings of the quantitative data through explanation or interpretation from the 
qualitative data. 
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3.9    Research Perspectives and Integration 
 
 
The answer to the question of why taxpayers were non-compliant was not straightforward. 
Along with economic selfishness, as argued by economists, there might be issues of poor 
service delivery by the tax administration or political interference in the tax administration 
(Alm et al., 1992a). Taxpayers might also be influenced by a sense of guilt, peer pressure, or 
by the rules of social institutions (Schmolders 1959, cited in Anderson, 1988; Gordon, 1989; 
Myles and Naylor, 1996; Sour, 2002) towards tax payment obligations (see sections 2.2 and 
2.4). Along with the main perspectives – economic, social, psychological and political 
economy – there are tax administrative issues, for example, tax law complexity (Witte et al., 
1989) that play an important role in tax compliance studies. Frey (2002) identifies four major 
perspectives in tax compliance studies, comprising political and fiscal perspectives, socio- 
psychological perspectives and decision-making perspectives. Morris and Lonsdale (2004) 
categorize the perspectives as business, sociological, industry, psychological and economic 
and  describe them as  factors rather than perspectives.  The  major  perspectives and  their 
features are set out below: 
 
Economic 
 
• Taxpayer is a rational economic calculator; 
• Gain from non-compliance is compared against potential losses if the non-compliance 
is detected; 
• Compliance increases with tough enforcement and higher probability of detection. 
 
 
 
Psychological 
 
• Taxpayers are problem solvers; 
• Personal factors (attitude); 
• How willing taxpayers are to take risks; 
• What they fear and trust; 
• Previous interactions with the tax authority. 
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Sociological 
 
• Tax compliance is a social problem, depending on group decisions; 
• Taxpayers weigh collective rather than individual utility; 
• Social codes and institutions deter tax cheating; 
• Perceived opportunities for non-compliance; 
• Fairness perceptions. 
 
Administrative 
 
 
• Attitude of tax administration; 
• Transparency in tax administration culture and policy; 
• Lack of logistic and technical support; 
• Capacity and efficiency of tax administration. 
 
Political economy 
 
• Taxpayer‟s perception of government actions; 
• Political system, institutions, and regime type are important issues; 
• Public services are evaluated by cost-benefit of tax payment; 
• No taxation without representation‟ – tax bargaining between state and citizens; 
forming a social-fiscal contract. 
 
 
 
This study argues that a more comprehensive understanding of tax compliance can be gained 
by integrating all perspectives rather than by extrapolating from a single perspective (Black et 
al.,1991).  However, the economic and tax administrative perspectives seems to be the most 
relevant to the present research problem. 
 
The reasons for taking economic perspective as the leading intuition is three-fold: first, as 
Akerlof and Romer (1993) argue, the tendency of profit maximization by large corporations 
is very high; even large corporations sometimes maximize profits by bankrupting their 
businesses. One reason for this might be the limited liability of corporate owners and the 
other is the poor accounting standards coupled with low penalty for law-breaking (Akerlof 
and Romer, 1993). Akerlof and Romer (1993:2) point out that large corporate behaviours can 
be better understood by the “the topsy-turvy economics of maximizing current extractable 
value.”   Second, Clinard and Yeager (1980) find that large corporations pay lit tle or no 
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emphasis on corporate social responsibility and engage in bribing officials and violating 
income tax laws for defrauding tax revenues. On this issue, Hasseldine (2010:11) states that, 
“There is going concern at large companies‟ ability to successfully avoid huge amount of 
 
taxes.  Extremely  high-concern  is  expressed  by  lobbyists  who  are  agitating  for  greater 
corporate social responsibility in the tax area.” For the growing significance of the economic 
approach of tax compliance, Oats and Tuck (2008: 14) note that, “Research regarding tax 
compliance  of  large  companies  tends  to  adopt  an  economic  rationalist  approach  and  is 
concerned with developing models that predict the compliance behaviour of large companies.” 
In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer to Slemrod (2004:6) who argues that, although the 
literature on corporate tax compliance by the non-economists is huge, “much of the modern 
literature adopts a perspective on corporations that is familiar to economists.” 
 
However,  corporate profit  maximization as selfishness  should  not  be equated  with self- 
interest (Brooks and Dunn, 2009). Slemrod (2004) says that in economics the term 
“selfishness” does not have the same negative connotations as it usually does. It is the type of 
individual selfishness that works as the “invisible hand” of the market economy and produces 
social welfare under certain institutional structures and instruments. The other reason for not 
limiting the study to a particular perspective is that individual and corporate decision-making 
are hugely influenced by the broad environment in which they function (Alm et al.,1992a). 
Investigating large corporations‟ tax compliance purely from an economic or administrative 
 
perspective  might  exclude  important or discerning  explanations  from the study (McGill, 
 
1988). 
 
 
 
Viewing tax compliance from several perspectives requires integration among these. For 
example, tax audit as a compliance instrument has both economic and tax administrative 
consequences.  Audits  are  primarily  used  as  a  compliance  instrument  to  increase  the 
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likelihood of detection, as argued in the economic school of thought. But how frequently 
audit action is taken and what criteria will govern it is an administrative matter. Similarly, 
taxpayer  service  is  provided  to  increase  confidence  and  reduce  the  distance  between 
taxpayers and the tax administration, but taxpayer service produces better compliance when 
taxpayers derive higher utility from the consumption of the service. Further, the issues of the 
state versus large taxpayer bargaining power on the one hand raise the economic aspects of 
tax compliance, and on the other remind us of the inability of the political system to handle 
large corporations, due to corporate ability to relocate businesses globally (Brautigam, 2008; 
Moore, 2008). Therefore vertical integration of perspectives would provide better 
measurement of the contribution of tax compliance instruments than horizontal integration. 
 
3.10 Sampling Method and Data Sources 
 
 
3.10.1 Unit of Analysis 
 
 
What exactly was to be analysed in this research? The unit of analysis was to measure the tax 
compliance effects of coercive and persuasive instruments among large corporations dealt 
with by the LTU, not the performance of the LTU as a unit of tax administration. To narrow 
down the empirical focus of the study, it would look only at the corporate taxpayers of the 
LTU. Individual taxpayers would remain outside the purview of the study. The population of 
corporate taxpayers in the LTU of Bangladesh is 275, which includes finance, manufacturing 
and service sector corporations. 
 
3.10.2 Research Instruments 
 
 
Both primary and secondary data were to be collected. For primary data, two survey 
instruments,  a  questionnaire  and  interviews,  would  be  used.  In  the  case  of quantitative 
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analysis, a structured questionnaire was favoured; whereas in the case of qualitative research, 
a semi-structured questionnaire or interviews were to be used. 
 
3.10.2.1 Document Analysis to Measure Tax Compliance 
 
 
In answering the first research sub-question, as mentioned in section 3.2, and measuring some 
of the control variables (see section 3.12.1.4), this research would take advantage of rich tax 
administration and corporate level data collected from the LTU database. Tax office records 
and documents would produce primary data to provide valuable information on return filing, 
tax payment, audit adjustment, marginal tax rate and tax appeals. These were real tax office 
data, which would make this study different from other similar studies. In studying tax 
compliance in Australia, Tran-Nam et al. (2000:243) state that, “the ability to use the tax 
authority‟s database instead of commercial mailing…represents a significant improvement .” 
 
The access to the Bangladesh LTU database would provide quality information for this 
research. Documentary data are important to give meaning to facts, to check response bias, 
and to cover up a low response rate and improve the validity of the research (Dunsmuir and 
Williams, 1992). In this research, primary data on return filing and tax payment behaviour 
would help to measure the reactivity problems of the survey data–the possibility of 
respondents giving an ethically acceptable reply rather than what they really believed 
(Bryman, 2004). The sources of data used in this dissertation would be both primary and 
secondary. The LTU computerized database, corporate tax files, LTU administrative 
documents, and income tax legal documents such as the income tax ordinance part I and part 
II, would be sources of primary data; and published opinions in newspaper edit orials, reports 
and trade body pamphlets would be secondary data sources. 
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3.10.2.2 Survey Questionnaire to Find Important Instruments 
 
 
To conduct the questionnaire survey, a sampling framework comprised of all LTU corporate 
taxpayers would be prepared to reduce the chance of mismatched or overlapping samples. A 
pre-test of the questionnaire would be conducted to avoid ambiguity and weed out weak 
items (Levy and Lemeshow, 1999). In conducting the pre-test, 10 corporations, at least two 
from each of the corporate sectors, manufacturing or service, would be taken. Based on the 
critiques at the pilot stage, the practicality and comprehension of the survey questions would 
be evaluated and the draft  questionnaire would  be revised where necessary. This would 
reduce measurement error. The questions would be mutually exclusive and accept all valid 
alternative responses, such as „don‟t  know‟ and „not applicable‟ in order to reduce bias. 
 
Questions would be asked specifically to avoid  misinterpretation. In some cases do uble- 
barrelled questions might be asked to make an answer multidimensional. Loaded questions 
would be avoided so as not to create the possibility of introducing personal bias (Schofield, 
2006). 
 
 
 
3.10.2.3 Elite Interviewing 
 
 
For in-depth information on the research context and explanations on compliance behaviour, 
one-to-one personal interviews based on semi-structured questions were to be conducted. In- 
depth information refers to semi-structured or loosely structured interviewing, which Webb 
and  Webb  (quoted  in  Burgess,  1982:164)  state  as,  “the  Method  of  the  Interview,  or 
„conversations with a purpose‟, a unique instrument of the social investigator.” Through 
interview it is possible to clarify and extend the meaning of a respondent‟s observation and to 
confirm or rule out ways of reasoning (Kvale, 1996). In a tax compliance study like this, as 
Hasseldine et al. (2007) argue, field interviews enable the researcher to probe attitudes to 
 
sanctions and motivational issues, and to understand the research problem well. 
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Elite interviewing was the particular type of interview technique to be used in this research. A 
significant strength of elite interviews is that they allow the respondents to elaborate on their 
attitudes, beliefs and perceptions through an open and flexible discussion (Schofield, 2006). 
Elites are individuals who are “considered to be influential, prominent, and/or well-informed 
people in an organisation or community” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999:113). As elite 
respondents, tax advisers, corporate directors, tax accountants and tax officials would be 
interviewed. Interviewing tax professionals or people from the corporate world would enable 
me to understand complicated compliance issues. These people would have the ability to 
provide better explanations and more insightful answers about why some tough measure 
might  fail  and  others  succeed.  In  conducting  the  interviews,  Jonson‟s  (2002:106)  wise 
 
comment would be followed: “The informant would be a kind of teacher and the interviewer 
a student, one interested in learning the ropes or gaining member knowledge from a veteran 
informant.” 
 
Interview bias would be quite absent, since there would be one interviewer for this work. 
Snowball sampling would be used for locating the experts to be interviewed. In the snowball 
process, as Warren (2002:87) states: “one respondent is located who fulfils the theoretical 
criteria, then that person helps to locate others through her or his social networks.”   In 
selecting the first interviewees, the Chamber of Commerce and Trade, the Bangladesh Tax 
Lawyers Association and the Association of Chartered Accountants would be consulted. This 
might  provide  an  idea  about  which  people  would  be  useful  sources  of  information  on 
corporate tax issues. 
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3.10.3 Data Triangulation 
 
 
The data for the research would be collected from multiple sources. Table 3.2 provides a 
complete  picture  of  data  sources  and  data  triangulation  for  each  of  the  dependent, 
independent and control variables. Survey and interviews would be the central data collection 
methods for the independent and control variables. For the dependent variable, the LTU 
database would be the only source. 
 
Table 3.2: Data triangulation chart 
 
Variables Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 
a. Dependent variable    
Filing compliance Documents   
Reporting compliance Documents   
Payment compliance Documents   
Composite compliance Documents   
b. Independent variables    
Penalty Survey Interview Documents 
Imprisonment Survey Interview Documents 
Tax audit Documents Interview Documents 
Taxpayer service Survey Interview  
Simplified tax law Survey Interview  
Mutual understanding Survey Interview  
c. Control variables    
Corporation size Survey  Documents 
Marginal tax rates Survey Interview Documents 
Ownership pattern Survey Interview Documents 
Corporate locationality Survey  Documents 
Corporate sector affiliation   Documents 
Employee salaries  Interview Documents 
Corporate age   Documents 
Type of tax advisor Survey  Documents 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own table 
 
 
In many cases, tax office documents such as tax files, tax registers, reports, and 
correspondence would be used to check the reliability of data collected from other sources. In 
the case of employee pay, to be used as a control variable, interview and document analysis 
would be the major sources of data collection. Employee pay data could be found in the 
audited financial statements of corporations submitted with their tax returns. A request for 
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information about respondents‟ income in a mailed questionnaire is highly likely to be 
unanswered and may increase non-response. 
 
 
3.11 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size 
 
 
For the questionnaire survey in this study, a stratified random sampling was to be adopted, 
where every item of the strata would have an equal chance of being selected. Random 
sampling is the precondition for generalizing research findings over a population and 
stratification of the sample preserves all the advantages of random sampling except the 
disadvantage of a reduced confidence interval (Gorard and Taylor, 2004; De Vaus, 2009). An 
advantage of stratified sampling is that separate results may be generated for each stratum, 
which is important for comparative performance. As the sample size increases, the sample 
distribution approaches normal.  Sample size affects the level of precision, the statistical level 
of confidence and the variability one expects (Lohr, 2010). 
 
Heuristically, a sample size needs to be five to ten times higher than the number of 
independent  variables  (Gorard  and  Taylor,  2004).  It  is  also  suggested  that  for  a  useful 
analysis the minimum size of the sample should be 30, and three factors should be considered 
while determining sample size: margin of error; the confidence or alpha level; and the degree 
of variability of interest (Tabacnick, and Fidell, 1996). In social science research, the alpha 
level applied in determining sample size is .05 or .01, with the tradition of using .05 more 
commonly. And the standard margin of error is 5% for categorical data (Lohr, 2010). Israel 
(2009) suggests using the following formula to determine the sample size for a given 
population. 
 
n = N/ [1+N (e) 2] 
 
 
where 
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n= sample size 
N= population 
e = alpha level 
 
Using the above formula, the sample size derived for the study is: 
 
n = 275/ [(1+275(.05)2] = 162 
 
 
From the above calculation, the sample size for the study is 162. This calculation of sample 
size is also corroborated by the sample size estimation formula by Lohr (2010). On the basis 
of corporate sector characteristics, the large corporate taxpayers in the proposed research 
would be divided into three groups: finance, manufacturing and service. Of a total of 275 
large corporations, 147 belonged to the finance sector, for example, banks, insurance, and 
leasing corporations. Of the remainder, 76 corporations belonged to the manufacturing sector, 
including cement, pharmaceuticals, and textiles; and 52 belonged to the service sector.   Of 
the 162 sample, proportionately, a total of (147x162/275) = 87 would be taken from the 
finance sector, (76x162/275) = 44 from manufacturing sector, and (52x162/275) = 31 from 
service sector. In selecting the sample, standard random sampling tables would be used . 
 
For qualitative data, this research planned to conduct a total of 30 interviews, ten from each 
of  the  elite  group:  large  corporations,  tax  officials  and  tax  professionals.  However,  in 
snowball  interviewing  it  is  difficult  to  decide  the  number  of  respondents  in  advance. 
Moreover, as with a survey questionnaire, there is no standard sampling technique to be used 
for interview respondents. In interviewing these two opposite groups of people, a sequence 
would be maintained so that the answers of one group of respondents could be investigated 
against those of the other group. 
 
3.12 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
 
Data analysis refers to the systematic processing, searching and arrangement of data to elicit 
the meanings that lie behind its surface content (Onyebuchi, 2007). Denscumbe (2007:243) 
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mentions that the purpose of data analysis is “to probe the data in a way that helps to identify 
the crucial components ... to explain the nature of the things being studied with the aim of 
arriving at some general conclusion.” Data interpretation, on the other hand, is the generation 
of ideas from the analysed data and the relating of them to the relevant literature and broader 
concepts (Bogdan and Biklen, 1998). Since data can be either in numbers or in words, they 
can be analysed quantitatively or qualitatively (Tashakkhori and Teddlie, 2003). As explained 
in section 3.7, this study would conduct both quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The 
quantitative analysis would include descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics 
would organize, analyse and present survey data through numerical and tabular techniques 
(Argyrous, 2011; Bryman, 2004). Uni-variate and multivariate techniques would tease out the 
important features of the data set and its distribution. The answer to the first research sub- 
question (see section 3.4.1) would be made through descriptive statistics that includes 
frequency, ratio, average and standard deviation. 
 
In finding an answer to the second and third research sub-questions (see sections 3.4.2 and 
 
3.4.3), inferential statistics would be needed to ensure that randomized samples accurately 
represented the population, and sampling errors did not distort the relationship between the 
dependent  and  independent  variables  (Heiman,  2010).  Two  important  aspects  of  the 
inferential procedure are the design and the scale of measurement of the dependent variable 
(Heiman, 2010). This research was to be based on a cross-sectional design with the dependent 
variable being measured nominally by binary responses and therefore requiring a non- 
parametric  inferential  procedure.  It  would  use  logistic  regression  as  the  base  model  to 
establish the relationship between the variables. Later, the robustness of the relationships 
would be checked by advanced data mining (e.g., CHAID) and multi-level logistic models. 
However, the limitation of regression-based analysis is that it does not shed light on the 
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causal chain underlying the relationship between the variables (Kittel, 2006). Therefore, 
qualitative data would be analysed by the interpretative approach. 
 
3.12.1 Quantitative Analysis 
 
 
The quantitative analysis for this research would begin with descriptive statistics, specifically 
frequencies and cross-tabulations. Frequencies would mainly be used to measure tax 
compliance with respect to the major demographic characters of large corporations. Cross- 
tabulations would include chi-square tests to assess the extent to which the survey could 
measure the variables and correlation, in order to make a preliminary assessment of the co- 
variation, association or degree of relationships between the variables (Chou, 1975; Simpson 
and Kafka, 1971). The next requirement would be to see how much impact the independent 
variables had on the dependent variable, or to estimate the magnitude of the effect of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable, by running regression analysis (De Vaus, 
2009). Regression analysis is of two kinds: simple (one dependent and one independent 
variable) or multiple (single dependent and one or more independent variables). Multiple 
regressions have a better or more complete name – ordinary least squares multiple linear 
regressions, or simply OLS regressions (Allison, 1999). 
 
OLS  regression  models  might  have  been  the  best  option  to  study  the  impact  of  the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. But such models run into problems in 
maintaining two of their basic assumptions when the dependent variable is dichotomous, as it 
is in the present study: a) homoscedasticity – the variance of the random disturbance term – is 
equal for all observations; and b) the random disturbances are normally distributed (Allison, 
1999). Allison states that because the dichotomous variable can have only two values – one 
or zero – the disturbance term too can have only two values, and therefore it is impossible for 
it  to  have  a  normal  distribution.  Again,  the  variance  of the  disturbance  terms  must  be 
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different for different observations when it varies as a function of the independent variable. 
For these reasons, this research would adopt a logistic regression analysis, or logit analysis, to 
estimate the magnitude of effects between the variables. 
 
To analyse the data, logistic regression would be conducted by the enter method, which 
allows simultaneous entry of all independent variables into the model and then individually 
analyses the influence of each independent variable on the dependent variable (Andrew et al., 
2011).  In other words, under this method an independent variable is entered into the model 
as if it were entered after all other variables, and its contribution to the model is evaluated in 
terms of what it adds to or detracts from the model (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996). Enter as a 
regression method is important to maximize the predictive power of the regression equation. 
 
Other possible methods were stepwise regression and the hierarchical method. Stepwise 
regression is used for large sets of independent variables; and the hierarchical method is used 
when the researcher knows from past experience or believes that one set of independent 
variables is more important than the other set of variables (Andrew et al., 2011; Bajpai, 2011). 
As regards the stepwise method, Rawlings et al. (1998) warn that it should not be used 
blindly without thoroughly checking any deficiencies and validating the regression outputs 
against an independent data set. 
 
3.12.1.1 The Logit Model 
 
 
To understand logistic regression models, it is important to understand odds and odds ratio, a 
better scale for comparison of the relationship between two dichotomous variables.  The odds 
of an event is the ratio of the expected number of times that an event will occur to the 
expected number of times that it will not occur. Odds of four means four times as many 
occurrences as non-occurrences. Odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of a proposition or event 
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occurring in one group to the odds of it occurring in another group. Odds can be translated 
into probability values by the following simple formula (Hair et al., 2006): 
 
O= (p/ 1-p) = probability of event/ probability of no event 
 
 
P=O/1+O 
 
 
In logit models, the estimated coefficients of the independent variables can be interpreted 
using either the logit value or the odds value as shown here: 
 
Logiti = ln [probevent/1-probevent] = β0+ β1X1 + β2X2 + … + βnXn ……… (Equation 3.1) 
 
Oddsi = ln [probevent/1-probevent] = eβ + β X
 + β X + … + β X  ………… (Equation 3.2) 0 1  1 2  2 n  n 
 
 
 
 
The two formulations are equivalent, with the only difference being in how the coefficients 
are interpreted. The left hand side of the equation – the one before the equal sign – is called 
logit and it is the log of the odds of an event occurring. β0, β1, β2 and βn are the coefficients 
for the respective variables X1, X2 and Xn. The coefficients measure the change in the ratio of 
the probabilities. In the first model (e.g., equation 3.1), the logistic coefficients are expressed 
in logarithms, and so are difficult to interpret. In the second model (e.g., equation 3.2), the 
coefficients  are  expressed  in  exponentiated  logistic  coefficients  (i.e.,  the  antilog  of  the 
original logistic coefficients), and therefore are easy to understand. The value e is the 
exponential constant, approximately equal to 2.71818, and its defining property is log (ex) = x. 
 
Logistic regression has some important advantages over OLS regression. The independent 
variables can be quantitative or categorical or mixed (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2010). It does 
not have disturbance terms, and can measure independent variables without error. However, 
this  does  not  mean  that  logistic  regressions  are  deterministic  rather  than  probabilistic. 
Another advantage is that independent variables do not require a normal distribution and a 
linear functional relationship. Logistic regressions use the maximum likelihood procedure, 
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which  instead  of  minimizing  the  least  squares,  as  in  OLS  regressions,  maximizes  the 
likelihood that an event will occur (Hair et al., 2006). It follows that logistic regressions 
require the following assumptions: that there is no multicollinearity; that there is no 
specification error (i.e., important independent variables are included and unimportant ones 
are excluded); and that the independent variables are measured at summative response scale, 
interval or ratio level (Meyers et al., 2006). 
 
3.12.1.2 Model Specification and Measurement of Variables 
 
 
In our econometric model, compliance would be modelled as a function of the selected 
coercive and persuasive instruments. This research would divide tax compliance into three 
components: filing, reporting and payment, and these would be summed to find the overall 
compliance performance. In total, therefore, four logit models would have to be run: the first 
equation would model the impact of the independent variables on filing compliance; the 
second equation on reporting compliance; the third equation on payment compliance; and the 
fourth one on overall compliance. Thus the four models would be as follows: 
 
a) Filing Compliance Equation 
 
ln(probFilCom /1-probFilCom) = β0+β1TaxPen+β2TaxAud+ β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ+ 
β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd+ β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn+ 
β9Corloc + β10CorpSect +β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal+ 
β13CorAge+β14TaxAdv 
 
(Equation 3.3) 
 
 
 
 
b) Reporting Compliance Equation 
 
ln(probRepCom/1-probRepCom) = β0+β1TaxPen+β2TaxAud+ β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ+ 
β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd+ β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn+ 
β9Corloc + β10CorpSect +β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal+ 
β13CorAge+β14TaxAdv 
(Equation 3.4) 
 
 
c) Payment Compliance Equation 
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ln(probPayCom/1-probPayCom) = β0+β1TaxPen+β2TaxAud+ β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ+ 
β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd+ β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn+ 
β9Corloc + β10CorpSect +β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal+ 
β13CorAge+β14TaxAdv 
(Equation 3.5) 
 
d) Overall Compliance Equation 
 
ln(probOvlCom/1-probOvlCom) = β0+β1TaxPen+β2TaxAud+ β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ+ 
β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd+ β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn+ 
β9Corloc + β10CorpSect +β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal+ 
β13CorAge+β14TaxAdv 
(Equation 3.6) 
 
Where: 
 
ProbFilCom -probability of filing compliance(For Equation 3.3) 
ProbRepCom -probability of reporting compliance(For Equation 3.4) 
ProbPayCom -probability of payment compliance(For Equation 3.5) 
ProbOvlCom - probability of overall compliance(For Equation 3.6) 
 
 
 
Where for all equations: 
 
TaxPen - Usefulness of tax penalty 
TaxAud - Tax audit adjustments 
Imprison - Effectiveness of imprisonment 
TaxServ - Quality of taxpayer service 
TaxLawSimp   - Whether the tax law is simple 
MutUnd - Whether mutual understanding is good 
CorSiz - Total assets of the large corporation 
CorOwn - Ownership pattern 
Corloc - Locational identity - local or multinational 
CorpSect - Sector affiliation - finance, manufacturing or service 
MarTaxRate -Corporate marginal tax rate 
EmpSal - Salaries paid to employees 
CorAge - Age of incorporation 
TaxAdv - Nature of tax advisor appointed 
 
 
 
In the above equations, the left hand column measures the log of the odds for each of the 
models. The independent and control variables for all the models are the same. The variables 
and the notations are defined as follows. 
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3.12.1.3 Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 
The dependent variable for regression and other statistical analysis was to be tax compliance, 
which would be measured as a dichotomous variable. A variable is dichotomous when it can 
have  only  two  possible  values.  Examples  of  dichotomous  variables  include  gender, 
pregnancy, employment status – that is one is male or female, pregnant or not pregnant, 
employed or not employed (Nachmias and Guerrero, 2011). In the current research, tax 
compliance was dichotomous because a large corporate taxpayer is either compliant or no n- 
compliant. In equation 1, filing compliance is the dependent variable and the selected six 
instruments  are  the  independent  variables.  In  equation  2,  reporting  compliance,  and  in 
equation 3, payment compliance, are the dependent variables.   Equation 4 takes overall 
compliance as the dependent variable. In all cases, the selected coercive and persuasive 
instruments are the independent variables. These variables are measured in the following way 
as shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Measurement of dependent (outcome) and independent (predictor) variables 
 
 
 
Variables Symbols Descriptions Variable type 
Dependent variables  
Filing compliance FilCom Actual filing date (AFD) compared with statutory 
filing date (SFD). AFD occurring before SFD is 
considered filing compliance and AFD occurring 
after SFD is filing non-compliance. 
Nominal 
Reporting 
compliance 
RepCom Reported  Income  (RI)  compared  with  audited 
income (AI) adjusted with appeal effects. RI equal 
to AI is treated as reporting compliance and RI 
less than AI is treated as non-compliance. 
Nominal 
Payment 
compliance 
PayCom Actual  tax  payment  (ATP)  is  compared  with 
statutory tax payment (STP). ATP higher or equal 
to STP leads to payment compliance and ATP less 
than STP is payment non-compliance. 
Nominal 
Overall 
compliance 
OvlCom Compliant in all three components; meaning AFD 
occurring before SFD, RI equal to AI, and ATP 
higher or equal to STP. 
Nominal 
Independent variables  
Tax penalty TaxPen Measuring the usefulness of  penalties for non- 
compliance       based on respondent‟s stated 
preference  on    a  five-point  Likert  scale  of  1- 
Ordinal 
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  Strongly  Agree,  2  -Agree,  3  -Undecided,  4  - 
Disagree and 5 -Strongly Disagree. 
 
Tax audit TaxAud Audit adjustments made by tax audit action in the 
LTU are common log transformed to smooth out 
the possibility of distribution having very low and 
very high audit demand 
Continuous 
Imprisonment Imprison Measuring the effectiveness  of  imprisonment 
based on respondent‟s stated preference on a 
five-point Liker scale of 1 - Strongly Agree, 2- 
Agree, 3-Undecided, 4-Disagree and 5-Strongly 
Disagree. 
Ordinal 
Taxpayer service TaxServ Measuring the quality of taxpayer service based 
on respondent‟s stated preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 - Very Good, 2 - Good, 3 - Fair, 
4 - Poor and 5 - Very Poor. 
Ordinal 
Simplified tax law TaxLawSimp Measuring whether tax law is simple based on 
respondent‟s stated preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 - Strongly Agree, 2 - Agree, 3 - 
Undecided,   4   -   Disagree   and      5-   Strongly 
Disagree. 
Ordinal 
Mutual 
understanding 
MutUnd Measuring  how  good  is  mutual  understanding 
between the corporations and the LTU authority 
on a five-point Likert scale of 1 - Very Good, 2 - 
Good, 3 - Fair, 4 - Poor and 5 -Very Poor. 
Ordinal 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own table 
 
To explain the dichotomous dependent variable, usually a suitable cumulative distribution 
function  (CDF)  is  used  (Christensen,  1997).  The  logit  models  use  cumulative  logistic 
functions where the probability of the random variable is no larger than a given value when 
the total order is defined. This, however, is not the only probability distribution function. 
There may be a normal probability distribution function describing a random variable as an 
approximation that tends to cluster around a single mean. In some cases, normal cumulative 
functions are found to be the most useful. The estimating model that uses a normal CDF is 
known as the probit model, and this could have been an alternative to the logit model. 
Practically, there is little difference between the logit and the probit models, because they 
produce  similar  results.  UCLA  (2007:1)  states that,  “In  logistic  regression…the 
transformation is the logit function which is the natural log of the odds… in probit models the 
function used is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution …in reality, this 
difference isn't too important:  both transformations are equally good at linearizing the model; 
which one you use is a matter of personal preference.” However, the estimates of parameters 
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of the two models are not directly comparable (Demaris, 2004; Shariff et al., 2009).  For this 
research, therefore, probit analysis would not be required. 
 
3.12.1.4 Control Variables 
 
 
The expression control variable refers to a possible independent variable other than the 
variable of interest that is held constant in statistical models (Kantowitz et al., 2009). 
According to Brym and Lie (2007: 661), “A control variable is a variable whose influence is 
removed from the association between an independent and a dependent variable.” We control 
variables because there is always a possibility that the relationship between the dependent 
and  the  independent  variable  is  explained  away  by  other  variables,  called  extraneous 
variables (Rubin and Babbie, 2010; Porta, 2008). For example, tax advisors might influence 
the relationship between filing compliance and penalty. When the role of tax advisor is 
considered by putting it in the statistical model, it is no longer an extraneous variable, but a 
control variable. Healey (2009:409) states that, “Control variables come from the theory 
underlying the research project and from creative and imaginative thinking and planning 
during the early phases of the project.” 
 
Following  a  review  of  the  relevant  literature,  eight  control  variables  were  chosen  for 
inclusion because they were thought to have an influence on tax compliance (see Table 3.4). 
These  included  corporate  demographic  factors  –  size,  ownership  pattern,  locationality, 
corporate sector and  incorporation age.  Also  included  were marginal tax rate, employee 
salaries and  type of tax adviser  appointed. The demographic  features would  be used  as 
control variables because compliance behaviour might be affected by the age of incorporation, 
ownership pattern and similar factors. There were enough theoretical and empirical reasons 
why the marginal tax rate imposed, or the salaries paid to tax administration employees, 
might  impact  on  the  study  findings.  Similarly,  whether  tax  advisors  were  hired  on  a 
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temporary contract or appointed full time might affect tax compliance. Theoretical arguments 
regarding this are presented in Appendix A.  The control variables were measured from tax 
office records in the following way. 
 
Table 3.4: Measurement of control variables 
 
 
 
Control variables Symbol Description Variable type 8 
Corporate size CorSiz Measured on the basis of corporate 
total assets, and common log 
transformed to smooth out the 
possibility  of  distribution  having 
low and high assets 
Continuous 
 
Corporate ownership 
CorOwn Defined  on  the basis whether  the 
shares of the corporation are traded 
in the stock market. 
Nominal 
Corporate locationality Corloc Decided  on  the  basis  of  foreign 
equity finance in  the corporation. 
25% or more foreign equity is 
treated  as  multinational   and  all 
other as local. 
Nominal 
Corporate sector 
affiliation 
CorSect Decided on the basis of goods and 
services produced by the 
corporations. The categories are: 
finance, manufacturing and service. 
Nominal 
Marginal tax rate MarTaxRate Actual corporate marginal tax rates 
imposed. Three different rates are 
27.5%, 37.5% and 45%. 
Ordinal 
Employee salaries EmpSal Measured  on  the  basis  of  total 
salary paid to the staff divided by 
staff number. To normalize the 
distribution, figures are natural log 
transformed. 
Continuous 
Corporate age CorAge Considers       how       long       the 
corporation has been running the 
business and counted by the period 
of time from the date of business 
incorporation  to  current  date. 
Three age groups are:  7-10 years 
old, 11-14 years old and 15 years 
or more. 
Nominal 
 
 
 
 
 
8A variable is continuous if it can take different values at different times, for example income or age.  A variable 
is nominal when it refers to a classification or category of individual items without any rank order among them, 
for example, gender or religious identity.   A variable is ordinal when the nominal categorization holds a 
meaningful sequence. A continuous variable is a quantitative variable, whereas nominal and ordinal variables 
are qualitative variables. 
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Type of tax adviser 
appointed 
TaxAdv Looks  at  how  the  corporate  tax 
compliance issues are resolved. 
Three major categories are: in- 
house tax department; temporary 
contract tax professional; both-in 
house and temporary contract 
professionals. 
Nominal 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own table 
 
 
 
3.12.2 Scaling Techniques: The Stated Versus the Revealed Preference 
 
Methods 
 
 
This  research  would  employ  Likert-type  scaling  in  measuring  respondent  attitudes  to 
variables. Three common scales used for measuring attitudes are: differential scales, 
cumulative scales, and summative scales (Bordens and Abbott, 1991). The Likert scale is a 
summative scale that adds up the scores of items to measure the variables, and therefore is 
easy to understand and construct. The other scales, cumulative and differential, are hard to 
construct and often inefficient because of a higher probability of response error. Likert -type 
scaling  is  more  useful  because  the  social  world  is  a  mult i-dimensional  one  where  a 
summative scale fits better than cumulative or the differential scales, which seek to study the 
uni-dimensionality of the problem (Hoyle et al., 2001). In scaling, a common issue is how 
many categories are desirable to reflect the respondents‟ attitudes. It is argued that for better 
 
reliability and validity, the number of categories can go from a minimum 5 up to 10, 
depending on the type of the variable to be measured (Sullivan, 2001).  This research would 
use a five-point scale and the categories would be regarded as forming an ordinal scale. 
 
In any scaling technique, the respondent‟s attitudes or opinions are drawn out by the direct 
asking of hypothetical questions or by looking at their real, expressed behaviour. The former 
 
is called “the stated preference method” and the latter is called “the revealed preference 
method.” The Likert scale, as a scaling technique, is based on the stated preference method, 
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which has its benefits and limitations just like the revealed preference method. It is important 
to bear in mind these benefits and limitations while reading the analytical framework. 
 
Stated preference methods employ hypothetical data to predict  the  ex-ante impact of an 
action or policy change using contingent valuation and conjo int analysis (including logistic 
regression)  techniques  (Whitehead  et  al.,  2007).  Questions  are  asked  about  a  particular 
concept (e.g., about the probable impact of specific tax compliance instrument in this case) 
over a range of fixed alternatives (Louviere et al., 2000) and the respondents freely state their 
opinions  and  attitudes  about  the  concepts  (Mitchell  and  Carson,  1989;  Bateman  et  al., 
2003).While asking a question, a hypothetical situation and problem are posed to the 
respondents. Respondents are presented with multiple scenarios and are requested to choose 
among them. 
 
The strong point of stated preference approaches is their flexibility, and they can be used to 
create practical policy scenarios for the most novel policies. Hypothetical questioning  is, 
most often, the only way to gain information from respondents about policies and concepts, 
and to measure the non-use value of these.  Another advantage is that preference indicators 
can be ranked or rated to reflect the choice. The major flaw of stated preference methods is 
their imaginary or hypothetical scenario. It may be difficult to gain information when 
respondents are faced with unknown imaginary situations. In such cases, respondents may 
give unhelpful, meaningless answers to the questions. 
Revealed preference approaches, on the other hand, depend on ex-post data to measure a 
policy or a concept (Andreoni et al., 2011). For example, the traveller‟s decision to visit a 
 
new tourist spot can be measured in terms of the price he or she paid to enjo y the spot in 
comparison to other spots (Whitehead et al., 2007).  The strength of this approach is that it is 
dependent on real information. The approach employs real cost -benefit data relating to a 
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choice made rather than being based on hypothetical cost-benefit data, as in the stated 
preference approach. Choices made on real costs and benefits, or on practical information, 
reveal a real preference for some action, and therefore the measurement becomes objective. 
This  approach  is  used  in  measuring  the  consistency of consumers‟ choices  in  studying 
 
consumer behaviour, for example in measuring the demand for goods. The main limitation of 
the method is that it only counts historical data and past experience. Often, new policy 
instruments or products need to be measured, and in such cases this method suffers from 
measurement error, particularly in the case of measuring intangibles. 
 
3.12.3 Measuring the Impact of Corporate Context: CHAID and Multilevel 
 
Models 
 
 
As discussed in section 3.4.2, logistic regression would identify the statistically significant 
instruments for tax compliance. It does not, however, throw any light on the effect of context 
variables on the dependent-independent-variable relationship, which is important to answer 
research sub-questions 2 and 3 to be presented in chapter 6. Context variables are the unique 
research characteristics that may have an influence on the outcome variable (Aykin, 2009; 
Ingrassia et al., 2011). Three corporate demographic features were suitable to be taken as the 
context variables for this study: corporate sector affiliation, corporate location and corporate 
ownership.  Based on respondent interviews, logistic regression outputs and the pattern of the 
LTU dataset, this research would select the appropriate context variable (see sections 5.5.5 
and 6.3.2). In the Deloitte analysis of large corporate risk profiles, the sector characteristics of 
the corporations, their location and structure, were considered as important contextual factors 
(see section 2.10.4). Hanlon et al. (2005) also argue that if there are particular characteristics 
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that may facilitate abusive tax practices, for example, corporate intangibles9, these need to be 
modelled in the equation. 
 
3.12.3.1The CHAID Model 
 
 
With this purpose in mind, CHAID (Chi-squared automatic interaction detection) models 
would be run first, so as to provide “a cross-over analysis... to correlate themes emerging 
from a qualitative analysis with quantitative variables”, as argued by Onwuegbuzie and 
Collins (2010:297). CHAID is an algorithm assuming that dependent and independent 
variables can be segmented into different layers and the most significantly related segments 
can be identified (Kass, 1980; Pietersen and Daminaov, 1998; Lowe and Hughes, 2002). For 
its data mining structures, CHAID is eminently good for interpreting logistic regression and 
producing multi-level splits as graphical tree outputs (Ratner, 2003). CHAID is considered 
appropriate when the dependent variable is dichotomous and the independent variables are 
ordinal and/or nominal, as in the proposed study. 
 
The essential characteristics of the CHAID algorithm are merging, splitting and stopping. For 
each  independent  variable  X,  it  merges  those  categories  that  are  non-significant  and 
maintains the ones that are significant, called child nodes (Chen, 2009).  In the splitting stage, 
the best predictor for each of the final categories or child nodes is selected. The splitting 
process stops when the best predictor for each of the child nodes is found. In the case of 
dichotomous and other non-metric variables, a chi-square test is suggested for merging and 
splitting, whereas in case of metric variables, F statistics are used (Schmidt and Hollensen, 
2006; Diepen and Franses, 2006). Chi-square tests are used in the case of discontinuous data 
 
involving mutually exclusive categories (e.g., tax compliant and non-compliant) and allow 
 
9Corporate intangibles refer to any gain that accrues to the shareholders through a lower effective tax rate. Such 
gains get eroded when competitors in the same sector enjoy similar benefits (Hanlon et al., 2005). 
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testing of whether the categories are significantly different, although drawn from the same 
populations (Field, 2010). They also allow comparison of the observed frequencies with the 
theoretical frequencies derived from a particular hypothesis. The general formula for chi- 
square is: 
 
χ2 = ∑ [(fo-fe) 2/fe]                                     (Equation 3.7) 
 
Where, 
 
fo= observed frequency 
fe= expected or theoretical frequency 
For a 2 x 2 table, an alternative formula may be 
χ2 = N (ad- bc) 2/ (a+b) (c+d) (a+c) (b+d) 
 
 
 
In the performance of chi-square tests, as above, the fragmentation process will continue until 
no more significant relationships are found between the dependent and the independent 
variables (Eherler and Lehmann, 2007). The segmentation process and the results of CHAID 
for tax compliant and non-compliant groups can be illustrated by the following diagram: 
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Figure 3.2:  Data segmentation in CHAID based tree diagram 
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Source: Adapted from Eherler and Lehmann, 2007. 
 
 
 
The nodes in the diagram as in Figure 3.2 signify sample sub categories. The core node 
includes the entire sample and the complete frequencies ni for each category of Y. At the next 
stage of the diagram, the sample is segmented by the best predictor, X1, of the outcome 
variable. The child notes under the best predictor represent the categories of the predictors 
and show the frequencies of the outcome variable related to that particular category. The 
sample can be further segmented by the other predictors, X2 and X3. The segmentation 
continues until the best predictor for each of the child nodes is found. 
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3.12.3.2Multilevel Logistic Regression (xtlogit): Fixed and Random Effects 
 
 
 
 
An important aspect of the analysis that still remains unexplored is the proportion of variation 
in the coefficients that  is explainable  by the context  variable.  Whether  the character or 
content of an item exerts any influence on the target variable can be studied by several 
models,  for  instance  item  theory  analysis,  structural  equation  modelling  and  multilevel 
models (Balluerka et al., 2010). This study specifically focuses on multilevel models 
(Raudenbush, 1993; Goldsten, 1987; Snijders and Bosker, 1999; StataCorp; 2011) for two 
reasons: first, multi-level models can combine the results obtained from logistic regressions 
and compare them with one another to explain the observed variations in the coefficients. 
Second, the hierarchical nature of the data – for example the large corporate taxpayers are 
embedded into different corporate sectors – and its influence on the target variable can be 
studied. Multi-level modelling, unlike OLS regression, assumes that the observations we 
make are not independent of each other but rather that observations are dependent or nested 
into one another (Kreft and Leeuw, 1998). The multilevel model for dichotomous dependent 
variable can also be called hierarchical logit model, xtlogit model or multilevel logistic 
regression. Therefore, this study used these terms interchangeably. 
 
The form of the model depends on the number of levels or tiers in the data, and it can take a 
minimum of two levels to a maximum of six levels (Luke, 2005). This study opted for two 
levels:  the level-1 model would take large corporate taxpayers (subject level) as the unit of 
analysis; and the level-2 model would take corporate characteristics (item levels) as the unit 
of analysis. Therefore the level-1 models would be the logistic regression models and the 
level-2  models would be the ones treating the coefficients of the logistic regressions as 
random  variables,  whose  variations  would  be  explained  by  the  context  variable.  The 
variations would be estimated in two parts: one part covering the slope of the overall model – 
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called the fixed effects – and the other part covering the slope variance that is the divergence 
of each group from the overall slope – called the random effects (Stata Corp, 2011; Hamilton, 
2008; Field, 2010). 
 
 
 
To explain the multilevel model, the standard logistic regression model would be taken as the 
baseline approach, and this would assume the intercept, β0, and the slopes or coefficients, β1, 
as fixed. In multilevel models, the assumption of regression models that intercepts and 
coefficients are fixed is challenged, and it is argued that intercepts and coefficients can be 
random and may change and therefore the logit model needs to be amended in the following 
way: 
 
Logit (p/ p-1) = β0+ β1X1 +β2X2 + … + βnXn                       (Equation 3.8) 
 
Amending the standard logistic model with fixed and random effects (Hedeker, 2008), the 
model yields: 
 
Logit (pij/ pij-1) = (β0 + u0j) + ( β1 +u1j)X1 + (β2 +u2j)X2 + …+ (βn + unj )Xn 
 
(Combined model- Equation 3.9) 
Multilevel logistic models typically include a systematic component and a random error that 
is  independent  of  subjects  and  cluster  (Congdon,  2006),  because  random  variables  are 
selected from probability distributions (Kreft and Leeuew, 1998). Thus the model becomes: 
 
Logit (pij/ pij-1)= (β0 +u0j) +(β1 +u1j)X1 + (β2 + u2j)X2 + … + (βn + unj )Xn + εij 
 
(Equation 3.10) 
In the literature of multilevel models, the combined model (equation 3.9) above can be 
described by the following equations (Guo and Zhao, 2000; Cho, 2003). 
 
Logit (pij/ pij-1) = β0j + β1xij 
 
(level 1 model) 
 
(Equation 3.11) 
 
β0j =β0 +uoj 
 
(level 2 model) 
 
(Equation 3.12) 
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The intercept has changed from a fixed β0 to a random β0j, and the slope has changed from a 
fixed β1 to β1j, which can be shown in separate equations: 
 
β0j =β0 +u0j, where u0j is normally distributed (0,σu0
2)                              (Equation 3.13) 
 
β1j = β1+u1j                                                                                                                                                        (Equation 3.14) 
 
 
The js in both equations reflect variations in the intercept and the slopes, where β0 and β1 
imply  the  mean  of  the  intercept  and  the  slopes,  therefore  u0j  and  u1j   are  the  variance 
parameters (Mourouga, 2004). Also, β0 and β1 measure the fixed and u0j and u1j the random 
effects of the model. In running the model, Stata xt procedures, such as xtlogit models, are 
applied (Xie and Powers, 2008; Menard, 2009). In Stata 11.00 the xt commands are 
documented in the cross-sectional time-series manual, which offers tools for analysing cross- 
sectional one off datasets (Stata Corp, 2011; Mourouga, 2004). In deciding the panel or group 
variable for the xtlogit model, an analysis of other contending panels, for example, corporate 
ownership patterns and corporate local and national identity, would be checked, in addition to 
the review of interview transcripts (see section 6.6.1). 
 
In the case of dichotomous dependent variables, the estimation of between-group variance is 
similar to the estimation of chi-square tests (see 3.14.2.1) and the estimation of within-group 
variance is a function of the group mean (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Leeuw and Meijer, 
2008). These suggest that in multilevel models, sector level aggregate measurements, for 
example the mean filing compliance of a particular sector should be treated as the outcome 
variable. 
 
3.12.4 Qualitative Evidence: Interpretative Approach 
 
 
A strong approach to data analysis is to explain the meaning of quantitative results on the 
basis of qualitative data. This research would conduct semi-structured interviews among elite 
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respondents  from  large  corporations  and  from  the  tax  administration.  In  analysing  the 
 
massive interview data, and to give meaning to the respondents‟ observations, an 
interpretational  approach,  also  called  interpretivisim,  would  be  followed.  This  approach 
 
focuses not only on the individual, but also on the unique individual context to explain and 
predict human experiences (Holloway, 1997; Heeks, 2001). It argues that numerical 
measurements are probabilistic and produce the analysed data mechanically, whereas 
qualitative  measurement  of  data  concerns  itself  with  an  interpretative  understanding  of 
human actions. In defining interpretivisim, Holloway (1997: 93) states that, “the experiences 
of peoples are essentially context-bound and not free from time, location or the mind of the 
human actor.” Interpretivisim emphasizes the researcher‟s understanding and the marrying of 
 
the social construction of the organization with individual behaviours (Capper, 1993). The 
researcher does not enter into the social setting with an a priori construct; rather, he or she 
develops concepts through natural interaction with respondents. The researcher in this way 
earns reflexivity that allows him/her to place in the research context as the main research tool. 
This makes the interpretivist approach a naturalistic inquiry that minimizes the researchers‟ 
 
manipulation of the study setting (Decorp, 2006; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Patton, 1990). 
 
 
 
The rationale for using an interpretivist approach in this study was that it would involve 
discussions with those participants who were directly involved in the research context and 
were able to influence their immediate surroundings. By using this approach, it would be 
possible to investigate the tax compliance process from the perspective of the parties who 
were involved in tax compliance generation. It would also generate empirical data and novel 
insights into the broader socio-politico-tax administrative aspects of the tax compliance 
process. 
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To describe the phenomenon under study, the interpretational analysis proceeds through 
establishing constructs, themes and patterns. According to Gall et al. (1996, quoted in 
Onyebuchi, 2007) the analytical process of this approach has five steps: (a) segmenting the 
database; (b) developing categories; (c) coding segments; (d) grouping category segments; 
and (d) drawing conclusions. There is an argument in this approach that data analysis should 
start from the field when the first interview is completed or the first document read. This 
helps to generate a possible list of coding categories, regularities and patterns (Richie and 
Lewis, 2003). Interview patterns and regularities are further processed through a creative 
logical approach based on intelligence, judgement and theoretical bases to make the data 
meaningful and explanatory (Creswell, 1998; Weston et al., 2001). 
To develop interview themes and patterns for this research, first a model reflecting 
respondents‟ experience of tax compliance would be developed that would provide a pre- 
structure for coding. Coding, as Merriam (1998) defines it, consists of short designations – in 
the form of words, letters, numbers, or any combination of these – assigned to the various 
features  of  the  data.  To  ensure  that  the  coding  represented  the  research  questions  and 
remained free from the researcher‟s personal biases, an iterative process would be followed 
 
(Weston et al., 2001; Mason, 2000). 
 
 
 
From the coded data, a matrix (Glesne and Pushkin, 1992) would be designed to show how 
instrument  patterns  were  linked  with  compliance  performance.  By creating  patterns  and 
themes from interviews, interpretivisim seeks to explain textual narratives and to make sense 
of them (Victor, 2007; Bevir, 2005; Corvellec, 2006; Mason, 2000). This research would 
gather data from tax office records, reports, income tax laws and other relevant laws, besides 
interviewing respondents. Therefore, explaining the text narratives would be another 
contribution of the interpretive analysis approach. Text narratives would be classified into 
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three categories:  what,  how and  why.    The “what” narratives would  contain the events, 
location or proper substance of tax compliance and the determinants needed to lay the story 
or the basic plot. The “how” narratives would include the discourse – the formal phrase, i.e., 
the way phrases on tax compliance and related factors were delivered by the interviewees, 
which might be straight or oblique. The story would be analysed within the plot, which would 
carry  the  connecting  sequences  of  action  and  events.  Finally,  and  most  importantly,  a 
typology consisting of explication, explanation and exploration would be adopted, which 
would answer the “why” question (Corvellec, 2006). By explication, as Corvellec (2006: 14) 
puts it, we answer the question, “What does the transcript say?” By explanation, we attempt 
to understand the question, “How does the text say what it says?” And exploration answers 
the  question,  “What  does  the  text  do  to  us?”  Altogether,  this  typology  would  make  a 
“narrative mode of knowing” (Czarniawska, 2004), the underlying logic between tax 
compliance and the selected instruments. 
 
3.13  Methodological Limitations and Constraints 
 
It is important to keep in mind several limitations regarding this study before claiming any 
authoritative conclusions. First, all the limitations commonly associated with a survey 
methodology are applicable. Of particular relevance is the possibility that participants‟ stated 
 
preference is subjective and may bias variable measurements. Wu (2005) argues that 
perceptual and self-reported psychometric data may be seriously affected by trash talking by 
respondents. Variable measurements in survey methods are also affected by how questions 
are phrased and placed (Kornhauser, 2007). However, Frey and Feld (2002: 2) point out that 
in economic theories, “Tax compliance is studied by using the subjective expected utility 
maximization calculus.” 
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An associated limitation was that the survey asked a single question on a five-point scale that 
was not part of a cluster of statements on a similar topic. Single-item questions, however, are 
not  new  in  research.  With  single-item  questions,  Khalek  (2006)  conducted  successful 
research on measuring happiness, and DeSalvo et al. (2006) on measuring health status. In 
tax compliance research, Sheffrin and Triest (1992) use a two-item question in measuring tax 
compliance and attitudes towards tax compliance; and Murphy uses two-item questions in 
measuring trust. Moreover, to mitigate this problem, respondents‟ observations  would be 
 
measured on a test and re-test basis. Martindale et al. (1992) used a Likert-type scale on a 
test-retest basis to measure attitudes to the complexity of US IRS income tax laws among tax 
professionals. And Khalek (2006) conducted a test-retest reliability check with a single-item 
Likert-type scale in his assessment of happiness among university undergraduates (Discussed 
further in section 5.3.1.2). 
A limitation of the study was that it took a sample of large corporate taxpayers from the LTU 
of Bangladesh only.   The emphasis on only one country‟s LTU would limit the external 
validity  or  generalizability  of  the  study  results.  Observations  fro m  the  large  corporate 
 
taxpayers of two separate LTUs within the same or different geographical locations would 
give further insight into how a mix of coercive and persuasive instruments influenced the 
compliance process. The results of the present study could only be generalizable to the large 
corporations of the geographical area studied. To overcome this limitation, efforts would be 
expended to take into account the corporate context. A contextual analysis of coercive and 
persuasive instruments would extend the external validity of the research to regions with 
similar contexts. 
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3.14  Chapter Conclusion and Summary 
 
 
This chapter has described the creation of the analytical framework to be employed for this 
research. It has attempted to justify the research question and the perspectives to be used in 
answering the question. The chapter has developed the logical framework for the study and 
has explained why the particular dependent, independent and control variables were selected. 
The design and the logical sequence to be followed in the research have been discussed. The 
validity and generalization issues have been reviewed. The appropriateness of the research 
method has been examined with particular emphasis on a mixed-method approach. Detailed 
discussion has been presented on sampling and data collection issues. The data analysis 
techniques to be used for the study have been elaborated. Before moving on to the data 
analysis, which is planned to start from chapter 5, a short presentation is made in chapter 4 of 
the fieldwork methods for the study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FIELDWORK METHOD 
 
 
 
 
4.1    Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the strategies and actions undertaken to collect data 
in the field. The chapter spells out the time frame of field visits, details of the survey and 
interview respondents, and the ways of establishing contact with them. It gives details of the 
collection of documents from the LTU and other wings of the tax administration. It discusses 
the checklists that helped in planning and implementing a balanced and varied fieldwork 
programme. In one sense, this chapter provides the practical programme for the theoretical 
structure we saw being designed in chapter III to guide the data collection and analysis 
techniques. It will present the significant fieldwork events and show how they were recorded 
to produce and make sense of the data.   It will show how pre-testing and piloting of the 
surveys and interviews was carried out before starting the data collection. The chapter starts 
with an introduction to the basic features of large corporate tax compliance before moving on 
to how the fieldwork plans were implemented. 
 
4.2 The Bangladesh LTU and Large Corporate Taxpayers 
 
 
The level of tax revenue in Bangladesh is among the lowest in the world. Tax collection is 
largely ad-hoc and leakage from the system is endemic. In 2002, before the LTU was 
introduced,  the  total  ratio  of  revenue  to  GDP,  at  9.7%,  was  low  compared  with  other 
countries in the region. To increase tax revenues through enhancing tax compliance by the 
biggest taxpayers, the National Board of Revenue – the apex revenue authority of Bangladesh 
established the Large Taxpayers Unit  (LTU) in November,  2003, under a DFID funded 
reform programme (NBR, 2005). Achieving this objective has been crucial, since a high 
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proportion of income tax revenue, around 30%, is collected from a few large taxpayers. It 
shows that non-compliance by a few hundred corporate taxpayers may cause a disaster in the 
revenue administration of Bangladesh. 
 
At the organizational level, four basic functions – taxpayer service, revenue accounting and 
return processing, collection enforcement, and audit – have been designated as the purpose of 
the LTU. Each of these functions, directly or indirectly, has a role in identifying non- 
compliance, with major support from the revenue accounting and audit wings. The revenue 
accounting function is to track the filing of tax returns, and the assessment and arrears 
situations, and thus identify filing and payment non-compliance. The audit function detects 
reporting non-compliance by reviewing unusual patterns and inconsistencies in tax returns. 
Revenue accounting and audit functions generate workload for the enforcement wings. The 
service function, on the other hand, is designed to educate taxpayers about complex tax laws 
and prepare documents to support legal actions in the courts. However, in practice there are 
deviations and overlapping of functions among the four wings that jeopardize the tax process 
to some extent. 
 
4.2.1 LTU Jurisdiction 
 
 
When the LTU came into being in Bangladesh in 2003, the NBR, by its order no.12 (8) kar- 
4/paribikkhan/96(aongsha-1)/2003/574,  dated  1/11/2003,  placed  254  large  corporate 
taxpayers under the LTU‟s jurisdiction. Subsequently, in tax year 2004-2005, the number of 
corporate taxpayers answerable to the LTU increased to 267; in tax year 2005-2006 the 
 
number increased to 276; and in tax year 2006-2007 it increased to 281. In contrast, during 
tax years 2007-2008 to 2009-2011, the number of corporate taxpayers dropped to 275, due to 
mergers by some large corporations, while in tax year 2011-2012, the number increased to 
317 as a result of the initiative that placed merchant banks under the LTU‟s jurisdiction. This 
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2005-2006 856 276 272 58.00 584 1 59.00 
2006-2007 878 281 265 136.00 613 3 139.00 
 
suggests that the LTU has had an increase of (317-254) = 63 corporate taxpayers during the 
last 9 years. 
 
In addition, there were 706 large individual taxpayers, who were the directors of those large 
corporations placed under LTU Jurisdiction. Large finance sector corporations are the 
mainstream corporate taxpayers, along with some large pharmaceutical and cement 
corporations. All the banking and financial corporations in Bangladesh fall under the LTU 
administration as a result of special orders of the NBR. 
 
Table 4.1 Annual returns submitted and tax collections 
 
Tax year Total 
submitted 
returns 
Corporate taxpayers Individual taxpayers Total 
collection 
(In mill. 
Taka) 
Total 
corporate 
files 
Submitted 
returns 
Tax collections 
(In mill. Taka) 
Submitted 
returns 
Tax 
collections (In 
mill. Taka)  
 
 
 2007-2008  828  275  252  323.00  576  11  334.00   
 
Source: LTU publications 
 
 
In  each  year,  as  we  see  from Table  4.1,  returns  submitted  by corporate taxpayers  fell, 
meaning a filing non-compliance. In the tax year 2007-08, (275-252) = 23 corporations did 
not submit returns or pay any taxes, which implies payment and reporting non-compliance by 
these corporations. However, quite surprisingly, tax collections have increased, even though 
there has been a decrease in filing compliance.   Tax payment by corporations at the filing 
stage, which presumably represents self-assessment returns, went up about 6-fold in 2007 
compared with 2005. This shows that some corporations paid more taxes in the tax year 
2007-2008 than in the previous tax years, perhaps, due to increased corporate profits and/or 
corporate marginal tax rates, or to decreased exemptions. Another reason for this might be the 
tough enforcements of coercive, or the gentle use of persuasive, actions, which this research 
seeks to explore. 
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2004-2005 21,000 14,756.1 (6,243.)* - 18.96 % 12.96% 55770 26% 
2005-2006 22,000 22,506.2 506. 6,750.0 52.50 % 45.5% 71620 31% 
2006-2007 31,000 31,044.8 44.8 (461.4) 37.73 % 30.53% 87210 35% 
2007-2008 39,500 40,420.0 920 8,75.2 30.10 % 21.00% 130145 31% 
2008-2009 48,000 48,100.0 100 (820. ) 19.00% 10.1% 150020 32% 
 
4.2.2 Tax Collections from Large Corporations 
 
 
The average real growth rate of income taxes paid by corporate and non-corporate taxpayers 
in the LTU during the period 2004-2009 was 24.01% (see Table 4.2), against growth in real 
GDP of 5.73% over the same period (CIA, 2010). In 2004, the total income tax collection 
from large corporate taxpayers was 14,756 (million Bangladeshi Taka).  In 2009, it rose to 
48,100 (million Bangladeshi Taka) equivalent to about 707.35 million US dollars. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2:  Annual total tax collections in the LTU in millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
 
 
 
Financial 
Year 
(1) 
Yearly 
target 
(2) 
Taxes 
collected 
(3) 
Excess/defic 
its in 
collection 
compared 
with yearly 
target 
(4) 
Increase/dec 
rease in 
collection 
compared 
with 
previous 
year(5) 
Nominal 
growth 
rate 
(6) 
Real 
growth 
rate 
(inflation 
adjusted) 
(7) 
National 
tax 
collection 
(8) 
% of LTU 
to national 
income 
tax (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LTU publications, * figures in the parentheses indicate deficit or fall in tax collect ion 
compared with previous year 
 
 
 
After the start of its fully-fledged operation in April 2004, the LTU showed a massive 
improvement in income tax collection. In each subsequent year, the targeted budget was 
achieved with surplus revenues (column 4), although the amount of the surplus fell gradually 
from 2004.  In the fiscal years 2006-2007 and 2008-2009, surplus tax collections had fallen, 
as compared with previous years (column 5), by 461.4 and 820.00 million Taka respectively. 
Notably, revenue growth in nominal and real terms had gradually decreased over the years 
(columns 6 and 7). The real growth, after making adjustment for inflation, rate of tax 
collection fell to 10.1% in the financial year 2008-2009 from 45.5% in financial year 2005- 
2006 (column 7). Targeted quantitative standards in revenue administration, however, as 
 
Crandall (2010) states, are very often set to give a simple direction to tax collection without 
133  
considering the potential for obtaining those tax revenues. Tax revenues may not rise with 
GDP growth because of important dependence on the agricultural sector or weak institutional 
capacity (World Bank, 2009; IMF, 2002). For the large corporate taxpayers, a potential 
reason for this may be a fall in the bank interest rate and its effect on the profit -making 
capacity of the banking sector, which provides 52% of LTU income tax revenues. Other 
reasons include a cut in the corporate tax rate over the years, extended tax holidays and 
accelerated depreciation allowances to corporate taxpayers. In addition, there may be 
accumulated tax arrears remaining uncollected for lack of adequate enforcement capability in 
the LTU. 
However, a striking feature of LTU revenue collection is its increasing share of national tax 
revenues. During 2004 to 2009, the LTU‟s share of tax collection in proportion to national 
income tax collection increased from one-quarter to one third. In financial year 2004-05, 
LTU‟s share of national income tax collection was 26%. In 2008-2009, the year the LTU 
reform was completed, the share went up to 32%, a net rise of 8% within five years. This 
prompts a question as to how the LTU compliance model, which claims that persuasive 
 
compliance strategies are equally as significant as, or more significant than, coercive 
strategies, contributes to improving tax compliance and revenues. 
 
4.2.3 Audit Action on Large Corporations 
 
 
Large corporations are subject to auditing on a selective basis once the deadline for return of 
submissions, as defined by the income tax law, has passed. The audit programme is based on 
those returns submitted within the time stipulated by tax law. Those who fail to submit 
returns on time incur a penalty.  Before the audit decisions are made, the tax returns are 
screened through the revenue accounting wings to detect any apparent non-compliance, for 
example, miscalculation of tax liabilities. The audit rate – the percentage of filed returns to be 
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2003-2004 80 80 0 0 5,340.0 3,320.0 
2004-2005 193 193 6 6 1,501.1 752.0 
2005-2006 196 196 6 6 3,142.3 1,527.1 
2006-2007 180 180 3 3 1,012.5 542.5 
2007-2008 84 26 0 0 112.3 23.5 
 
audited–  is  not  made  known  to  the  corporations;  but  the  audit  rate  of  large  corporate 
taxpayers in Bangladesh is usually high, given the possibility of revenue leakages from non- 
reporting. It is pertinent to mention that the rate of large corporate audit actions is high across 
the world. For example, in Hungary all large corporations are audited every second year (Pitti 
and Vazquez-Caro, 1998). In the US, the audit rate for large corporations was one in six 
(16%) in 2004 and this shot up to 64% in 2008 (TRAC Report, 2011; Dubin et al., 1990). 
 
Audit cases in the Bangladesh LTU are selected on the basis of pre-determined audit rules 
decided and approved by the NBR. Audits are of two kinds mainly – desk verification; and 
comprehensive audit. In a desk audit, tax returns and financial statements are verified away 
from the taxpayers‟ offices, without any legal engagement of the taxpayers at the point when 
 
the audit begins; while comprehensive audits start with the legal engagement of the taxpayers, 
and the audit team carefully examines how the taxpayers have attended to their statutory 
obligations under the tax laws rather than carrying out a traditional audit of the tax return. 
Comprehensive audits necessarily require fieldwork in taxpayers‟ and related offices to make 
 
the audit results acceptable to taxpayers. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Annual audit outputs from large corporate taxpayers in millions of 
Bangladeshi Taka 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax year 
(1) 
Completed audits Audit demands 
created (6) 
Collected from audit 
demands (7) 
 
Desk verification audit 
 
Comprehensive audit 
Files 
targeted to 
audit (2) 
Files audited 
(3) 
Files 
targeted to 
audit  (4) 
Files audited 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
 
  Total  733  675  15  15  11,108.2  6,165.1   
 
Source: LTU Annual Report, 2009 
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As Table 4.3 reveals, the amount of audit demands (column 6) and collections from these 
(column 7) have decreased over the years, except in tax year 2005-2006. For example, in tax 
year 2003-04, additional tax of 5,340.00 million Taka was demanded from the tax audits of 
80 files (column 2) i.e., per file audited tax demand was 66.75 million Taka. In 2005-06, per 
file audit demand decreased to 16 million, and in 2007-2008 to 1.33 million. Declining audit 
demands may have two potential explanations: first, audit actions have been successful in 
reducing the amount of income underreporting. Second, the deterrence effect of tax audit has 
fallen in the face of complicated game-playing techniques by the corporations. It should be 
noted that roughly half of the demands created in every tax year remained uncollected 
(column7), may be because the audit demands were bogus or the enforcement measures were 
weak or ineffective. 
 
4.3 Fieldwork: Major Stages 
 
 
Being effectively and correctly equipped for fieldwork not only influences the success of a 
research project but also makes a positive experience of the whole process of data collection 
(Nash, 2000; Robson and Willis,   1997). The fieldwork for this study was conducted from 
August, 2010,to November, 2010, and involved five major steps. The first step was to contact 
the LTU and other organizations to ask for data support and identify the most appropriate 
people to interview. Tax compliance data are regarded as classified information by tax 
agencies, and so it is difficult to get access without written permission from the concerned 
authority. The second step was to conduct the survey by using random sampling techniques. 
For this, a simple random table was used. A list of 275 large corporations was drawn up on a 
separate  sheet  and  the  samples  were  selected  based  on  Stat  Trek‟s computer-generated 
 
random number tables. The third important step was to design the preliminary questionnaire 
and present it to the sample respondents. 
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The fourth important step was to design a comprehensible and unthreatening, semi-structured, 
open-ended questionnaire for the interviews to be conducted among the selected elites. The 
sample interview guide is shown in Appendix C. A list of potential interviewees was drawn 
up, with their contact details, and these people were asked for an appointment at a time and 
place convenient to them. The final task was to  analyse the LTU administrative records 
involving tax files, the audit reports of the corporations, tax audit findings, related registers, 
and reports and statements prepared for taxpayers and for higher authorities, particularly the 
NBR.  Documents were mainly collected at off-peak office hours. Based on these five major 
stages, the total process of the fieldwork was broken up as follows. 
 
Table 4.4 Time taken and work flow organization of fieldwork 
 
Fieldwork task Approximate 
Duration 
1.Establishing contact with LTU 3 days 
Informal discussion 1 days 
Submitting formal letter 1 days 
Getting approval from LTU 1 days 
2.Sample design 5 days 
Sample design 2 days 
Making list of respondents 1 days 
Preparing mails 2 days 
3.Questionnaire: design and respondent opinion 35 days 
Piloting questionnaire 7 days 
Making changes in questionnaire 2 days 
Sending questionnaire to 162 respondents 1 days 
Collecting questionnaire by three research assistants 25 days 
4.Interviews 32 days 
Identifying initial interviewees 1 days 
Requesting time, appointment 1 days 
Conducting interviews 30 days 
5.Document analysis:162  tax files ( 8 tax files a day) 23 days 
6. Re-testing part of the questionnaire by assistants 20 days 
 
 
 
 
As the steps listed in Figure 4.1 show, the fieldwork involved different tasks in the six 
designated stages. The data collection process began after written permission was received 
from the LTU Commissioner. During August, in addition to making contacts, the sample 
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design and piloting of the questionnaire were partially completed. The main workload began 
in September, when the survey questionnaires were sent out to respondents and a few 
interviews were completed. Once the survey questionnaire was sent to the respondent large 
corporations by registered post, the research assistants were appointed to collect them in the 
first and second stream of survey questionnaire. The appointment of research assistants saved 
time for the researcher to conduct face-to-face in-depth interviews and collect data from tax 
office records. However, the researcher maintained telephone contact with the respondent 
corporations to make sure that the questionnaires were filled without fear or pressure. 
 
Chasing respondents by telephone continued until they finished answering the questionnaire. 
In some cases, the respondents were systematically approached three/four times to fill in the 
questionnaire.  Questions  were  asked  sparingly,  keeping  in  mind  that  large  corporate 
managers  and  directors  are  extremely  busy.  The  research  assistants  were  particularly 
instructed to collect the questionnaire once all questions had been addressed. It was therefore 
possible to get almost all questionnaires filled in (see section 5.2) and to keep non-response 
bias to the minimum. 
 
 
Checking for non-response bias10 was easier for questions 1 to 5 (see the questionnaire in 
appendix C) as they included data on corporate business type, ownership pattern, etc., and 
could be compared with LTU file records.  But there was a high possibility of response bias 
for those questions that included self-reported perceptual data. To check for bias in data 
drawn from the self-reported questions, these data were collected on a re-test basis, as 
discussed in sections 3.12 and 4.5. The reliability and validity of the self-reported data were 
checked and presented in section 5.3. 
 
 
10 In statistical surveys, non-response bias refers to a situation where the potential answers of non-respondents 
systematically differ from the answers of respondents. If the response rate is high, non-response bias causes no 
problem.  Response bias, on the other hand, relates to answers made on the basis of favouritism rather than the 
merit of the question. Both response and non-response bias can severely affect the generalizability of the study 
outcome (Edwards et al., 1997). 
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For  the  semi-structured  interview,  in  total,  27  respondents  were  interviewed.  As  the 
interviews were planned to be in-depth, and the appointments were pre-set, some interviews 
went on for three to four hours to enable a full discussion of the issues. The time frame set for 
data collection included 24 days off for weekends and public holidays. When the extent of the 
data required is considered, the time spent in the field seems reasonable, although Delamont 
(2002: 122) thinks that, “proper fieldwork is like a casserole: it should simmer for a long time 
at a low heat.” The following discussion elaborates some of the important activities in the 
field. 
 
4.4 Fieldwork Gatekeepers and Contacts 
 
 
As gatekeepers of areas of important information, the following people were contacted: the 
LTU Commissioner; a member responsible for tax administration at the NBR; a member 
responsible for tax policy at the NBR; the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes at LTU 
Headquarters; and the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes, Appeal and Enforcement at the LTU. 
In the process of negotiations with the gatekeepers, and subsequently with the participants, 
the following issues took priority: 
 
• Ensuring that these people were interested in participating in the research; 
 
• Explaining the research topic, its purpose and procedure; 
 
• Explaining the risks and benefits, if any, for taxpayers of participating in the 
research; 
• Explaining the voluntary nature of cooperation; 
 
• Emphasizing the confidentiality of the interviews and that the anonymity of 
survey respondents would be ensured; 
• Underlining that the consent of the participants was being sought before any 
data was asked for. 
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Negotiating access to interviewees is part of the data collection process, and the first stage of 
the “field journey” (Maso, 1995). Two documents are vital to start these negotiations and to 
eventually complete the fieldwork successfully: fieldwork permission from the academic 
authority involved; and authorised access to the organization or community involved 
(Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). The Ethical Review Committee of the University of 
Birmingham  granted   their   unconditional  approval  to   the   fieldwork,   first   by  email 
confirmation and then by formal letter (see Appendix C). The next step was to get access to 
the  LTU  database.  Access  to  tax  administration  databases  may  sometimes  be  difficult, 
because of entrenched bureaucracy in tax offices. With this caveat in mind, the process of 
establishing contact with the LTU authority of Bangladesh and large corporations under its 
jurisdiction was begun on the first day of the fieldwork. The top LTU officials were formally 
informed of the data requirement for the research, and were assured that all data would be 
treated with confidentiality. After an informal discussion, the researcher submitted a formal 
application to get written permission to access the computer database, income tax files, 
registers, reports and correspondence. The researcher was permitted access to the LTU 
database by LTU office order no LTU/admin/2010-2011/62, dated August 16, 2010 (see 
Appendix C). This permission was vital for selecting the sample taxpayers and contacting 
them for data. In addition, I attended a few conferences and symposiums arranged by trade 
bodies during the field visits. This provided me with the opportunity to know the corporate 
world better and widen my corporate networks. It also helped me in developing a personal 
relationship with potential elite interviewees and requesting an appointment. 
 
The other purpose of establishing contact with the tax authority was to collect documents, 
which would be an important source of data for the fieldwork.  These documents included 
NBR  bulletins,  magazines  and  annual reports;  local newspapers;  semi-public  documents 
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(records of tax advisors‟ associations); and semi-private documents (taxpayers‟/tax advisers‟ 
 
documents prepared for submission to the LTU). 
 
 
 
4.5 Administering the Questionnaire and the Interviews 
 
 
The big challenge of conducting a survey is to translate the research objectives into a well 
thought out and methodologically sound questionnaire (Warwick and Lininger, 1975; Tuck, 
2004). A questionnaire is an efficient and fitting method for collecting information by setting 
closed-ended  or  opened-ended  questions.  For  closed-ended  questions,  a  list  of  possible 
answers is offered, from which respondents are asked to select one (O‟Sullivan and Rassel, 
 
1994). Surveys of this type are called respondent dependent questionnaires (Chadwick et al., 
 
1984).  They have, however, some drawbacks: pre-set answer patterns cannot dig down into 
the inner or deeper meaning of a respondent observation.   Respondents have little or no 
liberty to change or explain an answer once made, and nobody other than the intended 
participants can participate in filling in the answer. 
 
To get accurate information, a questionnaire should not be more than 11 pages long and not 
have more than 125 questions (Dillman, 1978). The major information for this research was 
collected from tax office documents. For the remaining data, a very brief and simple closed 
questionnaire with 14 questions over four pages was framed. The survey package posted to 
each respondent contained a covering letter, the questionnaire and a consent form. No reply- 
paid envelope was needed, since the questionnaire would be collected by a research assistant 
in a personal meeting. The covering letter explained the aim of the study, guaranteed 
participants strict confidentiality for their responses, and gave the email and mobile contact 
numbers of the researcher and his lead supervisor (see Appendix C). 
The draft questionnaire, through a cognitive piloting exercise among a cross-section of large 
corporate tax professionals and accountants, was finalized. The questionnaire survey was 
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conducted twice. The second survey was conducted in the final month of the fieldwork, 
among the same respondents and using the same procedure followed for the first survey. The 
second questionnaire survey contained only five questions (see Q10-Q14 in the questionnaire, 
Appendix C). Three research assistants were appointed to help in conducting the survey. 
They were well trained in the use of the questionnaire and its contents and were instructed in 
how to interpret it to the respondents when they visited the respondents‟ office to collect the 
 
filled-in questionnaire. 
 
 
 
Similarly, to select the participants for the semi-structured interviews, I first reviewed the 
LTU database to trace good and bad corporations. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals and 
Enforcement) prepares a list of recalcitrant corporations that need chasing. This list was one 
of the documents taken as a guide in selecting the initial interviewees for the compliant and 
non-compliant groups. The initial interviewees so selected paved the way to get to other 
taxpayers who would help the researcher to arrive at an in-depth analysis of corporate tax 
compliance. Experts, who had a thorough knowledge about corporate tax compliance, 
irrespective of their corporate position, were selected. Such people were either referred to me 
by an expert already interviewed, or I found them by attending trade body seminars and 
symposiums. 
 
Fourteen tax officials involved with the tax affairs of large corporations were interviewed. Of 
these, six were interviewed from the LTU and eight from other tax bodies. According to t he 
Income Tax Ordinance (ITO), 1984, tax officials are not allowed to provide any opinion or 
records of any taxpayer without receiving permission from a higher authority. To make 
sessions with tax officials easier and more relaxed, the researcher had to make his academic 
and research identity clear through formal applications. In some cases, interviews were tape 
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recorded and transcribed. Where the interviewee refused permission to tape record, complete 
notes were taken and were transcribed soon after the interview. 
 
4.6 Insider Research:  A Challenge and an Advantage 
 
 
This is insider research in the sense that the researcher had spent about 14 years of his life in 
the tax administration of Bangladesh before embarking on the research. Insider research 
refers to a situation where the researcher has some experience of, or insight into, the world 
being researched, either from a personal or a professional perspective (Aguilar, 1981). Insider 
research  is  often  attacked  on  the  grounds  that  it  deals  with  the  researcher‟s  own 
organization‟s work and he/she is so involved that it may inhibit his/her perception of the 
social and cultural process. Insider research may affect the power relationship between the 
interviewee and the interviewer, and may cause an asymmetric flow of information from the 
 
conversation. Another limitation is that the researcher may not have the curiosity essential for 
the research because he/she is too close to the research setting and may not be interested in 
the behaviour of the research subjects from a scientific point of view (Aguilar, 1981). This 
may hamper him or her from in getting the objective information that is essential for credible 
research. To tackle this issue, Brannick and Coghlan (2007) propose that researchers have 
reflexive awareness of the relationship between them and the object of their research, which 
is one means of reducing the problems associated with insider research. 
 
The advocates of insider research argue that insiders are less likely to disrupt the social 
setting of their investigation and have already acquired a vast amount of knowledge on the 
community and its members (Sikes and Potts, 2008; Alvesson, 2003). This makes it less 
likely participants will conceal facts from them. Insider research thus becomes more 
economical and efficient (Atkinson et al., 2003). The advocates of insider research also argue 
that  the  possession  of  intimate  knowledge  of  a  community  and  its  members  does  not 
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necessarily mean the researcher has been employed by a particular organization (Hellawell, 
 
2006). The word “community” has wider implications than “organisation”, and knowledge of 
the local tax culture and the fact that he had established a prior relationship with respondents 
would enable the researcher to have unencumbered access to participants. Further, doctoral 
research  is  meant  to  create  new  knowledge,  which  comes  through  a  combining  of 
professional and higher academic practice with the researchers‟ individual projects (Drake 
 
and Heath, 2010). This requires the insider researcher to maintain a fluid and flexible stance, 
behaving sometimes as a practitioner and sometimes as a researcher and author, in order to 
make meaning out of his or her interactions and relationships with members of an 
organization. 
 
The  current  researcher  more than  fulfils  Twumasi„s  (2001)  requirements  for  conducting 
insider  research,  understanding  the  local  language  at  a  grass-root  level  and  being  well 
informed about the sentiments and aspirations of the participants. Because of a prior 
relationship with the tax administration of Bangladesh, the researcher had privileged access 
to important and sensitive information on tax compliance issues that would otherwise have 
remained unnoticed and unused by outsiders. For example, it was through an informal 
discussion that the researcher found out that many financial institutions prepare their audit 
reports on an incremental basis, based on the previous year‟s performance, to avoid the huge 
 
workload of starting them afresh. 
 
 
 
On balance, the advantages that accrued to the researcher from being an insider outweighed 
the disadvantages, especially considering that the issue of context was pivotal to the study. 
Knowledge of the language of the area of study meant that the researcher prepared and 
translated the interview guide and questionnaire himself. Thus the researcher was able to 
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ensure plenty of control over the data collection process by reducing the involvement of 
assistants in its crucial stages. 
 
There  was  however  a  danger  that  corporate  directors  and  tax  professionals  might  be 
victimized for sharing sensitive tax-related information and opinions with someone who was 
a tax official. To reduce such concerns, the researcher did not emphasize his official position, 
nor did he lie about it, but rather attached value to corporate views and experiences from a 
purely academic point of view. The researcher did not rigidly pursue answers to research 
questions; instead, in some cases, he allowed the respondents to focus on other issues of 
concern to them. For instance, some respondents commented that they were more concerned 
about and interested in a tax environment of strong inspection and surveillance than in the 
mere imposition of penalties or imprisonment as a means of coercive tax practice. It seemed 
that listening to the respondents in a greater detail and adopting a flexible approach boosted 
their confidence, shifted the power imbalance, and reduced their concerns. To further reduce 
anxiety, strict adherence to ethical standards was promised at every stage of the research 
process (see next section). As a result, respondents‟ concern did not greatly affect the study 
 
results. 
 
 
 
4.7 Ethical Issues 
 
 
Tax compliance research is highly sensitive, especially when the research is based on real tax 
office  data.  Disclosure  of  classified  information  to  the  public,  either  for  research  or 
newspaper reporting, may endanger the tax administration. It would not be safe for large 
corporations to disclose their tax evasion and non-compliance practices, particularly to an 
insider researcher. There is every chance that at a later date they will run into trouble for 
sharing such sensitive information. The only reason that the tax administration and the 
corporation will take the risk of sharing their data is if they receive an assurance of high 
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ethical standards and confidentiality from the researcher. Ethical considerations are important, 
 
particularly when fieldwork is involved which probes respondents‟ private lives and seeks for 
information they would prefer to keep secret. 
 
 
Ethical considerations raise the question of how to guard the interests of those who willingly 
take part in research and how to minimize any potential conflicts between researcher and 
respondents (Flick, 2009; Cash et al., 2009). A researcher, throughout the research process, 
has no right to intimidate or harm the respondents for giving or not giving any information. 
Methodological and ethical issues are inextricably interwoven (Chen et al., 2007). Gillam and 
Guillemin (2004) state that ethical codes and standards oblige researchers to respond and 
react to the most sensitive disclosures made by respondents and to manage the disclosure 
dilemma. If a respondent reveals vulnerability in answering a question, this should be an 
ethically important moment and the researcher in that case has to decide how far he can probe 
the respondent. 
 
While interviewing and administering the survey among the tax officials, corporate directors 
and professionals, it was emphasised that respondents should share only information they 
were willing to give.  A consent form was placed before the respondent giving the identity of 
the researcher, and the title and purpose of the research, in order to ensure informed consent. 
The consent form informed the respondent that he could withdraw from the interview at any 
time without any hesitation, and that he could refuse to answer any question. However, an 
unequal power relation between researcher and respondents, particularly when the latter were 
tax advisors, could cause them to refuse to answer a question. In such cases, the researcher 
relied more on body and facial signals, to avoid causing the respondent discomfort and 
uneasiness. 
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An important aspect of ethical practice is the confidentiality of the research process and the 
anonymization of the individuals interviewed (Somekh and Lewin, 2011). Respondents have 
every right to know where the information they give will be disclosed and how it will be 
stored.  In  the  case  where  researchers  have  to  disclose  their  sources  to  authenticate 
information gathered, pseudonymization can be used in such a way that the real respondents 
cannot be identified (Simons, 2009).To ensure confidentiality and anonymization, Mochmann 
and Muller (1979) suggest the separation and removal of identifying items; the erasing of 
data after a fixed period; the controlling of physical access to data by anyone other than the 
researcher; and giving respondents the right to withdraw or to get back the data they have 
supplied at any time later.  However, in some cases, for example where participants carry out 
research  into  their  own  background  or  policy  area,  anonymization  may  not  prevent 
recognition of the contribution of some participants. 
 
4.8. Chapter Conclusion and Summary 
 
 
This chapter has focused on the „who, what, where, when and how‟ of the fieldwork activities 
for this research.  It has explained how the fieldwork plan was implemented during the data 
 
collection  stage  of  the  research.  It  has  identified  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the 
researcher in the field. And it has shown the time frame and the way different fieldwork tasks 
were coordinated and integrated to make the fieldwork successful. The data for the research 
were gathered over a period of three and a half months. The next chapter analyses the data to 
measure the extent of tax compliance achieved by the large corporate taxpayers. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
HOW COMPLIANT ARE LARGE CORPORATE 
TAXPAYERS? 
 
 
 
 
5. 1 Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to measure the level of tax compliance achieved by large 
corporations in Bangladesh and to assess the validity of the data obtained by survey. In 
pursuit of this objective, tax compliance is divided into two levels: component level and 
overall level. At component level, tax compliance is measured by its components, namely, 
filing, reporting and payment. At overall level, individual components are totalled to measure 
overall tax compliance. Taxpayers originally labelled “non-compliant”, but who subsequently 
got a ruling from the appellate authority that they were compliant, were considered during the 
measurement  process.  Measured  compliance was reviewed  on the basis of corporations‟ 
 
demographic features. Thus this chapter is mainly divided into three sections:   First, it 
measures the reliability and validity of the data. Second, it measures the tax compliance 
levels in component and overall terms. Third, it contextualizes the measurement process by 
taking the corporate sector as the contextual variable. 
 
5.2 Sample Description 
 
 
The data for this study were drawn from two sources mainly: tax office documents and 
surveys (see section 3.10.3). From the data on tax compliance collected from the LTU 
database, information on 154 out of the 162 sample corporations was found, which was used 
to measure the tax compliance performance of the large corporate taxpayers. Seven tax files 
could not be traced as they had been sent to the appeal court. The survey was conducted 
among large corporate taxpayers registered with the LTU of Bangladesh. The questionnaire 
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was mailed to 162 large corporations, of which 154 responded adequately. The response rate 
for the survey was 95.65%. A detailed description of the sample corporations and their 
demographic characteristics is presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics on sample corporations and their demographic 
characteristics (N = 154) 
 
Characteristics Categories Frequencies Percentages Cumulative ratios* 
Ownership 
Structure 
 
 
Corporate 
sector 
Public limited 
Private limited 
 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
 
Corporate 
location 
Local 
Multinational 
 
 
 
 
Corporate size 
A(assets)<$3m 
$3m<A<$7m 
$7m<A<$25 
$25m<A<$80m 
$80m<A<$500m 
A>$500m 
 
 
Incorporation 
age 
3-6 years 
7-10 years 
11-14 years 
15 years or more 
*For all characteristics cumulative percentages are calculated on valid percentages, e.g., 154 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 shows the demographic composition of the large corporate taxpayers in the sample. 
As it shows, 74.7% of the corporations had public limited ownership, with only 25.3 % being 
private. Of these, finance sector corporations constituted the major part (51.9%) followed by 
the manufacturing (27.9%) and service (20.1%) sector corporations. Large corporations with 
multinational  locations  numbered  only  a  few  (16.2%),  and  the  majority  were  local 
corporations (83.8%).  Corporations having total assets of between three and seven million 
US dollars made up the major band (23.4%), followed by the seven to twenty five million 
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asset band (20.1%). Statistics for incorporation age (e.g., age group) show that large 
corporations in the “15 or more years” group formed the principal category (39.8%). 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3. Reliability and Validity Test 
 
 
5.3.1 Reliability 
 
 
Reliability is the extent to which a test yields consistent scores on repeated trials (Stangor, 
 
2011). Reliability in quantitative research, according to Hartas (2010:71), “is the consistency 
and stability of a measurement, and is concerned with whether the results of a study are 
replicable (repeatable).” Hartas (2010) suggests that the consistency of a measurement can be 
examined in three ways: consistency over time, equivalence and internal consistency. This 
research employed the test of consistency over time, which refers to the extent to which the 
measurement is the same each time if the survey is conducted under the same conditions 
(Stangor, 2011). Under this method reliability is measured by the test-retest procedure, where 
two equivalent tests are conducted on the same respondents on different occasions. To see the 
stability of measurement between test 1 and 2, intraclass correlation is useful (Trochim, 2006; 
Hartas, 2010). Generally, with intraclass correlation, a score of from .30 to .49 is regarded as 
modest; from .50 to .69 is regarded as moderate; and from .70 to 1.00 is high (Brigham et al., 
2009). Accordingly, in this research, intraclass correlation (ICC) was computed. 
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Variables (questions) Intraclass correlation* 
Single measures Average measures 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Reliability test statistics for the survey questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
Attitude to taxpayer service quality .63 .77 
Attitude to  mutual understanding .60 .75 
Attitude to simplified tax law .52 .68 
Attitude to tax penalty .71 .83 
Attitude to imprisonment .83 .91 
*all significant at the .01 level 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 illustrates the intraclass correlation with 95% confidence intervals for test and retest 
values of the concepts. It shows that the single measure ICCs for all concepts range from .52 
to .83 and the average measures (ICC) range from .68 to .91, all significant at the p <.001 
level.  This indicates high consistency and thus reliability between the tests conducted on the 
two occasions. 
 
5.3.2 Validity 
 
 
A measure is valid if it reflects the content of the concept in question. Bryman and Cramer 
(2005:80) state that, “the question of validity draws attention on how far a measure really 
measures the concept that it purports to measure.” It can be difficult to measure concepts 
accurately, due to measurement error, and this is even more the case with a single-item scale. 
However, there are good and bad sides to both the single-item scale and the multiple-item 
scale. Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007: 175) argue that when the construct is unambiguous, 
“there is no difference in the predictive validity of the multiple-item and single-item 
measures.”  It is argued that a holistic impression is useful when the respondent is busy, or ill, 
or is dismissive of the meticulousness of the multiple-item measures (Youngblut and Casper, 
1993; Wanous et al., 1997). With single-item scales, Zimmerman et al. (2006) effectively 
measured quality of life, Wanous et al. (1997) studied job satisfaction, Robins et al. (2001) 
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assessed self-esteem, and Cook and Perri (2004) studied compliance with medication. 
Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007: 176) further argue that, “preference for single-item measures is 
not  theoretically  based  but  rather  is  practical,  in  that  single-item  measures  minimize 
respondent refusal and reduce data collection and data-processing costs.” The only caveat, as 
Bergkvist and Rossiter state, is that a single-item scale may not adequately measure a non- 
concrete  construct.  Therefore  Bajpai  (2011)  suggests  that  the  research  objective  should 
dictate whether to take a single item or multi-item scale. 
 
The predictive validity of a single-item scale can be assessed by bivariate correlation, called 
“validity  coefficient”,   and   by  multivariate   regression  (Rossiter,   2002).   Point -biserial 
correlation and P values are two simple tools that can be used to investigate whether the test 
is measuring what it purports to measure. Verma (2006) used item point-biserial correlation 
to check for student class test reliability and validity. Point-biserial values range from +1 to - 
1, with a value of at least .15 recommended, and above .25 considered good (Verma, 2006). 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Item point-biserial output 
 
 
Variables(Questions) 
 
First Survey (Test) 
Taxpayer service quality 
Mutual understanding 
Simplified tax law 
Tax penalty 
Imprisonment 
Second Survey (Retest) 
Taxpayer service quality 
Mutual understanding 
Simplified tax law 
Tax penalty 
Imprisonment  .399  .755   
 
 
 
 
Table  5.3  above  shows  that  the  point-biserial  correlations  (e.g.,  corrected  item  total 
correlation in the table) are within acceptable limits, except for the measurement of simplified 
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tax law in the second survey (.10).   For all other single-item questions the values range 
from .16 to .42, and therefore the predictive validity is well maintained. Some scholars, 
however, argue that it is important for a researcher to estimate the construct validity of a 
measure (Bryman and Cramer, 2005), which does not require empirical testing of the survey 
questions; it requires a theoretical specification of the relationship (Carmines & Zeller, 1979), 
for example, drawing upon ideas about the impact of technology on work experience. The 
theoretical relationship between the concepts used in this research, like taxpayer attitudes to 
penalties, has been specified (see sections 2.7.1 to 2.7.6). Moreover, in the pilot stage, the 
questionnaire, particularly the portion involving single-item scale, was reviewed by the LTU 
senior tax officials and professional accountants of large corporations. 
In addition to the above, how respondents‟ attitude to coercive and persuasive instruments 
differ  across  different  corporate  sectors  (i.e.,  finance,  manufacturing  and  service)  were 
checked and this has been placed in the Appendix (see point B in Appendix A). 
 
 
5.4 Tax Compliance Components and Their Relationships 
 
 
As elaborated in section 2.2.2 of the thesis and in the introduction to this chapter, tax 
compliance comprises three segments or components: filing, reporting and payment. Filing 
compliance measures whether tax returns have been filed on time. Reporting compliance 
measures whether income has been disclosed fully in the tax return. And payment compliance 
measures whether taxes have been paid in full on taxable income. 
 
The question is what is the relationship between and among the three segments? If there is a 
filing compliance, it does not necessarily mean that income has been fully reported or taxes 
have been fully paid. There may be underreporting of income or underpayment of taxes, 
despite the fact that the tax return has been filed on time. From this point of view, the three 
segments maintain a mutually exclusive relationship. But the opposite may also happen. If 
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the return is filed on time, all income is declared, and taxes are paid in full, this makes the 
three components mutually inclusive and concurrent. Another possibility for the relationship 
of the components is that returns are filed on time and incomes are reported properly, but 
taxes are not paid in full; for reporting fully does no not mean paying fully. The only possible 
absurdity in the relationship would be for taxes to be paid in full but income  not to be 
reported or tax returns not to be filed. 
 
5.4.1  Tax Compliance Measurement 
 
 
Filing compliance was measured directly from the tax office records that showed whether tax 
returns had been filed in time or not. According to the Income Tax Ordinance of Bangladesh, 
1984, all corporate taxpayers, small, medium or large, are liable to submit their tax return by 
the fifteenth day of July following the end of their income year. But if this date comes before 
the expiry of six months from the end of their income year, then filing should come before six 
months expire from the latter date, unless the submission time is extended. 
 
Table 5.4: Binary measurement of tax compliance – the dependent variable 
 
Compliance type Compliant Non-compliant 
 
 
Filing compliance 1 0 
Reporting  compliance 1 0 
Payment compliance 1 0 
Overall compliance, if shown 3 - 
Overall non-compliance , if shown - 0, 1 or 2 
Source:  Candidate‟s own table   
 
 
The above table on the binary measurement process of tax compliance demonstrates that 
corporations filing tax returns within deadline are filing compliant and are assigned a value of 
1; those failing to file tax returns within the time are filing non-compliant and assigned a 
value of 0. Filing non-compliance is difficult for a corporate taxpayer, especially a large one, 
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since getting registered with the tax authority is a pre-condition to incorporation by the Joint 
 
Stock Office of Bangladesh. 
 
 
 
Reporting compliance is measured from LTU audit adjustments. The audit records contain 
information as to whether there has been audit adjustment or not. Any adjustment imposed on 
a firm means that there has been a case of underreporting of income. For measurement 
purposes, no audit adjustment means the taxpayer has been found clean in its income 
declaration, although practically it may mean that the audit measures have failed to dig up 
unreported income. No audit adjustments means the taxpayer is reporting compliant (value = 
1), whereas audit adjustments means reporting non-compliant (value = 0). In measuring tax 
compliance,  the effect  of appeals relating  to  initial non-compliance  has  been taken  into 
account (discussed in section 5.4.3). 
 
Payment compliance, the final component, is also measured from the LTU payment registers, 
which records whether taxes have been paid fully on the correct taxable income. No shortfall 
between the payable and the paid taxes makes a taxpayer payment compliant (value = 1). Any 
shortfall between these two makes a taxpayer  payment  non-compliant  (value = 0).  Tax 
evasion through payment non-compliance is also easy to detect. It only requires looking at 
whether taxes payable on taxable income, some of which was voluntarily reported by the 
taxpayers and some unreported and later unearthed by tax audit measures, has been paid. 
 
Measuring compliance for any single component, as above, gives information about the status 
of a large corporation for that particular component only. But tax compliance is a holistic 
concept that necessitates combining the three components to define a taxpayer as either 
compliant or not (discussed elaborately on section 5.5.3). The combination process, however, 
depends on how compliance is defined as a dependent variable. Tax compliance defined as a 
continuous variable, as Hamm (1995) and Palil (2010) defined it in their studies on personal 
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income tax compliance, allows it to be measured in ratio or proportion. In such cases, for 
example, reported income is divided by the total taxable income of the taxpayer to measure 
the extent or degree to which the taxpayer is compliant in its reporting obligation. From this 
approach to measurement, a taxpayer can be fully (when reported and real income is the same) 
or partially (when reported and real income differs) compliant. But this research defines tax 
compliance as a dichotomous variable, meaning that large corporate taxpayers can either be 
compliant or non-compliant. 
 
The binary nature of this measurement therefore justifies totalling compliance components to 
assess the overall compliance performance of a taxpayer. Based on the above arguments, a 
taxpayer is considered overall compliant if in each of the components it has scored 1 (filing = 
1, reporting = 1 and payment = 1) i.e., a total score of 3. Taxpayers will be overall non- 
compliant if their total score is less than three (e.g., score from 0 to 2).  Total scores of 3 are 
converted into 1 and scores below 3 are converted into 0 in order to run the analysis in 
PASW-18 (former SPSS) and Stata-11 and to measure the variables. 
 
5.4.2  Is Tax Auditing A Narrow Measure of Reporting Compliance? 
 
 
Tax evasion and corruption are endemic in Bangladesh (Khan, 1996).  In a recent newspaper 
article, it was reported that of the 55,000 corporate taxpayers in Bangladesh, only 10,000 
declare a profit. The remaining 45,000 corporations do not declare any profit or pay taxes 
(The Daily Inquilab, 18 July, 2011). How effective is tax audit as a measure of reporting non- 
compliance in a country like this? Two common reasons for tax audit to be imperfect, as 
Hanlon et al. (2005) argue are: first, ambiguous tax laws; and second, inefficient and corrupt 
tax administration – both of which occur in the tax system of Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2006). 
Adjustment proposed through audit action is always questionable because audited demands 
are always used as an opening bid to raise declared income or to demand a bribe. Tax audit as 
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a measure is also criticized for its inability to take into consideration the long-term versus the 
short-term effects of any audit objections. For example, the audit team disallows an expense 
on the grounds that it should have been amortized over several years rather than charged as 
an expense for a particular year.  The audit teams will only record the deficiency arising from 
the difference between the claimed expense and the first-year allowable expenses, but not the 
future fall in revenue for the amortization. Again, due to the present value of money, both the 
value of the yearly amortization and the audit adjustment will get de-valued, which the audit 
team does not record. 
 
Despite these problems, tax audit adjustment is found to be a powerful deterrent to tax non- 
compliance in many studies, for example those by Mills, 1998; Mills and Sansing, 2000; 
Mills and Newberry, 2001.  Fuest and Riedel (2009) state that micro approaches like tax audit 
information are quite effective in measuring tax non-compliance through survey. Referring to 
tax audit successes in the measurement of tax evasion in the US and Sweden, Fuest  and 
Riedel argue that using national accounting data as a measure is disadvantageous for two 
reasons: they provide the overall picture only; and they are not very well produced in 
developing countries. Fuest and Riedel (2009:52) suggest that to answer the question of “why 
taxes are evaded, a desegregated analysis of taxes and taxpayer group would be required.” 
Slemrod (2004) and Hanlon et al. (2005) also support this view by pointing out that tax audit 
adjustments were used as an estimate of the US income tax gap for small, medium and large 
corporations from 1977 to 1980.  It can therefore be said that tax audit is the best of all the 
available measures, although it has some limitations. 
 
5.4.3  Effects of Appeals on Tax Compliance 
 
 
To measure tax compliance, the appellate and tribunal judgments passed in favour of a 
corporate  taxpayer  for  an  initial  non-compliance  need  to  be  considered.  A  corporation 
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declared tax non-compliant by the LTU for any compliance component may opt for an appeal 
to the Taxes Appellate Authority (TAA). If it fails at the TAA stage, it may opt for a second 
appeal to the Taxes Tribunal Authority (TTA); and finally there may be an appeal to the High 
Court (HC) of Bangladesh. The LTU also reserves the right to challenge any appellate or 
tribunal judgment  passed  in favour of a taxpayer.  Of the 154 sample large corporations 
(Table B.1 in Appendix B), 85 lodged appeal cases against the LTU‟s audit decisions, of 
which 58 appellants failed, 14 won and 13 had their appeal cases set aside or re-assessed. Of 
the remaining large corporations (154-85) = 61 were happy with the LTU‟s decision and 8 
corporations did not opt for an appeal, although there were grounds for one. All the fourteen 
 
appeals yielding positive outcome relate mainly to reporting non-compliance. 
 
 
 
In consideration of the high appeal rate and its probable impact on study results, adjustments 
were made in the measurement of tax compliance (see Table 3.3, section 3.12.1.3). For 
example, while measuring reporting compliance, corporations that were treated as non- 
compliant by the LTU but were later judged compliant by appeals courts were considered 
reporting compliant. LTU records show that only 68 corporations were reporting compliant, 
but when the appeal and re-assessment effects were included, the number of reporting 
compliant  corporations  increased  to  83.  If  this  adjustment  had  not  been  made,  the 
measurement of both reporting compliance and overall compliance would have been affected. 
 
However, no records were found on how many of those who failed in the first appeal opted 
for further appeals in the TAA or HC levels. Since some appeals were still pending in the 
TAA and HC levels, at the time the survey was conducted, it was not possible to take into 
account the effects of these appeals on the study design. Therefore the adverse effect of high 
appeals on the study outcome could be mitigated largely, but not fully. 
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Another issue related to the accuracy of this measurement is the quality and neutrality of 
appeal judgments. It was argued by a respondent that, “the appellate authority is outright 
corrupt and they sell judgments for money” (Respondent 26). Another respondent made the 
following explicit comment: “Large corporations know that if the LTU does not accept the 
audit report, they have to go for an appeal and have to spend money in the appellate offices to 
get justice” (Respondent 9).  Other respondents commented that the money taxpayers spent in 
buying justice made them underreport income in the audit reports (elaborated on further in 
section 7.7.3). 
 
Thus the effect of appeals cases can both be positive and negative on tax compliance and 
there are several tiers through which appeals cases are settled. The appeals process is not 
neutral and takes a long time to finalize. To get an unbiased judgment from the appellate 
authorities, the appellant may have to become involved in a collusive practice, which will 
have a direct bearing on the compliance performance of large corporations. 
 
5.5    How Compliant are Large Corporate Taxpayers? 
 
5.5.1  Compliance Components 
 
 
Based  on  the  interrelations  between  tax  compliance  components  and  the  measurement 
process discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.4.1, this section measures the level of compliance by 
large corporate taxpayers. 
 
Table 5.5 below provides summary statistics for compliant and non-compliant taxpayers. The 
first important observation here is that filing compliance is the highest among the three 
compliance components (84.41%). Second, as large corporate taxpayers move to the next 
compliance component, i.e. from filing to reporting, the rate goes down; and it goes up again 
from reporting to payment compliance. Tax compliance by income reporting is 53.89% and 
by payment of taxes is 75.32 %.  Filing compliance has a mean of 0.84. A mean of 0.84 in 
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this case means that 84% of taxpayers are compliant, since the higher code 1 was treated as 
tax compliance and 0 as non-compliance. The mean value for any nominal variable that has 
only two categories has meaning (Leech et. al., 2008). In the case of tax payment, mean 
compliance (M = .75) falls as compared to filing compliance; and for reporting compliance, 
mean value falls further (M = .54). In each case, the modal group is 1, meaning tax 
compliance. 
 
Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics on the tax compliance levels of large corporations (N = 154) 
 
 
 
 
Filing compliance Compliant 130 84.41 84.41 
(FC) Non-compliant 24 15.59 100 
 
Reporting compliance 
 
Compliant 
 
83 
 
53.89 
 
53.89 
(RC) Non-compliant 71 46.11 100 
 
Payment compliance 
 
Compliant 
 
116 
 
75.32 
 
75.32 
(PC) Non-compliant 38 24.68 100 
 
Overall compliance 
 
Compliant 
 
57 
 
37.01 
 
37.01 
  Non-compliant   97  62.99  100   
 
 
 
 
5.5.2  Overall Tax Compliance 
 
 
The  method  and  rationale  for  totalling  components  was  clarified  in  section  5.4.1.  In 
measuring overall tax compliance for a particular taxpayer, the individual component scores 
are added.  Table 5.6 shows that 96 large corporate taxpayers in the sample are both filing 
and payment compliant. If reporting compliance were not included, then overall compliance, 
based on the filing and payment components, would be 62.33%. But the number of taxpayers 
who are both filing and reporting compliant is 65, which reduces the level of composite 
compliance to 42%. The table shows that there are only 57 taxpayers who are filing, reporting 
and payment compliant, making 37.01% of large corporate taxpayers compliant in overall 
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terms. Thus, the mean composite compliance is .37 and the modal group is 0, signifying large 
corporate taxpayers are mostly overall non-compliant. 
 
Table 5.6 Cross-tabulation on measurement of overall tax compliance 
 
Compliance 
types 
 Payment Reporting Overall 
Com Non- 
com 
Com Non - 
com 
Com Non- 
com 
 
Filing by 
payment, 
reporting 
and overall 
compliance 
 
 
 
Filing 
Com 96 34 65 65 57 73 
Non- 
Com 
20 4 18 6 0 24 
Payment by 
reporting and 
overall 
compliance 
 
 
 
- - - 
 
Payment 
Com 72 44 57 59 
Non- 
com 
11 27 0 38 
Reporting to 
overall 
compliance 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - 
 
Reporting 
Com 57 26 
Non- 
com 
0 71 
 
 
 
 
At this stage binomial test statistics were derived, which showed whether the proportion of 
compliant and non-compliant large corporations differed by chance or by pre-specified 
probability (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). The test showed that there was a statistically 
significant difference in the proportion of compliant and non-compliant taxpayers in the cases 
of filing, payment and overall compliance (p = 0.001). But for reporting compliance, the 
difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.375). Again, a McNemar test, conducted to 
see the marginal frequencies of two binary outcomes, showed that there was a statistically 
significant difference in the proportion of compliant and non-compliant taxpayers between 
component and overall tax compliance (p = 0.001). Finally, Phi and Camri‟s V, measuring 
 
correlation between binary variables, found these to be weak between filing and overall 
compliance (phi and v = .329, p = 0.001) and between payment and overall compliance (phi 
and v = .439, p = 0.001).  But between reporting and overall compliance, the relationship was 
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found to be strong (phi and v = .709, p = 0.001) meaning most of the non-compliance came 
from the reporting component. 
 
5.5.3  Overall or Composite Tax Compliance: Why Do We Need It? 
 
 
Tax compliance performance measured by a single component reveals the position of 
corporations  with  regard  to  that  particular  type  of compliance.    By  fitting  a  regression 
analysis  between  filing  compliance,  as  the  dependent  variable,  and  the  selected  tax 
instruments of coercion and persuasion, as the independent variables, it is only possible to 
know the effects of these instruments on filing compliance. Similarly, by fitting a regression 
analysis between reporting compliance and the compliance instruments, only the effects of 
the instruments on reporting compliance can be found. But finding the influence of the 
compliance instruments on filing, reporting or payment gives only a partial or segmented 
picture of the compliance process. Rather than measuring the influence of the compliance 
instruments on a particular component, it may be more important to find the influences on the 
components taken together.  This is because tax compliance is a holistic concept comprised 
of all the three components.  A compliance instrument improving filing compliance may not 
have  any  influence  in  securing  overall  compliance;  whilst  a  compliance  instrument 
influencing overall compliance may not have any contribution to make to the creation of 
filing compliance. Studying the influence of the compliance instruments for each of the 
compliance components and then for overall compliance will provide discernible insights into 
the large corporate tax compliance process. 
 
5.5.4  Tax Compliance by Corporate Demographic Features 
 
 
Demographic issues are important to contextualize an analysis of organizational studies 
(Cordes at el., 2007; Hernes, 2004). Corporate size, ownership structure, and membership of 
a corporate sector emerge as some of the most significant demographic features in this study. 
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Measurement of tax compliance in terms of corporations‟ demographic features will enable 
us to select the context variable to be used in the multilevel logistic regression (see section 
 
3.12.3), which is important for seeing how the role of selected tax compliance instruments 
differs when the effects of context variable is taken into account. 
 
Table 5.7 shows the tax compliance performance of large corporations based on their salient 
demographic features. It shows that overall compliance is higher in private limited 
corporations  (43.58%)  than  in  public  limited  corporations  (34.78%).  Tax  compliance 
measured by location shows that multinational corporations (40.00%) are better than the local 
corporations (36.43%), but only marginally. 
 
In terms of filing compliance, the finance sector has the highest level of compliance (91.25%), 
followed  by the service (80.64%) and  manufacturing  sectors (74.41%). But  in reporting 
compliance,  service  and  manufacturing  corporations  jointly  reach  the  highest  level  of 
compliance (67.74%) and (67.44%) respectively, whilst rates for this compliance are 41.25% 
for   finance   corporations.   Finally, in   terms   of   payment compliance, manufacturing 
corporations are the most compliant (83.72%) followed by finance (73.75%) and the service 
corporations  (67.74%).  When  the  compliance  components  are  combined,  manufacturing 
corporations turn out to be the top compliers (44.18%), in comparison with service (38.70%) 
and finance (32.50%) corporations. 
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Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics on the tax compliance of large corporations by type of 
ownership, membership of corporate sector, and corporate location (N = 154) 
 
Tax 
compliance 
types 
Compl. 
status 
Ownership structure Corporate  sectors Location 
Public 
limited 
Private 
limited 
Finance Manu. Service Local Multi 
 
Filing 
compliance 
Compliant 
 
Non- 
compliant 
100 
(86.95%) 
 
15 
30 
(76.92%) 
 
9 
73 
(91.25%) 
 
7 
32 
(74.41%) 
 
11 
25 
(80.64%) 
 
6 
108 
(83.72%) 
 
21 
22 
(88.00%) 
 
3 
 
Reporting 
compliance 
Compliant 
 
Non- 
compliant 
57 
(49.56%) 
 
58 
26 
(66.66%) 
 
13 
33 
(41.25%) 
 
47 
29 
(67.44%) 
 
14 
21 
(67.74%) 
 
10 
68 
(52.71%) 
 
61 
15 
(60.00%) 
 
10 
 
Payment 
compliance 
Compliant 
 
Non- 
compliant 
84 
(73.04%) 
 
31 
3 
2(82.05%) 
 
7 
59 
(73.75%) 
 
21 
36 
(83.72%) 
 
7 
21 
(67.74%) 
 
10 
98 
(75.96%) 
 
31 
18 
(72.00%) 
 
7 
 
Overall tax 
compliance 
Compliant 
 
Non- 
compliant 
40 
(34.78%) 
 
75 
17 
(43.58%) 
 
22 
26 
(32.50%) 
 
54 
19 
(44.18%) 
 
24 
12 
(38.70%) 
 
19 
47 
(36.43%) 
 
82 
10 
(40.00%) 
 
15 
 
Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate compliance percentage in the respective category 
 
 
Two things are worth noting here: first, none of the sector corporations achieves top 
compliance in more than one component. The finance sector gets the highest compliance in 
filing, the manufacturing sector in payment, and the service sector in reporting compliance. 
On average, the manufacturing sector corporations are the most compliant. Now, the question 
is, why should this be so? Perhaps, central banking regulations and monitoring, as argued by 
the respondents,  require that  large corporations  in the  finance sector  prepare their  audit 
reports on time; but such regulations are not enough to ensure they fully report their business 
income. One respondent expressed his views about this in the following way. 
 
There are high level manipulations affecting tax compliance behaviour despite there 
being strong rules and regulations. For example, the accounts of banks are prepared 
on the basis of papers sent from the branches, which are huge. It is quite difficult, like 
measuring the size of an elephant for a blind person, to audit all the papers and find 
underreported income. Thus tax non-compliance may be a capacity-related issue as 
well as an intentional force attempt to hide some income or expenses. (Respondent 5) 
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Corporate national boundaries Corporate sectors  Total Finance Manufacturing Service 
 
The reason that service sector corporations are the top reporting compliers may be due to the 
fact   that   compared   to   finance   and   manufacturing   corporations,   the   percentage   of 
multinational corporations is relatively high in service sector. Of the service sector 
corporations, 29.03% are multinationals, whereas the percentage is 11.25% and 16.27% 
respectively for finance and manufacturing sector corporations (see Table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8 Distribution of large corporate sectors by location (N = 154) 
 
 
 
 
Local or a foreign Local 71 36 22 129 
corporation Multinational 9 7 9 25 
 Total  80  43  31  154 
 
 
 
As argued by the respondents, multinational corporations are comparatively better in their 
reporting behaviour than local corporations. Below are some of the comments submitted by 
respondents: 
 
I don‟t think there is much underreporting in LTU multinational corporations, except 
over the issue of transfer pricing. (Respondent 12) 
 
Large foreign corporations comply, if not fully at least nearly fully. They have some 
subtle non-compliance; the local ones commit very crude non-compliance. 
(Respondent 22) 
 
Tax compliance by the multinational corporations is high. Among the others, the 
publicly traded are better. Privately owned run by the family members have poor tax 
compliance. (Respondent 3) 
 
Among the large corporations, multinationals and publicly traded are comparatively 
good  in  tax  compliance.  My  only  headache  is  the  local  big   manufacturing. 
(Respondent 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
The fact that the manufacturing corporations emerge as the best compliers in payment 
compliance may be due to the fact that the tax burden for this group of taxpayers is low. 
Manufacturing corporations are charged tax at a rate of 27.5% (see Table B.10, Appendix B). 
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It  is  the  lowest  of  all  corporate  tax  rates.  The  corporate  tax  rate  for  manufacturing 
corporations whose shares are not traded publicly is 37.5%. The latter tax rate can be even 
lower  if  a  manufacturing  corporation  declares  dividends  of  more  than  10%  in  a  year. 
Collected data shows that 63% of manufacturing corporations are charged at the marginal tax 
rate of 27.5%. Another reason may be that most manufacturing corporations are likely to 
export their products, and hence may be able to gain from transfer pricing manipulation.  But 
for finance sector corporations the marginal tax rate was 45% in tax year 2008-2009, which 
may have created a huge tax burden for those that reported and paid taxes properly. 
 
5.5.5  Corporate Sector Characteristics and Tax Compliance 
 
 
The previous section made an assessment of tax compliance performance by corporate 
demographic features. This was conducted in line with the questions raised in sections 3.4.2 
and 3.12.3. The question is which of the demographic features should to be taken as the most 
appropriate context variable for the study, and why? This thesis found corporate sector 
characteristics to be the most fitting context, based on respondent observations and statistical 
analysis. To start with, the following observations of the respondents are worth mentioning: 
 
Large corporate tax compliance issues differ across corporate sector. Most 
manufacturing sector large corporations make more than one audit report to fulfil 
compliance requirements to different government and non-government bodies. The 
in-house accounts departments of the manufacturing are understaffed or ill-staffed. 
Banks   and   finance   sector   large   corporations   have   strong   in-house   accounts 
departments and most taxes are withheld at source. (Respondent 4) 
 
Banking and leasing sector large corporations are much better than other large 
corporate taxpayers. There is usually no underreporting on the income side of their 
audit reports and they file returns on time. What they do is to inflate expenses to 
reduce net profits. Even inflating expenses is sometimes very difficult for the tough 
monitoring they have to undergo from central banking regulations. (Respondent16) 
 
Tax non-compliance by manufacturing sector large corporations is greater than that 
by others. They have a lot of scope, for example, inventory valuation, which is linked 
with the cost of goods sold and thus the profit of the corporation. Underreporting of 
income not only helps in paying less tax, it also helps in paying less advance tax for 
the upcoming year. Large corporations are basically tax evaders, except the banking 
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sector corporations due to the heavy control and regulation of the central bank. 
(Respondent 2) 
 
Tax compliance issues differ between financial and manufacturing sector corporations. 
Banks are charged at a rate of 45% and manufacturing corporations at a rate of 27.5% 
to 37.5%. The tax rate for a manufacturing corporation is even different for corporate 
ownership pattern, for their sector affiliation and for whether a dividend is declared or 
not. (Respondent 3) 
 
Unequal tax laws within and between the sectors create many of the tax compliance 
issues. In our tax system, the agriculture and transport sectors are basically tax exempt 
and there are many large corporations in these. When a sector is fully exempt or 
partially exempt from taxes like this, the burden falls on others, and the obvious 
reaction is non-compliance. (Respondent1) 
 
 
The common thread of the respondents‟ arguments is that, due to differences in the regulatory 
frameworks that governs the large corporations, the level and nature of their tax compliance 
 
may vary widely. The respondents attributed a vertical inequality of tax burden and 
discriminatory tax laws among different sector regimes as the major concerns for large 
corporate tax compliance. They argued that burdening a particular segment of taxpayers with 
an unreasonable share of the tax bill might be a reason for non-compliance. 
 
To take corporate sector as context variable for the study, apart from the arguments presented 
above, logit models were run to see how the number of significant coercive and persuasive 
instruments changed when the effect of corporate sector and other potential context variables 
i.e., local versus multinational corporations, or public versus private ownership were 
considered (see section 6.3.2). The other strong reason for corporate sector to be an important 
context  is  that  the  tax  compliance  database  in  the  LTU  is  maintained  on  the  basis  of 
corporations‟ sector association. 
 
 
5.6    Chapter Conclusion and Summary 
 
 
This chapter has measured the level of tax compliance achieved by the sample corporations, 
dividing tax compliance into three segments: filing, reporting and payment. As revealed in 
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section 5.5, large taxpayers achieved their highest level of compliance in filing (84.41%), 
followed by payment (75.32%) and reporting (53.89%) compliance. The overall compliance, 
measured by totalling these three components, was 37.01% (sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2). The 
effect  of  appeals  was  considered  in  measuring  compliance  (section  5.4.3).  The  appeals 
process is lengthy and weighted against appellants, of whom only a few get a favourable 
judgment. To  get  insights into  the nature of compliance and  to  identify the appropriate 
context variable, corporate demographic features were reviewed (section 5.5.4). The finance 
sector was found to achieve the highest compliance in tax return filing (91.25%), while the 
manufacturing and service sectors achieved the highest compliance in payment (83.72%) and 
reporting compliance (67.74%), respectively. In overall terms, manufacturing sector 
corporations  were  the  top  compliers  (44.18%).  Respondent  observations  showed  that 
corporate sector was the most relevant context variable. In the next chapter, we shall discuss 
the analysis done to  find out  which instruments, coercive or persuasive,  might  be more 
relevant in explaining the level of tax compliance reached by large corporate taxpayers. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF COERCIVE AND PERSUASIVE 
TAX COMPLIANCE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter discussed how the tax compliance achieved by LTU large corporate 
taxpayers was measured. It showed that tax compliance is comprised of three components, 
filing, reporting and payment and these three together make up overall compliance. It showed 
that the taxpayers were most compliant in their filing obligations and the least compliant in 
reporting. Against the backdrop of the above findings, the objectives of this chapter are 
twofold. The first is to find out which are the significant tax compliance instruments for the 
achieved tax compliance. This will answer the second and the third research sub-questions 
(see research questions in section 3.2). To gather evidence on how the selected instruments of 
coercion and persuasion (see section 3.3) contribute to tax compliance, empirical support will 
be obtained from data collected through questionnaire survey and tax office records. The 
statistical relationship between the achieved level of tax compliance and the instruments that 
brought it about will be examined by binary logistic regression. To measure the influence of 
context  on  compliance  instruments  (e.g.,  predictors),  CHAID  algorithm  and  multilevel 
logistic regression will be used (discussed at length in 3.12.3).  The second objective of this 
chapter  is  to  determine  the  relative  contributions  of  the  instruments.  The  comparative 
positions of the odds ratios for the predictors, along with their level of significance, will show 
whether coercive or persuasive tax instruments are stronger in managing compliance issues. 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In section one, instruments affecting filing 
compliance will be analysed. Section two will look at the instruments affecting reporting 
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compliance. Section three will examine the instruments affecting payment compliance. And 
in section four, instruments affecting overall tax compliance will  be investigated.   Each 
section will begin by presenting descriptive statistics from ranked questions followed by 
logistic regression, CHAID and multilevel logistic regression.  Finally, the chapter conclusion 
will be presented in section five with a particular focus on the relative importance of the 
selected instruments. 
 
6.2    Important Instruments for Filing Compliance 
 
 
The tax compliance process begins with filing compliance. As seen in chapter 5 above, 84.41% 
of  large  corporations  were  filing  compliant  (section  5.5).  To  determine  the  relative 
importance of the instruments, this section begins by constructing a rank of choices of the 
survey respondents. The question specifically asked respondents to rank the instruments of 
coercion and persuasion in order of their importance for inducing tax compliance. The type of 
question asked here was different from those asked for measuring the predictors, for example 
taxpayer service or penalty; in the latter case, questions were asked on a scale, in particular a 
Likert-type scale. To determine the ranking of the instruments for filing compliance, the 
question asked was (see question 6 in the questionnaire in Appendix C): To ensure the timely 
submission of tax returns, how much would each of the following contribute (i.e., penalty, 
audit, imprisonment, taxpayer service quality, simplified tax law and mutual understanding)? 
To answer the question, respondents were to rank the most important instrument as 1, the 
least important as 6, and the rest in numerical order, with no equal ranking allowed. 
 
According to their ranking (Table B.2, Appendix B), tax penalty was as the best instrument 
(68/154) = 44.15% for inducing filing compliance. Simplified tax law (25.34%), mutual 
understanding (16.23%) and taxpayer service quality (7.14%) came out as the next best 
instruments.  In the ranking,  tax audit  and  imprisonment  were found  to  have a  minimal 
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contribution on filing returns.  Seen from the perspective of corporate sector affiliations, 
(26/43) = 60.45% of manufacturing and (35/80) = 43.75% of finance sector corporations rank 
tax penalty as more important than other instruments for achieving filing compliance. Only 
(7/31) = 22.58% of service sector corporations rank tax penalty as the most effective option. 
The majority of service sector corporations (31.03%) view simplified tax law as the best 
option to improve filing compliance. However, there are almost equal numbers of finance 
sector corporations (26.25%) and manufacturing corporations (20.93%) who view simplified 
tax law as the least favourable choice for improving filing compliance. 
 
A basic description such as that above provides a simple, primary, yet valid, indication of the 
instruments affecting filing compliance. But what might the results look like using intensity 
scales?  Johnson (2010:122) argues that, “to capture a range of feelings … ranking questions 
should be replaced with intensity scales.”  In the next section, the instruments of coercion and 
persuasion are measured on Likert-type scales. The purpose is to see whether any of the 
instruments are statistically significant. 
 
It should be noted that these same measurement techniques and stages are to be applied for 
finding the important instruments that affect reporting, payment and overall compliance. 
 
6.3 Logistic Regressions:  Variables, Scales and Estimations 
 
 
Binary logistic regression was performed to determine the significant predictors for filing 
compliance.   The  predictors  included  16  dummy  variables 11   which  represented  five 
categorical  variables  like  tax  penalty,  imprisonment,  taxpayer  service  quality,  mutual 
understanding and simplified tax law and one continuous variable  like tax audit. All the 
 
 
 
 
11Multicollinearity was checked by using VIF and the cut-off value of VIF was 5 (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 
1999; Menard, 1995). The values of VIF ranged from 1.041 to 1.257, and therefore all the 16 predictors were 
included in the analysis. In running the model, enter method was followed. 
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variables here, other than tax audit, were measured on a five-point Likert-type scale. For 
example, taxpayer service was measured with the following question with five answer points 
(see  question  10  in  the  questionnaire  in  Appendix  C):  The  quality  of  taxpayer  service 
provided to large corporate taxpayers by the LTU is – very good, good, fair, poor or very 
poor. However, in consideration of the sample size of the study, the measurement categories 
were subsequently collapsed from five into three.   The reliability and validity of this 
measurement have been discussed previously in section 5.3. 
 
In the logit models, each of these predictors takes on three categories and is valued at from 1 
to 3. Observations scaled 1 for the predictors – e.g., taxpayer service quality and mutual 
understanding – would mean “very good”.  A value of 2 would mean “good” and 3 “poor”. 
For predictors like simplified tax law, tax penalty and imprisonment, a value of 1 would 
mean “agree with”, a value of 2 would mean “undecided” and 3 “disagree with” the 
usefulness/effectiveness of the compliance instruments. The other predictor, tax audit, is a 
continuous  variable 12 .  The  eight  control variables  were put  in  the  model to  nullify the 
 
confounding effect. 
 
 
 
6.3.1  Results and Interpretations of Logistic Regression 
 
 
The results showed that the logit model was statistically significant, χ2 (16, N =154) = 47.78, 
p = .001 compared to the null model. The fitness of the model improved from the baseline 
model (-2 LL = 116.54) to the intended model (-2 LL = 66.44). The model explained between 
49.3% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 52.0% (Nagelkerke R square) of the variance in filing 
 
compliance. It correctly classified 96.6% of large corporations who filed tax return on time 
 
 
12Tax audit data collected from LTU records were found to be highly skewed (skew = 6.509, SE = .195, kurtosis 
= 50.138, SE = .389) as there were audit adjustments from zero to several million dollars. To make the 
distribution normal, I log transformed the distribution through common (log to the base 10). I added 1 to all 
audit adjustments before doing the transformation, as there were zeros. Post log transformation values (skew = - 
.082, SE =.195, kurtosis= -1.847, SE =.389) of the diagnosis statistics were found satisfactory. 
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and 60.0% of corporations who did not with an overall success rate of 91.3% in the 
classification. Table 6.1 below shows the B coefficients, Wald χ2, significance levels, and 
Exp (B) of the predictors, which are interpreted as follows. 
 
First, when the usefulness of tax penalty is dummy coded into “agree” and “undecided”, by 
setting  “disagree”  as  the  reference  group,  there  is  significant  difference  in  the  filing 
compliance between those taxpayers agreeing and those disagreeing on its usefulness (β = 
3.204, Wald χ2 = 7.429, p = .041, odds ratio = 24.642). The odds ratio implies that large 
corporations agreeing that tax penalty is useful are 24.64 times more likely to be filing 
compliant than those disagreeing. There is also significant difference between large corporate 
taxpayers who are undecided and those who disagree as regards the usefulness of tax penalty 
(β = 3.080, Wald χ2 = 7.099, p = .008, odds ratio = 21.75). 
 
The odds ratio indicates that taxpayers who are undecided about the usefulness of tax penalty 
are 21.75 times more likely to file their tax return on time than those who disagree. This 
result is evidence that large corporate taxpayers who agree or are undecided about the 
usefulness of LTU tax penalty are more likely to be filing compliant than those who are not. 
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Compliance instruments Categories β Wald  χ2 Stand. 
Error 
Sig. Exp(β) 
 
Table 6.1: Logistic regression outputs on filing compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive instruments 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
3.204 
   
7.429 
   
1.176 
   
.041* 
 
 
24.642 
Tax penalty Undecided 3.080  7.099  1.156  .008** 21.756 
 Disagree 0 .  .  .  1 
Tax audit  .543  7.534  .198  .006** 1.721 
 Agree -.098  0.007  1.168  .933 .906 
Imprisonment Undecided 1.945  1.865  1.424  .172 6.996 
 Disagree 0 .  .  .  1 
Persuasive instruments          
 Very good -1.683  1.447  1.399  .229 .186 
Taxpayer service Good .337  0.056  1.422  .813 1.400 
 Poor 0 .  .  .  1 
  Agree 
 
-2.765  
 
2.051  
 
1.931  
 
.152 
 
.063 
Simplified tax law Undecided -2.781  1.649  2.165  .199 .062 
 Disagree 0 .  .  .  1 
  Very Good 
 
-1.628  
 
1.320  
 
1.417  
 
.251 
 
.196 
Mutual understanding Good -.898  0.518  1.247  .472 .407 
 Poor 0  .  .  . 1 
  .        
Constant  9.84        
Overall model evaluation          
χ2 47.785 .001** 
-2 Log likelihood 
(baseline) 
-2 Log likelihood 
(intended) 
116.548 
 
66.426 
Cox & Snell R2 .493 
Wald test 53.87 .000** 
Nagelkerke R square .520 
Goodness of fit test 
 Hosmer & Lemeshow  9.722  .285   
 
Notes: 
Enter method was followed 
*Significant at the 0 .05 level 
**Significant at the 0 .01 level 
 
 
 
ln(probFilCom /1-probFilCom) = β0+β1TaxPen+β2TaxAud+ β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ+ 
β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd+ β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn+ 
β9Corloc + β10CorpSect +β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal+ 
β13CorAge+β14TaxAdv 
 
Where:   
ProbFilCom - Probability of filing compliance 
TaxPen - Usefulness of tax penalty 
TaxAud - Tax audit adjustment 
Imprison - Effectiveness of imprisonment 
TaxServ - Quality of taxpayer service 
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TaxLawSimp   - Simplified tax law 
MutUnd - Mutual understanding 
CorSiz - Total assets of large corporation 
CorOwn - Ownership pattern 
CorLoc - Locational identity - local or multinational 
CorpSect - Sector affiliation - finance, manufacturing or service 
MarTaxRate - Marginal tax rate 
EmpSal - salary paid to the employees 
CorAge - Age of incorporation 
TaxAdv - Nature of tax advisor appointed 
 
 
 
Second, when the tax audit adjustment of large corporate taxpayers is taken as a predictor, 
there is significant difference in filing compliance (β = .543, Wald χ2 = 7.534, p = .006, odds 
ratio = 1.721). This shows that a 1 percent increase in audit adjustment yields a .54 percent 
increase in the probability of filing compliance.13 This finding suggests that corporations who 
are audited and found to have adjustments are likely to be more filing compliant than those 
who are not found to have any audit adjustments. 
 
Third, when the effectiveness of imprisonment is dummy coded as “agree” and “undecided”, 
by setting “disagree” as the reference group, no significant difference is found between the 
filing compliance of those corporations “agreeing” and those “disagreeing” with its 
effectiveness (β = -.098, Wald χ2 = .007, p = .933) or between taxpayers “undecided” and 
those “disagreeing” (β = 1.945, Wald χ2 = 1.865, p = .172).  This means that imprisonment 
measures, whether effective or not, do not affect the filing compliance of large corporate 
taxpayers. 
Fourth, when the quality of taxpayer service is dummy coded into “very good” and “good”, 
by setting “poor” as the reference category, there is no significant difference in the filing 
 
 
 
13In a logit model, where a predictor is log transformed, we interpret “the coefficient (without transformation) as a 
percentage change for a 1 percent increase in the covariate in its original metric” (Allison, 2010:214).  Since 
tax audit adjustment is log transformed, the coefficient .543 is interpreted as a percentage change for a 1 percent 
change in tax audit adjustment. 
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compliance of those large corporations scaling taxpayer service quality as “very good” and 
those scaling it as “poor”(β = -1.683, Wald χ2 = 1.447, p = .229). There is also no significant 
difference between those taxpayers scaling taxpayer service quality as “good” and those 
scaling it as “poor” (β = .337, Wald χ2 = .056, p = .813).This indicates that taxpayer service 
quality does not affect the filing compliance of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
Fifth, when simplified tax law is dummy coded as “agree” and “undecided”, by setting 
“disagree” as the reference group, no significant difference is found between those taxpayers 
“agreeing” and those “disagreeing” on tax law simplicity (β = -2.766, Wald χ2 =  2.051, p 
= .152). The same finding applies to those taxpayers who are “undecided” and those 
“disagreeing” on the simplicity of the tax law (β = -2.781, Wald χ2 = 1.649, p = .199). This 
means that simplified tax law does not affect the filing compliance of large corporate 
taxpayers. 
 
Sixth, when the level of mutual understanding is dummy coded the same as taxpayer service 
quality, there is no significant difference in the filing compliance of those large corporations 
scaling it as “very good” and those as “poor” (β = -1.628, Wald χ2 = 1.320, p = .251) or 
between those scaling it as “good” and those as “poor‟ (β = -.898, Wald χ2 = .518, p = .472). 
 
This indicates that mutual understanding does not improve return filing. 
 
 
 
As this shows, two predictors, tax penalty and tax audit, are statistically significant to filing 
compliance. Both the predictors have a positive influence on filing compliance. The statistical 
significance of the logistic regressions is generally consistent with the story told by the 
respondent ranking, where penalty and audit were found important. However, no persuasive 
instrument emerged as important for filing compliance in the logit model. This suggests the 
necessity for further analysis to find out whether persuasion might have any role in improving 
filing behaviour. 
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6.3.2  Penalty and Audit: Are They the Only Instruments to Influence 
 
Filing Compliance? 
 
The logit model shows that penalty and audit are important to filing compliance. However, it 
is difficult to claim that they are the only predictors without further analysis being done to 
check this finding. This thesis has argued (see section 3.12.3) that CHAID analysis can be 
applied over the logit models to explore whether any segment of the outcome variable is fully 
or partially influenced by any segment of a predictor. The CHAID model also enables us to 
estimate the influence of the context variable by extracting hidden predictive information in 
the form of a multilevel tree structure. The reasons for choosing corporate sector as the 
context variable have been discussed in section 5.5.5.   The main argument was developed 
from elite interviews and the fact that large corporations are clustered according to their 
sector affiliation. These arguments were bolstered by comparing the logit output derived 
“with” and “without” the three contending context variables: ownership pattern, corporate 
location and sector affiliation. 
 
As reported in Table B.6, Appendix B, the logit models were first run with all the predictors 
and control variables. Second, the models were run removing the variable on corporate sector. 
Third, the models were run dropping the variable on ownership pattern, and finally dropping 
corporate location. Comparing the models it  was found that the impact, in terms of the 
number of significant predictors, of removing the variable on corporate sector was higher 
than removing the other two. When the corporate sector variable was taken out, penalty, 
imprisonment and simplified tax law were found not to be statistically significant for filing, 
payment and overall compliance respectively. When location was taken out of the model, 
taxpayer service and simplified tax law became insignificant to overall compliance. No 
changes were found with respect to the significant predictors when ownership pattern was 
removed from the model. Therefore, sector affiliation is taken as the context variable. 
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6.3.3  CHAID Models 
 
 
Two predictors, marginal tax rate (p = .014, χ2 = 6.03) and mutual understanding (p = .024, 
χ2  =  6.31),  are  found  to  be  significant  to  filing  compliance  in  the  CHAID  model 14 . 
According to this model, marginal tax rate is the best predictor of filing compliance, which is 
taken as a control variable in the model. Mutual understanding is a significant variable when 
the marginal tax rate is charged at the rate of 45%. When the marginal tax rate is charged at a 
lower rate (27.5% to 37.5%), it does not appear to be significant any more.  In the CHAID 
model (Figure 6.1 below), mutual understanding is placed at the second stage as a terminal 
code15. 
 
As the model shows, 77% of large corporations charged at this tax rate are filing compliant. 
For the 45% marginal tax rate (e.g., mainly charged on finance corporations), the percentage 
of filing compliant taxpayers is much higher (91.2%), which supports our findings in section 
5.5.4. Again large corporations who are given a tax rate of 45% and who think that mutual 
understanding is “very good” are 95.5% compliant with their filing obligations. But filing 
compliance falls to 71.4% when large taxpayers think that mutual understanding is not very 
good. 
 
When corporate sector is used as an influence variable16 in the model, it neither takes other 
predictors as significant nor drops any predictor as insignificant. 
Risk  estimates 17  (see  Table  B.7  in  Appendix  B)  in  both the  models  (with  and  without 
corporate sector) are .156, which implies that in 15.6% cases, the categories predicted by the 
 
 
 
14In all cases likelihood criteria with child node 10 and parent node 25 have been used and have been compared 
with Pearson criteria. Cross-validation has been used when no influence variable is used. 
 
15A node is terminal when it does not take any further variable as significant and ends in itself. 
 
16 Corporate sector is taken as an influence variable to define its influence on the tree-growing process. 
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model are wrong. In other words, as the classification table18 (see Table B.8 in Appendix B) 
shows, the model classifies 84.4% of the filing compliance cases of large corporate taxpayers 
correctly. The classification table also indicates that it predicts 100% of filing compliant 
corporate taxpayers correctly; meaning none of the filing compliant large corporate taxpayers 
is misclassified as non-compliant. The gain19, as shown by the target category of the gains 
chart (Figure 6.2), indicates that the model is fairly good. It starts from 0% and ends at 100% 
and finally levels off smoothly. 
 
Figure 6.1: CHAID model showing significant predictors for filing compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 In CHAID models, risk estimates show cases in which the predicted category may be wrong. In other words, 
they refer to the risk of misclassifying a large corporate taxpayer as non-compliant who should rather be 
compliant, or vice versa. 
 
18 The classification table is the opposite of the risk estimate, which shows the extent to which outcomes are 
classified correctly. 
 
19Gain refers to the number of cases in the terminal node of the target category, whereas the gain chart indicates 
the fitness of the model. A gain chart starting at 0% and ending at 100% with a steep rise towards the end 
signifies a good model. A diagonal reference line means that the model has failed to provide any information 
about the fitness of the model. 
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Figure 6.2: Gains summary of the fitness of the CHAID model on filing compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CHAID model has shown the impact of corporate sector on the tree growing process. 
However,  it  cannot  specify the all-sector and  the  unique sector  effects of the  influence 
variable on the significant instruments. These specifications can provide an approximate 
description of within and between sector influences of corporate sectors on the significant 
compliance instruments. In the language of contextual effects literature, they show whether 
the estimated significance and the odds are individual or compositional in nature (Reardon et 
al., 2002).  For this purpose, multilevel logistic regression is used. Unlike the standard logit 
model, where the unit of analysis was large corporate taxpayers, these models consider 
corporate sector as the unit  of analysis 20 .  Also, these models use sector level aggregate 
measurements. That is, such models, for example, will use the mean filing compliance of 
corporate sector instead of that of individual large corporations as the outcome variable. In 
 
20The coefficients in the standard logit model that originate from a probability distribution are considered fixed, 
but in the multilevel regression those coefficients are treated as random (Kreft and Leeuw, 1998). 
180  
the case of predictors, for example tax audit, the sector mean of tax audit will be used as the 
predictor variable. 
 
6.3.4  The Impact of Corporate Sector on Filing Compliance: Fixed and 
 
 
Random Effects Models 
 
 
First, the  fixed  effects  logistic  regression  was  estimated  to  understand  the  within-group 
effects of the context variable (i.e., corporate sector), and the random effects logistic 
regression was conducted to see the across- or between-group effects of the context variable 
(Stata Corp, 2011; Hamilton, 2008).These showed whether the standard logit  model had 
under- or over-estimated the effects of the compliance instruments by not taking into account 
the effect of clustering the corporations in different corporate sectors (Cho, 2003; Guo and 
Zhao,  2000).  To  specify  the  variance-covariance  matrix  (VCE)  corresponding  to  the 
parameter estimates, and to identify misspecification problems, jackknife estimation was 
applied. Jackknife, also called jknife, is a replication-based estimation procedure that 
calculates the statistic in question, omitting one of the observations from the dataset each 
time the test is repeated (Mooney and Duval, 1993; Mosteller and Tukey, 1977).This 
estimation could also be done by the bootstrap technique, but the attempt to obtain the 
estimations through bootstrap was unsuccessful. 
 
In the fixed effects logistic regression, tax penalty (p = .008, CI = 95%, odds ratio = .048) and 
tax audit (β =.516, p = .007, CI = 95%, odds ratio = 1.67) appeared statistically significant 21, 
in line with the standard logit models (see Table 6.2). But the standard logit model 
overestimated  the  effects  of  both  tax  penalty  and  tax  audit  on  filing  compliance.  Such 
overestimation for tax audit, within the corporate sectors, was (.54%-.51%) = .03%; and for 
 
 
 
21A quadrature check at 12 points was done for the above and all other xtlogit models. It showed that none of the 
coefficients changed by more than a relative difference of 10-4 (0.01%), thus the choice of quadrature points 
does not significantly affect the outcome, and the result may be confidently interpreted. 
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tax penalty it was (24.64-20.83) = 3.81 units. Variance-covariance estimations (VCE) done 
through the jackknife approach were compared with the fixed effects paramet ers and were 
found consistent (Tax penalty, p = .008, CI = 95%, odds ratio = .037 and Tax audit, β =. 423, 
p = .012, CI = 95%). The jackknife standard error for tax penalty was .167 and for tax audit it 
was .117; and the logit model standard errors for them were 1.176 and .198. The logit model 
standard error for tax penalty was (.167/1.176)2= .020 of the size of jackknife standard error, 
 
and the logit standard error for tax audit was (.117/.198)2= .349 of the size of jackknife 
standard error. In both cases the difference was not high and was thus acceptable (Biemer, 
2011). 
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Compliance 
instruments 
Fixed effects logistic regression Random effects logistic regression 
Cat. Exp β Sig. SE*** Jknife 
S E 
Exp β Sig. S E Jknife 
S E 
 
Table 6.2: Results obtained when fitting fixed and random effects logistic regression to filing 
 
compliance data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive 
instruments 
 
 Agree .048 0.008** .055 .167 .067 .011* .071 .036 
Tax penalty Undecided .900 0.917 .907 . .834 .854 .817 . 
 Disagree 1 . . . . . . . 
 
Tax audit  
 
1.676 
 
0.007** 
 
.321 
 
.117 
 
1.494 
 
.009** 
 
.229 
 
.160 
  Agree 
 
1.077 
 
0.948 
 
1.232 
 
1.418 
 
1.089 
 
.938 
 
1.200 
 
.063 
Imprisonment Undecided 6.939 0.059* 7.127  4.873 .109 4.757 . 
 Disagree 1 . . . . . . . 
Persuasive          
instruments  
Very good 
 
4.902 
 
0.246 
 
6.714 
 
3.123 
 
5.540 
 
.208 
 
7.526 
 
2.646 
Taxpayer Good 6.830 0.058* 6.914 . 4.930 .085 4.568 . 
service          
  Poor 
 
1   
 
.     
  Agree 
 
14.229 
 
0.160 
 
26.915 
 
2.068 
 
5.024 
 
.247 
 
7.005 
 
1.244 
Simplified tax Undecided .988 0.994 1.437 . .8940 .938 1.293 . 
law          
 Disagree 1 . . . . . . . 
 
 Very good 4.828 0.259 6.734 1.673 7.487 .130 9.966 .233 
Mutual Good 2.024 0.374 1.606 . 2.307 .287 1.812 . 
understanding          
Poor 1 . . . . . .. . 
Constant .657 
 
Model fitness and variance components 
 
LRChi2,re 
 
20.82 
 
.014 
-2LL, re 
σ2ν, re 
-34.793 
-14.47 
 
Rho, re 1.57e-07  
Rho, Jknife 1.66e-07  
Notes: 
*Significant at the 0.05 level 
**Significant at the 0 .01 level 
***Standard errors reported in the table are the square root of the variances of the VCE 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) = 0.00, Prob >= chibar2 = 1.000 
 
 
 
The results showed that the random effects logit model was statistically significant, LRChi2 
 
= 20.82, p = .014, and at least one of the predictors‟ regression coefficient was not equal to 
zero. The fitness of the model improved from the baseline model (-2 LL = -57.105) to the 
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intended model (-2 LL = -34.793). The panel level or corporate sector level variance (sig2u 
or σ2ν) was -14.47, and the proportion of the total variation accounted for by the random 
effect (e.g., rho, or intraclass correlation coefficient22) was 1.57e-07. Since the value of rho 
was not zero, the panel level variance component was important, and was different from the 
standard logistic regression (Stata Corp, 2011). The improvement in the proportion of the 
contribution to the sector level variance made by the intraclass correlation coefficient (rho = 
1.66e-07, CI = 95%), as shown by jackknife estimations, reinforced the importance of 
corporate sector as a context variable23. 
 
Both tax penalty (p = .011, odds ratio = .067) and tax audit (β = .402, p = .009, odds ratio = 
 
1.49) were statistically significant in the random effects logistic regression. But tax penalty 
was significant only for those taxpayers who agreed that it was useful, as compared with 
those who did not. The percentage increase in filing compliance for a 1% increase in tax audit 
fell to .40%, which was .54% in the logit model. For penalty, the odds ratio fell to 14.92, 
which was 24.64 in the logit model. This showed that the standard logit models overestimated 
the effects of both predictors. In the jackknife estimations, however, only tax penalty was 
found to be significant (p = .015 CI = 95%, odds ratio =). The jackknife standard error for tax 
penalty was .036 and for tax audit it was .160. The logit standard error for tax penalty was 
(.036/1.176)2 =.000 of the size of jackknife standard error, and for tax audit it was(.160/.198)2 
= .652 of the size of jackknife standard error. In both cases the difference was very small and 
was thus acceptable. 
 
 
 
 
 
22Intraclass correlation measures the degree to which corporations share common experiences (Kreft and Leeuw, 
1998). A high intraclass correlation means that corporations are likely to share common experiences. It can also 
be called a measure of the homogeneity of the corporations in a group or of the proportion of total variability 
due to corporate sector affiliation (Kreft and Leeuw, 1998). 
 
23 For comparison purpose,  An ANOVA based within and between sector variance components along with 
intraclass correlation has been placed in Appendix A, point C. 
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6.4 Section Summary 
 
 
Several  statistical  tests  were  conducted  to  obtain  accurate  estimates  of  the  predictors‟ 
 
significant to filing compliance. Three instruments – tax penalty, tax audit and mutual 
understanding – emerged as significant to filing compliance. Although marginal tax rate was 
found to be significant, it is not considered here as it was taken as a control variable in the 
models. Throughout the tests, tax penalty and tax audit were statistically significant, which 
tends to suggest that tax penalty and tax audit are the most significant predictors of filing 
compliance. Clearly, two instruments belong to the coercive and one to the persuasive 
category. This means that the role of coercive tax instruments is comparatively high in 
achieving large corporate filing compliance. 
 
 
6.5 Important Instruments for Reporting Compliance 
 
 
It was found that 53.89% of large corporations were reporting compliant (section 5.5.1). To 
construct the ranking for reporting compliance, respondents were asked to answer the 
following questions (Q7): To ensure timely declaration of full income, how much would each 
of the following contribute (i.e., the six instruments)? It showed that tax penalty and taxpayer 
service quality dominated in their ranking (see Table B.3, Appendix B). Of large corporate 
taxpayers, 35.71% view penalty as the first choice as a weapon against reporting non- 
compliance. However, respondents who think tax penalty could be the second (15.58%), third 
(11.68%) or fourth (12.33%) choices for creating reporting compliance are almost equal in 
number. As far as taxpayer service is concerned, 11.03% of taxpayers think it to be the best 
option to improve reporting compliance. But tax audit, which is meant to be the major 
instrument to combat reporting non-compliance, is not well viewed as an option for inducing 
reporting compliance. Only 8.44% of large corporate taxpayers think that tax audit could be 
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an effective tool for improving reporting compliance. Other instruments are found to make 
little contribution on reporting compliance. 
 
Sector-based comparison of ranked items shows that 48.83% of manufacturing and 35.00 % 
of finance sector corporations rank tax penalty as more important than other instruments. In 
choosing their second option, 28.75% of finance and 25.58% of manufacturing sector 
corporations rank mutual understanding as a means of improving reporting compliance. For 
service sector corporations, the best option for improving reporting compliance is simplifying 
tax law (35.48%) followed by mutual understanding (22.58%) and taxpayer service (22.58%). 
For  service  sector  corporations,  tax  penalty  is  the  fourth  option  (19.35%)  for  making 
reporting compliance better, and tax audit is even less preferred (3.22%) as an instrument. 
The next section pursues a regression analysis based on measurement of these instruments on 
Likert-type scale. 
 
6.6 Logistic Regression Estimates of Reporting Compliance 
 
 
 
The results showed that the model was statistically significant, χ2  (16, N =154) = 142.39, p 
 
= .000 compared to the null model. The fitness of the model improved from the baseline 
model (-2 LL = 190.84) to the intended model (-2 LL = 48.44)24.    The model explained 
between 64.4% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 85.9% (Nagelkerke R square) of the variance 
in reporting compliance, and it correctly classified 89.0% of the large corporate taxpayers 
who reported their due taxes on time and 92.3% of the taxpayers who did not report on time, 
with an overall success rate of 90.6% in the classification. Table 6.3 shows B coefficients, 
Wald χ2, significance levels, and Exp (B) by predictors, and the results are interpreted below. 
 
 
 
 
 
24Multi-collinearity was checked by using VIF, and the cut-off value of VIF was 5 (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 
1999; Menard, 1995). The values of VIF ranged from 2.03 to 3.25, and therefore all 16 predictors were included 
in the analysis. In running the model, enter method was followed. 
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Table 6.3: Logistic regression outputs on reporting compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance instruments Categories β Wald χ2 Stand. 
error 
Sig. Exp (β ) 
 
Coercive instruments 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
1.238 
 
 
1.249 
 
 
1.108 
   
.264 
 
 
3.450 
Tax penalty Undecided .820 0.523 1.133  .470 2.270 
  Disagree 
 
0 
 
. 
 
.  
 
. 
 
1 
Tax audit  -.358 17.81 .436  .000* .699 
 Agree .267 .036 1.400  .849 1.306 
Imprisonment Undecided 1.371 .754 1.579  .385 3.940 
 Disagree 0 . .  . 1 
 
Persuasive  instruments        
 Very good -2.240 1.851 1.647  .174 .106 
Taxpayer service Good -3.007 3.485 1.611  .062 .049 
 Poor 0 . . .  1 
  Agree 
 
-.433 
 
.122 
 
1.241  
 
.727 
 
.648 
Simplified tax law Undecided -4.612 2.222 3.094  .136 .010 
 Disagree 0  .  . 1 
 
 
Very good 
 
.129 
 
.005 
 
1.870  
 
.945 
 
1.138 
Mutual understanding Good 1.054 .515 1.468  .473 2.868 
 Poor 0 . .  . 1 
 
Constant  
 
6.630      
Overall model evaluation        
 
Χ2 142.396 .000* 
-2 Log likelihood (baseline) 190.845 
-2 Log likelihood (intended) 48.448 
Cox & Snell R2 .644 
Wald Test .463 .496 
Nagelkerke R square .859 
Goodness of fit test  
 Hosmer & Lemeshow  3.17  .923   
 
Notes: 
Enter method was followed 
*Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
ln(probRepCom/1-probRepCom)= β0 + β1TaxPen + β2TaxAud + β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ + 
β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd + β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn + 
β9Corloc +  β10CorpSect + β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal + 
β13CorAge + β14TaxAdv 
 
Where 
 
 
 
ProbRepCom -Probability of reporting compliance(For Equation 3.4) 
TaxPen - Usefulness of tax penalty 
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TaxAud - Tax audit adjustment 
Imprison - Effectiveness of imprisonment 
TaxServ - Quality of taxpayer service 
TaxLawSimp   - Simplified tax law 
MutUnd - Mutual understanding 
CorSiz - Total assets of large corporation 
CorOwn - Ownership pattern 
Corloc - Locational identity - local or multinational 
CorpSect - Sector affiliation- finance, manufacturing or service 
MarTaxRate -Marginal tax rate 
EmpSal - Salary paid to employees 
CorAge - Age of incorporation 
TaxAdv - Nature of tax advisor appointed 
 
 
 
First, when the usefulness of tax penalty is dummy coded into “agree” and “undecided”, by 
setting “disagree” as the reference group, there is no significant difference in reporting 
compliance between those who agree tax penalty to be useful and those who disagree (β 
=1.238, Wald χ2 = 1.249, p = .264). Also, there is no significant difference in reporting 
compliance between large corporate taxpayers who are undecided and those who disagree 
about its usefulness (β = .820, Wald χ2 = .523, p = .470). This shows that tax penalty does 
not affect the reporting compliance of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
Second, when tax audit adjustment is taken as a predictor, there is significant difference in 
the reporting compliance of large corporations (β = -.358, Wald χ2 = 17.821, p = .000, odds 
ratio = .699). This shows that a 1 percent increase in audit adjustment leads to a .35 percent 
decrease in the probability of reporting compliance. This finding suggests that corporations 
who are audited and are found to have adjustments are likely to be less reporting compliant 
than those who are not found to have any adjustments. 
 
Third, when the effectiveness of imprisonment is dummy coded as “agree” and “undecided”, 
by setting “disagree” as the reference group, no significant difference is fo und in reporting 
compliance between those corporations agreeing and those disagreeing with the proposition 
(β = .267, Wald χ2 = .036, p = .849) or between those undecided and those agreeing (β = 
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1.371, Wald χ2 = .754, p = .385).  This means that imprisonment does not affect the reporting 
compliance of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
Fourth, when quality of taxpayer service is dummy coded into “very good” and “good”, by 
setting  “poor”  as  the  reference  group,  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  reporting 
compliance between taxpayers scaling service quality “very good” and those scaling it “poor” 
(β = -.240, Wald χ2 = 1.851, p = .174), or  “good” and “poor” (β = -3.007, Wald χ2 = 3.485, p 
= .062). This indicates that taxpayer service quality does not affect reporting compliance. 
 
 
 
Fifth, when simplified tax law is dummy coded as “agree” and “undecided”, by setting 
“disagree” as the reference group, no significant difference is found between those taxpayers 
“agreeing” and those “disagreeing” on tax law simplicity (β = -.433, Wald χ2 = .122, p 
= .727).  The same finding applies for respondents scaling it as “undecided” and those scaling 
it as “disagree” (β = -4.612, Wald χ2 = 2.222, p = .136).  This means that simplified tax law 
does not affect the reporting compliance of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
Sixth, when mutual understanding is dummy coded in the same way as taxpayer service, 
there are no significant differences in the reporting behaviour of respondents scaling it “very 
good” and those scaling it “poor” (β = .129, Wald χ2 = .005, p = .945) or those scaling it 
“good” and those scaling it “poor”(β = 1.054, Wald χ2 = .515, p = .473). This indicates that 
mutual understanding between large corporate businesses and the tax administration does not 
influence reporting compliance. 
 
Tax audit emerges as the only significant predictor of reporting compliance and maintains a 
negative relationship with it. With an increase in audit adjustments, large corporations are 
likely to be less reporting compliant. The ranking schedule at the beginning of this section 
shows tax penalty to be the most and tax audit to be the least effective option, whereas the 
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logit model produces tax audit as the only significant (negatively) predictor of reporting 
compliance. 
 
 
6.6.1  Is Tax Audit the Only Significant Predictor of Reporting Compliance? 
 
 
Using the same predictors in CHAID models, it is possible to see whether tax audit is still 
significant for reporting compliance (see Figure 6.3). CHAID estimates demonstrate that for 
reporting compliance, tax audit is the only significant predictor (p = .000, χ2 = 136.49).  The 
CHAID model divides tax audit into two segments:  having audit adjustments and having no 
audit adjustments. The category, “tax audit with adjustment”, takes another variable, tax 
advisor, as a significant variable. This means that for large corporate taxpayers with audit 
adjustments, tax advisor, a control variable in the model, is a significant predictor. 
 
Figure 6.3: CHAID model showing significant predictors for reporting compliance (wit hout 
influence variable) 
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Taxpayers in this category are only marginally compliant (16.5%) with their reporting 
obligations.   Perhaps those having audit adjustments have to hire a tax advisor to file an 
appeal against the additional demand created through tax audit. As is apparent from the 
terminal node 4 of the CHAID estimates (see Figure 6.3), large corporate taxpayers having 
audit adjustments and managing compliance issues by in-house tax departments are fully 
non-compliant. This means that salaried tax advisors working as employees of corporations 
might  not  have  played  any  role  in  reporting  compliance.  Professional  tax  advisors, 
individually or in collaboration with an in-house tax department, can contribute towards 
reporting compliance. Corporations having tax audit adjustments and employing professional 
tax advisors and/or in-house tax departments are 21.5% reporting compliant. 
 
Figure 6.4: CHAID model showing significant predictors for reporting compliance (with 
influence variable) 
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The above case, however, does not take into account the effect of sector affiliation. When 
sector affiliation is used as an influence variable in the model, the category “both in-house 
and appointed tax advisor” takes corporate age, another control variable in the model, as a 
significant predictor (see Figure 6.4).  This means that corporations that have both in-house 
and appointed tax advisors and are either at the early or at the mature stage of their business 
incorporation are 25.5% reporting compliant if they have any audit adjustments. 
 
Figure 6.5: Gains summary of the fitness of the CHAID model (without influence variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Gains summary of the fitness of the CHAID model (with influence variable) 
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The risk estimates of .091 in both the models imply that the models classify approximately 
 
90.9% of reporting compliant large corporate taxpayers correctly (Table B.7 in Appendix B). 
The classification table (Table B.8 in Appendix B) shows that it classifies 83.1% of reporting 
compliant corporate taxpayers correctly. The difference between the risk estimates of 90.9% 
and the classification of 83.1% implies that that some reporting compliant taxpayers are 
wrongly classified with the reporting non-compliant taxpayers. Finally, the cumulative gains 
chart (Figures 6.5 and 6.6 above) starts at 0% and ends slightly before 100%, showing a steep 
rise towards the end.  As a result, both the models can be taken as fairly successful.  Results 
obtained up to now have revealed a strong case for tax audit to be taken as a significant 
predictor of reporting compliance. But before confirming this, a final verification is made 
through fixed and random effects logistic regressions in the following section. 
 
 
6.6.2  Fixed and Random Effects of Corporate Sector Affiliation on 
 
 
Reporting Compliance 
 
 
 
In the fixed effects logistic regression, tax audit (β= -.692, p = 0.000, CI = 95%, odds ratio 
 
= .500) emerged as a significant predictor of reporting compliance (see Table 6.4). As seen 
from the sign of the coefficients, the direction of the relationship between tax audit and 
reporting compliance did not change in comparison to the standard logit model. But there was 
an increase in the likelihood of reporting non-compliance in case of tax audit from .35% in 
standard logit model to .69% in fixed effects model.  This shows that the standard logit model 
underestimated the effects of tax audit on reporting non-compliance by (.69%-.35%) =.34%. 
However, variance-covariance estimations (VCE) done through the jack-knife approach 
showed that tax audit was no longer a significant predictor to reporting compliance (β =.322, 
p = .879, CI = 95%). The jack-knife standard error for tax audit in the fixed effects model 
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Compliance 
instruments 
Fixed effects logistic regression Random effects logistic regression 
Cat. Exp β Sig. S E** Jknife 
S E 
Exp β Sig. S E Jknife 
S E 
 
was .074, and for the logit model standard error it was .436. The logit model standard error 
for tax audit was (.074/.436) 2=.028 of the size of jackknife standard error and the difference 
was very low. 
 
Table 6.4: Results obtained when fitting fixed and random effects logistic regression to 
reporting compliance data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive 
instruments 
 
 Agree .302 .269 .327 1.561 .301 .282 .335 .142 
Tax penalty Undecided .695 .721 .707 . 633 .648 .633 . 
 Disagree 1 . . 2.120 1 . . . 
 
Tax audit  
 
.500 
 
.000* 
 
.074 
 
. 
 
.463 
 
.000* 
 
.070 
 
.048 
  Agree 
 
.760 
 
.844 
 
1.056 
 
4.908 
 
.567 
 
.685 
 
.792 
 
.163 
Imprisonment Undecided 3.061 .263 3.057 . 3.037 .280 3.120 . 
 Disagree 1 . . . 1 . . . 
Persuasive          
instruments          
 Very good 8.943 .176 14.49 4.489 12.04 .133 19.93 .006 
Taxpayer Service Good .504 .516 .532 . .554 .582 .594 . 
 Poor 1 . . . 1 . . . 
  Agree 
 
1.589 
 
.699 
 
1.905 
 
3.716 
 
1.191 
 
885 
 
1.443 
 
.228 
Simplified tax Undecided .018 .142 .049 . .017 .144 .048 . 
law          
 Disagree 1 . . . 1 . . . 
  Very good 
 
.941 
 
.974 
 
1.712 
 
1.64 
 
.586 
 
.756 
 
1.00 
 
.265 
Mutual Good 2.381 .70 2.933 . 2.14 .525 2.58 . 
understanding  
Poor 
 
1 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Constant      1.121    
 
Model fitness and variance components 
 
LRChi2, re 
 
137.65 
 
.000* 
-2 LL 
σ2ν, re 
-24.787 
-14.68 
 
Rho, re 1.27e-07  
 Rho, jknife  1.86e-07   
 
Notes: 
*Significant at the 0 .01 level 
**Standard errors reported in the table are the square root of the variances of the VCE 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) = 0.00 Prob >= chibar2 = 1.000 
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The results showed that the random effects logit model was statistically significant, LRChi2= 
 
137.65, p=.000, and none of the predictors‟ regression coefficient is equal to zero. The fitness 
of the model improved from the baseline model (-2 LL= -95.42) to the intended model (-2 
 
LL=-24.78).The panel level or the corporate sector level variance (sig2u) was -14.68 and the 
proportion of total variation accounted for by the random effect (rho) was 1.27e-07. Since the 
value of rho was not zero, the panel level variance component was important, and was 
different from the standard logistic regression. The improvement in the proportion of the 
contribution to the sector level variance made by the intraclass correlation coefficient (rho = 
1.86e-07, CI = 95%), as shown by jack-knife estimations, reinforced the importance of 
corporate sector as a context variable. Tax audit remained statistically significant in the 
random effects logistic regression (β= -.769 p = .000, CI = 95%, odds ratio = .463) and the 
percentage change in the probability of reporting non-compliance for 1% increase in tax audit 
adjustment  increased to .76% without  any change in the direction of the relationship. It 
implies that the standard logit model underestimated the effects of tax audit on reporting 
compliance. In the Jackknife estimation, however, tax audit was not found significant as it 
was found in the case of fixed effects logistic regression. The jackknife standard error for tax 
audit was .048. The logit standard error for tax audit was (.048/.436)2= .012 of the size of 
 
jackknife standard error, which is very low and is acceptable. 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Section Summary 
 
 
In several tests, tax audit is found to be the only significant variable for reporting compliance. 
It has been found significant in the logit, CHAID and random and fixed effect logistic models. 
The other predictors found to be significant were tax advisors and incorporation age, which 
are used as control variables in the model and are beyond the scope of this study. In no 
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models does the nature of the relationship change: tax audit is found to have a negative 
relationship with reporting compliance. When adjustments in tax audit rise by a certain 
percentage, reporting compliance between and within corporations is likely to be less by a 
certain percentage for the cluster effect.   This shows that coercive tax instruments are the 
only option through which the LTU can obtain the reporting compliance of large corporations. 
Persuasive instruments seem not to have any influence on large corporate reporting 
compliance. 
 
6.8    Important Instruments for Payment Compliance 
 
 
 
In contrast to reporting compliance, 75.32% of large corporations were found to be payment 
compliant (section 5.5.1). In creating the ranking schedule, the question asked was (Q8): To 
ensure timely payment of all taxes, how much would each of the following contribute (i.e., the 
six instruments)? Table B.4, Appendix B shows that tax penalty again surfaces as the best 
option (46.10%) for achieving payment compliance. Of the other options, mutual 
understanding (20.77%), simplified tax law (19.48%), and taxpayer service quality (7.14%) 
come out as the preferred choices to deal with payment compliance. Tax audit and 
imprisonment have a marginal effect on making taxpayers payment compliant. 
 
Payment compliance viewed in the sector context shows that 55.81% of manufacturing and 
 
47.5 % of finance sector corporations rank tax penalty as more important than other 
instruments. For the service sector, 29% of corporations rank tax penalty as the best choice. 
As the next important choice, 16.25% of finance, 25.58% of manufacturing and 25.80% of 
service sector corporations think that mutual understanding is an effective instrument to 
payment compliance; and there are more corporations who view understanding as the second 
or third option for raising payment compliance. Support for simplified tax law as a first 
choice is also negligible and the choice of tax audit is quite insignificant. In the next section, 
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like the filing and reporting compliance, the logistic regression coefficients are determined 
for payment compliance. 
 
6.9     Results and Interpretations of Logistic Regression 
 
 
The results showed that the model is statistically significant, χ2  (16, N =154) = 29.74, p 
 
=.007 compared to the null model25.  The fitness of the model improved from the baseline 
model (-2 LL = 154.376) to the intended model (-2 LL = 124.350). The model explained 
between 19.4% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 28.8% (Nagelkerke R square) of the variance 
in payment compliance and it correctly classified the 93.4% of large corporate taxpayers who 
paid their taxes on time and the 23.9% of the taxpayers who did not, with an overall success 
rate of 76.1% in the classification. Table 6.5, Appendix B shows the Beta coefficients, Wald 
χ2, significance levels, and Exp (B) of the predictors, which are interpreted as follows. 
 
First, when the usefulness of tax penalty is dummy coded into  “agree” and “undecided”, by 
setting  “disagree”  as  the  reference  group,  there  is  significant  difference  in  payment 
compliance between those large corporations agreeing that tax penalty is useful and those 
disagreeing (β = .891, Wald χ2 = 1.924, p = .000). Significant  difference is also  found 
between large corporate taxpayers who are undecided and those who disagree on the point of 
the usefulness of tax penalty (β = 1.232, Wald χ2 = 3.516, p = .051). This result demonstrates 
that tax penalty positively influences the payment compliance of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25Multicollinearity was checked by using VIF and the cut-off value of VIF was 5.The values of VIF ranged from 
1.286 to 4.729, and therefore all the 16 predictors were included in the analysis. Here too, when the model was 
run, enter method was followed. 
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Table 6.5: Logistic regression outputs on payment compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance instruments Categories β Wald  χ2 Stand. 
Error 
Sig. Exp(β) 
 
Coercive instruments 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
.891 
 
 
1.924 
 
 
.642 
 
 
.000** 
 
 
2.437 
Tax penalty Undecided 1.232 3.516 .657 .051* 3.429 
 Disagree 0 . . . 1 
 
Tax audit  -.271 7.612 .098 .006** .763 
  Agree -1.569 4.620 .730 .032* .208 
Imprisonment Undecided -1.107 1.660 .859 .198 .331 
 Disagree 0 . . . 1 
 
Persuasive  instruments       
 Very good -.514 .320 .909 .572 .598 
Taxpayer service Good -1.021 1.432 .854 .231 .360 
 Poor 0 . . . 1 
  Agree .449 .484 .645 .487 1.566 
Simplified tax law Undecided -.153 .023 1.002 .879 .858 
 Disagree  .    
  Very good -.392 .239 .804 .625 .675 
Mutual understanding Good .182 .079 .647 .778 1.200 
 Poor 0 . . . 1 
 
Constant  6.336     
 
Overall model evaluation       
χ2 29.746 .097 
-2 Log likelihood (baseline) 154.376 
-2 Log likelihood (intended) 124.350 
Wald test 32.029 .000** 
Cox & Snell R2 .194 
Nagelkerke R square .288 
Goodness of fit test 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 7.552 .478 
Notes: 
Enter Method was followed 
*Significant at the 0 .05 level 
**Significant at the 0 .01 level 
 
ln (probpayCom/1-probpayCom) = β0 + β1TaxPen + β2TaxAud + β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ + 
β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd + β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn + 
β9Corloc +  β10CorpSect + β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal + 
β13CorAge + β14TaxAdv 
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Where 
 
 
ProbPayCom -Probability of payment compliance 
TaxPen - Usefulness of tax penalty 
TaxAud - Tax audit adjustment 
Imprison - Effectiveness of imprisonment 
TaxServ - Quality of taxpayer service 
TaxLawSimp   - Simplified tax law 
MutUnd - Mutual understanding 
CorSiz - Total assets of large corporation 
CorOwn - Ownership pattern 
Corloc - Locational identity - local or multinational 
CorpSect - Sector affiliation - finance, manufacturing or service 
MarTaxRate - Marginal tax rate 
EmpSal - Salary paid to the employees 
CorAge - Age of incorporation 
TaxAdv - Nature of tax advisor appointed 
 
 
Second, when tax audit adjustment is taken as a predictor, there is significant difference in 
the payment compliance of large corporations (β = -.271, Wald χ2 = 7.612, p = .006, odds 
ratio = .763). This indicates that tax audit affects payment compliance negatively. It also 
shows that a 1 percent increase in audit adjustment leads to a .27 percent decrease in the 
probability of payment compliance. This finding tends to suggest that corporations who are 
audited and are found to have adjustments are likely to be less payment compliant than those 
who are not found to have any adjustments. 
 
Third, when the effectiveness of imprisonment is dummy coded as “agree” and “undecided”, 
by setting “disagree” as the reference group, significant difference is found in payment 
compliance between those corporations agreeing and those disagreeing on its effectiveness 
(β = -1.569, Wald χ2 = 4.620, p = .032, odds ratio = .208). The odds ratio of .208 implies that 
large corporations agreeing on the effectiveness of imprisonment are (1/.208) = 4.8 times less 
likely to be payment compliant than those who consider it ineffective. But there is no 
significant difference found between the payment compliance of those who are undecided 
and those who disagree on its effectiveness (β = -1.107, Wald χ2 = 1.660, p = .198). This 
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means that imprisonment affects the payment compliance of large corporate taxpayers 
negatively. 
 
Fourth, when the quality of taxpayer service is dummy coded into “very good” and “good”, 
by setting “poor” as the reference group, there is no significant difference in payment 
compliance between those taxpayers scaling quality of taxpayer service as “very good” and 
those scaling it “poor” (β = -.514, Wald χ2 = .320, p = .572), or those scaling it “good” and 
those scaling it “poor” (β = -1.021, Wald χ2 = 1.432, p = .231). This implies that quality 
taxpayer service does not payment of taxes. 
 
Fifth, when simplified tax law  is dummy coded as “agree” and  “undecided”, by setting 
“disagree” as the reference group, no significant difference is found between those taxpayers 
“agreeing” and those “disagreeing” on tax law simplicity (β = .449, Wald χ2 = .484, p = .487). 
The  same  finding  applies  to  taxpayers  labelling  it  „“undecided”,  and  those  labelling  it 
“disagree” (β = -.153, Wald χ2 = .023, p = .879). This means that simplified tax law does not 
affect the payment compliance of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
Sixth, when mutual understanding is dummy coded in the same way as taxpayer service, 
there are no significant differences in payment compliance between the “very good” and the 
“poor” groups (β = -.392, Wald χ2 = .239, p = .652) or between the “good” and the “poor” 
groups (β = .182, Wald χ2 = .079, p = .778). This indicates that mutual understanding, 
whether good or bad, does not help payment compliance. 
 
As these results show, tax audit and imprisonment, are found to affect payment compliance 
negatively and tax penalty positively. Now, are these the only predictors having a significant 
relationship to payment compliance? This will be explored in the next section. 
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6.9.1 Penalty, Audit and Imprisonment: How Consistent are these 
 
Instruments in Influencing Payment Compliance? 
 
 
The CHAID model (Figure 6.7) shows that for payment compliance only tax audit (p = .001, 
χ2 = 12.21) is statistically significant26. All the tax audit categories end up in terminal nodes, 
in that none of the categories contain any other predictors influencing payment compliance. 
As node 2 reveals, corporations with no audit adjustments are 88.4% payment compliant, 
while corporations having some audit adjustments are only 64.7% payment compliant. This 
means that corporations with audit adjustments are less payment compliant than those with 
no adjustments. The findings remain unchanged when corporate sector is used as an influence 
variable. 
 
Figure 6.7: CHAID model showing significant predictors for payment compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26As a requirement of the CHAID model, tax audit has been transformed into three categories: 1) zero or no 
audit adjustments; 2) audit adjustments from $1 to $1000000; and 3) audits adjustments over $1000000. 
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Figure 6.8:Gains summary of the fitness of the CHAID model for payment compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The risk estimate of .247 in both the models (Table B.7, Appendix B), with and without 
corporate sector as an influence variable, implies that the model classifies approximately 75.3% 
of payment  compliant  corporate taxpayers correctly.  The classification table (Table B.8, 
Appendix B) shows that it predicts 100% of payment compliant corporate taxpayers correctly. 
This means that none of the payment compliant taxpayers is wrongly classified with payment 
non-compliant taxpayers. Also, the cumulative gains chart (Figure 6.8) starting at 0% and 
ending slightly before 100%, showing a steep rise towards the end and a good fitness of the 
CHAID model. 
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6.9.2 Fixed and Random Effects of Corporate Sector Affiliation on 
 
Payment Compliance 
 
 
In the fixed effects logistic regression (see Table 6.6), penalty (p = .001, CI = 95%, odds ratio 
 
= .417), tax audit (β= -.263, p = .006, CI = 95%, odds ratio = .768) and  imprisonment 
(β= .532, p = .033, CI= 95%, odds ratio = 1.702) appeared significant, in a similar way to 
what was seen in the standard logit model. It should be noted, however, that in the standard 
logit model the relationship between imprisonment and payment compliance was negative, 
whereas in the fixed effects model it had changed into positive. One reason for this might be 
aggregation bias – “aggregated measurement at higher levels of hierarchy can produce results 
different  from individual results”, Kreft  and  Leeuw (1998:3). In their studies, Kreft  and 
Leeuw found education had positive effect on income when workers were the unit of analysis, 
but a negative effect on income when the unit of analysis was industry sector.   The other 
reason for this may be effect size of sample on significance (Gorard and Taylor, 2004). 
However, for penalty and tax audit, the nature of the relationship remained unchanged in the 
fixed effects model. The standard logit model overestimated the probable effect of penalty 
and imprisonment on payment compliance. For tax audit, the effect remained same in both 
models. For a 1% increase in audit adjustment, large corporations were .26% less likely to be 
payment non-compliant, which is similar to the percentage in the standard logit model. In the 
jackknife estimations, only tax audit was found statistically significant (p=.021, CI=95%, 
odds ratio=.797). The jackknife standard error for tax audit was .026, and the logit model 
standard error for it was .098, which was (.026/.098)2= .070 of the size of jack knife error. 
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Compliance 
instruments 
Fixed effects logistic regression  Random effects logistic regression 
Categories Exp β Sig. S E*** Jknife 
S E 
Exp β Sig. S E Jknife 
S E 
 
Table 6.6: Results obtained when fitting fixed and random effects logistic regression to 
payment compliance data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive 
instruments 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
.417 
 
 
 
.001** 
 
 
 
.264 
 
 
 
.382 
 
 
 
.422 
 
 
 
.002** 
 
 
 
.272 
 
 
 
.228 
Tax penalty Undecided 1.394 .052* .8532 . 1.381 .000** .848 .563 
 Disagree 1 . . . 1 . . . 
Tax audit  .768 .006** .074 .026 .786 .009** .072 .015 
 Agree 1.702 .033* 3.350 .743 1.683 .043* 2.904 .239 
Imprisonment Undecided 1.569 .487 .996 . 1.419 .410 1.065  
 Disagree 1 . . . 1 . . . 
Persuasive          
Instruments          
 Very good 1.661 .571 1.487 .503 1.977 .447 1.772 .055 
Taxpayer Good .611 .381 .343 . .650 .831 .364  
service          
 Poor 1 . . . 1 . . . 
  Agree 
 
.645 
 
.492 
 
.465 
 
.072 
 
.577 
 
.382 
 
.363 
 
.011 
Simplified tax 
law 
Undecided .554 .483 .465 . .566 .502 .479 . 
 Disagree 1 . . . 1 . . . 
 Very good 1.456 .635 1.154 .360 1.175 .836 .915 .011 
Mutual Good 1.751 .372 1.099  1.620 .445 1.025  
understanding          
 Poor 1 . . . 1 . . . 
Constant      5.11    
 
Model fitness and variance components 
 
LRChi2, re 
 
19.99 
 
.045* 
-2LL, re 
σ2ν, re 
-63.269 
-12.37 
 
Rho, re 1.21e-07  
Rho, jknife 1.16e-07  
Notes: 
*Significant at the 0 .05 level 
**Significant at the 0 .01 level 
***Standard errors reported in the table are the square root of the variances of the VCE 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) = 0.00 Prob >= chibar2 = 1.000 
 
 
 
 
The results showed that the random effects logit model was statistically significant, LRChi2= 
19.99, p=.045, with none of the predictors‟ regression coefficient was equal to zero. The 
fitness of the model improved from the baseline model (-2 LL= -77.04) to the intended model 
(-2 LL= -63.26).The panel level variance (σ2ν) was -12.37 and the proportion of the total 
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variation accounted for by the random effect was 1.21e-07. Since the value of rho was not 
zero, the panel level variance component was important, and was different from the standard 
logistic regression. The reduction in the proportion of the contribution to the sector level 
variance made by the jackknife intraclass correlation coefficient (rho = 1.16e-07, CI = 95%), 
undermined the importance of corporate sector as a context variable for payment compliance. 
In the random effects logistic regression, imprisonment (β=.521, p = .043, CI = 95%, odds 
ratio= 1.683) and tax audit (β= -.240, p = .009, CI = 95%, odds ratio = .786) were found 
statistically  significant.  But  imprisonment  was  significant  only  for  those  taxpayers  who 
agreed that it was effective to reduce tax related offences as compared with those who did not. 
Results showed that by not taking into account the random effects within corporate sectors, 
the standard logit model overestimated the effect of imprisonment on payment compliance. 
For tax audit, the effect on payment compliance remained almost same. In the jackknife 
estimations, however, only tax audit was found to be significant (p= .059, CI= 95%, odds 
ratio= .810), and the logit standard error was (.015/.098)2 = .023 of the size of jackknife 
 
standard error which was acceptable as a consistent measure. 
 
 
 
6.10 Section Summary 
 
 
In the standard logistic regression, three instruments – penalty, tax audit and imprisonment – 
are found significant for payment compliance. The CHAID models show that only tax audit 
is  significant  for  payment  compliance.  Lastly,  in  the  fixed  and  random effects  models, 
penalty, tax audit and imprisonment are found significant for payment compliance. In the 
latter  models,  the  direction  of  the  relationship  between  imprisonment  and  payment 
compliance has changed compared to that in the base model. Therefore in a “without- 
contextual-effect” case, payment compliance is likely to be less when imprisonment is 
considered  effective.  And  in  a  “with-contextual-effect”  case,  the  situation  is  reversed  – 
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payment compliance is likely to be more when imprisonment is considered effective. On all 
counts,  it  is  apparent  that  only  coercive  instruments  explain  the  payment  compliance 
behaviour of large corporate taxpayers, and there is no role for persuasive instruments. 
 
6.11 Important Instruments for Overall Compliance 
 
 
 
Overall compliance is the summated output of the three compliance components, as discussed 
in section 5.5.2 in chapter 5, and 37% of large corporate taxpayers were found to be overall 
tax compliant. To obtain the ranking of choices for compliance instruments, the question 
asked was (see question 9 in the questionnaire): To ensure fulfilment of all tax obligations 
(i.e., filing return, paying taxes and reporting income) properly, how much would each of the 
following contribute (i.e., the six instruments). According to their ranking (Table B.5, 
Appendix B), taxpayer service was as the best instrument (93/154) = 60.38% for overall 
compliance. Simplified tax law (44.15%), tax audit (38.33%) and mutual understanding 
(25.97%) came out as the next best instruments.  In the ranking, penalty and imprisonment 
were found to be the last choices.  Seen from the perspective of corporate sector affiliations, 
(55/80) = 68.75% of finance and (18/31) = 58.06% of service sector corporations  rank 
taxpayer service as more important than other instruments for achieving overall compliance. 
Only (20/43) = 46.51% of manufacturing sector corporations rank taxpayer service as the 
most effective option. The next section pursues a regression analysis based on measurement 
of these instruments on a Likert-type scale. 
 
6.12 Results and Interpretations of Logistic Regressions 
 
 
The results showed that the model was statistically significant, χ2  (16, N = 154) = 84.61, p 
 
=  .000 compared  to the null  models.  Also  the fitness of the model improved  from the 
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baseline  model  (-2  LL  =180.71)  to  the  intended  model  (-2  LL  =  96.09). 27  The  model 
explained between 45.8% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 62.8% (Nagelkerke R square) of the 
variance in overall compliance and it correctly classified the 78.0% of large corporate 
taxpayers who were overall compliant and 88.6 % of taxpayers who were overall non- 
compliant, with an overall success rate of 84.8% in the classification. Table 6.7 shows B 
coefficients, Wald χ2, significance levels, and Exp (B) by predictors, and the results can be 
interpreted as follows. 
 
First, when the usefulness of tax penalty is dummy coded into “agree” and  “undecided”, by 
setting “disagree” as the reference group, there is no significant difference in the overall 
compliance between those who agree tax penalty to be useful and those who disagree (β 
= .884, Wald χ2 = 1.212, p = .271). There is also no significant difference in overall 
compliance between those large corporate taxpayers who are undecided and those who 
disagree about the usefulness of tax penalty (β = .707, Wald χ2 = .805, p = .370). This result 
demonstrates that tax penalty does not affect the overall compliance of large corporate 
taxpayers. 
 
Second, when tax audit adjustment is taken as a predictor, there is significant difference in 
the overall compliance of large corporate taxpayers (β = -.698, Wald χ2 = 27.099, p = .000, 
odds ratio = .498). This shows that a 1 percent increase in audit adjustment leads to a .69 
percent decrease in the probability of overall compliance. This finding suggests that 
corporations who are audited and are found to have audit adjustments are likely to be less 
overall compliant than those who are not found to have any adjustments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27Multi-collinearity was checked by using VIF and the cut-off value of VIF was 5. The values of VIF ranged 
from 2.62 to 2.89, and therefore all the16 predictors were included in the analysis. 
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Compliance instruments Categories β Wald χ2 Stand. 
Error 
Sig. Exp (β) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.7: Logistic regression outputs on overall compliance data 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive  instruments 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
.884 
 
 
1.212 
 
 
.803 
 
 
.271 
 
 
2.420 
Tax penalty Undecided .707 .805 .788 .370 2.027 
 Disagree 0.  . . 1 
Tax audit  -.698 27.099 .134 .000** .498 
  Agree 
 
-1.207 
 
2.054 
 
.842 
 
.152 
 
.299 
Imprisonment Undecided -.293 .082 1.020 .774 .746 
 Disagree 0 . . . 1 
 
Persuasive  instruments       
 Very good -3.064 9.154 1.013 .002** .047 
Taxpayer service Good -2.434 6.834 .963 .012* .088 
 Poor 0 . . . 1 
  Agree 
 
1.826 
 
3.130 
 
1.032 
 
.051* 
 
6.208 
Simplified tax law Undecided .109 .006 1.412 .038* 1.115 
 Disagree 0 . . . 1 
  Very good 
 
.534 
 
2.72 
 
1.022 
 
.602 
 
1.705 
Mutual understanding Good 1.159 2.164 .788 .141 3.185 
 Poor 0 . . . 1 
 
Constant  
 
3.293     
 
Overall model evaluation       
χ2 84.613 .000** 
-2 Log likelihood (baseline) 180.715  
-2 Log likelihood (intended) 96.095 
Wald test 10.189 .001** 
Cox & Snell R2 .458  
Nagelkerke R square .628  
Goodness of fit test   
Hosmer and Lemeshow 8.433 .392 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Enter method was followed 
*Significant at the 0 .05 level 
**Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
 
ln (probOvlCom/1-probOvlCom) = β0 + β1TaxPen + β2TaxAud + β3Imprison + β4 TaxServ+ 
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β5TaxLawSimp + β6MutUnd + β7CorSiz + β8 CorOwn + 
β9Corloc + β10CorpSect + β11MarTaxRate + β12 EmpSal + 
β13CorAge+ β14TaxAdv 
 
Where: 
 
 
ProbOvlCom - Probability of overall compliance 
TaxPen - Usefulness of tax penalty 
TaxAud - Tax audit adjustment 
Imprison -Effectiveness of imprisonment 
TaxServ - Quality of taxpayer service 
TaxLawSimp   - Simplified tax law 
MutUnd - Mutual understanding 
CorSiz - Total assets of large corporation 
CorOwn - Ownership pattern 
Corloc - Locational identity - local or multinational 
CorpSect - Sector affiliation - finance, manufacturing or service 
MarTaxRate -Corporate marginal tax rate 
EmpSal - Salary paid to the employees 
CorAge - Age of incorporation 
TaxAdv - Nature of tax advisor appointed 
 
 
 
Third, when the effectiveness of imprisonment is dummy coded as “agree” and “undecided”, 
by setting “disagree” as the reference group, no significant difference is found in overall 
compliance between those corporations agreeing and those disagreeing with its effectiveness 
(β = -1.207, Wald χ2 = 2.054, p = .152) or those undecided and those disagreeing (β = -.293, 
Wald χ2 = .082, p = .774). This means that imprisonment does not affect the overall tax 
compliance of large corporations. 
 
Fourth, when the quality of taxpayer service is dummy coded into “very good” and “good”, 
by  setting  “poor”  as  the  reference  group,  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  overall 
compliance between those large corporations scaling service quality as “very good” and those 
scaling it as “poor” (β =-3.064, Wald χ2 = 9.154, p = .002, odds ratio = .047). There is also 
significant difference in overall compliance between those corporate taxpayers scaling 
taxpayer service quality as good and those scaling it as poor (β = -2.434 Wald χ2 = 6.834, p 
=  .012,  odds  ratio  =  .088).  The  inverted  odds  ratio  (1/.047)  =  21.27  means  that  large 
taxpayers who view taxpayer service quality as “very good” are likely to be 21.27 times less 
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overall complaint than those who view it as “poor”. The odds ratio (1/.088) = 11.36 means 
that large corporations who said that quality of taxpayer service was “good” are 11.36 times 
less  likely to  be overall compliant  than those who  scaled  it  “poor”.  This  indicates that 
taxpayer service affects overall compliance negatively. 
 
Fifth, when simplified tax law is dummy coded as “agree” and “undecided”, by setting 
“disagree” as the reference group, significant difference is found between those taxpayers 
“agreeing” and those “disagreeing” on tax law simplicity (β = 1.829, Wald χ2 = 3.130, p 
= .051, odds ratio=6.208). The same finding applies to taxpayers scaling it „“undecided”, and 
those scaling it “disagree” (β = .109, Wald χ2 = .006, p = .038, odds ratio=1.115).   This 
means that simplified tax law affects the overall compliance of large corporate taxpayers 
positively. 
 
Sixth, when mutual understanding is dummy coded into “very good” and “good”, by setting 
“poor” as the reference group, there are no significant differences in overall compliance 
between those taxpayers scaling it as “very good” and those scaling it as “poor” (β = .534, 
Wald χ2 = .272 p = .602) or between those taxpayers scaling it as “good” and those scaling it 
as “poor” (β = 1.159, Wald χ2 = 2.164, p = .141). This indicates that mutual understanding 
does not help to improve overall compliance. 
 
Taxpayer service, simplified tax law and tax audit are found to be significant predictors of 
overall compliance in the logit model. Taxpayer service and tax audit are found to have a 
negative influence on the likelihood of increased overall compliance and simplified tax law a 
positive effect. 
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6.12.1 Taxpayer Service and Tax Audit: How Valid are they as Predictors 
of Overall Compliance? 
For the first time taxpayer service and simplified tax law emerge as significant predictors, 
along with tax audit. The CHAID output without the influence variable (see Figure 6.9) 
demonstrates that for overall compliance, other than tax audit (p = .000, χ2= 60.74), there is 
another variable, simplified tax law (p = .047, χ2 = 5.14) that plays a significant role, and this 
 
was the second important variable in the respondent ranking (section 6.11). 
 
 
 
This demonstrates that for the segment of large corporate taxpayers having no adjustment or 
additional claim, tax audit is the only significant predictor of overall compliance, as happened 
in case of reporting compliance.  Taxpayers in this category are 69.6% overall tax compliant. 
The other category, “tax audit with adjustment” takes simplified tax law as a significant 
variable. This means that for large corporate taxpayers with audit adjustment s, simplified tax 
law is the best predictor of their overall compliance. Tax audit remains the most significant 
predictor, even when the influence of corporate sector is taken into account (see Figure 6.10), 
and both of its categories take other predictors to overall compliance. Simplified tax law is 
dropped  as  a  significant  predictor,  and  taxpayer  service  (P  =  .016,  chi-square  =  7.00) 
becomes the next best predictor in the model. 
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Figure 6.9: CHAID model showing significant predictors for overall compliance (without 
influence variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  6.10:  CHAID  model showing  significant  predictors for  overall compliance  (with 
influence variable) 
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Figure 6.11: Gains summary on the fitness of the CHAID model on overall compliance 
(without influence variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Gains summary on the fitness of the CHAID model on overall compliance (with 
influence variable) 
 
 
 
 
As terminal node 5 shows, taxpayers without any audit adjustments and who consider that 
taxpayer service quality is either “good” or “poor” are 52.4 % overall compliant. This means 
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that taxpayers without any audit adjustments scaling taxpayer service quality as “poor” are 
almost equally divided into overall compliant and overall non-compliant. However, those 
having no audit adjustments and scaling taxpayer service quality as “very good” are highly 
(77.1%) overall compliant. 
 
Risk estimate (Table B.7, Appendix B) without the influence of corporate sector is .195, 
which rises to .201 when the influence of corporate sector is included in the model. This 
suggests that the capacity of the CHAID model to correctly explain the extent of overall 
taxpayer compliance has fallen slightly from 80.5% to 79.9%. Also, the model without the 
influence of sector variable, as reported in the classification table (Table B.8, Appendix B), is 
84.2% correct in identifying overall taxpayer compliance, which falls drastically to 64.9% 
when the influence of sector is considered. This is a problem that arises due to the influence 
of corporate sector in the model. Finally, the cumulative gains charts (see Figures 6.11 and 
6.12) start from 0% and stop slightly before 100%, maintaining a  steep and steady rise 
towards the end. Thus this can be taken as a fairly good model, like the other ones. 
 
CHAID  models  indicate  that  tax  audit,  simplified  tax  law  and  taxpayer  service  are 
statistically significant instruments, like the logit models, which reported taxpayer service 
quality,  simplified tax law and tax audit  as significant  predictors to overall compliance. 
Sector-specific fixed and random effects analysis is produced below to measure the effect of 
corporate sector on the significant predictors. 
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6.12.2 Fixed and Random Effects of Corporate Sector Affiliation on 
 
Overall Compliance 
 
 
The above models showed that three instruments – tax audit, taxpayer service quality and 
simplified tax law – were significant to overall compliance. The results obtained were further 
examined by the fixed and random effects of corporate sector.  In the fixed effects logistic 
regression (see Table 6.8), taxpayer service was significant only among those corporations 
that viewed taxpayer service quality as “very good” (β= 2.971 p = .003, CI = 95%, odds ratio 
= 19.51). Large corporations that considered taxpayer service quality to be “very good” were 
 
19.51  times  more  likely to  be  overall  compliant  than  those  that  scaled  it  “poor”.  It  is 
important to note that the direction of the relationship between taxpayer service quality and 
overall compliance has changed to positive, having been negative in the logit model. But for 
other groups of taxpayers, those who scaled taxpayer service quality as only “good” over the 
reference category, taxpayer service quality was not a significant variable (p = .361, CI = 
95%, odds ratio= 1.833). This implies that corporations within a sector were likely to be more 
overall compliant if they scaled taxpayer service quality as “very good”. Tax audit (β=-.676, 
p = 0.000, CI = 95%, odds ratio = .508) remained significant, and the likelihood of overall 
non-compliance due to tax audit adjustment decreased to .67% from the .69% it was in the 
standard logit model.  The direction of the relationship has not changed. In both cases, tax 
audit was affecting overall compliance negatively.  Finally, simplified tax law (p = 0.032, CI 
= 95%, odds ratio = .170) was found significant only between those taxpayers within a sector 
“agreeing” and those “disagreeing” on tax law simplicity. The inverted odds ratio for this was 
(1/.170) = 5.88, which showed that the standard logit model overestimated the influence of 
simplified tax law. In the jackknife estimations only taxpayer service (p= .021, CI= 95%, 
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Compliance 
instruments 
Fixed effects logistic regression  Random effects logistic regression 
Categories Exp β Sig. S E** Jknife 
S E 
Exp β Sig. S.E Jknife 
SE 
 
odds ratio= 3.67) and tax audit (p= .018, CI= 95%, odds ratio= .546) were found statistically 
significant, but not simplified tax law. The jack knife standard error for taxpayer 
 
Table 6.8 Results obtained when fitting fixed and random effects logistic regression to overall 
compliance data 
 
 
 
 
Coercive 
instruments 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
.472 
 
 
 
.282 
 
 
 
.337 
 
 
 
.241 
 
 
 
.356 
 
 
 
.191 
 
 
 
.280 
 
 
 
.160 
Tax penalty Undecided .835 .803 .600  .884 .863 627  
 Disagree 1 . . . 1 . . . 
 
Tax audit  
 
.508 
 
.000* 
 
.066 
 
.044 
 
.515 
 
.000* 
 
.065 
 
.030 
  Agree 
 
3.22 
 
.157 
 
2.678 
 
.932 
 
3.324 
 
0.160 
 
2.270 
 
.459 
Imprisonment Undecided 2.428 .249 1.869 . 2.972 0.143 2.213  
 Disagree 1 . . . 1 . . . 
Persuasive          
instruments          
  Very good 
 
19.511 
 
.003* 
 
2.471 
 
2.641 
 
23.547 
 
.002* 
 
2.020 
 
.496 
Taxpayer service Good 1.833 .361 1.218 . 2.001 .288 1.308  
 Poor 1 . . . 1 . . . 
 
 Agree .170 .032 .172 .179 .163 .047 .168 .042 
Simplified tax law Undecided .151 .100 .174 . .142 .092 .164 . 
 Disagree 1 . . . . . . . 
  Very good 
 
.599 
 
.610 
 
.601 
 
.735 
 
.455 
 
.428 
 
.451 
 
.027 
Mutual 
understanding 
Good 
 
Poor 
1.829 
 
1 
.453 
 
. 
1.472 
 
. 
. 
 
. 
1.611 
 
1 
.546 
 
. 
1.272 
 
. 
. 
 
. 
Constant      1.606    
 
Model fitness and variance  
LRChi2, re 
-2LL 
 
82.44 
-49.136 
 
.000* 
σ2ν, re 
 
-14.42  
Rho, re 1.66e-07  
 Rho, jknife  8.67e-07   
 
Notes: 
*Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Standard errors reported in the table are the square root of the variances of the VCE 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) = 0.00 Prob >= chibar2 = 1.000 
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service quality was 2.471, and the logit model standard error for it was 1.013, which was 
(2.641/1.013)2= 6.797of the size of jackknife standard error, and the difference between them 
was huge.  For tax audit (.044/.134)2 = .107 and for simplified tax law (.179/1.032)2 = .030 
such differences were not, however, sizeable. 
 
 
The random effects logistic regression was statistically significant, LRChi2 = 82.44, p = .000, 
with none of the predictors‟ regression coefficient being equal to zero. The fitness of the 
model improved from the baseline model (-2 LL= -90.35) to the intended model (-2 LL= - 
49.13). The panel level variance (σ2ν) is -14.42 and the proportion of the total variation 
accounted for by the random effect was 1.66e-07. Since the value of rho was not zero, the 
panel level variance component was important, and was different from the standard logistic 
regression. The improvement in the proportion of the contribution to the sector level variance 
made  by  the  jackknife  intraclass  correlation  coefficient  (rho  =  8.67e-07,  CI  =  95%) 
reinforced the importance of corporate sector as a context variable for overall co mpliance. 
 
 
Tax audit (β=-.663, p = 0.000, CI = 95%, odds ratio = .515), taxpayer service (β= 3.159, p = 
 
0.002, CI = 95%, odds ratio = 23.547) and simplified tax law (p = 0.047, CI = 95%, odds 
ratio  =.163) turn out to be statistically significant in the random effects model. For a 1 
percent increase in tax audit adjustment, the likelihood of overall non-compliance decreased 
to .66% from the earlier .69% in the standard logit model, meaning an overestimation of its 
effect on overall compliance by the standard logit model.   But the standard logit  model 
slightly underestimated the effect of taxpayer service in comparison with the random effects 
model. And the relationship between taxpayer service and overall compliance has changed 
into positive. This means that quality taxpayer service was likely to increase overall 
compliance for corporations between the sectors. In the case of the effect of simplified tax 
law on overall compliance, the estimations made by the standard logit model odds ratio= 
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6.208 and the random effects logistic regression odds ratio (1/.163) = 6.134 were almost the 
same. In the jackknife estimations both tax audit (p=.051, CI=95%, odds ratio=.559) and 
taxpayer service (p=.057, CI=95%, odds ratio=4.00) remained statistically significant. 
Simplified tax law discontinued to be significant in the jackknife estimations. And the 
difference between the jackknife standard error and logit model standard error was not much. 
For tax audit it was (.030/.134)2 = .050, for taxpayer service it was (.496/1.013)2 = .239, and 
 
for simplified tax law it was (.042/1.032)2 = .001, which were within acceptable limits. 
 
 
 
 
6.13 Section Summary 
 
 
If we look at the pattern of the instruments emerging as significant predictors of overall 
compliance, we see taxpayer service, tax audit and simplified tax law have consistently been 
on the list. In the logit, CHAID and multilevel logistic models they have continued to be the 
most significant predictors of overall compliance. Apparently, coercive and persuasive 
instruments are equally significant for overall compliance, which makes this result uniquely 
different from the results found for filing, reporting, and payment compliance. 
 
6.14 Comparative Importance of Coercive and Persuasive 
 
Instruments 
 
 
The snapshot below in Table 6.9 and 6.10 shows, in general terms, that filing compliance is 
influenced by two instruments, tax penalty, and tax audit, which represent different aspects of 
coercive tax instruments. For reporting compliance, only tax audit comes out as a significant 
predictor, which is also a coercive instrument.   In the case of payment compliance, where 
three coercive instruments – penalty, tax audit and imprisonment – have been found to have 
significant influence. 
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TaxPen Sig+  Sig+ Sig+  
TaxAud Sig - Sig Sig- Sig - Sig- Sig Sig- Sig- 
Imprison Sig -  Sig+ Sig +     
TaxServ     Sig - Sig/ no demand Sig+ Sig + 
TaxlawSimp     Sig+ sig Sig+ Sig+ 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.9: Illustrating the relative positions of filing and reporting compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance 
instruments 
Filing Reporting 
 
Logit 
 
CHAID Multi- level  Logit 
 
CHAID Multi-level 
 
FE 
 
RE 
 
FE 
 
RE 
TaxPen Sig + Sig+ Sig+ 
TaxAud Sig + Sig+ Sig+ Sig - Sig Sig- Sig- 
Imprison 
TaxServ 
TaxLawSimp 
 MutUnd   
 
Notes: Sig – Statistically significant instruments; +/ - indicates whether the coefficient showed a positive or a 
negative relationship, FE – fixed effects, RE – random effects 
 
 
 
Table 6.10: Illustrating the relative positions of payment and overall compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance 
instruments 
Payment Overall 
 
 
Logit 
 
CHAID Multi-level 
 
 
Logit 
 
CHAID Multi-level 
FE RE FE RE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 MutUnd   
 
Notes: Sig – Statistically significant instruments; +/ - indicates whether the coefficient showed a positive or a 
negative relationship, FE – fixed effects, RE – random effects 
 
 
 
Finally, for the achievement of overall tax compliance, three instruments are important – tax 
audit,  taxpayer  service  and  simplified  tax  law.  One  of  these,  tax  audit,  is  a  coercive 
instrument; and the other two, taxpayer service and simplified tax law, are persuasive 
instruments.  Apparently,  overall  tax  compliance  is  influenced  by  both  coercive  and 
persuasive instruments, whereas the component compliances are principally influenced by 
coercive instruments. 
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6.15 Chapter Conclusion and Summary 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to determine how significant the instruments of coercion 
and persuasion are to the tax compliance of large corporations, based on descriptive and 
inferential statistical evidence. The chapter has shown that, for filing compliance, tax audit 
and tax penalty are the most significant predictors. Both these predictors have a positive 
influence on filing compliance (see section 6.3.1). In the fixed and random effects models, 
the degree of likely influence fell for both the predictors, but the nature of the relationship 
with the outcome variables remained unchanged (section 6.3.4). 
 
The  chapter  has  revealed  that  tax  audit  is  the  only  significant  predictor  of  reporting 
compliance (section 6.6). This chapter has illustrated that for payment compliance, tax audit, 
imprisonment and tax penalty are the significant predictors (section 6.9). They were found 
significant  in  the  standard  logit  model and  in  the  fixed  and  random effects  regressions 
(sections 6.9 and 6.9.2).  Only tax audit was found significant in the CHAID model. Also to 
note that the direction of the relationship between tax payment and imprisonment changed to 
positive in the fixed and random effects model from negative in the standard logit model. For 
tax audit there has not been any change in the nature of the relationship with payment 
compliance across the different models. The chapter has demonstrated that for overall tax 
compliance, taxpayer service quality, simplified tax law and tax audit are the most significant 
instruments.  Both taxpayer service and tax audit affect overall compliance negatively, and 
simplified tax law positively (section 6.12).   It should also be noted the nature of the 
relationship changes for taxpayer service from negative to positive with the inclusion of 
corporate sector variable. 
 
Evaluating the significance and contribution of the instruments, it may be claimed that 
coercive  tax  instruments  have  a  strong  influence  on  filing,  reporting,  and  payment 
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compliance. But for overall compliance, both coercive and persuasive instruments contribute 
significantly. 
 
In deducing the significant  coercive and persuasive instruments, the effects of corporate 
sector, as referred to in sections 3.4.2 and 3.12.3, were considered. The issue of corporate 
sector was mainly raised to make a precise measurement of the significant compliance 
instruments. Since this issue was considered only to make a robust assessment of the 
instruments, it does not reappear in the next chapter, which looks at why t he instruments were 
significant or not, providing an answer to research sub-question 4 of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR WHY COERCION OR 
PERSUASION IS IMPORTANT 
 
 
 
 
7.1    Introduction 
 
 
 
The outputs of logistic regressions, CHAID and xtlogit models identified the statistically 
significant instruments for tax compliance. To find potential explanations for the importance 
of these instruments and the nature of their relationship with tax compliance, this chapter 
analyses the data collected through open-ended in-depth interviews and tax office records. 
The respondents for the interviews were different from those for the questionnaire survey. 
They were asked to explain the importance of, and the nature of the relationship between the 
selected coercive and persuasive instruments and corporate tax compliance. In total, 27 
respondents were interviewed: 14 from the tax authority and 13 from the corporate world. 
The respondents from the tax authority included six officials from the LTU and eight from 
other income tax offices experienced in large corporate tax compliance management. The 
respondents from large corporations included six chartered accountants, four corporate 
directors and three chief finance officers (CFOs). A summary of respondent interviews is set 
out in Table C.2, Appendix C. Besides analysing respondent observations, this chapter 
analyses the data collected from LTU administrative records and other sources. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one focuses on the major codes, themes 
and pattern created from the interviews. Section two explains the reasons why some 
instruments are significant to tax compliance and some are not. Finally, section three 
concludes the chapter. 
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7.2    Factors Underlying the Working of the Instruments 
 
 
The  exploration  process  begins  with  breaking  down  interview  excerpts  into  meaningful 
pieces and then comparing and contrasting them to figure out the patterns in the respondents‟ 
arguments. The respondents were questioned so as to place their arguments in the debate on 
 
coercive  versus  persuasive  approaches  to  tax  compliance,   focusing  on  the  selected 
instruments. The intention was to encourage unrestrained narratives on the main argument of 
coercion versus persuasion and then to understand the role of the selected instruments. 
Arguments the researcher was sceptical about, i.e., he thought a respondent might not be 
expressing what they believed, were re-investigated with other respondents. Themes arising 
from the narratives were worked through to establish how and why they contributed to the 
stance of the respondents.  Strategically,  this approach is a reversal of the questionnaire 
survey, which set  off with the variables  – defining coercion and persuasion – and then 
deduced either coercion or persuasion as important. The other difference in the carrying out 
of the interviews was that it was made clear that compliance consisted of three important 
segments – filing,  reporting  and  payment. This  was done so that the respondents could 
provide probable explanations as to why a compliance instrument was important at the 
component and the overall levels. 
 
In generating the codes28, themes and patterns (see Table 7.1 for the free nodes and Appendix 
C Table C.1 for their links with one another), Nvivo-9 was employed, and to present the 
explanations, the interpretivist approach (see section 3.12.4) was followed. The free nodes are 
clarified in Table 7.1, which shows that the respondents mentioned 64 different nodes in 
 
 
 
28In Nvivo, codes, which refer to the selected section of a text are called nodes. Nodes are of two types: free 
nodes and tree nodes.  Free node refers to the initial coding that has no direct and logical link with other nodes, 
whereas tree nodes systematically establish the link between the free nodes. 
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explaining the role of coercive and persuasive instruments with respect to component and 
overall compliance. As the Table7.1 shows, of the 27 respondents, 18 discussed coercive 
instruments and the frequency of reference to the coercive instruments by the respondents 
was 41. 
 
Table7.1: Major free nodes mentioned in the respondents‟ arguments 
 
 
Nodes Sources References Nodes Sources References 
Tax administration issues 24 36 Penalty as an instrument 7 9 
Trust and understanding 14 23 Persuasion as a policy tool 19 35 
Political influence 11 12 Falsified accounts 16 32 
Bribery and corruption 17 29 Profit motive 17 26 
Accountability and 
transparency 
7 9 Pseudo-military rule (1/11) 10 12 
Coercion as a policy tool 18 41 Firm regulatory action 8 9 
Complementarity of the 
instruments 
23 28 Inspection and surveillance 4 4 
Taxpayer confidence 3 3 Cooperation  and respect 12 14 
Corporate employees 5 7 Hard legal background 12 16 
Corporate governance 4 7 Interactive audit 7 12 
Corporate sector character 8 9 Value for money 20 40 
Education and training 17 34 Equity and fairness 9 10 
Environment for negotiation 1 2 Conflicts of interest 18 26 
Financial accounting standards 6 11 Knowledge gaps 14 21 
Inter-sector competition   Tax audit standard 19 35 
Income based audit selection 5 8 Attitude of the tax official 16 16 
Habit and norms 3 5 Ethics and morality 16 33 
Hassle-free environment 2 2 Simplifying tax law 23 48 
Supreme judiciary 7 7 Rationality of action 22 38 
Hidden large business 2 2 Financial burden 16 21 
Alternative use of concealed 
income 
18 27 Networking and 
modernization 
4 9 
Image and Reputation 6 9 Lack of coordination 14 17 
Implementation difficulties 7 12 Credibility of action 16 23 
Prosecution and imprisonment 8 12 Illegal use of power 6 10 
Insecurity of business 2 3 Disbelief and disregard 4 4 
Institution building 1 1 Biased appeals procedure 8 17 
Institutional monitoring 6 9 Transfer pricing 6 6 
Legal compulsion 12 18 Discretionary power 4 4 
Taxpayer service 16 25 Detection risk 7 10 
Tax professionals 8 15 Motivation 3 4 
Tax compliance costs 8 22 Local versus multinational 9 10 
Ownership and partnership 18 25 Litigation culture 8 22 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own table, compiled from field data 
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Similarly, persuasion as a topic was discussed by 19 taxpayers, and the frequency was 35. 
This means there were some respondents who focused on both coercion and persuasion as 
possibilities for improving tax compliance. Again, tax administration as a free node was 
referred to by 24 respondents and these respondents attempted to link tax administration 
inefficiencies with corruption, accountability, confidence building, mutual understanding and 
tax laws (see Appendix C, TableC.1). Frequency of reference, however, is not a significant 
factor in the qualitative understanding of a problem.  What  is important is to look for a 
concept or argument that really matters or carries a meaning for our understanding. Based on 
the links among the free nodes, the major patterns of respondent arguments have been 
modelled in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Patterns of the major themes related to the creation of tax compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own figure created from field data using Nvivo-9 
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The figure shows that there is a common thread among the free nodes that creates the major 
 
pattern and theme of the respondents‟ arguments on why a tax compliance instrument is 
significant  to  an  understanding  of tax  compliance.  For  example,  tax  audit,  penalty  and 
 
imprisonment as coercive instruments emerge from the need for serious legal action. Other 
similar issues indicative of the need for coercive action are inspections and surveillance on 
compliance activities within a strong regulatory framework. Persuasion as a policy tool is 
argued to produce higher compliance if it can incentivize taxpayers by means of quality 
financial and accounting standards, modernized tax-office and inter-office networking and 
connectivity, and building trust and confidence in the tax system. The pattern reveals that 
trust and motivation are the fundamental incentives for persuasion, which in turn is linked t o 
the  effectiveness  of  taxpayer  services  or  tax  law   simplification.   The  link  between 
motivational forces, co-operations and effective use of taxpayer service suggests that the 
quantitative analysis has not fully captured the forces that induce tax compliance. 
 
7.3    Important Instruments to Achieving Tax Compliance: Some 
 
Explanations 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide probable explanations for the results of the 
quantitative analysis presented in chapter 6 regarding the effects on tax compliance of 
different compliance instruments. The chapter investigates why some instruments were found 
to influence tax compliance positively and some negatively. To do this, it uses evidence from 
the interviews and documents, against the background of the international tax compliance 
literature. 
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7.4 Tax Penalty: Why Does It Influence Filing and Payment 
 
Compliance Positively? 
 
 
As found in chapter 6, an increase in tax penalty is likely to create more filing and payment 
compliance.  No  other  types  of  compliance,  i.e.,  reporting  or  overall,  are  likely  to  be 
influenced by penalty. This section attempts to answer why tax penalty is significant in 
securing filing and payment compliance. The following arguments were made by the 
respondents. 
 
7.4.1Certainty of Application 
 
 
Discussion with the respondents revealed that tax penalty is the instrument most frequently 
used to control filing and payment non-compliance by large corporate taxpayers. The large 
corporations, as one respondent observed that, “are certain that failure to submit a return and 
to pay taxes on time will end in an immediate fine” (Respondent 4). The firm imposition of a 
penalty on those who violate laws about littering the highway in Singapore is a glaring 
example of how tough measures work in our neighbouring country, was one respondent‟s 
 
argument. The respondents added that certainty and toughness in the application of penalties 
meant that taxpayers would become habituated to complying with tax laws in the long run. 
To verify this argument, the tax penalty register of the LTU was checked. It showed that the 
penalty imposition rate for non-filing of returns had been 100% since 2004. The “certainty of 
application” argument gets stronger when the use of other penal actions, for example, 
imprisonment, freezing of bank accounts or shutting down of business premises, is compared. 
Freezing of bank accounts as a punishment is used only occasionally, while imprisonment 
and the shutting of business premises are rare. Since 1923, when the income tax department 
of Bangladesh came into being, no criminal proceeding have been taken against filing non- 
compliance except in the tax year 2008-2009, when it was politically motivated (discussed in 
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section 7.8.2). 
 
 
 
7.4.2 Financial Burden of Penalty 
 
 
However, some respondents had a different view. They argued that it is not the frequency or 
the certainty of penalty imposition, but the amount of the financial burden a penalty imposes 
is important. Referring to tax code 124 of the Bangladesh Income Tax Ordinance, the 
respondents noted that non-filing without reasonable cause is subject to a fine not exceeding 
10% of the last assessed taxes. And for non-payment of taxes the fine is an amount not 
exceeding the amount of underpaid taxes (Tax Code 125), or 25% of the amount of 
underpayment  (Tax  Code  127).  Such  penalty  rates  are  exorbitant  for  large  corporate 
taxpayers, who are charged with a marginal corporate tax rate of from 27.5% to 45% on the 
generated profit (in the tax year 2008-2009, large corporations had an average profit of $41 
million with a standard deviation of $283 million). One respondent specifically observed that, 
“The penalty chargeable for non-submission of return or non-payment of taxes is so huge that 
it‟s like a double taxation on corporate profit. No corporation will take the risk of making 
 
unreasonable delays in paying taxes and being penalized with a rigorous financial burden” 
(Respondent, 7). 
 
A review of the relevant literature demonstrates that between severity and probability, the 
latter is more important in understanding the influence of penalty on tax compliance (Varma 
and Doob, 1998). The severity argument even fails to increase compliance in non-tax areas. 
In studying the effect of severity versus probability of penalty in reducing crime among 
homeless young people, Baron and Kennedy (1998) found that the threat of financial burden 
failed to reduce violent crimes. William (2001) found that large fines do not produce a higher 
rate of tax return filing among Australian taxpayers. 
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7.4.3 Section Summary 
 
 
It seems that of the two contradictory explanations for why penalty improves filing and 
payment behaviour, the frequency argument versus the financial burden argument, the former 
is  more  plausible.  This  is  because  the  penalty  rates  (Tax  Codes  124,  125  and  127,  as 
mentioned above in paragraph 4) are common to all taxpayers in Bangladesh, corporate and 
non-corporate, large and small. Arguably, the financial burden penalties impose is fairly 
similar  across  taxpayers,  and  there  is  no  reason  for  large  corporate  taxpayers  to  feel 
financially more affected than the others. What makes sense is the high probability that 
penalty is unavoidable for filing and payment delays, since large corporations cannot remain 
off the radar of the tax authority when it comes to the statutory obligation of registering with 
the LTU. 
 
7.5 Why Does Penalty Fail to Improve Reporting Compliance? 
 
 
The main arguments put  forward to explain why penalty fails to improve reporting and 
overall compliance are twofold: first is the profitable alternative use of underreported income; 
and second is the possibility of winning a favourable appeal judgement in a reporting non- 
compliance case. 
 
7.5.1 Alternative Use of Underreported Income 
 
 
In-depth interviews with respondents revealed that a 10% penalty (Tax Code 128) is charged 
on underreported income. This rate is much lower than the interest rate on commercial bank 
deposits and borrowing. The commercial bank interest rate on fixed deposits is usually 12% 
to 14%, and on bank borrowing it is 16% to 18%. Large corporate taxpayers find it 
economically more profitable to underreport income, and they either deposit the money in 
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commercial banks or use it to service debts. A senior chartered accountant and tax 
representative of a large corporation stated emphatically: 
 
For reporting non-compliance, a big issue for large corporations is the bank interest 
rate on fixed deposits and borrowing. The bank interest rates on fixed deposits and 
borrowing are always higher than the tax penalty rate. For the underreported income, 
there is a penalty of 10%, but the interest rates on deposits and borrowing are much 
higher. This makes most of the large corporations prefer to hide income and invest the 
money in bank deposits, or to repay their bank loan first. (Respondent, 25) 
 
 
The respondents added that the fundamental difference between the nature of payment and 
reporting non-compliance and the possible profitable alternative use of underreported income 
can together provide a strong explanation for the ineffectiveness of tax penalty in inducing 
reporting compliance. The respondent said that payment non-compliance is measured on the 
basis  of  declared  or  settled  income.  Once  income  is  settled,  calculating  the  payment 
obligation is comparatively easy and there is less scope for ambiguity. As a result, penal 
actions  are  successful  in  dealing  with  non-payment.  On  the  other  hand,  to  penalise 
undisclosed income, the tax authority has to gather definite information of hidden income, 
which is far more difficult and less likely. One respondent commented that t he possibility of 
the tax authority unearthing the correct amount of undisclosed income is much weaker than 
the possibility that it can calculate taxes on declared income correctly. It is therefore rational 
for tax dodgers, particularly large ones, to choose an act of non-compliance where the 
probability of being detected and penalised is low or non-existent. 
 
7.5.2 Biased Appeal Judgements 
 
 
Other respondents had a different explanation. They observed that the success of any coercive 
action, tax penalty in particular, depends on how neutral appeal courts are. The tax appellate 
authority enjoys enormous discretionary power in settling non-compliant cases, particularly 
the reporting non-compliance that constitutes the majority of appeal cases. As reported in 
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Table B.9, Appendix B, a total of 85 large corporations lodged appeal applications. Of the 85 
appeal applications, 69 related to reporting non-compliance, which is much higher than for 
filing (8 appeals) and payment non-compliance (31 appeals). 
 
One respondent said that, “It is difficult to win non-filing and payment cases at the appeal 
court, since the tax law involved is straightforward and the scope for applying discretionary 
power is limited. But for non-reporting cases, appellate authorities enjoy enormous 
discretionary power” (Respondent, 9). This ample scope for winning a favourable judgement 
on reporting non-compliance in the appeal courts makes large corporate taxpayers careless 
about penal action by the LTU administration. This is supported by the finding of the 
international tax compliance literature that an independent appeal mechanism is needed to 
limit the discretionary power of tax officials and to make tax compliance actions meaningful 
(Torgler and Schneider, 2007). 
 
7.5.3 Section Summary 
 
 
From the above facts it can be deduced that higher interest rates on bank deposits and 
borrowing compared with the penalty rate is an important but not a sufficient explanation for 
the failure of penalty to increase reporting compliance.  It seems more justifiable to argue that 
the opportunity to make alternative use of underreported income is exploited only because 
such clandestine operations are safe and less likely to be identified. And the relaxed appeals 
process for  non-reporting  cases  further  weakens the possibility that  penalty can bring  a 
positive change in taxpayers‟ sense of their reporting obligations. 
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7.6 Tax Audit: Why Does It Increase Filing Compliance? 
 
 
Going back to chapter 6, tax audit is statistically significant for filing, reporting, payment and 
overall tax compliance. Tax audit affects filing compliance positively, but all other 
compliances negatively. This section discusses why tax audit improves filing compliance; 
and the next section discusses why it fails to increase other compliances. 
 
7.6.1 The Interactive Audit Process 
 
 
The initial explanation emerging from the in-depth interviews as regards the impact of tax 
audit on filing compliance relates to the highly interactive and dialogue-based audit process 
followed in discharging an audit examination. The audit process starts with (see Figure 7.2) 
sending a formal letter notifying the taxpayer of the audit selection criteria and the documents 
needed to meet the audit requirements. Both the parties, tax officials and corporate 
representatives, discuss the audit points formally and informally in the tax office or at the 
corporate accounts office. This interactive audit process keeps large corporate taxpayers well 
connected with the LTU management and binds them to fulfil the first step in tax comp liance 
(i.e., return filing). This was well-explained by a tax professional as follows: 
 
Audit actions are a good way to enter into a relationship with the LTU authority. We 
know that we will have many disagreements, but whatever disputes or contentions we 
have, we cannot uproot ourselves from the tax system and avoid the business 
relationship that starts with return filing. (Respondent, 10) 
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Figure 7.2: Tax audit flow in the LTU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LTU Annual Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.6.2 Increased Risks of Detection for Non-Filing of Returns 
 
 
The argument that the interactive audit process keeps taxpayers connected to the tax authority 
has  some  truth  in  it,  but  there  are other  facts  that  need  to  be  understood.  One  of the 
underlying facts is the increased risk of being selected for audit examination when the 
submission of a return is delayed. The LTU audit policy clearly states that delays in filing are 
the first reason for large corporation being faced with an audit action. An LTU official 
explained this point in the following way: “A timely submitted return with all taxes paid is 
less likely to be audited than a return submitted beyond the time limit with obvious mistakes” 
(Respondent, 21). The officials argued that the high likelihood of selection for audit has 
implications  for the strategic relationship  between  large corporate taxpayers and  the tax 
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authority. In the strategic game, every step the large corporate taxpayers take is intended to 
create a positive image of a good complier, and to avoid the severity of audit adjustment. In 
support of this explanation, the tax officials provided evidence from audit records. They 
claimed that large corporations audited at least once in the previous three years usually 
submitted their tax return on time. Even if they failed; they would notify the tax office in 
advance to avoid the risk of audit selection. The filing register illustrates that of 42 non-filers 
in the 2008-2009 tax year, 24 had received some audit adjustments in one or more of the 
previous three years. All these 24 late-filers informed the LTU in advance of their failure to 
submit their return and applied for extensions. The other 18 non-filers, who had had no audit 
adjustments during the previous five years, did not apply for extensions. The tax officials 
argued that it is the effect of the previous years‟ audits and the attempt to reduce the risk of 
 
being selected for tax audit that influence timely returns filing, not the affinity that grows out 
of the audit-led interactions. 
There is evidence in the literature to support the above argument. Pentland and Carlile (1996) 
found that making positive impressions is part of the taxpayer‟s strategic interaction in the 
audit process. Pentland and Carlile argued (1996:227) that, “In filing a return, the taxpayer 
 
makes the first control moves in the expression game. Taxpayers present a limited, stylized 
set  of  information  that  purports to  summarize  their  economic  activities  for  the  year  in 
question. In selecting a return for audit, the IRS makes its first uncovering move. At this level, 
from the taxpayer‟s point of view, the game consists of a single question: „will I get audited if 
 
I include (or omit) this information on my return?‟” 
 
 
7.6.3 Section Summary 
 
 
The conclusion from the above discussion is that reducing the risk of being selected for audit 
due to non-filing offence is the main concern of large corporate taxpayers. Non-filing of a 
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return increases the possibility of being selected for audit and the subsequent threat of being 
caught with undeclared income and extra tax owing. The opportunity to make a profit out of 
other non-compliances, especially non-reporting, is much higher than the opportunity 
associated with non-filing of a return. Thus it suggests that to protect other possible non- 
compliance from penalty and audit investigations, large corporate taxpayers file their returns 
on time. With this, the fact that large corporate taxpayers are under a statutory obligation to 
register with the tax authority expedites filing compliance. 
 
7.7 Why Does Tax Audit Fail to Improve Reporting, Payment and 
 
Overall Compliance? 
 
 
Surprisingly, tax audit has backfired as a means of improving the reporting, payment and 
overall compliance of large corporate taxpayers (see section 6.14). Conflicting explanations 
of this  fact  have  been  given  by  respondents,  both  from the  tax  administration  and  the 
corporate world. Major explanations include falsified audited financial reports, mutual 
disbelief and disrespect and rampant tax audit corruption. These are discussed below. 
 
7.7.1 Defective and Sub-Standard Accounts 
 
 
Audited financial statements (e.g., income statement, balance sheet and all related documents) 
are an integral part of the filed return for all corporate taxpayers in Bangladesh, small or large. 
In  many  cases,  audited  financial  reports  in  Bangladesh  are  either  falsely or  mistakenly 
prepared. It is not only the tax officials of the LTU, but also the certified public accountants, 
who believe that audited financial reports are defective and sub-standard. One tax official 
commented: “For the weak regulatory bodies, many large corporate taxpayers prepare more 
than one audit report to misrepresent facts on income and expenditure” (Respondent, 8). In 
the same vein, a chartered accountant added: “Neither local nor international accounting 
standards are followed with respect to  income reporting and tax payment. The common 
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misrepresentation for manufacturing concerns is over-valuation of inventory to raise the cost 
of goods sold. There is nothing the auditor can use to insist that the market price of the goods 
was higher or lower than that reported in the audit report” (Respondent, 25).  This respondent 
also informed the researcher that many of the audited financial reports submitted in the name 
of his accounting firm were in fact produced by other accountants. What the large corporate 
taxpayers do is to use the name and logo of a famous accounting firm to make the audit 
reports convincing. According to respondent observations, falsified, sub-standard audited 
financial reports cause audit failure in two ways. First, large corporate taxpayers do not feel 
alarmed by tax audit findings because an audit demand based on a falsified audit report can 
be managed by further falsification of documents. Second, aggressive audit adjustments by 
the audit team, due to their belief that the audited accounts are baseless, make corporate 
taxpayers even more reckless about complying with audit actions. In other words, large 
corporations never feel coerced by audit actions because of their capacity to take advantage 
of sub-standard accounting policies and regulations. 
 
Some respondents, however, refuted this argument, saying that it is not defective and sub- 
standard audited financial reports but conflicting local and international accounting practices 
that create reporting and payment non-compliance. The CFO of a large multinational 
corporation explained this conflict with a vivid example: “As a multinational corporation we 
use the MIP software, compiled by the US-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles), for internal reporting with our parent corporation in Canada.  MIP requires gross 
sales to be reported as turnover and trade discounts as administrative expenses. However, 
according to the Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS), turnover is gross sales net of tr ade 
discount. Despite the treatment differences, the effect on net profit is the same, which the 
LTU authority seldom understands. Every year this becomes a bone of contention on our 
reporting and payment issues” (Respondent, 17). In such cases, as the respondent emphasized, 
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tough monitoring and surveillance are likely to fail in dealing with non-compliance. The 
respondent proposed that conflicts in accounting standards and practices could be minimized 
by persuasive measures such as simplifying the relevant accounting practices and motivating 
taxpayers to obey them. 
 
7.7.2 Disbelief in Submitted Accounts 
 
 
Chronic disbelief between tax officials and large corporate taxpayers has a major negative 
impact on the success of tax audit. It has become an audit ritual to refuse to believe reported 
income, even when this is correct. A corporate CFO explains:  “We certainly know that the 
tax officials will disbelieve the accounts and reject them. This negative attitude and mistrust 
compel us more towards non-disclosure and non-payment ... In fact we leave scope for the 
audit team to increase the reported income” (Respondent, 19). Similarly, an LTU auditor 
commented, “Even if the income declaration is perfect, we raise it to demonstrate our 
efficiency to our superiors. If the audit adjustment is nil, it creates suspicion of our honesty 
and  capabilities  as  tax  auditors”  (Respondent,  12).  In  an  environment  of  mistrust  and 
disbelief, taxpayers find it rational to understate their income, with the connivance of 
professional accountants, as discussed above, although the audit action taken may be severe. 
 
7.7.3 Tax Audit Corruption 
 
 
Many respondents cited tax audit corruption as the single most important reason for audit 
failure. The respondents argued that disbelief of reported income and accounts was only a 
surface level explanation: the desire of tax officials for bribes came closer to explaining the 
fact. The tax authority raises questions on audited reports only to pursue its base motives. The 
money spent to meet such illegal demands is itself a reason to understate or falsify the 
accounts. One respondent, a qualified chartered accountant, raised the following question: 
“Will it ever be possible to claim bribery as an allowable expense in the audited accounts? If 
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not, then who will bear the expenses? A natural consequence therefore is a concocted audit 
report and audit failure” (Respondent 26).This statement was supported by a tax 
commissioner, who said that, “the pervasive corruption in our tax system deprives us of most 
of its benefits. The audit measures fail because the tax audit team easily succumbs to their 
desire for personal financial gain, instead of undertaking a systematic and rigorous audit 
action” (Respondent 12).Another tax official explained that, “tax officials are in a competition 
to make money from large corporate taxpayers. This creates alienation between them. Large 
taxpayers find that visiting the tax office gets them robbed in broad daylight. When this is the 
case, taxpayers find underreporting of income logical” (Respondent 21). 
 
Tax audit corruption, however, is not a tax administration issue only. The large corporate 
taxpayers are equally, or in some cases more, interested in the connivance process. One 
respondent  said,  “The  corrupt  large  firms  are  free  birds  in  society,  not  accountable  to 
anybody for their corrupt business activities. There is much evidence that corporate managers 
and directors have recourse to bribes to suppress facts and tax liabilities” (Respondent 9). 
The respondent further said that many corporate managers are happier to have a corrupt tax 
official to assess their income than an honest officer. 
 
In the international literature, tax audit corruption is a much researched issue. The Bureau of 
Inland Revenues (BIR) in the Philippines finds that 96% of its audit cases are settled with 
corruption (Co et al., 2007). In the Ugandan LTU, as the World Bank (2009: 158) states that 
“in 2003… five senior officers attached to large taxpayer units (LTUs) were involved in a 
major corruption scandal.” The US IRS comments that an aggressive audit system that spends 
too much time on unnecessary tax issues may lessen the fear of audit  actions and their 
success.  Phillips  (2008:147)  adds  that,  “even  if  a  business  keeps  proper  books  and  its 
accounts are audited by an accredited auditor; the tax official disregards this and makes an 
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assessment based on informal negotiation.” Tanzi (1998), however, claims that a substantial 
part of tax evasion arises because taxpayers deliberately manipulate their accounts. Bergman 
and Armando (2006, pp: 1) state that, “cheaters further non-comply after audits, while 
moderate compliers appear to take audit threats more seriously.” This tendency among 
corporate taxpayers indirectly fosters tax audit corruption and undermines the success of 
audit action. Therefore Daniel (2010) cautions corporate taxpayers not to take advantage of a 
weak tax audit, since exploitation of a weak tax audit may cause it to become increasingly 
aggressive. 
 
7.7.4 Use of Reported Income as an Audit Selection Criterion 
 
 
Another factor that may adversely affect audit action is reported-income-based audit selection 
policy for large corporate taxpayers. The higher the reported income is, the higher the 
probability of audit adjustments. To be on the safe side, large corporations keep their reported 
income as low as possible. This argument by large corporations has some basis in the LTU 
audit adjustments, which show that those filing high profit declarations are given high audit 
adjustments. For example, the highest amount of audit adjustment in the tax year 2008-2009 
was made on a cellular corporation which was also the top taxpayer in that year (The Daily 
Prothom Alo, 4 November, 2011).This explanation is supported by the literature, with Hanlon 
et al. (2005:5) stating that: “more profitable corporations are relatively less compliant.” In 
other words, non-reporting increases as the firm‟s revenues or added value increases. 
 
 
7.7.5 Tax Audit is Expensive 
 
 
The high cost of tax audit is another reason for this instrument failing to make a positive 
contribution to reporting and payment compliance. The cost of tax audit includes not only 
bribery and other illegal expenses but also the huge cost of assembling the massive number of 
records and other documents required and the professional fees paid to accountants and 
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advisors. The more frequent the audit is, the higher the audit cost. To recover some of this 
cost, large corporations either conceal income or inflate expenses. In this connection, it is 
worth quoting an LTU official: “Businessmen never share their profits. All audit compliance 
costs are recorded in the accounts under true or false heads of expenditure, sometimes as 
„miscellaneous‟” (Respondent, 9).  The respondent added that the cost of audit compliance is 
 
so huge and frequent that underreporting becomes the only choice. The respondent believed 
that audit  actions would be more successful if compliance costs could  be reduced. This 
concern is supported in the relevant literature. Slemrod et al. (2001: 3) state that, “The true 
tax base is not costlessly observable to the tax collection agency, although known to the 
taxpayer. Then, under certain circumstances, the taxpayer may be tempted to report a taxable 
income below the true value.” Kopczuk (2006:14) clarifies this point with reference to large 
corporations in the following lines: “There is at least a possibility that a very high probability 
of audit (such as for large corporations that are almost continuously audited) can backfire 
when audits are themselves costly.” 
 
7.7.6 Section Summary 
 
 
Review of the above responses and explanations suggests that tax audit corruption is the 
fundamental reason for tax audit to backfire. Corruption, however, is not a one-way game. 
Rather, all the parties concerned in the tax audit process have an equal interest and role in it. 
The commercial tax auditors make money by falsifying the audit reports at the request of the 
large corporate taxpayers; and the tax officials make money out of the defects in the accounts. 
Mutual disbelief and disrespect centre on the money-making aspect of audit actions. The 
other aspect of the matter is the lack of audit standards, as a result of which almost all audit 
adjustments  end  in  dispute  and  litigation.  There  is  no  audit  and  risk  assessment  guide 
followed uniformly among the audit teams. Moreover, the audit teams enjoy huge discretion 
in disallowing expenses, without much accountability to any authority. 
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7.8 Why Does Imprisonment Impact on Payment Compliance 
 
Negatively and Fail to Influence Other Compliances? 
 
 
As found in chapter 6, imprisonment is statistically significant (negatively) to payment 
compliance, but when the context variable is considered, it influences payment compliance 
positively. Imprisonment does not have any significant relationship with other types of 
compliance. A few explanations have been explored, and these are set out below. 
 
7.8.1 Imprisonment Lacks Rationality 
 
 
Non-payment of taxes is an offence, but not a criminal offence that should be punished with 
imprisonment. In-depth interviews with survey respondents showed that imprisonment as a 
coercive action is a mismatch to tax non-payment. One tax advisor observed: “Imprisonment 
as a tax compliance instrument raises the question of rationality. The tax authority should not 
imprison its own people and be inimical towards them over taxes. Rather the tax authority 
should build confidence among large corporate taxpayers” (Respondent, 19).Respondents 
argued that the goal of the punishment system should not be to destroy the steady income 
stream of a taxpayer, which is an essential condition to the payment of taxes. It is argued that 
large corporate taxpayers are rarely found to be payment non-compliant if the claim is 
undisputed. Respondents commented that the only reason that large corporations would not 
pay was conflict on legal issues or severe financial crisis. The respondents recommended that 
differences on legal issues should be addressed by simplifying tax law, and financial crises 
should be accommodated by liberal payment options. Imprisonment during hard times would 
further exacerbate the payment capacity of large corporations. 
 
The respondents further added that in terms of likely impact on large corporate business, 
imprisonment differs from penalty and tax audit. Penalty and tax audit adjustments represent 
a financial risk to large corporations; but imprisonment causes both financial and reputational 
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risk. Imprisonment of a key corporate director or an employee involved in tax non-payment 
may destroy the public image of a corporation and may drive it out of the tax-base completely. 
Respondents claim it is more justifiable to impose monetary fines if the corporation is 
sufficiently financially sound to bear the tax burden, rather than pursuing a criminal 
prosecution. 
 
7.8.2 Inequity and Lack of Proportionality 
 
 
Equity and proportionality are the two vital features of any compliance instruments if the 
latter are to be successful. Respondents argued that it was the violation of these fundamental 
principles that explained the negative relationship between imprisonment and tax non- 
compliance. One of the reasons that imprisoning taxpayers violates these basic principles is 
that   it   represents   the   politicization  of  the   tax  administration.   In  a   politicized   tax 
administration,  imprisonment  as  an  action,  as  respondents  observed,  is  used  more  as  a 
political instrument than a tax policy instrument. For example, respondents cited the massive 
criminal investigation and imprisonment drives during the time of the military backed 
caretaker government of 2008-2009, popularly known as 1/11  in Bangladesh politics. A 
major tool of this vengeful government was to implicate political leaders in tax corruption 
cases. Other taxpayers guilty of the same level of non-compliance were not prosecuted. In 
some cases, taxpayers were prosecuted for non-filing of returns, which did not match the 
level of the offence committed and could be seen as a violation of the rule of proportionality. 
The underlying reason for such a violation is political favour and persecution, as was well- 
explained by an LTU official: “A large corporation having an inimical relationship with the 
government is in serious trouble. In a country like ours, where political vengeance is rampant, 
you  have  to  maintain  a  relationship  with  the  political  power.  Once  you  are  liked  and 
patronized  by  a  certain  political  party,  you  are  less  likely  to  face  unequal  treatment” 
(Respondent, 21).The respondents observed  that  an unequal application of imprisonment 
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motivated by political interest created disrespect of the tax system and worked against the 
success of criminal prosecutions. 
 
7.8.3 Credibility of Threat 
 
 
According to respondent observations, a leading issue affecting the working of imprisonment, 
like that of other coercive tools, is the credibility of the threat it represents. When 
imprisonment is only a distant possibility, it is less likely to change the behaviour of large 
corporations with regard to tax compliance. Making imprisonment a real threat depends on a 
lot  of  factors,  especially  enforcement  skills  and  the  risk  and  cost  involved  in  criminal 
proceeding. As far as the enforcement skills of the LTU‟s Enforcement and Collection Wing 
 
(ECW) are concerned, there is strong doubt about these. Neither the officials nor the staff 
have the legal expertise or sound knowledge necessary to conduct a criminal case. On this 
point, one respondent had this to say: 
 
To initiate a criminal proceeding you must give a hearing to the defendant; but in 
most cases the ECW wing does not follow the procedure properly. Inefficient 
application   of   the   law   enables   large   corporate   taxpayers   to   challenge   and 
outmanoeuvre a criminal prosecution easily. A large corporate taxpayer escaping a 
criminal investigation become less fearful of the tax authority and will tend to be 
more non-compliant in the future (Respondent, 23). 
 
 
On the point of the risk involved in criminalising tax non-payment, respondents commented 
that the tax authority is always under the threat of political accusations from large corporate 
taxpayers. This threat seems genuine when the General Secretary of a political party says that, 
“when we come into power, we will take legal action against the tax officials for initiating 
criminal investigations against our party leaders. Action will also be taken against those who 
have published tax return information to serve government interests” (The Daily Jugantor, 14 
May,  2010).”  To  avoid  such  dangers  many  tax  officials  are  not  interested  in  initiating 
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criminal proceedings, even though a successful prosecution is much coveted.  As a result 
criminal prosecution loses its impetus and fails to produce the intended outcome. 
 
7.8.4 Cost and Administrative Impediments 
 
 
To tax officials, seeking prison terms for wrongdoers is ineffective because of the cost and 
administrative burden this imposes on the tax administration. A tax commissioner informed 
me that in the recent past, the tax administration had been expected to bear all expenses 
involved in the litigation and imprisonment process. The tax commissioner was saying that 
huge funds were needed to initiate a legal battle against the most affluent section of taxpayers. 
In terms of the scant yearly budget allocated to the LTU, undertaking criminal prosecutions 
became a white elephant for the tax administration. In fighting non-compliance prosecutions, 
large corporate taxpayers could appoint the best lawyers and bear as much financial burden as 
necessary, whereas the lawyers appointed by the tax authority were professionally less 
competent. It was argued by respondents that unequal financial and professional expertise 
was the main impediment to the successful application of imprisonment as a coercive tool. 
The   international  tax   compliance   literature   supports  the   arguments   that   inequitable 
application of imprisonment and lack of credibility of the threat it represents can negatively 
affect  its success.  Wu  (2005)  argues that  imprisonment  and other  penal measures don‟t 
 
succeed because of their severity, but because of their certainty, swiftness and frequency, 
which enhance the credibility of the threat.  It can also be maintained that imprisonment is a 
less effective measure if taxpayers are financially capable of meeting their tax obligations. 
Aparicio  et  al.  (2011)  claim  that  non-monetary  punishment  like  imprisonment  is  most 
suitable if the offence is grave and repeated, and the taxpayer is not financially capable of 
bearing a monetary fine. There is also some evidence that too much publicity given to the 
criminalization of tax non-compliance, as happened in case of the caretaker government era 
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in Bangladesh, can have a bad effect on tax compliance (Dubin, 2007). Dubin (2007) found 
that doubling tax audit actions increased tax collection by $ 21.7 billion in the US, whereas 
doubling criminal investigations increased tax collection by $16.0 billion after a huge 
publicity effort. 
 
7.8.5 The Impact of Corporate Sector and the Change in the Direction of 
the Relationship 
 
On the  point  of why  imprisonment  positively  contributes  to  payment  compliance  when 
corporate sector affiliation is taken into account, two major explanations could be drawn from 
respondent observations, in addition to the statistical explanations given in section 6.9.2. First, 
corporations  affiliated  to  a particular  sector  have  many  business  and  strategic  issues  in 
common.  Finance  sector  corporations,  for  instance,  have  to  follow  common  business 
standards imposed on them by central bank regulations. It may be that large corporations in 
the same sector tend to follow each other in dealing with government agencies as a part of 
their business strategy. Second, business competition among corporations in the same sector 
forces them to be identical in income reporting and tax payment behaviour. However, these 
explanations fit more to the corporations within a particular sector, but not for corpo rations 
between the sectors. This study, therefore, finds it is important to probe further the question 
of  why  the  contextual  variable  affects  the  relationship  between  imprisonment  and  tax 
compliance positively, and to conduct an empirical study to this end. This proposal for future 
research  also  applies  to  the  changed  relationship  between  taxpayer  service  and  tax 
compliance, as discussed in section 7.9. 
 
7.8.6 Section Summary 
 
 
There  is  some  truth  in  the  argument  that  the  politicization  of  criminal  investigat ions 
undermines their capacity to contribute to the achievement of higher tax compliance among 
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large corporate taxpayers. But the politicization of criminal prosecutions does not happen in 
isolation. Politicization is an integral part of a corrupt tax system where the political masters 
and  large  corporate taxpayers  are  in  a  symbiotic  relationship  to  maximize  each  other‟s 
 
economic interests. A respondent strongly argued that, “in fact business is controlled by the 
politicians. It is the corrupt political system and the politicians that make the law and control 
the law. Political and business interests go hand in hand; public interests are less considered.” 
In addition, the failure of imprisonment as a policy tool can be understood to some degree as 
the result of poor coordination between the judiciary and the tax administration. The ultimate 
fate of criminal proceeding depends on how non-compliance cases are dealt with at the top 
echelons of the judicial system. In Bangladesh, the judiciary seldom gives priority to the 
settling of revenue cases, which ties up millions dollars of tax revenues in the litigation 
process. It is worth mentioning that a total of $ 323.47 million of tax revenues from large 
taxpayers  have  been  tied  up  in  the  higher  courts  for  over  a  decade.  However,  further 
empirical evidence would be needed in order to find out whether the failure of imprisonment 
is more a tax administration issue or a judiciary issue. 
 
7.9 Why Does Taxpayer Service Fail to Improve Tax Compliance? 
In chapter 6 we found that taxpayer service does not improve tax compliance. We found that 
taxpayer service is only important to those taxpayers who are overall compliant. This means 
that taxpayer service has no influence on a particular component of tax compliance, but only 
on compliance as a whole.  It  further  means that taxpayer  service  is  important  to  those 
 
taxpayers who are already good compliers (e.g., in the sense that they are overall compliant). 
Taxpayer service does not have any impact on those who commit any sort of non-compliance 
(e.g.,  in the sense that  they are  non-compliant  in one or  more compliance obligations). 
Chapter  6  also  showed  that  the  negative  relationship  between  taxpayer  service  and  tax 
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compliance turns into a positive one when sector affiliation is considered. On this point of a 
changed relationship, the thesis makes the same argument as it made in case of the changed 
relationship  between imprisonment  and tax compliance (see section 7.8.5). Respondents‟ 
 
explanations for why taxpayer services fail in improving overall tax compliance have been 
summarized and presented in Chart 7.1 
 
Chart 7.1:  Frequency distribution of respondent observations on taxpayer service and tax 
compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own figure created from field data using Nvivo-9 
 
 
 
 
As the chart shows, 14 respondents had some observations on the effect of taxpayer service 
on tax compliance, among other issues. Among them, respondents 2, 11, 14, 23 and 26 
considered the quality of service to be a strong, and respondents 1, 2, 6, 8 and 20 considered 
it a weak, means of dealing with large corporate tax compliance. Respondents 4, 7, 10 and 22, 
however, raised doubts as to whether service influenced large corporate taxpayers at all. The 
percentage above the bar for each respondent shows the proportion of the discussion that was 
related to taxpayer service. The explanations given in the discussions are discussed below. 
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7.9.1 Poor Value for Money 
 
 
A strong reason for the negative relationship between overall tax compliance and taxpayer 
service,  as  it  emerged  from  respondent  observations,  is  the  poor  value  for  money  that 
taxpayer service represents. Respondents argued that taxpayer service – good or bad quality – 
should enable taxpayers to reduce the financial and psychological costs of tax compliance 
(defined in section 2.2). There were strong doubts among respondents as to whether the 
quality taxpayer service by the LTU reduced tax compliance costs at all. The chief accountant 
of a large corporation explained that, “there is a better opportunity to discuss our problems at 
LTU level, but unfortunately services like this in most cases end in disagreement and in loss 
of money and time” (Respondent, 3). However, this view was challenged by a tax official 
who argued that whether taxpayer service creates value or not, and whether the service is 
good or bad in quality, the contribution of taxpayer service to tax compliance is always 
minimal. The reason is that taxpayers do not face any financial liability for enjoying the 
service and refusing tax payment in return. The respondent added, 
 
Through quality service you can increase tax compliance only minimally, at best 10%. 
This is because large corporations know that non-response to taxpayer service does 
not involve any cost to their business, as the penal and tax audit measures do. As a 
rational economic unit they will only refrain from non-compliance when the potential 
cost of disregarding a tax compliance tool is higher than the gain they may make out 
of such disregard for the tool. (Respondent, 20) 
 
 
The international tax compliance literature demonstrates that large corporate taxpayers, as 
consumers of taxpayer service, are interested in three things: service quality, responsiveness 
and value for money (Clarke et al., 2007, quoted in Tuck, 2004:4). This reflects the fact that 
taxpayer service is treated like other public services, for example, the service patients expect 
from hospitals. Taxpayer services become effective in producing the desired result only when 
the service provider-customer relationship between the tax administration and the taxpayer is 
well accepted by both sides. There are examples of large corporate taxpayers not being happy 
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with the service-provider-customer relationship. The tax director of a UK multinational 
corporation quoted by Tuck (2004:15) stated that, “I told [a previous director of LBO] quite 
vociferously that we aren‟t customers. In my view the customer of the Inland Revenue is the 
 
Treasury and we are not customers, we are taxpayers...clearly to the extent they are regulators 
we are tax payers then we have to pay up and face the consequences.” 
 
7.9.2 Taxpayer Service Not Needed 
 
 
Some respondents argued that taxpayer service might not be an important requirement at all 
to increase large corporate tax compliance. This is because these corporations have their own 
tax departments, staffed by qualified and efficient accountants and advisors. A tax advisor, 
also the long-time president of the Income Tax Association of Bangladesh, said: “Taxpayer 
service is not a firm requirement to improve tax compliance for large corporations, because 
these corporations have well-equipped in-house tax departments that never lack taxpayer 
service. Taxpayer service is only likely to be an important factor for the individual and small , 
for whom services are out of reach” (Respondent, 10). The same argument was made by a 
high official of the LTU: “The potential for increased large corporate tax compliance through 
quality taxpayer service is questionable. The big corporations don‟t talk about service. Give 
 
all service you want and see what happens. There will be no change in their compliance 
levels. If service could help, we would not need the constitution, the power or enforcement 
groups. Basically, no corporation wants to pay taxes” (Respondent, 7). 
 
7.9.3 Tax Administration Attitude 
 
 
A vital fact contributing to the failure of taxpayer service in promoting overall compliance is 
negative attitude and lack of trust by the tax administration towards large corporate taxpayers. 
To provide quality taxpayer service, the tax authority has to abandon its risk-averse attitude 
and  the  bureaucratic  inertia  that  cause  taxpayer  service  not  to  work.  One  respondent 
249  
specifically said that, “The attitude of the LTU administration and the quality of service it 
provides to taxpayers are interconnected. No large corporation will pay millions of dollars in 
taxes to promote the luxurious life of the LTU tax officials. If the LTU does not change its 
basic attitude to service provision, it will alienate itself from the large corporations and 
taxpayer service will fail to achieve the intended results” (Respondent, 21). It is argued that 
lack of partnership and friendly relationships between taxpayers and the tax administration is 
one reason that taxpayer service fails to improve tax compliance. If there is bad feeling 
between taxpayers and the tax administration, the taxpayers can redirect all this resentment 
by complaining about poor taxpayer service. A tax official commented that, “High quality 
service, for example, telephoning taxpayers, visiting their premises, having tea or lunch 
together, has a role to play in addressing compliance issues. The service rendering process 
and frequent visits and informal meetings make taxpayers a part of the tax system and move 
tax compliance positively” (Respondent, 6). 
 
The above respondent, however, cautioned that relationship-building should not depend on 
taxpayer service alone. In the background, stringent corporate tax law must be set up to make 
sure that the non-compliers are punished (see the Figure 7.1). The respondent suggested that 
taxpayer service might produce good results if there were tough legal consequences for 
denying compliance obligations once the relevant services had been provided to facilitate 
compliance. A respondent made this point clear by stating that, “Some corporations view 
service provision as a weakness of the LTU enforcement mechanism. They think that the 
LTU does not have the power and the legal capacity to catch tax dodgers and punish them” 
(Respondent, 22). Another respondent added that tax compliance was a legal obligation and 
therefore should be handled with coercion rather than by persuasion (Respondent 25). This 
respondent argued that constant inspection and surveillance of the business activities of large 
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corporations  could  make  sure  that  taxpayers  took  the  legal  compulsion  seriously  and 
complied with their tax obligations. 
 
The related literature has been reviewed on the points discussed above. On the point of 
negative tax administration attitude and its adverse effect on tax compliance, Snavely 
(1990:64) states that, “...the potential obstacle is the fear of risk-taking  ...the common risk- 
averse  attitude  in  the  tax  administration.  Many  of  the  service  policies  are  untried  and 
represent a significant departure from traditional routines.” Snavely argues that the principle 
objective of taxpayer service is to convey a message to taxpayers that the tax department‟s 
 
attitude to them has shifted from toughness to softness, and in exchange the taxpayers should 
fulfil their tax obligations. Snavely further states that taxpayer service should dispel fear of 
the tax administration and distrust towards it. It is pertinent to refer to Bodin (2003), who 
argues that unless the historically entrenched colonial mind set of tax officials and their 
organisational culture is changed, taxpayer service, however good, is unlikely to improve tax 
compliance. 
 
The literature also supports the argument made by Respondent 25 (above) that the success of 
any legal obligations, of which tax compliance is an example, is more linked with coercive 
techniques than with persuasion. This is because violation of legal obligations can be 
challenged in the courts of law. Disregard for taxpayer service is not a matter of right that can 
be pursued in the courts (Dworkin, 1986, quoted in Menendez, 2001). Jenkins and Forlemu 
(1993) say that taxpayer service may fail to get results if taxpayers have an idea that tax non- 
compliance will be treated as a mere misdemeanour rather than a felony. 
 
7.9.4 Section Summary 
 
 
In seems from the above discussion that the argument that taxpayer service, whether good or 
bad quality, is not a requirement for the improvement of tax compliance is more justifiable 
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than the other arguments. Large corporate taxpayers are well-equipped to create the services 
they need in the preparation, submission and defence of their tax returns. In the literature, 
there is support for the idea that poor value for money and attitudinal issues in the tax 
administration may cause taxpayer service to fail, but the fact that taxpayer service is not 
required at all by large corporate taxpayers is new in the literature. It also seems reasonable to 
argue that the success of taxpayer service depends greatly on the existence of hard legal 
measures in the background. This research found (in sections 7.7 and 7.8) that tax audit and 
imprisonment  have  a  negative  relationship  with  tax  compliance.  This  might  be  one 
explanation as to why taxpayer service is less effective in increasing tax compliance, since 
two powerful coercive measures have failed to improve such compliance. 
 
7.10 Why is Simplified Tax Law Important to Overall Tax 
 
Compliance? 
 
 
Simplified tax law, as was found in chapter 6, plays a significant positive role in improving 
overall tax compliance. Having a positive relationship only with overall compliance means 
that simplified tax law is important to those taxpayers who are already good compliers (e.g., 
in the sense that they are overall compliant). Simplified tax law does not have any impact on 
those  who  commit  some  sort  of  non-compliance  (e.g.,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  non- 
compliant with one or more tax obligations). 
 
In order to deal effectively with this subject, the nature of the complexity of income tax laws 
in Bangladesh has been reviewed. The Income Tax Manual – the main source of all tax laws 
– is primarily divided into Part I and Part II.  Part I is the Income Tax Ordinance, 1984; and 
Part II is the Income Tax Rules, 1984 (see Figure 7.3 below). Both parts of the manual are 
designed for all taxpayers, and there are no separate sections or chapters for corporate or non- 
corporate taxpayers. Part I has 23 chapters with 184 sections, a large number of sub-sections 
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and explanations, and seven schedules. Some of the schedules are divided into several parts: 
the first schedule has 3 parts (Part A, Part B and Part C); and the fifth and sixth schedules 
have two parts each (Parts A and B). The other schedules (the second, third, fourth and 
seventh) do not have parts. 
 
Figure 7.3: Income tax laws for large corporate taxpayers 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own figure devised from the Income Tax Ordinance and related 
documents 
 
 
In the schedules, there are 115 paragraphs and a huge number of sub-paragraphs. In Part II, 
there are 50 rules and huge numbers of sub-rules and explanations. As well as the Income 
Tax Manual, Parts I and II, there are SROs (Statutory Regulatory Orders), circulars and 
explanations issued by the NBR that further complicate the income tax laws. In the 
interpretation of tax codes, rulings from lower and higher tax courts within the country and 
sometimes from outside, particularly from India and Pakistan, are frequently referred to. 
Moreover, every year there are minor and major changes in tax laws through the finance bills. 
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Other laws of the land having direct and indirect bearing on the understanding and execution 
of income tax compliance include, but this list is not exhaustive: the  Companies Act, 1913 
and 1914; the Banking Act, 1991; the Cooperative Societies Act, 1940; the Cost and 
Management Accountants Ordinance, 1977; the Partnership Acts, 1932; the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908; the Penal Code,  1860; the Chartered Accountants Ordinance,1961; the 
Value Added Tax Act, 1991; the Emigration Ordinance, 1982; the Registration Act, 1908; the 
Gift Tax Act, 1963; the Limitation Act,1908; the Evidence Act, 1872; the Foreign Exchange 
Regulations Act, 1947; the Customs Act, 1969; the Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and; Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898. This shows that the income tax laws that have to be met by large 
corporate taxpayers are full of complexities. Analysing respondent interviews and the above 
information, the following explanations were found as to the relationship between overall tax 
compliance and simplified tax law. 
 
7.10.1 Reduced Compliance Cost 
 
 
Simplified tax law can reduce tax compliance costs. Reduction in compliance costs may 
encourage and enable large corporate taxpayers to better honour their compliance obligations. 
Large  corporations  bear  the  compliance  cost  of  maintaining  records  of  t heir  business 
transactions,  which  is  expensive  and  difficult.  Reduction  of  this  cost  means  increased 
financial capacity to meet tax payments. The following comments of the respondents reveal 
the relationship between compliance costs and simplified tax law and the effect on higher 
overall compliance: 
 
Complex tax laws make it difficult and expensive to manage the accounts as laid 
down in the tax law.   Many corporations employ one or two officers, instead of a 
fully-fledged income tax and accounts department, to reduce tax compliance costs. 
The money so saved helps indirectly to curb the tax burden and enables higher overall 
compliance (Respondent, 15). 
 
Complex tax laws affect the process of confidence building, because they help tax 
auditors, legal advisors and tax officials to make illegal extra money from the large 
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corporations. We can better honour our tax liabilities if the law is easier to understand 
(Respondent, 23). 
 
 
 
Simplified tax laws not only reduce the fees of commercial auditors and the expenses for 
administrative support; they also reduce the chances of misrepresentation and corruption – a 
major barrier to tax compliance (see section 7.7.3). A related reason why simplified tax law 
can raise tax compliance is because it widens the base of withholding taxes. In Bangladesh, 
around 52% of the taxes from large corporations are collected from withheld taxes, and here 
simplified tax law can be particularly helpful. Some respondents argued that simplified tax 
law could reduce compliance costs by reducing the cost of litigation caused by ambiguous tax 
laws. 
 
7.10.2 Complementary Role to Other Compliance Instruments 
 
 
It was revealed in the respondent observations that simplified tax law can play a 
complementary role in the effective use of coercive and other persuasive instruments. 
Penalties, for example, are sometimes so blindly imposed that corporate conditions are never 
considered. Some corporate non-compliance may be unintentional and simply require 
clarification and proper understanding of the tax laws, rather than the severe application of a 
penalty or audit adjustment. One respondent had this to say to make the complementary role 
of simplified tax law understandable: “A simple and easily understandable tax law is well- 
accepted by large corporate taxpayers. Even tax audit and other deterrence measures can be 
successfully applied if tax laws are simple” (Respondent, 12).  Respondents argued that the 
tax authority had the moral right to apply a harsh law only when the tax law was easily 
digestible and unambiguously understandable. 
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7.10.3 Enhanced Accountability and Coordination 
 
 
Simplified tax law, as large corporations believe, can encourage accountability among 
commercial tax auditors and tax advisors and can make a positive contribution to tax 
compliance. Commercial tax auditors and tax advisors are major players in the non- 
compliance game, but their accountability under the tax laws is not well defined. The CFO 
(Respondent, 18) of a large corporation said that, “Sometimes we are punished for an offence 
of our commercial auditor or the tax return preparers.” The respondent mentioned that tax 
compliance gaps could be closed up if a tax law clearly defined the roles and responsibilities 
of the tax professionals. Also it is important to coordinate and synchronise the different tax 
obligations of large corporations. To achieve this goal in many LTUs around the world, for 
example in Australia and New Zealand, income tax, VAT, customs and other tax liabilities 
are set out in a single tax code. In Bangladesh single codification for large corporate tax 
compliance has yet to be done, although the VAT and income tax LTUs have been set up 
close to each other to allow an easy flow of information. In this context, an LTU official 
informed me that a certain amount of non-compliance in the LTU arises from the different 
ways in which the VAT and income tax departments treat revenue and expenditure. 
Collaboration and reconciliation between the VAT and income tax laws has become an 
objective for the large corporations in the LTU. A World Bank Report (2009 :70) states that, 
“In the interest of transparency, it is a good practice to consolidate all laws with tax 
implications into one code  ...large taxpayer units (LTUs) that administer most or all of the 
taxes for large businesses under one roof have been introduced in many countries. The use of 
a single administrative law is especially helpful in the case of administering taxpayers in 
LTUs.” 
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7.10.4 Addressing Legal Discrimination and Inequity 
 
 
Respondents stated that the non-compliance of large corporations is often caused by 
discriminatory and unequal tax laws, which are a direct result of the complexity of the tax 
laws. Respondents argued that special tax treatments (tax holiday, deductions, credits, etc) 
allowed to taxpayers gave rise to much tax non-compliance, and this could only be solved by 
simplifying  the  tax  law,  not  by  penalty  or  imprisonment.  In-depth  interviews  with 
respondents demonstrated that the more the tax law is simplified, the better corporations will 
feel about equity and fairness issues, and the higher tax compliance will be. 
 
The international literature on tax compliance supports some of the arguments made by the 
respondents. Kopczuk (2006: 11) argues that simplified tax laws make the imposition of 
penalty and audit actions easier and more acceptable to taxpayers. Kopczuk states (2006: 11): 
“The  bottom  line  is  that  complexity  makes  relying  on  penalties  a  much  less  appealing 
approach to enforcement. This is so for two reasons: penalties and audits become more costly 
because they have to be associated with some attempt to distinguish honest taxpayers from 
cheaters,  and  they  directly  reduce  the  welfare  of  honest  taxpayers.”  This  argument  is 
supported by the findings of Ingraham and Karlinsky (2005) in their study of tax law 
complexity and its impact on small-business, where they comment that tax law simplification 
has strong links with tax compliance through its influence on fairness, equity and so forth. 
 
A further reason, as claimed in the World Bank Report (2009) is: the simpler the tax law, the 
higher is the dependence on withholding taxes to promote reporting and payment compliance. 
Since large corporations withhold tax from payments to non-large corporations and 
individuals, their cash flow is augmented by the taxes collected from others. This may even 
make the compliance cost negative for some large corporations, because of the financial gains 
they may make out of the augmented cash flow. There are also supporting arguments in 
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World Bank Literature that simplified tax law has a strong bearing on the unification and 
coordination of different tax and VAT laws that expedite transparency and the comp liance 
process (see section 7.10.3). 
 
7.10.5 Section Summary 
 
 
From the above arguments and the empirical evidence it seems justifiable to claim that 
simplified tax law improves tax compliance mainly through the reduction of compliance costs. 
With a huge volume of complex tax laws, the cost of maintaining and administrating records 
becomes very high. Tax law complexity not only makes the compliance process expensive, it 
lessens taxpayers‟ interest in visiting the tax office and paying their taxes in a timely and full 
 
manner. The money spent on record keeping can be offset by some payment non-compliance, 
which  is  one  reason  for  simplified  tax  law  to  encourage  higher  tax  compliance.  This 
argument prevails over other arguments because tax compliance involves expenditure for 
corporate taxpayers. Any persuasive instrument that cuts some of that expenditure is likely to 
boost the compliance process. The other benefits of simplification, establishing accountability 
and supplementing the imposition of coercive action, seem to have an indirect role in 
improving the compliance environment. 
 
7.11 Mutual Understanding: Why Can’t It Promote Large 
 
Corporate Tax Compliance? 
 
 
As will be recalled from chapter 6, mutual understanding is not statistically significant in 
increasing large corporate tax compliance. The only influence this variable has is on the filing 
compliance of those corporations charged with a 45% marginal tax rate, as was found in the 
CHAID estimations. Since marginal tax rate was used as a control variable for the statistical 
analysis, its effect on tax compliance is not discussed here (see section 3.12.1.4 for control 
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variables). This section mainly discusses why mutual understanding fails to improve large 
corporate tax compliance. 
 
7.11.1 Conflict of Interest and Priority 
 
 
Mutual  understanding  as  an  instrument  does  not  overcome  the  conflict  of  interest  and 
priorities between large corporate taxpayers and the tax administration. The large corporate 
taxpayers remain under the rigorous surveillance of the tax authority with respect to their 
payment  (i.e.,  withholding  taxes)  and  reporting  obligations.  Delays  on  the  part  of  the 
taxpayers are generally subject to warnings and penal actions, and attempts are often made to 
resolve these situations through mutual talks and discussions. Both the large corporations and 
the tax authority know, and perhaps believe, that the interests of business and the interest of 
revenue are largely different and are therefore hard to balance with mutual respect and 
understanding. One respondent argued, “The LTU view and the corporation view of business 
differ widely. The LTU‟s main concern is mobilizing tax revenues, but our priority is to 
maximize the income and profit of the corporation. Unfortunately, the tax authority doesn‟t 
understand this and sends us legal notices when the filing of returns is delayed by even a 
week”  (Respondent,  3).  The  respondents  expressed  frustration  that  the  LTU  does  not 
 
understand the pressure large corporate taxpayers are under from the regulatory inspection 
and surveillance of accounts preparation. There is no evidence, as the respondent argued, that 
the tax authority takes an understanding view when accounts preparation is delayed. The 
finance director of a large commercial bank told me, “The accounts of commercial banks are 
prepared on the basis of huge and complex documents gathered from numerous branches, 
which are time and resource consuming to work through. In our own interest, we want to 
make the accounts as perfect as possible. However, the tax authority smells something else 
when the accounts preparation is delayed” (Respondent, 5). 
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Corporate sectors Did the corporation appeal? Total 
Yes No No grounds for appeal 
 
7.11.2 Litigation Prone Compliance Environment 
 
 
Until very recently, mutual understanding as a policy has no legal basis, and usually remains 
outside the volumes in which tax law is published. Respondents argued that legal obligations 
should always be addressed with legal means because mutuality of interest and understanding 
is a vague concept, and arriving at a concrete decision is beyond its scope. Many respondents 
take the huge volume of appeals cases lodged by large corporate taxpayers as an indication of 
the failure of mutual understanding. A detail of appeals cases and their effects were discussed 
earlier, in section 5.4.3. This section presents a sector-specific distribution of appeals cases in 
Table 7.2. It shows that finance sector corporations are the most likely to be involved in 
litigation, with 68% of them disagreeing with audits findings and assessments, although audit 
adjustments are made through mutual agreement. 
 
Table 7.2: Cross-tabulation of appeals cases by corporate sector for tax year 2008-2009 
 
 
 
 
Finance 55 3 22 80 
Manufacturing 18 2 23 43 
Service 12 3 16 31 
Total 85 8 61 154 
 
Source:  LTU Appeals and tribunal records 
 
 
 
The reasons for litigation are two-fold: first, there is no legal obligation on the large 
corporations to obey audit adjustments arrived at through discussion. One respondent from 
the LTU showed me a written declaration from a large banking corporation that the tax 
agreed on through mutual understanding would be honoured. However, a few weeks later the 
corporation filed an appeal with the tax courts and refused to pay the taxes. Second, at the 
appellate level there are opportunities to manipulate and reduce taxes by connivance 
(discussed in section 5.4.3). 
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7.11.3 Lack of Knowledge and Training 
 
 
The other explanation for the failure of mutual understanding is the huge knowledge and 
skills gap between the audit teams and the representatives of large corporations. Determining 
tax liabilities for large corporations requires specialised knowledge. Several respondents 
unanimously agreed that large businesses are full of technical and complex issues. Lack of 
professional knowledge and understanding by the LTU gives rise to many instances of 
reporting and payment non-compliance. An investigation was carried out into the taxation 
and accounting knowledge of tax officials (Charts 7.2 and 7.3), which many respondents 
identified as a potential barrier to mutual understanding. Out of fourteen tax officials 
interviewed, only four had academic knowledge of accounting and taxation; the others had 
only in-service training on tax law. 
 
Chart 7.2 Respondents‟ academic knowledge of accounting and taxation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Candidate‟s own figure created from field data using Nvivo-9 
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Chart 7.3 Respondents‟ work experience and accounting knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Candidate‟s own figure created from field data using Nvivo-9 
 
 
 
 
Chart 7.2 shows that almost all tax professionals have accounting or business degrees. Four 
per cent of tax professionals have no qualification in accounting, because the ITO, 1984 has 
allowed retired tax officials to plead tax cases, who do not require having academic 
qualifications in accounting or taxation. Chart 7.3 illustrates all respondents having 25 or 
more years of experience have degrees in accounting, because respondents in this experience 
group are tax professionals. But respondents in the other two experience groups, mostly tax 
officials, have lesser qualifications in business and accounting. Of the eight respondents in 
the below-15-years-experience groups, only four have accounting degrees, one of which is a 
tax professional. In the 15-25 year experience group only three out of nine have accounting 
degrees, most of which are tax officials. 
 
Addressing this huge gap in accounting and tax knowledge, a respondent argued that tax 
officials need to have a thorough understanding of financial and tax accounting standards and 
262  
rules (Respondent, 15). The respondents insisted that local and international financia l and tax 
accounting standards must be in unison, to reduce confusion among LTU officials. A 
respondent made the following observation about an occasion on which penalty was wrongly 
allowed as an admissible expense, when it should have been added as income. 
 
Because of poor knowledge of a mobile operator‟s business and its accounting 
software, we foolishly allowed penalty as an admissible expense that was imposed on 
the  income  from  hidden  business  operations.  We  failed  to  understand  that  the 
concealed  income had to be added to the income of the corporation, rather than 
simply allowing the penalty on such clandestine business as admissible. Such non- 
compliances arose only due to our lack of understanding of the mobile operator‟s 
business (Respondent, 27). 
 
In the same vein, other respondents stated that: 
 
Tax officials must understand the nature of the business they are assessing. Most of 
the differences of opinion arise when there are gaps of knowledge and understanding 
between the taxpayers and the tax administration. This takes a critical turn as the large 
taxpayers are equally, or more, knowledgeable and powerful than the LTU authority. 
(Respondent, 12) 
 
LTU  tax  officials  don‟t  know  their  job  properly  and  want  too  many  papers. 
Sometimes   they   lack   proper   accounting   knowledge   and   arrive   at   a   wrong 
understanding of the books of accounts. This creates mistrust between the tax officials 
and the large corporate taxpayers (Respondent, 17). 
 
 
This respondent continued to say that sometimes LTU officials failed to observe the spirit of 
the tax law because of lack of understanding. They disallowed an expense that should have 
been allowable, for instance, provision for bad debts in the case of the banking corporations. 
He explained that, according to tax law, legal action must be exhausted in order to claim bad 
debts as an allowable expense; but the banks argued that further litigation would only add to 
the  expense,  without  any  benefit.  This  gap  in  understanding  creates  a  huge  number  of 
reporting and payment non-compliances each year. On this point, other respondents stated 
that the problems of misunderstanding emerged from two sources: first grey tax laws; and 
second poor knowledge of accounting and taxation. The respondents emphatically argued that 
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mutual talks and understanding could only increase tax compliance when the tax officials had 
full knowledge of tax laws and audit standards. 
 
7.11.4 Section Summary 
 
 
Mutual understanding as a persuasive instrument fails because it does not have any legal 
back-up. Understanding-based arrangements succeed when both the parties have a common 
interest and pursuance of that common interest is supported by legislation. Mutuality of 
interest as a concept does not succeed in securing tax compliance because business and the 
tax authority‟s interests are varied and different. The tax authority‟s objective is to maximize 
revenue, whereas the large corporate taxpayer‟s goal is to keep tax payments to the minimum, 
legally or illegally. Large corporate taxpayers will abandon this goal when the tax authority 
does the same. No tax administration would risk its present tax collections for the sake of 
 
establishing friendship with large corporate taxpayers, although this might increase the long- 
term potential of tax collection. It also seems that mutual understanding works better in a tax 
compliance  environment  of  negotiation  than  in  an  environment  where  compliance  is 
measured in terms of the strict application of the relevant laws. 
 
7.12 Chapter Conclusion and Summary 
 
 
This chapter has identified the potential reasons why coercive and persuasive instruments are 
important to the understanding of large corporate tax compliance. Findings show that how 
frequently a coercive instrument is applied is more important than the financial burden it 
imposes (section 7.4.1). The burden of financial penalty, however huge, can be managed if 
there are profitable alternative uses for the funds saved by non-compliance (section 7.5.1). 
Probable financial gain from an act of non-compliance or its profitable alternatives becomes 
an attractive choice when the possibility of being  identified  as committing  such hidden 
actions is less probable and the appeal courts are less effective in handling non-compliance 
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cases (section 7.5.2). The chapter has argued that the probability of being caught for alleged 
non-compliance is always a factor in the success of a coercive instrument, as is manifested in 
the positive relationship between tax audit and return filing (section 7.6.2). The single most 
important factor that undermines the likelihood of a coercive instrument detecting an offence 
is widespread corruption in the preparation of audited financial reports and the arrangement 
of tax audit (sections 7.7.1, 7.7.2 and 7.7.3). Added to corruption is the political interference 
or patronization that further undermines the effectiveness of coercive instruments (section 
7.8.2). The findings have suggested that the failure of coercive instruments should not be 
attributed only to the toughness of the action taken: tough actions must  be amenable  to 
reason. The research has revealed that the reasons penalty, audit and imprisonment fail is not 
totally financial or due to the genuineness of the threat of their application, but also to the 
lack of capacity that constrains the tax agencies from confronting them. 
 
The chapter has found that persuasive instruments can be effective in improving large 
corporate tax compliance if they fit to the needs of large corporate taxpayers and provide real 
value for money by reducing some of the cost of tax compliance (section 7.9.1). It has 
suggested that persuasive instruments sometimes work if there is a tough coercive 
environment. In other  words, the success of persuasion as a policy tool to  some extent 
depends on the existence of coercive instruments in the background. It has further found that 
persuasion through increased mutual understanding fails because business and tax 
administration interests and priorities are different: the large corporate interest is to maximize 
profit, whereas the tax administration‟s is to mobilize tax revenues (section 7.11.1). This 
 
chapter has noted that a knowledge gap between tax officials and large corporate taxpayers is 
one of the fundamental reasons for the failure of persuasive measures (section 7.11.3). 
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To sum up, the failure or success of coercion or persuasion as tax policy tools depends on 
different sets of reasons. Coercive instruments fail if the threat of coercion is unreal or the 
financial burden it imposes does not match the magnitude of the offences committed. 
Persuasive instruments fail if the value for money of the motivation provided is poor and the 
legal  environment  is  not  tough  enough.  It  was  found  that  the  success  of  persuasive 
instruments depends more on cost-benefit issues, despite the fact that they aim at working 
through the ethical or moral concerns of taxpayers. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RESEARCH 
FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis and describes its methodological and 
empirical contribution to knowledge of the subject. Drawing on general and large corporate 
tax compliance models and approaches, the study set out to solve a research problem which 
had not previously been investigated: the contribution made by coercive and persuasive tax 
compliance instruments to achieving tax compliance by large corporations. After reviewing 
the  relevant  body of knowledge,  an  analytic  framework  was  designed  to  formulate  the 
research question. Details of sample large corporations and data relating to them were 
collected from the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) of Bangladesh. In identifying significant 
coercive and persuasive instruments through regression analysis, the influence of extraneous 
variables was controlled. Also, the probable influence of the context var iable (i.e., corporate 
sector – finance, manufacturing or service) was considered (in chapters 5 and 6). 
 
This chapter starts with a brief review of the research question, followed by discussion of the 
research approach and methods. It then introduces the main research findings and probable 
explanations as to why an instrument fails or succeeds in securing tax compliance. The 
arguments are supported by adequate and appropriate evidence collected from tax office 
documents,  a  survey  and  elite  interviews.  The  chapter  concludes  by  focusing  on  the 
limitations of the present study and areas for future research. 
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8.2 Restatement of the Research Problem and Questions 
 
 
Improving large corporate tax compliance is perceived as a challenging objective for tax 
administrations. To meet this challenge, specialised tax administration units, known as LTUs, 
and tax compliance techniques, for example the co-operative compliance model, have been 
created (sections 2.8  and  2.9.1). A review of the relevant  literature reveals two  distinct 
features of tax compliance studies. First, individual taxpayers are the major focus of tax 
compliance studies, and there has been comparatively little focus on corporate and large 
corporate taxpayers (Murphy, 2005; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2009; Frey and Feld, 
2002; Kornhauser, 2007, Torgler, 2003; Torgler, 2005; Chung and Trivedi, 2003; Blumenthal 
et al., 2001). Second, there has been assessment of the impact of different tax compliance 
determinants, but scant attention has been paid to whether tough or soft measures (i.e., sticks 
or carrots) work better in producing higher rates of compliance. As a result, tax compliance 
studies share an implicit assumption that all tax compliance instruments and the context in 
which they operate are homogeneous. On the ground, however, coercive and persuasive 
instruments differ in their probable outcomes and implications in terms of promoting higher 
tax compliance. The implications of the measures also differ according to the taxpayers to 
whom the instruments are applied. 
 
Studies identifying the influence of particular tax compliance instruments raise questions, for 
instance, “How does tax audit affect corporate tax compliance?”  From the viewpoint of the 
present research problem, where compliance instruments are dichotomized as coercive versus 
persuasive, the question asked is: “What difference does tax audit make as a coercive tax 
compliance instrument in comparison with other coercive instruments, for example, tax 
penalty, or in comparison with a persuasive instrument, for example, taxpayer service?”  This 
particular  perspective  on  the  problem  has  received  little  attention  in  the  field  of  tax 
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compliance studies (Kamdar, 1997; Short, 1997; Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002; Okike, 1998 
and Aparicio et al., 2011). Since tax administrations have two different sets of tax compliance 
instruments, it is imperative that both sets are adequately researched and documented to 
decide which are more useful in creating tax compliance.  As a result of the researchers‟ 
 
perceptions of the limitations of existing tax compliance literature, the present study proposed 
the following research question, in the hope that its answer would contribute to filling the gap 
in understanding the tax compliance issues of large corporate taxpayers. 
 
Are coercive or persuasive tax compliance instruments more important for the 
tax compliance of large corporate taxpayers in the LTU of Bangladesh, and why? 
 
 
The above question was broken down into five sub-questions, listed in section 3.2. Chapter 5 
tackled the first research sub-question, which dealt with the level of tax compliance achieved 
by large corporations, while chapter 6 attempted to answer the question of whether coercive 
or persuasive instruments were more important. Finally, chapter 7 exp lored the underlying 
reasons for coercion or persuasion being important in the pursuit of large corporate tax 
compliance. 
 
8.3 Summary of the Thesis 
 
 
Chapter  1  of the  thesis  presented  the  research  context  and  objectives  of the  study;  the 
research question and methodology to be followed; and the relevance and structure of the 
thesis. To maintain the logical consistency of the thesis, the principal and specific research 
questions formulated within the analytical framework were presented in this chapter, which 
also contained an outline to help the reader navigate through the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the relevant  literature on tax compliance up to the point  where the 
research problem for this thesis emerged. It started by breaking down the conceptual 
framework of tax compliance and describing its constituents.  In order to grasp the theoretical 
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basis and the perspectives of tax compliance instruments, it conducted a comparison of 
different tax compliance models and paradigms. The standard coercive and the persuasive tax 
compliance instruments were critically examined to see whether their effects on tax 
compliance were positive or negative. As the current research looks at large corporations 
whose tax affairs are dealt with by LTUs, a full review was made of the compliance models 
and approaches applied to large corporate taxpayers. The chapter specifically identified a gap 
in the tax compliance  literature: there was a lack of studies of the comparative role of 
coercive and persuasive instruments as applied to large corporate taxpayers. The thinking 
behind this thesis is that it is important to investigate how significant coercive and persuasive 
instruments are in inducing tax compliance among large corporations. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the analytical framework of the study that provided the theoretical 
structure to deal with the research questions. It focused on the research design and methods 
for the study. It is important to state that the research did not take a specific perspective on 
understanding the problem. Rather, all the major viewpoints – economic, political, 
psychological and administrative – were applied so as to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the compliance process. Based on the various perspectives, a summary of 
the underlying research logic was made and a complete procedure was developed to answer 
each of the research sub-questions. A cross-sectional research design was framed, with an 
explanation of how the research process would be addressed. As contributory parts of the 
research process, co-variation between tax compliance (e.g., outcome variable) and 
compliance instruments (i.e., predictors), a logical flow of arguments from respondent 
observations, and a priori knowledge were applied. Regression-based statistical models were 
used to analyse the survey data. Statistical analysis of data might not be sufficient to ensure 
an understanding of the research problem and the research context, thus interviews with the 
elite personnel from large corporations and the LTU were conducted. The research questions 
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were answered using both quantitative and qualitative methods – a mixed methods approach. 
The first three research sub-questions were answered on the basis of a quantitative approach 
and the fourth research sub-question was answered on the basis of a qualitative approach. 
 
Chapter 4 presented the fieldwork activities and data collection strategies for the study. Data 
were collected  mainly from tax office documents and  a survey.  The research depended 
heavily on tax office records for data on tax compliance. The survey had two parts: a closed- 
ended questionnaire survey; and interviews conducted with two sets of elite respondents. The 
questionnaire survey was piloted among a small group of large corporate respondents before 
being used with the selected respondents. Face-to-face in-depth interviews were later 
conducted among tax officials and corporate tax representatives to triangulate the survey data 
and reflect the research context. The researcher chose to focus on the LTU of Bangladesh, 
which is specifically empowered to deal with large corporate taxpayers. A performance 
appraisal of the large corporations was made in this chapter. In total, 162 large corporations 
from the LTU were surveyed and 27 elite interviewees were used. Due to the small sample 
size, great efforts were made to ensure that the data set of questionnaire survey did not have 
any missing cases. 
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 presented the main findings of the data analysis. The findings were 
presented in the same order as the research questions were raised in section 3.2. The major 
findings  that  contribute to  the tax  compliance  literature  were presented  for  each of the 
specific question. 
 
8.4    Summary of the Main Findings 
 
 
The principal objective of the thesis was to ascertain the role of coercive and persuasive tax 
compliance instruments in creating tax compliance by large corporate taxpayers. This section 
presents the significant  findings of the questions developed  in section 3.2 and discusses 
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whether the questions have been answered properly. It points out the contribution the study 
has made to the relevant body of knowledge. Finally, the section elucidates the wider 
implications of the study. 
 
8.4.1To What Extent Are Large Corporate Taxpayers Compliant? 
 
 
This was the first of the five research sub-questions raised. The objective of the question was 
to measure the component (i.e., filing, reporting and payment) and the overall (i.e., the 
components   taken  together)  tax  compliance   achieved   by   large   corporate  taxpayers. 
Component and overall tax compliance were taken as the dependent or outcome variable in 
the regression models and measured as a dichotomous variable (section 3.12.1.3). Thus 
measuring tax compliance meant measuring the dependent variable for the regression models. 
The measurement process for the dichotomous variable was presented in section 5.4.1. First, 
the rate of compliance was measured for each of the tax compliance components; and then 
they were added together to produce an overall, or composite compliance, rate. Data for 
measuring tax compliance were collected from LTU records and registers. Filing compliance 
was measured from the filing returns register, which records information on whether 
corporations submit tax returns by the legal deadline. It was found that 84.41% of LTU 
corporations were filing compliant (section 5.5.1). As a result, there was no lack of accuracy 
in  the  measurement  of  the  level  of  filing  compliance  achieved  by  the  large  corporate 
taxpayers. 
 
With reporting compliance, tax audit adjustments were used as the basis for measurement. 
Corporate taxpayers found with zero audit adjustment were treated as reporting compliant, 
while corporations with audit adjustments were treated as non-compliant unless the audit 
demand was quashed at the appellate level. Of the sample large corporate taxpayers, 53.89% 
were found reporting compliant. Measuring reporting compliance is not as easy as measuring 
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filing compliance. This is because tax audit does not provide a guarantee that all hidden 
income has been uncovered, which makes the measurement of reporting compliance slightly 
questionable. But of the available options, tax audit seemed to be the most suitable one (for 
detailed discussion see section 5.4.2). 
 
Payment compliance was measured by the payment records of the large corporations. 
Analysed data showed that 75.32% of the large corporate taxpayers were payment compliant. 
Any corporations deliberately failing to settle their tax payments in full were considered 
payment non-compliant and corporations with up-to-date payment records were payment 
compliant. But a question arises in the measurement of payment compliance that is related to 
the one discussed with respect to reporting compliance. If there is suspicion about the 
measurement of reporting compliance, there is also suspicion about the measurement of 
payment compliance, because the accurate measurement of the latter depends on the accurate 
measurement of the former. The researcher, however, did not find a better alternative to 
measure payment compliance than the measurement techniques followed by the LTU 
administration. 
 
The overall tax compliance rate, measured by totalling the rates for the three components, 
was 37.01% (section 5.5.2). The reason for measuring tax compliance at both component and 
overall levels was to see whether persuasive and coercive instruments influenced tax 
compliance differently at the different levels (section 5.5.3). Such investigations would shed 
light on the areas of tax compliance that needed special attention. The research found that the 
sample large corporate taxpayers achieved their highest compliance in filing and their lowest 
in reporting. When the compliance performance for the three components was added up, the 
rate fell (Table 5.5 in section 5.5.1). These findings suggest that for large corporat e taxpayers 
it is more difficult to fulfil all their compliance obligations than to fulfil an individual one. 
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The findings obtained in this way are supported by the literature, which suggests that 60% of 
large corporate taxpayers in Australia underpaid taxes in 1990 and their payment compliance 
was below the OECD average (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001). A recent ATO report 
shows that almost half of the 1100 large corporations in Australia, of which one-fifth had 
taxable income, did not pay any taxes during the tax years 2005-2008. In the UK, of the 700 
large business taxpayers with the Large Business Service (LBS) around 40% did not pay any 
taxes in the tax year 2005-2006 (House of Commons, UK, 2007). Records also show that one 
third of the 275 large multinationals in the US did not pay any taxes during 2001-2003 
(ICFTU, 2004). 
 
In addition to the above findings, tax compliance was measured on the basis of corporate 
demographic features- ownership pattern, corporate sector association and corporate location 
(section 5.5.4).It was found that the finance sector corporations achieved the highest 
compliance in filing compliance, while the manufacturing and service sector corporations 
achieved the highest compliance in payment (83.72%) and reporting compliance (67.74%), 
respectively. In overall terms, manufacturing sector corporations were the top compliers 
(44.18%). It showed that overall compliance was higher in private limited (43.58%) than in 
public limited corporations (34.78%), and by location multinational (40.00%) were better 
than the local corporations (36.43%). Considering the importance of corporate sector in the 
tax compliance process (see sections 5.5.5 and 6.3.2), it was taken as the context variable for 
the multilevel regression analysis (e.g., xtlogit models) conducted to identify significant 
coercive and persuasive instruments in chapter 6. 
 
In the compliance measurement process, the effect of appellate decisions was considered. 
This feature of the study has made its measurement of tax compliance unique, because the tax 
compliance  literature is silent  on how compliance measurement  may be affected  by the 
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decisions of appeal courts. Since this research is based on tax office real data, it was able to 
ascertain the number of tax cases that were treated as non-compliant by the LTU authority 
but  subsequently  considered  compliant  by  the  tax  appellate  authority  (section  5.4.3). 
However, it should be noted that the appeal judgment may be equally debatable because of 
corrupt appeals procedures, and in that case the objectivity of the measurements is subject to 
criticism. 
 
8.4.2 How Important Are Coercive Instruments? 
 
 
This question attempts to measure the contribution of coercive tax compliance instruments in 
achieving tax compliance. All three coercive instruments, i.e. tax penalty, tax audit and 
imprisonment, were put into the regression models as predictor variables, along with the three 
persuasive instruments and eight control variables (sections 3.12.2.3 and 3.12.1.4). As the 
standard model, four binary logistic regression models were fitted: the first model attempted 
to measure the role of the selected coercive instruments on filing compliance, the second on 
reporting compliance, the third on payment compliance and the fourth on overall compliance. 
To  see  how  corporate  sector  influences  the  magnitude  and  nature  of  the  relationship 
measured  in  the  binary  logistic  regression,  this  research  conducted  CHAID  and  xtlogit 
models. The latter model determined the fixed and random effects of the context variable (i.e., 
corporate sector). Detailed discussion has been made in sections 3.4.2, 3.12.3 and 5.5.5 for 
the justification of considering the influence of corporate sector in the analysis. 
 
The purpose of conducting separate models on the role of coercive instruments in component 
and overall compliance was to see whether they were equally important at component and 
overall levels. For example, imprisonment as a coercive instrument might be important to 
deal with payment non-compliance but might be unimportant for filing or reporting non- 
compliance. The purpose of conducting standard logit and then CHAID and xtlogit was to see 
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how  consistent  the  relationships  were  between  tax  compliance  and  the  compliance 
instruments across different statistical tests. The research found the following coercive 
instruments influential. 
 
8.4.2.1 The Contribution of Tax Penalty to Tax Compliance 
 
 
Through the first set of regression models – the standard logistic regression models – it was 
found that tax penalty significantly (positively) influenced filing and payment compliance but 
not reporting or overall compliance (sections 6.3.1, 6.6, 6.9.1 and 6.12). According to the 
CHAID estimations, tax penalty was not a significant predictor of filing compliance. But it 
remained significant when the fixed (e.g., within-sector) and random effects (e.g., between- 
sector)  of  corporate  sector  was  measured  by  the  xtlogit  model.  Similarly,  tax  penalty 
remained significant to payment compliance in the fixed and random effects model.  The 
degree of influence on filing and payment compliance from tax penalty, however, decreased 
(sections 6.3.4 and 6.9.2) when the influence of corporate sector was taken into account. 
 
8.4.2.2 The Contribution of Tax Audit to Tax Compliance 
 
 
The second important coercive instrument was tax audit, which was positively significant for 
filing compliance but negatively significant for reporting, payment and overall compliance 
(sections 6.3.1, 6.6, 6.9.1 and 6.12). In the standard logistic regressions, the CHAID and in 
the fixed and random effects models, tax audit emerged as a significant instrument for all 
compliance components and for overall compliance. As far as filing compliance is concerned, 
tax audit emerged significant in the standard logit model but not in the CHAID model. 
However, both in the fixed and random effects models, when the within-sector and between- 
sector influences of corporate sector were considered, tax audit emerged as a significant 
predictor of filing compliance. Like tax penalty, the degree of influence of tax audit on filing 
compliance went  down slightly due to  the influence of corporate sector. In the case of 
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reporting compliance, the role of tax audit is more consistent (sections 6.6, 6.6.1 and 6.6.2). 
Tax audit emerged significant for reporting compliance in the standard logistic regression and 
in the CHAID and xtlogit models. Similarly, for payment and overall compliance, tax audit 
was found to be consistently significant in the standard logistic and in the subsequent models. 
 
This finding is not supported by the literature. Among large corporate taxpayers in the 
manufacturing sector of the US, Mills (1998) finds a positive relationship between excess 
book income over taxable income and proposed audit adjustment. Mills explains that when 
the tax authority identifies additional hidden income in large and complex firms, the 
coefficient between tax compliance and audit adjustment will be positive. Such a coefficient 
can only be negative, as Mills claims, when large corporate taxpayers outsmart the tax 
authority by better tax avoidance planning. This study however suggests differently: the 
coefficient between audit adjustment and tax compliance can be negative when audit and 
accounting practices are sub-standard and tax audit corruption is rampant (elaborated in 
sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.3). 
 
8.4.2.3 The Contribution of Imprisonment to Tax Compliance 
 
 
The third coercive instrument is imposing prison sentences on corporations to improve tax 
compliance. In the standard regression model, imprisonment was found to be statistically 
significant (negatively) to payment compliance, which means that imprisonment does not 
improve payment compliance. This finding of the study contradicts the literature. Aparicio et 
al. (2011) found evidence that imprisonment as a tax compliance tool improves payment 
compliance. Aparicio et al. (2011) claimed that 10% of corporations increased tax payments 
as a result of the inclusion of imprisonment in the Ecuadorian Tax Reform of 2007. However, 
their findings showed that the majority (70%) of corporate taxpayers did not increase their tax 
payments. Therefore Aparicio et al. (2011) concluded that the impact of higher punishment is 
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mixed.  Imprisonment  as  a tough  deterrent  was  also  found  to  be  contributing  positively 
towards increased tax payment in the Philippines. The Bureau of Inland Revenue of the 
Philippines successfully raised tax collection by 43.6% under the Run After Tax Evaders 
(RATE) programme in 2007, which was based solely on imprisoning taxpayers who were 
payment non-compliant. 
 
However, when the context variable was taken into account in the CHAID and the xtlogit 
models, the nature of the relationship between imprisonment and payment compliance turned 
positive (section 6.9.2). This study argued that the positive effect could turn negative for two 
reasons: first the aggregation bias; and second the effect of the size of the sub samples within 
and across the corporate groups (section 6.9.2). This suggests that when the unit of analysis is 
large corporate taxpayers, tax compliance is likely to decrease with imprisonment; while 
when the unit of analysis is corporate sectors, tax compliance is likely to increase with 
imprisonment. For other compliances – filing, reporting and overall – imprisonment was not 
found statistically significant. 
 
To sum up, this study suggests that among coercive instruments tax penalty is statistically 
significant to filing and payment compliance, whereas tax audit is statistically significant to 
filing,  reporting,  payment  and  overall  compliance.  Imprisonment  is  significant  only  to 
payment compliance. 
 
8.4.3 How Important Are Persuasive Instruments? 
 
 
The three persuasive instruments selected for the study were taxpayer service, simplified tax 
law and mutual understanding between LTU officials and large corporate taxpayers. In 
measuring  their  significance,  the  same  procedure  as  that  followed  to  determine  the 
significance of coercive instruments, was applied. 
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8.4.3.1 The Contribution of Taxpayer Service 
 
 
As was found in section 6.12, taxpayer service was negatively related to overall tax 
compliance  in  the  standard  logistic  regression.  This  means  that  taxpayer  service  is 
statistically significant to those large corporate taxpayers who are compliant in all their tax 
compliance and taxpayer service affects their tax compliance negatively. It also implies that 
the importance of taxpayer service is limited to a small segment of the large corporate 
taxpayers. Likewise, the CHAID analysis showed that taxpayer service is significant only for 
the segment of large corporate taxpayers who are audited but do not receive additional audit 
demands  (section  6.12.1,  Figure  6.10).  But  for  the  other  segments  of  large  corporate 
taxpayers,  who  are  the  majority,  taxpayer  service  does  not  influence  tax  compliance. 
However, chapter 6 also illustrated that the negative relationship between tax compliance and 
taxpayer service in the standard logistic regression turned positive in the xtlogit models when 
the influence of corporate sector was counted (section 6.12.2). 
 
8.4.3.2 The Contribution of Simplified Tax Law 
 
 
Simplified tax law was found to maintain a statistically significant positive relationship with 
overall compliance in the standard logistic regression and in the fixed and random effects 
logistic regression models (section 6.12). It also appeared significant in the CHAID models. 
This implies that the more the tax laws are simplified, the greater is the possibility that this 
will improve the number of overall compliant large corporations. The limited relationship 
between simplified tax law and overall compliance means that simplification is important 
only to very good compliers, not to those who commit some sort of non-compliance, as has 
already been argued in case of taxpayer service and overall compliance. Similar to taxpayer 
service, the significance of simplified tax law is consistent across the standard logit and 
subsequent models. Thus there is a similarity between the influence of simplified tax law and 
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that of taxpayer service on tax compliance, since both are related to overall tax comp liance 
only. 
 
8.4.3.3 The Contribution of Mutual Understanding 
 
 
The probable impact of the other persuasive instrument, mutual understanding, is minimal, 
since it does not make any direct contribution to the creation of tax compliance at component 
or overall level. Mutual understanding only becomes important if the marginal tax rate is very 
high (section 6.3.3, Figure 6.1), which was not a predictor of interest in the regression models 
and was treated as a control variable. This finding of the thesis agrees with the international 
literature, which argues that contradictions and imperfect understanding of mutual issues of 
taxation have a significant influence on tax compliance (Elfers et al., 2006; Scholz and Lubell; 
1998 and NTCA, 2009). This research identified several contradictions and conflicts between 
large corporate taxpayers and the tax authority that adversely affect mutual understanding and 
tax compliance obligations (section 7.11) 
 
This section, like the previous one, made a successful attempt to measure the impact of 
persuasive instruments. It focused on each of the persuasive instruments and their roles, 
based on statistical analysis of the data. Findings suggest that taxpayer service and simplified 
tax law are statistically significant to a small segment of the large corporations, and mutual 
understanding does not have any influence on their tax compliance.  The next question deals 
with the probable reason why some instruments emerged significant and others did not. 
 
8.5 Why Are Some Instruments Significant? 
 
 
The objective of this question is twofold: first, is to compare the contribution of the coercive 
and persuasive instruments; and second to explain the underlying reasons why some of the 
instruments are statistically significant and others are not. 
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8.5.1 Comparative Influence of Instruments 
 
 
In measuring the comparative influence of these opposite, yet to some extent complementary, 
sets of instruments in relation to tax compliance, two criteria have been considered:   how 
many tax compliance components are influenced by a particular instrument; and how 
consistent is the influence at different statistical models. Viewed by these criteria, tax audit is 
statistically the most significant coercive instrument for tax compliance. In all analyses, from 
the standard logistic regressions to the xtlogit models, tax audit came out as the most 
significant instrument. Tax audit was found to affect filing compliance positively, but other 
compliances – reporting, payment and overall compliances – negatively. In the literature we 
find that tax audit  may influence tax compliance both positively and negatively (section 
2.7.1). In our case, the influence was mostly negative, particularly in the case of reporting 
compliance. Of the other coercive instruments, tax penalty showed a statistically significant 
positive impact on filing and payment compliance, and imprisonment showed a negative 
effect on payment compliance, which later turned into a positive relationship for corporations 
within and between the sectors. This shows that the coercive instruments are statistically 
significant to both component and overall compliance. 
 
On the other hand, among the persuasive instruments, taxpayer service and simplified tax law 
were found to be statistically significant to overall compliance only. This tends to suggest 
that the persuasive tax compliance instruments have a limited influence on tax compliance. 
The other persuasive instrument – mutual understanding – failed to make any impact at the 
component or the overall compliance levels. 
 
8.5.2 Probable Explanations of the Instruments’ Importance 
 
 
The probable explanations for the relative significance of the coercive and persuasive 
instruments were explored using an interpretivist approach. Analysing respondent interviews 
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and tax office records, this research identified several reasons for the significant positive 
relationship  between  filing  compliance  and  tax  audit:  first,  the  closeness  that  grows 
throughout  formal  and  informal  tax  audit  interactions  makes  the  large  corporations 
responsible and aware of their filing obligations. However, this closeness does not have a 
lasting impact on return filing. Rather, it is the risk that non-filers are more likely to be 
audited that induces filing compliance (section 7.6.2). A stronger reason for this behaviour is 
that filing compliance is easier compared to other compliances, and the potential gains from 
other non-compliances are higher than those from filing non-compliance (section 7.6.3). 
Moreover, it is difficult for large corporations to remain unregistered in the tax network and 
do business underground. 
 
The  reasons  why  tax  audit  may  backfire  in  creating  reporting,  payment  and  overall 
compliance are somewhat different. The first reason this study found is gross falsification in 
audited financial statements, along with unresolved and conflicting local and foreign 
accounting standards that creates disbelief in submitted accounts (sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.2). 
The study explored tax officials‟ disbelief in submitted accounts, which leads to doubts and 
 
outright rejection of the income reported by corporations. This disbelief motivates many 
corporations to be untruthful to their tax declarations.  The other important explanation is 
widespread tax audit corruption (section 7.7.3). Large corporate taxpayer s underreport and 
underpay because they know that facts can be suppressed in connivance with the audit team. 
The audit team, for its part, collaborates because it has fallen prey to the offer of bribery. The 
research argues that tax audit corruption is not only a tax administrative issue, but is also a 
well-orchestrated non-compliance game played by large corporate taxpayers, the tax audit 
team and professional accountants and tax advisors. 
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The study found that audit measures might fail when reported income was taken as a function 
of audit selection. The higher the reported income, the higher the chance of being selected for 
tax audit: which encourages taxpayers to underreport income and reduce the risk of audit 
selection (section 7.7.4). In the face of tough audit action, tax non-compliance may worsen 
because of the high frequency of tax audit and the cost of responding to it. Tax audit is 
expensive, and facing tax audits regularly means making financial arrangements to meet that 
expense. As a result, non-compliance becomes a necessity rather than a choice (section 7.7.5). 
 
It is argued in this research that beyond being coercive, tax audits may sometimes be 
persuasive,  despite the degree of coercion being  higher  than that of persuasion.  This  is 
because the accounting practices of large corporations are complex and in some cases 
conflicting, and so are less likely to end up being dealt with severely. It needs a certain 
amount of motivation and application to make tax audit effective (section 7.7.1, last 
paragraph).   Also, audit  staffs often harass corporations by disbelieving the figures they 
present where respectful care and timely delivery of service might improve compliance issues. 
 
Of  the  coercive  instruments,  tax  penalty  and  imprisonment  have  comparatively  little 
influence on large corporate tax compliance. Tax penalty is useful to deal with filing and 
payment non-compliance because it is the most frequently employed deterrent in curbing 
non-filing and non-payment offences. Large corporate taxpayers are certain that failure to file 
and pay on time will bring penal action. Therefore, the certainty of the penal action makes it a 
successful tax compliance  instrument  for improving  filing  and  payment  behaviours.  The 
thesis found that the use of penalty as a lever could only be effective in reducing non- 
compliance if there is no alternative profitable use for underreported income (section 7.5.1). 
Analysed   data   also   showed   that   fines   imposed   for   reporting   non-compliance   are 
comparatively  low  in  relation  to  the  potential  gains  that  can  be  made  from  depositing 
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underreported income with a commercial bank. Viewed from the point of view of cost -benefit 
analysis, large corporate taxpayers find it economically more attractive to disregard reporting 
obligations. This tendency of large corporate taxpayers is encouraged by the possibility of 
getting a favourable judgement on reporting and payment non-compliance from the appeal 
courts, which enjoy enormous discretionary power in making their decisions (section 7.5.2). 
 
Imprisonment as a coercive instrument influences payment compliance negatively. No other 
component  compliance,  or overall compliance,  is affected  significantly  by prison terms, 
either negatively or positively. The thesis identified four potential explanations for this. First, 
imprisonment is not a rational policy tool for deterring payment non-compliance, particularly 
when the taxpayer is financially solvent or the reasons for non-compliance are a matter of 
legal dispute rather than negligence (section 7.8.1). It was argued that large corporate 
taxpayers have the financial means to meet undisputed tax bills. Second, imprisonment fails 
due to the politically biased and unequal application of criminal prosecutions (section 7.8.2). 
Third, the threat of punishment by a prison term is, in most cases, unreal. Imprisonment is not 
a likely choice as a policy tool for tackling tax non-compliance (section 7.8.3). Fourth, there 
are severe administrative bottlenecks in terms of cost and complex bureaucratic procedures 
that inhibit the initiation of criminal prosecutions against the most affluent section of 
taxpayers. This research argues that the politicization of criminal prosecution and the lack of 
smooth coordination between the judiciary and the tax administration are the fundamental 
reasons why imprisonment fails to improve compliance (section 7.8.6). 
 
The study looked at the respondent observations for an explanation as to why the nature of 
the relationship between imprisonment and tax compliance changes to positive when the 
effect of corporate sector is considered, and it found two reasons in addition to those 
mentioned in section 6.9.2. First, there are similarities in business and strategic approaches 
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within corporations in the same sector. Second, corporations in the same sector are subject to 
the same sort of regulatory and monitoring practices by their controlling authorities. These 
similarities may cause large corporations in the same sector to follow each other and react to 
tax compliance obligations in a similarly positive way when imprisonment is used as a 
compliance instrument (section 7.8.5). 
On the persuasive side, taxpayer service fails to improve tax compliance because even if it is 
good, it doesn‟t provide the value for money that large corporate taxpayers expect (section 
 
7.9.1). Taxpayer service can only produce compliance if the tax authority and large corporate 
taxpayers depend on each other in a service provider-client relationship. To be useful in 
promoting tax compliance, taxpayer service must reduce some of the compliance cost of the 
service recipient large corporate taxpayers. It was evident from respondent observations that 
taxpayer service can be useful when the tax administration has the required efficiency and 
positive attitude to service provision (section 7.9.3). The tax authority must have the belief 
that  quality  taxpayer  service  can  change  the  compliance  level.  It  was  also  argued  that 
taxpayer service can be effective in producing higher tax compliance when there are tough 
legal consequences for those who consume a particular service and then disregard their tax 
obligations. 
 
The finding that taxpayer service can fail to ensure tax compliance if it does not improve tax 
administration efficiency also has support from the literature. Taliercio (2004) examined the 
contribution of four aspects of taxpayer service – tax payment, the issuing of regulations, 
information provision, and tax audit – on tax administration efficiency and tax compliance 
among large corporate taxpayers in Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. He found that only 
tax audit has a positive influence on tax administration effectiveness and higher tax 
compliance. On the failure of taxpayer service to improve tax administration efficiency and 
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tax compliance, Taliercio (2004) argues that,  „„ responsive and helpful‟‟ service increases 
compliance, not the quality of the taxpayer service. This implies that taxpayer service to 
 
create higher tax compliance needs to be supported by improved tax administration efficiency, 
positive attitude and trust in tax officials. Finally, the study made the same argument for the 
change in the nature of relationship between tax compliance and taxpayer service as an effect 
of corporate sector (section 7.9) as it made for tax compliance and imprisonment (section 
7.8.5). 
 
 
 
Interestingly, an opposite argument applies as regards the statistically significant positive 
influence of simplified tax law on tax compliance. Simplification contributes to higher 
compliance through reduction of the compliance costs that large corporations bear for 
maintaining records and a professional tax set up. Simplification reduces much of the scope 
for illegal and corrupt business dealings. It enables tax agencies to avoid tough coercive 
action by helping corporations avoid non-compliance that is unintentional. The thesis argues 
that beyond motivational incentives, simplified tax law plays a complementary role to the 
application  of  coercive  instruments.  In  addition,  simplified  tax  law  not  only  makes 
compliance obligations understandable, it provides a clear accountability structure for tax 
professionals and corporate tax representatives. Simplification can improve tax compliance 
by uniting all tax obligations under one tax system. The fact that simplification can stop the 
migration of large corporate taxpayers to the underground economy, and unification of all tax 
laws can facilitate higher tax compliance, is well documented in the literature (World Bank, 
2009; OECD, 2009). Even the DFID memorandum of understanding with the NBR 
acknowledged the need for a unified VAT and Income Tax department for the management 
of large corporate tax compliance in Bangladesh. The bottom line of the arguments is that if 
simplification promotes the unification of divergent tax laws, it will reduce compliance costs 
and improve tax compliance. 
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On the failure of mutual understanding as a persuasive tool, the thesis points to the conflict of 
interests and priority between large businesses and the tax administration. The corporate 
interest is to maximize profit and the tax administration‟s interest is to mobilize tax revenues. 
 
Again, enhanced understanding may be a negotiation-based or an administrative-compliance 
tool; but it does not have any legal basis. The failure of mutual understanding is apparent in 
the huge amount of litigation initiated by large corporate taxpayers, particularly with respect 
to reporting and payment non-compliance. Finally, mutuality of understanding also fails due 
to the huge gap in knowledge and skills related to tax and accounting between the large 
corporations and the tax administration. 
 
8.6 Overall Study Findings and Contribution 
 
 
Of those coercive and persuasive tax compliance instruments selected for the study, which 
are more important to the understanding of large corporate tax compliance in the LTU of 
Bangladesh, and why? Although there has been plenty of research on tax compliance, there is 
relatively little on the comparative influence of coercive and persuasive tax compliance 
instruments (see also Fehr and Schmidt, 2007; Hanlon et al. 2005; Slemrod, 2004; Mills, 
1998).   This is particularly true in the case of large corporate taxpayers (section 3.2), for 
whom the combination of these instruments is seen as one of the means of improving large 
corporate tax compliance (sections 2.9.1, 2.9.2 and 2.9.3). Therefore, this research contributes 
to the literature by presenting a way of modelling as well as empirically examining the 
comparative effects of coercive and persuasive tax compliance instruments on large corporate 
taxpayers. 
 
This research has empirically proved that neither coercion nor persuasion can secure large 
corporate tax compliance when pursued separately (see also Timmons, 2004; Imbeau, 2009; 
James and Alley, 1999; Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001; DFID, 2009; Kirchler, Hoelzl and 
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Wahl, 2007; Tuck, 2004; Hendrix, 2008). It argues that creating tax compliance among large 
corporate taxpayers needs a combination of coercive and persuasive tax instruments, where 
the former seem to play a more significant role than the latter. For instance, effective 
imposition of tax audit to a large extent depends on how simple the relevant tax laws are 
(section  7.10.2),  but  the  ultimate  success  of  audit  action  depends  on  the  toughness  of 
sanctions for disobeying audit requirements (section 7.9.3, paragraph 2). 
 
This research has provided strong evidence that the success of coercive instruments depends 
on their frequency of application (sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.3), a lack of profitable alternative 
uses for concealed income (section 7.5.1), limited scope for illegal influence on appeal 
judgements (section 7.5.2) and increased risk of detection (section 7.6.2). On the other hand, 
coercive instruments fail due to huge tax administration corruption (section 7.7.3), poor 
auditing and accounting standards within a weak accountability framework  (sections 7.7.1 
and 7.7.6), lack of rationality in, and unreliability of, the threat they pose (sections 7.8.1, 
7.8.2 and 7.8.3), and a politicised tax administration (section 7.8.6). The research claims that 
the persuasive instruments produce an outcome if they meet taxpayer needs effectively 
(section 7.9.2), provide real value for money (section 7.9.1), reduce tax compliance costs 
(section7.10.1),   minimize   conflicts   of   interest   and   knowledge   gaps   between   large 
corporations and the tax administration (sections 7.11.1 and 7.11.3), and play a 
complementary role to that played by coercive instruments (sections 7.9.4 and 7.10.2). 
 
Another contribution of the study is to analyse tax compliance both at component and overall 
levels from contextual viewpoints. The study took corporate sector as a relevant context for 
the hierarchical nature of compliance performance. In this regard, it was found that coercive 
instruments are important at both the component and overall levels, while persuasive 
instruments  are  important  at  the  overall  level  only  (section  6.14).  This  suggests  that 
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persuasion affects outcomes for only a limited segment of the large corporations (section 7.9). 
Finally, the research found that understanding of large corporate tax compliance requires 
understanding of the corporate sectors to which large corporations belong and the impact of 
those sectors on compliance performance (sections 6.3.2 and 7.8.5). 
 
8.7    Methodological Implications of the Study 
 
 
This study has made some methodological contributions to understanding the debate on the 
comparative  effects  of  coercive  and  persuasive  tax  compliance  instruments.  First,  in 
measuring the tax compliance performance of large corporations, the study used real tax 
office data and is one of the first to do this in the context of a developing country‟s tax 
 
administration (see also Gupta and Mookherjee, 1998; MacLaren, 2003). Real tax office data 
were also used for measuring some predictors and control variables (sections 3.12.1.3 and 
3.12.1.4). To cover some areas where real tax office data were not available or accessible, 
due to improper data management in the tax office, a questionnaire survey among real large 
corporate taxpayers was conducted. This allowed reflection of the opinions of concerned 
taxpayers in the measurement process. 
 
Second, this study is exceptional in terms of the methods used (sections 3.7 and 3.8). It 
employed a quantitative approach in measuring tax compliance performance and the effect of 
coercive  and  persuasive  tax  compliance  instruments  on  it.  To  explain  why  a  particular 
coercive or persuasive instrument worked, semi-structured elite interviews were conducted 
among tax officials and corporate leaders. The questionnaire survey and the in-depth 
interviews were conducted among different  sets of respondents, which is an exceptional 
means of data triangulation.  Most tax compliance studies have used one method of analysis, 
and on a very few occasions a mixed-methods approach has been used. 
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Third, the study selected a unit of tax administration and types of taxpayers of which the 
researcher had adequate knowledge. Prior knowledge about the tax administration helped 
with the understanding of the research context, the verification of the quality of information 
obtained from the tax office, and the selection of participants relevant to the interviews, 
without using power relationships (sections 4.4 and 4.6). Methodologically, pre-exposure to 
the research field contributed to the efficient and objective use of the data, and to preventing 
the concealment of facts by the respondents. In addition, knowledge of the research setting 
enabled the researcher to control the data collection process by reducing the involvement of 
assistants in the crucial stages of collection. 
 
8.8 Implications for Theory 
 
In the design of the thesis, alternative theoretical approaches that motivate and put pressure 
on the tax compliance decisions of large corporations were reviewed. These included 
economic, psychological, social, political and tax administrative theories (see sections 2.4 
and 3.9).The results of the thesis demonstrated that a coercive approach is often more 
significant  than  a  persuasive  one  in  inducing  compliance  in  large  corporate  taxpayers, 
although a mix of both is desirable. How does this finding fit with the alternative theoretical 
explanations? 
 
The  findings  of the thesis  are  consistent  with  the  argument  that  penalty (Schwartz  and 
Orleans, 1967; Varma and Doob, 1998; Baron and Kennedy, 1998; William, 2001), tax audit 
(Kamdar, 1997; Witte et al., 1987) and imprisonment (ADB, 2009; Klepper and Naggin, 
1989b; Aparicio et al, 2010; Levi, 2009; Shover and Hochstetler, 2006) affect tax compliance 
decisions when the threat of punishment is genuine and the chance of being identified for an 
alleged  non-compliance  is  high.The  argument  that  the  genuineness  of  the  threat  of 
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punishment improves large corporate tax compliance is consistent with the economic or 
expected utility theory (section 2.4.1). 
 
The findings of this research show that there are some circumstances  in which inducing large 
corporate tax compliance through quality taxpayer service (Bird, 2004; Barbone et al., 1999) 
and mutual understanding (HMRC, 2006; ATO, 2007; Brem and Tucha, 2007) seems less 
impressive than inducement through simplification of tax laws (OECD, 2006; Perry, 2007; 
Slemrod, 1985; Morris and Londsdale, 2004).  This result of the thesis mainly agrees with the 
economic approach because of the evidence that quality taxpayer service fails in inducing tax 
compliance unless it can lessen some of the tax compliance costs (section 7.9.1). 
 
The above argument carries additional weight when tax law simplification is argued to be 
successful if it reduces tax compliance costs by reducing the need for extensive accounting 
and paper work (section 7.10.1), dependence on tax professionals, and scope for corruption 
and misinterpretation of tax laws (section 7.10.2). However, the argument that a positive tax 
administration attitude may improve the effectiveness of taxpayer service corresponds to the 
intention theory (section 2.4.4). According to this theory tax morale or a sense of civic duty 
among tax officials can resolve much of the latter‟s bureaucratic inertia and risk-averse mind- 
 
set. 
 
 
 
The evidence that tax audit fails when there is massive corruption (section 7.7.3) and 
falsification in audit and accounting standards (section 7.7.1) better reflects the economic 
rationality of large corporate and tax administration behaviours. The thesis found that 
imprisonment as a policy tool failed, largely due to the politicization of the criminalization 
process (section 7.8.2), huge tax administration costs (section 7.8.4) and uncertainty about 
prison terms (section 7.8.3). Arguably, favouring politically well-connected corporations and 
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vilifying others, as was the case during the army-backed caretaker government in Bangladesh, 
upholds the political economy model of tax compliance (section 2.4.8). 
 
Perhaps the relevance of economic theory is more apparent in the failure of mutual 
understanding as a compliance instrument (section 7.11), as evidenced by the conflicts of 
interest between business profits and tax revenues (section 7.11.1), and by the tax culture of 
mistrust and litigation (section 7.11.2). But the latter proposition is equally conceivable as a 
fact of corporate tax morale and attitudes, and therefore corresponds to the intention theory 
(section 2.4.4). 
 
The argument that non-compliance is a rational economic choice makes further sense when 
the profitable use of under-reported income becomes an important factor in understanding the 
strategic game the corporations play with the tax authority. High interest rates on commercial 
bank deposits and borrowing (section 7.5.1) make it more profitable for large corporations to 
under-report  income  and  divert  the  hidden  income  into  meeting  business  expenses  or 
investing in an interest-yielding safe deposit. 
 
In summary, the results of the research can be understood from the various theoretical angles 
outlined in this thesis, but economic theory seems to have a dominant role in the findings of 
the research. 
 
8.9 Generalizability to similar context 
 
The tax compliance environment for large corporations in Bangladesh demonstrates several 
common features: a high level of corruption, lack of democratic accountability, a culture of 
mistrust, and political interference in tax enforcement. The international literature on tax 
compliance suggests Bangladesh‟s experience is not unique: for example, LTU corruptions in 
 
Uganda or tax audit problems in the Philippines (section 7.7.2). The other similarity is that, in 
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almost all tax systems, LTUs‟ operational mechanism is similar – a client-based function- 
oriented organizational structure (sections 2.9 and 2.10) established under the central role of 
 
the IMF (section 2.8.1). There are many areas of tax law and its legal framework in which 
developing countries follow common practices: for example, there are tax law similarities 
among the systems of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan (section 7.10).According to Moore 
(2008), developing country tax systems have in common their high level of tax law 
complexity, their litigation practices, their record-keeping and the bureaucratic design of their 
tax governance. These similarities indicate some possibilities that the results of the thesis will 
be relevant to countries with comparable systems and circumstances. 
 
But in countries with different legal histories or political and institutional systems, the 
coercive and persuasive instruments tested would not be expected to yield similar outcomes. 
It is equally important to note that even where there are similarities among countries in their 
compliance approaches or compliance environments, each country‟s experience is its own. 
 
Therefore verification of the study results in different contexts is essential. 
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Apart from the contextual issues, the research design and analytical issues of a study also 
impinge on the generalizability of the study results. Field surveys conducted among real LTU 
corporate taxpayers, selected through probability sampling (section 3.11), contributed to the 
reliable and valid measurement of data – an essential condition for generalizability of study 
results (section 5.3.1). A high response rate (95.65%) in the survey questionnaire further 
contributed to the generalizability of the study. However, the large number of finance sector 
corporations represented in the sample data might not be a common feature for all LTUs. In 
Bangladesh, all finance sector corporations – banks, insurance companies and institutions 
providing lease financing – are placed within the LTU‟s specialized jurisdiction.  This may 
 
reduce the generalizability of the study results. 
 
 
 
8.10 Limitations of the Study 
 
 
Resource and time constraints prevented the researcher from studying the compliance 
behaviours of large corporations from more than one LTU, which has limited the 
generalizability of the study. Another limitation was the small sample size. However, by 
collapsing the initial categories of the predictor variables, it was possible to mitigate this 
problem. There was also the problem of incomplete data on appeal decisions. Some cases 
were still open at  the appeal court or had  been referred  to the higher  court  for further 
decisions. From the literature, it was found that there is a tendency among taxpayers to take 
shelter in the appeals procedure, in order to hold up tax payment or understate the accurate 
amount of tax owing (see Ongwamuhana, 2011; Sebastian, 2008). 
 
A particular limitation of the study is in the measurement of penalty, imprisonment, taxpayer 
service, simplified tax law and mutual understanding based on the stated preferences of 
respondents. This research, for example, did not segment taxpayer service into different 
components and run a factor analysis to measure what constitutes taxpayer service. As a 
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result, there is a strong likelihood that different respondents perceived taxpayer service 
differently and answer differently. However, data on these variables were collected on a test - 
retest basis and were checked to see whether the answer in the first and second streams were 
consistent over time. Thus the study was not affected by the possibility that the measurement 
of some variables might have been different, due to differences in respondent perceptions. 
 
The study explored probable explanations for why the selected coercive and persuasive 
instruments are important and how they are positively or negatively related to the tax 
compliance behaviours of large corporate taxpayers. But it did not shed major light on why 
the nature of the relationship changes from negativity in the standard logistic regression to 
positivity in the xtlogit models.  Additionally, the use of corporate sector as context variable 
limited the generalizability of the study. 
 
8.11 Areas for Further Research 
 
 
Contextual assessments of the influence of coercive versus persuasive instruments from the 
perspective of large corporations seem to be a novel method of researching corporate tax 
compliance. Further studies around this topic that use larger sample sizes and include wider 
and different coercive and persuasive aspects of tax compliance are necessary. In particular, 
studies on how coercive and persuasive instruments have to be designed with respect to the 
different corporate classes may be of pivotal importance. This study has indicated that there 
is very little literature considering the contextual issues in tax compliance studies. Besides 
corporate sector, used as the context variable in this study, there may be further issues, for 
example ownership patterns or location, to be considered as context. 
 
The effect of taxpayer service on large corporate tax compliance is an innovation in tax 
compliance research and will require further studies. The findings of this study suggest that 
tax audit and taxpayer service – two major instruments – are playing a negative role in the 
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creation of tax compliance. Further studies are required to confirm the findings in the 
centrality of tax compliance research and to inform policy. Likewise, the nature of the 
relationship between imprisonment and tax compliance turned positive from the earlier 
negative relationship in the logistic regression. This study could not find any strong reason as 
to why this should happen and this could be a fertile area for future research. 
 
To conclude, this research found that the explanation of tax compliance patterns is not 
straightforward.  A  complex  set  of  tax  environment  issues  interact  with  coercive  and 
persuasive instruments in the compliance generation process. Of particular importance are the 
strategic games the large corporations and LTU officials play around reporting compliance; 
but also important are widespread tax audit corruption, the constraints in the LTU‟s capacity 
 
to pursue criminal prosecutions, and the inability to provide service of real value. To better 
understand the effectiveness of the coercive and persuasive instruments, future research on 
the LTU compliance environment – including its legal enactment system and regulatory 
process of tax audits – would be required. 
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APPENDIX A (OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS) 
 
 
 
 
A.Operational Definition of the Variables and their 
Measurements 
 
The purpose of this section is to give an idea of how the variables were defined. Choosing 
appropriate variables and assigning reasons for their inclusion in the study is a major part of 
the thesis. Three kinds of variables are used in the statistical analysis of the study: dependent, 
independent and control, as discussed in the research logic model in section 3.3. The 
operational measurement of these variables is discussed in sections 3.12.1.3 and 3.12.1.4. The 
following is an attempt to define the variables and their relevance to the study. The dependent 
variable is defined in section A.1, the independent variables from sections A.2 to A.7, and the 
control variables from sections A.8 to A.15. 
 
A.1 Tax compliance 
 
For this study tax compliance is comprised of three components: filing, reporting and 
payment. Filing compliance measures whether the tax return is submitted by the statutory 
date, i.e. the original, or an extended, date set by the tax authority. It is a statutory obligation 
for all corporations, small or large, to submit their tax return by the 15th of July following the 
end of their financial year, provided a period of six months has elapsed from the end of their 
financial year. A tax return includes a tax form, audited financial reports, and calculation of 
taxable income and taxes due. Any tax return submitted by this date is filing compliant. All 
compliances are measured as a dichotomous variable, as discussed in sections 3.12.1.3 and 
5.4.1. Reporting compliance in this research is measured by whether any unreported income 
is unearthed through audit actions, inspection or any other means. This research therefore 
defines any hidden income detected by the tax authority as a case of reporting non- 
compliance, although a case of tax compliance does not give a guarantee of complete 
disclosure (see section 5.4.2).  However, in this measurement process the impact of an appeal 
judgement in favour of the appellant is taken into account. Payment compliance is measured 
on the basis of full payment of all taxes, advance, withheld and current. It would have been 
laborious and time consuming to go through records file-by-file to be sure of the payment 
compliance of all the sampled corporations. Therefore, the computer-generated and manually 
determined payment records of the LTU were consulted. Finally, to determine overall 
compliance, all the three compliance components were totalled. In practice, the LTU – like 
many other tax administration units in Bangladesh – does not maintain any records of the 
overall compliance of taxpayers. So this was measured once the data for the three complia nce 
components were gathered. 
 
A.2 Penalties 
 
Financial penalty is the coercive action most widely applied to control non-compliance. In the 
Income Tax Ordinance of Bangladesh (ITO, 1984), there are penal provisions for non- 
submission of returns (Tax Code 124), concealment of income (Tax Code 128) and non- 
payment of taxes (Tax Codes 125 and 127). Besides these, there are other penal actions, for 
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example, penalty for not maintaining accounts in the prescribed form (Tax Code 123) and 
penalty for non-response to statutory notice (Tax Code 126). The tax advisors and corporate 
finance directors and CEOs are well aware of the implication of these penal actions on their 
tax liability. This research is only interested in penal actions related to the filing, reporting 
and payment obligations of large corporations. Throughout the questionnaire survey and in 
the face-to-face high-level interviews, penalty is defined in accordance with the relevant 
income tax sections (i.e., Tax Codes 124, 125, 127 and 128) of the Income Ordinance. The 
study asked questions of the respondents to assess their perception of the usefulness of these 
penal provisions on tax compliance. The reason for its inclusion as a coercive instrument is 
that the tax administration employs penal action as its first line of attack in pursuing alleged 
non-compliance. 
 
A.3 Tax audit 
 
Tax audit in this study refers to the audit claims or adjustments made through audit actions. 
Audit adjustment refers to the book-tax difference between the taxable incomes reported in 
tax returns and tax audit findings.  Audit adjustments made by the audit teams are not final. 
The corporate taxpayers may challenge them in the appeal court, which needs to be taken into 
account in measuring the audit adjustment. Audit adjustments made through all types of 
audits – desk and comprehensive – and non-audit action – for example, inspections – were 
considered.   Audit   demands  across  corporations   may  vary  widely  and  normality  of 
distribution of audit data may not be maintained. Therefore, audit adjustment data were 
common log transformed to normalize them. A question to decide here is whether audit 
adjustment  is  used  as  an  exogenous  or  endogenous  variable  to  the  model.  Between 
randomized and return-based audit selection, the LTU administration of Bangladesh follows 
the latter. After an initial scrutiny and evaluation of the submitted return in terms of tax law 
and past audit adjustments, a corporation‟s accounts may be subject either to a desk-based or 
a comprehensive audit. The year under study, i.e., tax year 2008-2009, LTU had a 100% 
audit examinations on its corporate taxpayers.  The audit selection process, sometimes, is also 
driven by risk factors, which are in the hands of the higher authority. In almost no cases are 
audits selected at random, which makes audit adjustments an endogenous variable to the 
regression and other statistical models employed in the study. As an endogenous variable, 
audit is likely to better explain its effect on tax compliance. The other reason tax audit is 
included in the study is that when penal actions fail, the tax authority moves to unearth 
business details by desk or comprehensive audit actions. 
 
A.4 Imprisonment 
 
This  is  the  final  and  the  toughest  coercive  action  that  may  be  imposed  for  any  non- 
compliance behaviour according to the Income Tax Ordinance of Bangladesh, as in many 
other countries. In between financial penalty and imprisonment, there are some other legal 
sanctions, for example, search and seizure, freezing of bank accounts and closure of business 
premises, which are less frequently pursed as a means to improve compliance. Imprisonment 
of corporate taxpayers can be taken as a separate action or in combination with other coercive 
actions, for example financial penalty or freezing of bank accounts. In the tax system of 
Bangladesh, generally, the softer coercive actions are pursued first before launching into the 
tough actions. All non-compliances, non-filing, non-reporting and non-payment, are 
punishable with imprisonment from a minimum of one to a maximum of five years (Tax 
Codes 164, 165 and 166). Imprisonment can be applied for failure to submit documents or to 
provide or protect information (Tax Codes 164 and 168) or for disposal of property under 
attachment by a third party (Tax Code 167). 
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This study is only interested in measuring the effectiveness of imprisonment in relation to 
non-filing of returns, non-reporting of income and non-payment of taxes. Inclusion of this 
variable is important because during the tax year 2008-2009, the year in which the study was 
conducted, there were a few cases of imprisonment, mostly of political leaders and in some 
cases of corporate directors. It was pertinent to measure how effective imprisonment was in 
boosting the compliance of the largest of the taxpayers, who are financially and politically 
powerful. However, since the corporations are corporeal legal beings, the principal officers of 
the  corporation,  which  may  include  its  managing  director,  secretary,  treasurer,  agent, 
accountant or any other officer responsible for the management of the corporation‟s affairs 
(Tax Code 2/48) are liable to be imprisoned and prosecuted for any act of non-compliance. 
 
A.5 Taxpayer service 
 
Taxpayer service covers a wide range of issues from filing to examination of tax returns, the 
availability of a help desk, the running of formal and informal workshops/seminars, the 
establishment of a tax website, provision of tax return facilities, etc. Quality of taxpayer 
service is considered to be the first step towards building an atmosphere of cooperation and 
trust between the tax administration and taxpayers. In the LTU of Bangladesh, there is a 
taxpayer service wing to help large corporations resolve their compliance issues. In addition, 
the LTU is the only tax organ of Bangladesh where online return submission has been 
initiated to expedite the filing of returns by large corporate taxpayers. In regard to taxpayer 
service quality, this study did not particularize any component of service delivery; rather it 
took taxpayer service quality as a holistic concept measured on a five point Likert-type scale. 
The respondents were not asked direct questions as regards the impact of taxpayer service on 
tax compliance. Rather, they were asked to evaluate the quality of service they receive from 
the Large Taxpayer Unit. The purpose was to assess how their perception of good and bad 
quality  service  from  the  LTU,  as  defined  by  the  respondents  on  the  five-point  scale, 
influences their response to compliance obligations. 
 
A.6 Simplified tax law 
 
Complex tax laws deflect taxpayers from their tax obligations and push them either towards 
tax avoidance or tax evasion (Slemrod, 1985 and Mirlees, 2010). What constitutes a simple 
tax law is difficult  to define (OECD, 2006). In Bangladesh every year the tax laws are 
changed to some extent through the finance bills. Also, over the year, special regulatory 
orders (SROs) from the NBR make tax laws more complicated. Very often, the complexity of 
corporate tax law is attributed to the gap in understanding at different levels of the tax 
administration, for example between territorial and appellate authorities. Tax laws on capital 
gains  from  share  trading  are  a  particular  example  of  complex  tax  law  for  many  large 
corporate  taxpayers   in  Bangladesh.   In  order  to  avoid   measurement   difficulties,  the 
respondents were asked straightforward question on whether tax laws relating to large 
corporate taxpayers have been simplified by the tax authority. This was the same procedure 
followed in measuring the quality of taxpayer service. The respondents state their perception 
of the simplicity of the tax  laws on a five-point  scale.  Stated perceptions are coded in 
numbers and are regressed with their actual compliance performance. 
 
A.7 Mutual Understanding 
 
In the literature it is argued that the purpose of mutual understanding is to make sure that all 
the parties the compliance process performs in accordance with the law and innocent tax 
payers are not penalized for silly mistakes (Sparrow, 1994 and Braithwaite, 1998). Not only 
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in the theory but also in practice, countries have moved towards an understanding based tax 
compliance system. Mutual understanding in the settlement of tax liabilities is an often-cited 
approach  in  the  management  of  large  corporate  tax  compliance  in  Bangladesh.  In  the 
National Budget speech for the fiscal year 2011-2012, the finance minister of Bangladesh laid 
special emphasis on the collaborative and mutually agreed settlement of tax disputes. The 
minister said that the tax administration should initiate and depend more on dialogues than 
statutory actions as a means to solving non-compliance. The Customs, Excise and VAT 
department of the NBR has already started the full application of discussion-based settlement 
of tax cases. However, in the income tax laws there is no mention of the issue of mutual 
understanding. Against this background, it is hoped that establishing mutual understanding is 
likely to persuade the taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations. Therefore, respondents 
were asked to state their perception of how good the mutual understanding between them and 
the LTU authority was on a five-point scale. The purpose was to see how compliance 
performance varied between those respondents who viewed understanding as good and those 
who viewed it as bad. 
 
A.8 Marginal tax rate 
 
 
Marginal income tax rate influences tax compliance, although the extent of this impact is 
indeterminate, and in some cases there are contradictory. Clotfelter (1983), Spicer and Becker 
(1980), and Friedland et al. (1978) find marginal tax rate has a negative impact on tax 
compliance.  Among  large  corporate taxpayers  in  the  US,  Kamdar  (1997)  had  the  same 
finding – a negative relationship. Feinstein (1991) and Yaniv (2007), on the other hand, find 
that tax rate is positively related to tax compliance in pooled regression data, but negatively 
in separate year data. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provide a stronger explanation as to 
why the tax rate impact can both be negative and positive. The positive impact emerges from 
the income effect, implying that an increase in tax rate reduces net income, and given the 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, taxpayers will be less willing to underreport their income. 
The negative impact comes from the substitution effect, meaning the higher the tax rate, the 
more profitable it is to underreport income at the margin. The ultimate effect depends on the 
interaction of the two impacts. 
 
For large corporate taxpayers in Bangladesh, marginal tax rates for financial, manufacturing 
and cellular are different. The marginal tax rate is also different for different manufacturing 
businesses, for example, for textile and non-textile businesses.  The corporate tax rate begins 
at 27.5%. This rate applies mainly to garment manufacturing, whether in or outside the LTU. 
The other rate, 37.5%, applies to other manufacturing and service providers across the 
corporate sectors. The highest corporate marginal tax rate is 45%, which is imposed on the 
finance and cellular. 
 
A.9 Corporate size: 
 
 
There are a few contending measures of corporate size, which is also an important matter for 
the definition of large corporate taxpayers (see section 2.8). Graham and Tucker (2006) find 
that corporate size has a positive relationship with corporate demand for tax shelters and tax 
evasion.  Corporate  size  can  be  better  measured  by  profit  or  sales  than  income  data 
(Hasseldine et al., 2007). Size can also be measured by total or net assets. An examination of 
the large corporate taxpayers of Bangladesh shows that many of them enjoy exemptions and 
tax holidays. Profit reporting is highly biased when corporations enjoy exonerations and 
exemptions. Profit as a base may also be misleading when corporations have carried over 
322 
 
business losses or unabsorbed depreciation from previous years. To avoid this problem, total 
assets at book value are used as the measure of corporate size. Large corporate taxpayers 
submit their audited financial reports, which contain the yearly total and net assets of the 
corporation. This study collected the amount of total assets from audit reports and log 
transformed them for the same reason as that explained for tax audit (see section A.3 above). 
 
A.10 Corporate Ownership: 
 
The nature of ownership, private or public, can influence tax compliance, because publicly 
owned corporations are legally bound to undertake a certain kind of financial reporting. Some 
LTU large corporate taxpayers are listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and others are 
not. Large corporations whose shares are traded on the stock market face tough monitoring 
by the DSE, the SEC (Securities Exchange Limited) and the Controller of Capital Issues 
(CCI). Control mechanisms like these keep the large corporations defensive about reporting 
their  income  and  taxes  (Cloyd,  1995;  Mills  and  Newberry,  2001).  Public  disclosure  of 
accounts is also important for public image and corporate fair play. A firm‟s compliance 
makes a positive impression if its shares are publicly traded and strictly regulated by industry 
norms and practice (Aparicio et al., 2011). For this study, ownership is t aken as a categorical 
variable measured as a binary response. Large corporations are categorized as private or 
public. Private versus public ownership was checked by the certificate of incorporation or 
from the audited financial reports. Also, a list of corporations whose shares were traded on 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange was collected to ascertain which were the publicly and which the 
privately owned corporations. 
 
A.11 Corporate Location 
 
From the point of view of locationality, corporations can be categorised as local or national 
and  foreign  or  multinational.  Location  issues  have  important  bearings  on  corporate 
compliance behaviour (Swenson, 1994; Grubert et al., 1999). It is argued that multinational 
corporations are more law abiding than national corporations. Discussion with the tax 
authority in Bangladesh also supports the idea that large multinational corporations are better 
in reporting and tax payment behaviour than local manufacturing corporations. To minimize 
the effects of corporate location on tax compliance, corporations having foreign investments 
of more than 25% are treated as multinationals, and all others are treated as local. To collect 
relevant data, the respondents were asked to provide information on this, which again was 
checked with the information provided in the audited financial statements. 
 
A.12 Corporate Sector 
 
One of the most important corporate demographic features is corporate sector affiliation. 
Compliance issues may vary according to the nature of the services or types of goods 
corporations produce. Manufacturing corporations can easily play with inventory valuations, 
while the banking corporations can play with provisions for bad debts, among the others. The 
large corporate taxpayers in Bangladesh are grouped into three corporate sectors: finance, 
manufacturing and service. Of these the finance sector corporations, for example, banks, 
insurance and leasing, have to ensure disclosure based on the Banking and Insurance Act, 
1991  of  Bangladesh.  And  the  insurance  have  to  follow  the  Insurance  Act  of  1940.To 
minimize the confounding role of sector affiliation, the variable was measured categorically 
and the data for such measurement were collected from the LTU database. 
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A.13 Employee Salary 
 
Corporate employees work as agents between their corporate owners and the tax authority. 
Employees tend to introduce tax evasion by committing accounting fraud as a condition of, or 
in the hope of, higher pay and incentives from the corporate management (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2005; Slemrod, 2004). There is growing evidence that employee salary is based 
on the after-tax income of corporations. However, salary is fixed in a secret agreement and is 
therefore difficult to measure. For ease of measurement, it was measured on the basis of total 
on  salary  and  perquisites,  as  reported  in  the  income  statement.  In  the  case  of  general 
insurance, expenditure on salaries is not reported separately, but is included in management 
expense. To take account of this, management expenses are considered as a measure of salary 
expense. To normalize data distribution among firms of unequal sizes, the data collected are 
log transformed. 
 
A.14 Corporate Age 
 
In finance and economics, corporate life cycle theories and corporate profit motives have 
been a well-founded concept in which corporate tax issues are of crucial importance (OECD, 
2002; Mueller, 1972). Longer established corporations are more likely to have adopted and 
habituated themselves to compliance practices, or to have developed a certain resistance with 
the help of professional expertise. The tax compliance issues of such corporations are likely 
to be different than from those of newer corporations. Corporate age is measured by the years 
or time lapsed from the year of business incorporation. A certificate of incorporation is the 
document that best indicates how old a business is. The three categories made on the basis of 
age are: 7-10 years old, 11-14 years old and 15 years or more. 
 
A.15 Types of Advisor 
 
There is substantial evidence that paid preparers play a key ro le in the tax compliance process 
(Erard, 1993; McGill, 1988), although it is quite ambiguous whether influence is positive or 
negative in relation to compliance behaviour (Hite and Hasseldine, 2003). To expand our 
understanding of the regression process, controlling for the role of tax advisors was essential. 
Tax advisory services in large corporations are varied and diversified. Some corporations 
appoint paid advisors to plead tax matters with the tax office as and when they need them. 
Others have their own tax advisory department manned by professionals who deal directly 
with the tax office. The third category contains a combination of both, with both in-house tax 
staff and appointed advisors working jointly to address compliance issues. Therefore, to 
control for the role of tax advisory services, the categories created were: in-house tax 
department; appointed tax professional; and both in-house and appointed professionals. Data 
were collected from the questionnaire survey and were measured as a categorical variable. 
 
 
 
 
B. Respondent Attitudes to Coercive and Persuasive Tax Compliance 
 
Instruments 
 
 
The purpose of this discussion is to see how respondents from different corporate sectors (i.e., 
finance, manufacturing and service) differ in their attitude to coercive and persuasive 
instruments. Three trained and skilled research assistants were appointed to contact the 
respondents once the questionnaire had been mailed-out. On two separate occasions, six 
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questions were asked. The questions and the research assistants responsible for collecting 
filled-in questionnaires were the same on both occasions. Of the six questions, three were on 
coercive and three on persuasive instruments. Questions were to be answered on a five-point 
Likert-type scale. That meant that respondents were given five options from which to make a 
choice. The choices went from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, or “very good” to 
“poor”, for both the main and the re-test survey. 
 
A Kruskal-Wallis (KW) one-way ANOVA of ranks was used for this purpose. This is a non- 
parametric test that determines whether the means from different samples are from the same 
population (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Gray et al. (2001) applied the KW test with a sample 
of 134 large multinational firms stratified into manufacturing and non-manufacturing groups 
to determine respondents‟ attitudes towards policy and non-policy factors in their investment 
decisions. There is, however, a debate as to whether Likert-type choices should be treated as 
nominal or ordinal variables. Those arguing that Likert-type items should be taken as a 
nominal variable apply a t-test for the inferential statistics; those who prefer them to be taken 
as ordinal variable use Kruskal and Willies (KW) or Mann-Whitney U tests, depending on 
sample size and distribution (Winter and Dodou, 2010; Clason and Dormody, 1994). 
 
Considering the sample size, a KW test was conducted to examine the null hypothesis that the 
median  values  over  different  respondent  groups  were  equal  (Nikolaidis,  2009).  Results 
obtained suggested that there was a statistically significant difference among the three sectors‟ 
perceptions of taxpayer service (χ2 = 3.166, df = 2, P = 0.03), with a mean rank (median 
values) of 70.54 for the finance, 90.84 for the manufacturing and 77.54 fo r the service sector 
corporations. Thereafter, a follow-up test was conducted among the three groups using the 
Bonferroni approach to find out how the groups‟ medians differed. It revealed a significant 
difference   between   manufacturing   and   finance   corporations‟  attitudes,   meaning   that 
manufacturing corporations were more interested in taxpayer-service-based compliance than 
finance corporations. 
 
The mean values (median values) of mutual understanding between large corporate taxpayers 
and the LTU were 77.72, 66.72 and 91.87 for finance, manufacturing and service sector 
corporations respectively.  KW was used to examine the null hypothesis that the median 
values of the three corporate groups were equal and its result (χ2 = 7.822, df = 2, P = 0.026) 
suggested that we reject the null hypothesis and adopt its alternative research hypothesis. The 
follow-up test by the Bonferroni approach revealed a significance difference between service 
and  manufacturing  corporations‟ attitudes,  meaning  that  the  service  sector  was  more 
interested in mutual-understanding-based compliance than the manufacturing corporations. 
 
Regarding their attitude to simplified tax law, the mean values (median values) were 82.91, 
71.58 and 71.74 for finance, manufacturing and service sector corporations respectively. The 
KW test showed that the median values of the three corporate groups were equal, and its 
result (χ2 = 3.12, df = 2, P = 0.209) suggested that we accept the null hypothesis. Therefore, 
there was no difference in the attitudes of the three groups towards simplified tax law. 
 
The mean values (median values) of the usefulness of penalty were 68.62, 85.35 and 81.30 
for finance, manufacturing and service sector corporations respectively. The KW test result 
(χ2 = 5.081, df = 2, P = 0.056) suggested that we reject the null hypothesis and adopt its 
alternative research hypothesis. The follow-up test by the Bonferroni approach revealed a 
significant difference between manufacturing and finance corporations‟ attitudes, meaning 
the manufacturing sector was more confident of the usefulness of penalties than the finance 
sector. 
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The mean values (median values) of the effectiveness of imprisonment were 74.35, 78.35 and 
81.87 for finance, manufacturing and service sector corporations respectively. A KW test was 
used to examine the null hypothesis that the median values of the three corporate groups were 
equal and its result (χ2 = .759, df = 2, P = 0.684) suggested that we accept the null hypothesis. 
Therefore,  there  was  no  difference  in  the  attitudes  of  the  three  groups  towards  the 
effectiveness of imprisonment. 
 
Regarding their attitude to tax audit, the mean values (median values) were 82.91, 71.58 and 
71.74 for finance, manufacturing and service sector corporations respectively. The KW test 
showed that the median values of the three corporate groups were equal and its result (χ2 = 
3.12, df = 2, P = 0.209) suggested that we accept the null hypothesis. Therefore, there was no 
difference in the attitudes of the three groups towards simplified tax law. 
 
 
 
 
C. ANOVA based within and between sector variation as an influence of 
corporate sector 
 
 
 
The variance estimates of corporate sector measured by ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) have 
been presented here to make a comparison with the outputs derived from the random effects 
model. It is, however, an unorthodox procedure to use ANOVA for binary variables, although 
feasible (UCLA, 2007; Field, 2010; Baker, 2006). The unorthodoxy comes from the fact that 
ANOVA assumes normal distribution. As far as the random effects of corporate sector on 
filing compliance is concerned, it has a between-sector mean square (MS) of .423 and a 
within-sector mean square of .128, with a model r2  of 0.041 ( see Table A.1).The sum of 
between-sector squares (SS) is .847 and that for within-sector squares is 19.412. The 
corresponding F statistic is 3.30, with a significance level of 0.039; thus the model appears to 
be significant at the p < .05 level. However, the intra-class correlation (ICC = .046) shows 
that only a little of the variation in filing compliance between the corporations is explained by 
corporate sector. The value of intraclass correlation also suggests that corporations within the 
sectors are as different from each other as corporations across the sectors. 
 
Table A.1: Measurement of variations between and within corporate sectors for filing 
compliance 
R2 =0.041 
Source SS df MS F P 
Between 
sectors 
Within 
sector 
.847 2 .423 3.30 0.0397 
 
19.412 151 .128 
Total 20.259 153 .132 
Intra-class 
correlation 
(ICC) 
0.046 
Note: Estimated SD of corporate sector effect .079, estimated SD within sector is .358 and 
estimated reliability of sector means is 0.696 
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The reporting compliance random effects model has an r2 of 0.069, which means that the 
proportion of variation explained by the context variable is low (Table A.2). The sum of the 
squares (SS) for between and within market sectors are 2.66 and 35.60 respectively. Within- 
sector variation in reporting compliance is much higher compared to within-sector variation 
in filing compliance. The corresponding F statistic is 5.65 and significant at the level of 0.004. 
Thus the model appears to be significant. The intra-class correlation (ICC = .08) is very near 
to zero, meaning that corporations within the same sector are as different from each (non- 
homogeneous) other as corporations across sectors. 
 
 
Table A.2: Measurement of variations between and within the corporate sectors for reporting 
compliance 
R2= 0.069 
 
Source SS df MS F P 
Between 
Sectors 
Within 
Sector 
2.662 2 1.33 5.65 0.004 
 
35.60 151 .235 
 
Total 38.266 153 .250 
Intra-class 
Correlation 0.089 
 (ICC)   
 
Note: Estimated SD of corporate sector effect is .152, estimated SD within corporate sector is .485, 
and est. reliability of sector mean is 0.822 
 
 
 
The influence of corporate sector on payment compliance, as explained by the model r2 
(0.017) indicating a low capacity of the model to explain between-sector variations. The sum 
of squares (SS) for between and within corporate sectors are. 501 and 28.122 respectively. 
Within corporate sectors, variation in payment compliance is much higher than between 
corporate sectors. The corresponding F statistic is 1.35 and has a significance level of 0.26. 
Thus the model appears not to be significant. The intra-class correlation (ICC = .007) shows 
that corporations within the same sector are as different from each other as corporations 
across sectors. 
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Source SS df MS F P 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3: Measurement of variations between and within the corporate sectors for payment 
compliance 
 
R2=   0.0175 
 
Source SS Df MS F P 
Between 
sectors 
Within 
sector 
.501 2 .250 1.35 0.263 
 
28.122 151 .186 
Total 28.623 153 .187 
Intra-class 
correlation 
(ICC) 
0.007 
Note: Estimated SD of corporate sector effect is .036, estimated SD within corporate sector is .431, 
and est. reliability of sector mean is 0.256 
 
Finally, the r2 for the model on overall compliance is .010 (Table A.4), which suggests that 
the corporate sector is not very successful in explaining variability in overall tax compliance. 
The sum of squares (SS) for between and within market sectors are .393 and 35.50 
respectively, and the corresponding F statistics are .85 with a significance level (p = .43). 
Thus the model does not seem to be significant. The ICC is zero, implying that when the 
influence  of  corporate  sector  is  considered,  corporations  within  the  same  sector  are  as 
different from each other as corporations across different sectors are. 
 
 
 
Table 6.12: Measurement of variations between and within the corporate sectors for overall 
compliance 
 
r2  = 0.010 
 
Between sectors .393 2 .196 0.84 0.435 
Within sector 35.509 151 .235   
Total 35.907 153 .234   
Intra-class 0.00000     
Correlation (ICC)      
Note: Estimated SD of corporate sector effect is nil, estimated SD within corporate sector is .484, and 
est. reliability of sector mean is 0.00 
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APPENDIX B (TABLES) 
 
Table B.1: Appeals outcome on cases found non-compliant by desk and comprehensive audit 
(N=154). 
 
 
 
Appeals cases Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Fail 
Win 
Others 
Total 
Not an appealable case 
Did not opt for an appeal 
Total 
58 37.7 37.7 37.7 
14 9.1 9.1 46.8 
13 8.4 8.4 55.2 
85 55.2 55.2  
61 39.6 39.6 94.8 
8 5.2 5.2 100.0 
154 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
Table B.2: Ranking of coercive and persuasive instruments for filing compliance 
 
 
 
Instruments 
 
Sectors 
Ranking 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Total 
Penalty Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
35 
26 
7 
8 
9 
5 
12 
1 
2 
6 
1 
5 
8 
2 
1 
7 
4 
8 
4 
0 
3 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 68 22 15 12 11 19 7 154 
Simplified 
tax law 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
21 
9 
9 
5 
0 
1 
5 
4 
8 
8 
2 
5 
9 
8 
3 
13 
9 
2 
19 
11 
3 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 39 6 17 15 20 24 33 154 
Mutual 
understanding 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
13 
5 
7 
29 
8 
9 
11 
6 
8 
6 
6 
4 
8 
11 
0 
5 
2 
1 
8 
5 
2 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 25 46 25 16 19 8 15 154 
Taxpayer 
service 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
4 
1 
6 
18 
5 
12 
24 
4 
7 
2 
5 
1 
4 
9 
2 
14 
12 
3 
14 
7 
0 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 11 35 35 8 15 29 21 154 
Tax audit Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
4 
2 
1 
5 
5 
3 
8 
8 
1 
29 
13 
7 
18 
9 
8 
12 
5 
8 
4 
1 
3 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 7 13 17 49 35 25 8 154 
Imprisonment Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
1 
0 
1 
3 
1 
0 
11 
10 
3 
14 
11 
2 
16 
1 
11 
18 
7 
6 
17 
13 
8 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 2 4 24 27 28 31 38 154 
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Table B.3: Ranking of coercive and persuasive instruments for reporting compliance 
 
 
Instruments 
 
Sectors 
Ranking 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Total 
Penalty Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
28 
21 
6 
11 
6 
7 
13 
2 
3 
10 
3 
6 
10 
4 
4 
6 
3 
2 
2 
4 
3 
9 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 55 24 18 19 18 11  154 
Simplified 
tax law 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
18 
7 
11 
6 
1 
0 
11 
8 
6 
7 
1 
4 
7 
5 
1 
12 
9 
4 
19 
12 
5 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 36 7 25 12 13 25 36 154 
Mutual 
understanding 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
12 
8 
7 
23 
11 
7 
15 
6 
12 
5 
3 
3 
6 
13 
1 
8 
0 
1 
11 
2 
0 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 27 41 33 11 20 9 13 154 
Taxpayer 
service 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
7 
3 
7 
17 
8 
12 
14 
3 
5 
6 
3 
0 
5 
5 
3 
19 
13 
3 
12 
8 
1 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 17 37 22 9 13 35 21 154 
Tax audit Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
10 
2 
1 
7 
2 
3 
8 
6 
2 
17 
14 
5 
20 
8 
10 
13 
10 
7 
5 
1 
3 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 13 12 16 36 38 30 9 154 
Imprisonment Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
6 
1 
1 
3 
2 
0 
9 
10 
3 
17 
10 
2 
15 
3 
10 
12 
3 
10 
18 
14 
5 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 8 5 22 29 28 25 37 154 
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Table B.4: Ranking of coercive and persuasive instruments for payment compliance 
 
 
 
 
Instruments 
 
Sectors 
Ranking 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Total 
Penalty Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
38 
24 
9 
11 
9 
4 
10 
3 
2 
5 
3 
5 
8 
2 
3 
7 
2 
5 
1 
0 
3 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 71 24 15 13 13 14 4 154 
Mutual 
understanding 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
13 
11 
8 
26 
8 
8 
12 
5 
8 
5 
4 
4 
11 
12 
0 
4 
1 
2 
9 
2 
1 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 32 42 25 13 23 7 12 154 
Simplified 
tax law 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
16 
5 
9 
2 
1 
1 
7 
4 
8 
8 
3 
5 
11 
6 
2 
12 
11 
3 
24 
13 
3 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 30 4 19 16 19 26 40 154 
Taxpayer 
service 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
4 
2 
5 
17 
6 
12 
18 
4 
6 
3 
3 
0 
3 
7 
4 
24 
11 
3 
11 
10 
1 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 11 35 28 6 14 38 22 154 
Tax audit Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
4 
1 
0 
6 
1 
4 
9 
7 
3 
25 
19 
6 
18 
10 
6 
14 
3 
9 
4 
2 
3 
80 
43 
31 
  5 11 19 50 34 26 9 154 
Imprisonment Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
3 
0 
1 
5 
5 
1 
14 
12 
2 
14 
7 
3 
19 
3 
12 
8 
6 
5 
17 
10 
7 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 4 11 28 24 34 19 34 154 
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Table B.5: Ranking of coercive and persuasive instruments for overall compliance 
 
 
 
 
Instruments 
 
Sector 
Ranking 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Total 
Taxpayer 
service 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
55 
20 
18 
11 
9 
6 
4 
1 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
6 
0 
2 
2 
0 
3 
1 
2 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 93 26 8 9 8 4 6 154 
Simplified tax 
law 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
35 
19 
14 
15 
10 
6 
10 
7 
2 
7 
6 
4 
5 
0 
2 
5 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 68 31 19 17 7 8 4 154 
Tax audit Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
35 
14 
10 
23 
16 
8 
8 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
0 
4 
1 
1 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 59 49 17 14 5 4 6 154 
Mutual 
understanding 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
20 
5 
15 
36 
23 
8 
13 
7 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
0 
4 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 40 67 21 9 4 7 6 154 
Penalty Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
8 
5 
4 
20 
5 
8 
17 
11 
6 
19 
10 
6 
9 
4 
3 
5 
5 
2 
3 
2 
2 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 17 33 34 35 16 12 7 154 
Imprisonment Finance 
Manufacturing 
Service 
6 
3 
4 
35 
11 
10 
19 
7 
4 
9 
10 
5 
6 
9 
5 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
80 
43 
31 
 Total 13 56 30 24 20 8 3 154 
 
 
 
 
Table B.6: Reporting statistically significant variables in the logit models „with and without‟ 
the potential context variables. 
 
Compliances Significant predictors 
With all 
predictors 
 
(1 ) 
Without 
corporate 
sector 
(2) 
Without 
ownership 
levels 
(3) 
Without national 
boundaries 
 
(4) 
Filing penalty, audit audit penalty, audit penalty, audit 
Reporting audit audit audit audit 
Payment audit 
imprisonment 
audit audit 
imprisonment 
audit, imprisonment 
Overall taxpayer 
service, audit, 
simplified tax 
law 
audit, taxpayer 
service 
taxpayer 
service, audit, 
simplified tax 
law 
audit 
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Table B.7: Risk estimation of various CHAID model 
 
 
 
 
Complianc 
e type 
Method With the influence of 
corporate sector 
Without the influence of 
corporate sector 
Estimate S E Estimate SE 
Filing Resubstitution 
Cross-validation 
.156 
.188 
.029 
.032 
.156 
.162 
.029 
.030 
Reporting Resubstitution 
Cross-validation 
.091 
.091 
.023 
.023 
.091 .023 
.091 .023 
Payment Resubstitution 
Cross-validation 
.247 
.247 
.035 
.035 
.247 .035 
.247 .035 
Overall Resubstitution 
Cross-validation 
.201 
.221 
.032 
.033 
.195 .032 
.195 .032 
 
Growing Method: CHAID 
Dependent variable:  filing compliance 
 
Table B.8: Classification of various CHAID model 
 
 
Compliance 
Type 
 
 
 
 
 
Observed 
With the influence of corporate 
sector 
Without the influence of 
corporate sector 
Predicted Predicted 
Tax non- 
compliant 
Tax 
compliant 
Per cent 
correct 
Tax non- 
compliant 
Tax 
compliant 
Per cent 
correct 
Filing Tax non-compliant 0 24 .0% 0 24 .0% 
Tax compliant 0 130 100.0% 0 130 100.0% 
Overall percentage .0% 100.0% 84.4% .0% 100.0% 84.4% 
Reporting Tax non-compliant 71 0 100.0% 71 0 100.0% 
Tax compliant 14 69 83.1% 14 69 83.1% 
Overall percentage 55.2% 44.8% 90.9% 55.2% 44.8% 90.9% 
Payment Tax non-compliant 0 38 .0% 0 38 .0% 
 Tax compliant 0 116 100.0% 0 116 100.0% 
 Overall percentage .0% 100.0% 75.3% .0% 100.0% 75.3% 
Overall Tax non-compliant 86 11 88.7% 76 21 78.4% 
 Tax compliant 20 37 64.9% 9 48 84.2% 
 Overall percentage 68.8% 31.2% 79.9% 55.2% 44.8% 80.5% 
Growing Method: CHAID 
Dependent variable:  Overall compliance 
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B.9 Appeals cases lodged by different type of non-compliant taxpayers 
 
Compliance 
Type 
Compliance 
Outcome 
Did the taxpayer appeal? 
Yes No No 
Ground 
Total 
Filing Tax compliant 
Tax non- 
compliant 
8 
77 
3 
5 
13 
48 
24 
130 
 Total 85 8 61 154 
Reporting Tax compliant 
Tax non- 
compliant 
69 
16 
2 
6 
0 
61 
71 
83 
 Total 85 8 61 154 
Payment Tax compliant 
Tax non- 
compliant 
31 
54 
7 
1 
0 
61 
38 
116 
 Total 85 8 61 154 
Overall Tax compliant 
Tax non- 
compliant 
76 
9 
8 
0 
13 
48 
97 
57 
 Total 85 8 61 154 
 
 
 
 
B.10: Corporate Tax rates in Bangladesh 
 
Corporate Categories Corporate Tax Rates 
2008-09 2010-2011 
Publicly Traded 
 
Normal Tax rate ( paying dividend by 10% or >) 
Higher rate (paying dividend by <10%) 
 
 
 
27.5% 
 
 
 
37.5% 
 
 
 
27.5% 
 
 
 
37.5% 
Financial corporations: 
Banks, Insurances  and Leasing 
45% 42.5% 
Non-publicly traded 37.5% 37.5% 
Mobile Phone Operator Corporations: 
Publicly Traded 
 
Non publicly traded 
 
35% 
 
45% 
 
35% 
 
45% 
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Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
1. Name of your organization: 
 
2. Which of the following types of corporation is this? (Please tick one) 
 
a) Public limited b) Private limited c) Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
3. To which corporate sector do you belong? (Please tick one) 
 
a)  Finance b)  Manufacturing c) Service d) Other ( Please specify) 
 
 
 
4. Do you have foreign shareholding of more than 25% of your assets? (Please tick one) 
Yes No Other (Please specify) 
 
5. Do you have an in-house tax advisor, or do you appoint an outside advisor to settle 
your tax matters or both? (Please tick one) 
 
In-house tax advisor Appointed tax advisor Both 
 
6. To ensure the timely submission of tax returns, how much would each of the following 
contribute? (PLEASE RANK in order of importance: 1, 2, 3…6, with 1 being the top and 6 
the last choice) 
 
a. 
b. 
Charging penalties for non-declaration 
Auditing of corporation accounts by your tax office 
-------------- 
-------------- 
c. 
d. 
Imprisoning those responsible in non-complier corporations 
Simplifying income tax law 
-------------- 
-------------- 
e. 
f. 
Quality taxpayer service by tax office 
Mutual understanding between tax office and corporations 
-------------- 
-------------- 
 
 
7.   To ensure timely declaration of full income, how much would each of the following 
contribute? (PLEASE RANK in order of importance: 1, 2, 3 ...6, with 1 being the top and 6 
the last choice) 
 
a. 
b. 
Charging penalties for non-declaration 
Auditing of corporation accounts by your tax office 
-------------- 
-------------- 
c. Imprisoning those responsible in non-complier corporations -------------- 
d. 
e. 
Simplifying income tax law 
Quality taxpayer service by tax office 
-------------- 
-------------- 
f. Mutual understanding between tax office and corporations -------------- 
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8. To ensure timely payment of all taxes, how much would each of the following contribute? 
(PLEASE RANK in order of importance: 1, 2, 3 ...6, with 1 being the top and 6 the last 
choice) 
 
a. 
b. 
Charging penalties for non-declaration 
Auditing of corporation accounts by your tax office 
-------------- 
-------------- 
c. Imprisoning those responsible in non-complier corporations -------------- 
d. 
e. 
Simplifying income tax law 
Quality taxpayer service by tax office 
-------------- 
-------------- 
f. Mutual understanding between tax office and corporations -------------- 
 
 
9.   To ensure fulfilment of all tax obligations (i.e., filing return, paying taxes and reporting 
income) properly, how much would each of the following contribute (PLEASE RANK in 
order of importance: 1, 2, 3 ...6, with 1 being the top and 6 the last choice) 
 
 
a. 
b. 
Charging penalties for non-declaration 
Auditing of corporation accounts by your tax office 
-------------- 
-------------- 
c. 
d. 
Imprisoning those responsible in non-complier corporations 
Simplifying income tax law 
-------------- 
-------------- 
e. 
f. 
Quality taxpayer service by tax office 
Mutual understanding between tax office and corporations 
-------------- 
-------------- 
 
 
 
10. A significant goal of tax administrations is to provide quality service to taxpayers.  The 
LTU has developed a taxpayer service wing to provide quality service. Please show which of 
the following best reflects your choice for the statement below by ticking a box on the line. 
 
 
 
The quality of taxpayer service provided to large corporate taxpayers by the LTU is: 
 
 
Very       Very 
Good Good  Fair  Poor  Poor 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Simplifying tax law is one of the goals of the LTU, which hopes simplification will 
improve large corporate taxpayers‟ ability to understand their tax obligations and reduce 
undesirable legal disputes. Please show which of the following best reflects your choice for 
the statement below by ticking a box on the line. 
 
The income tax laws relating to large corporations have been simplified by the LTU: 
 
Strongly    Strongly 
Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Disagree 
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12.  Mutual understanding between large corporations and the LTU helps in solving common 
concerns and establishing an enhanced relationship. Please show which of the following best 
reflects your choice for the statement below by ticking a box on the line. 
 
The mutual understanding between your corporation and the LTU is: 
 
Very     Very 
Good Good Fair Poor  Poor 
 
 
 
13.   The LTU employs penalties (Tax Codes 124, 125, 127 and 128 of the ITO, 1984) to 
control various kinds of non-compliance by large corporate taxpayers.  Please show which of 
the following best reflects your choice for the statement below by ticking a box on the line. 
 
Tax penalties imposed by the LTU on its large corporate taxpayers are useful: 
 
Strongly    Strongly 
Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Disagree 
 
 
 
 
14.  Imprisonment of corporate taxpayers for committing tax offences (Tax Codes 164, 165 
and 166) is seen as an effective step by the LTU administration. Please show which of the 
following best reflects your choice for the statement below by ticking a box on the line. 
 
Imprisoning large corporate taxpayers (Tax Code 2/48) is an effective way to reduce tax 
related offences: 
 
Strongly    Strongly 
Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End of the questionnaire 
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Sample Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.  Interview Schedule ( For Large Corporate Taxpayers) 
 
 
I. Please briefly describe the income tax compliance process of your corporation. 
II. What are the main difficulties your corporation faces in the tax compliance 
process? What are the major encouraging issues? 
III. In your view, what are the major reasons for a large corporation, including 
yours, failing to submit a tax return on time or pay the required taxes? 
IV. Please say why some corporations don‟t properly report their income in their 
tax return? 
V. Why do you think that ----- is/are a strong reason for compliance failure? 
Please can you give me an example from your experience? 
VI. Do you think that coercive instruments like penalty, audit and imprisonment 
contribute to higher tax compliance? Which one of them is important to filing 
and which one to reporting, payment and overall compliance? 
VII. How do you perceive or describe the influence of quality taxpayer service, 
simplified tax law and mutual understanding between the tax administration 
and your corporation on tax compliance? In which ways do they affect 
different tax compliance obligations? 
VIII. Do you think that a balanced use of coercive and persuasive instruments 
induces greater tax compliance by large corporations? Or should some of the 
compliance instruments be emphasised more than the other? And why? 
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B.  Interview Schedule (For Tax Officials) 
 
 
I. How long have you been working with large corporate taxpayers? 
II. Would you please describe the compliance behaviour of large corporate 
taxpayers? 
III. What are/were the major difficulties you face/faced in dealing with large 
corporate taxpayers? 
IV. In your opinion, why does a large corporation fail to submit its return on time 
or to pay its taxes? 
V. Please tell me why some corporations don‟t declare their income properly in 
their tax return? 
VI. Why do you think that ----- is/are a strong reason for compliance failure? Can 
you give me an example from your experience? 
VII. Which coercive instrument do you use more among penalty, audit and 
imprisonment? Do you use some of them to increase filing compliance and 
others to increase reporting or payment compliance? Are all of them equally 
important to you in improving large corporate tax compliance? 
VIII. How do you evaluate the role of persuasive compliance measures, including 
quality taxpayer service, simplified tax law and mutual understanding, in 
managing large corporate tax compliance? How are these measures related to 
the different compliance obligations? 
IX. Do you think that a balanced use of coercive and persuasive instruments 
induces greater large corporate tax compliance? Or should some of the 
compliance instruments be emphasised more than others? And why? 
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Table C.1: Linking the Free Nodes 
 
Free nodes Connection with other nodes 
Accountability and 
transparency 
Linking  tax and non-tax laws 
Linking good corporate governance 
Linking institutional monitoring 
Linking institutional development 
Accounting standards Linking  tax audits 
Linking corporate officials 
Linking international tax forums 
Coercion as a policy tool Linking tax law 
Linking politics and governance 
Linking the cultural and economic perspectives of the country 
Linking accounting standards 
Linking corporate income and profit 
Linking monitoring 
Linking fear of the tax environment 
Lining coercion with persuasion to make the complementary 
Linking corruption 
Linking comparatively soft measures, for example, CCTV 
Linking litigation 
Corporate employees Linking corruption 
Linking accountability 
Lining accounting standards 
Insecurity of business Linking profit motive 
Linking political issues 
Linking underreporting 
Linking auditors in the process 
Institutional monitoring Linking institutions 
Linking sectors Linking 
accountability Linking tax 
administration 
Linking coercion (positive role of coercion) 
Linking society 
Persuasion as a policy tool Linking tax law 
Linking marginal tax rate 
Linking motivation and attitude 
Linking complemetarity 
Linking habituality 
Linking taxpayer service 
Linking political atmosphere 
Linikng tax administration 
Linking education and ethics 
Networking and 
modernization 
Linking institutional development 
Lininking monitoring Linking 
accountability Linking 
accounting standards Linking 
taxpayer service 
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 Linking tax administration 
Linking tax audits and auditor 
Ownership  and partnership Linking accountability 
Linking corruption 
Linking accounting standards 
Linking corporate good governace 
Linking  mutual understanding 
Linking  attitudinal development 
Tax administration issues Linking corruption 
Linking political-economic issues 
Linking mutual understanding 
Linking attitudinal issues 
Linking confidence building 
Linking training and education 
Linking sector issues 
Linking social responsibilities 
Linking accountability 
Linking trust 
Linking tax law 
Tax audit standard Linking training and education 
Linking accountiung standards 
Linking  ethics 
Linking  corruption 
Linking image and reputation 
Linking capacity issues 
Linking  political and governance isssues 
Linking  accountability 
Linking corporate profit and greed 
Tax education and training Linking corporate profit 
Linking persuasion 
Linking mutual understanding 
Linking accountability 
Linking tax administration 
Linking corruption 
Linking economic interetst or profit 
Linking to coercion 
Linking capacity building 
Simplified tax law Linking  persuasion 
Linking  accounting standards 
Linking  sector issues 
Linking habituality 
Linking tax administration 
Linking tax audit 
Linking  coercion 
Taxpayer service Linking coercion 
Linking persuasion 
Linking tax administration 
Mutual understanding Linking  corporate profit 
Linking politics 
Linking  the tax law/system 
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Linking tax administration 
Linking  accounting standards 
Linking persuasion 
Linking ethics and education 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.2: summary of key evidence from interviews 
 
 
RESPONDENT 
NO. 
TITLE ISSUES 
RES-01 Chartered Account Focused  on  the  importance  of  corporate  sector 
characteristics  and  the  influence  of  power  and 
politics on tax compliance. 
RES-02 Corporate Managing 
Director 
Provided  a  general  review  of  the  coercive  and 
persuasive instruments and emphasised mutual 
understanding as an option; acknowledged the role 
of corporate sectors in compliance behaviour. 
RES-03 Corporate Finance 
Director 
Focused  on  the  importance  of  corporate  sector 
characteristics and compliance behaviour: 
multinationals are better; services do not reduce the 
cost of compliance or produce value for money. 
RES-04 Chartered Accountant It‟s  the  probability  of  any  coercive  action  and 
regulatory discipline that  induces compliance,  not 
the amount of the penalty. 
RES-05 Bank Finance Director Argued that structural deficiency in the accounting 
system and lack of competent accounting staff cause 
many compliance problems. 
RES-06 Addl. Commissioner , 
LTU 
Focused on why taxpayer service fails and 
emphasized the need for coercion. 
RES-07 Joint Commissioner, 
Khulna 
Insisted  that  the  possibility  of  a  huge  financial 
penalty  was  more  coercive  than  its  probability 
merited;  preference  for  powerful,  severe  actions 
over soft, persuasive solutions. 
RES-08 Second Secretary, 
NBR 
Poor regulatory framework of the financial 
accounting system   and its   impact on   income 
underreporting. 
RES-09 Inspector, LTU Tax officials‟ discretionary powers and their 
potential impact on compliance; large corporations 
are   greedy  profit-makers;  also   concentrated  on 
complex tax law and uneven competition. 
 
RES-10 
 
Income Tax 
Practitioner 
 
Audit adjustment process and how it influences 
compliance issues and how taxpayer service can be 
futile in creating compliance. 
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RES-11 
 
Chief Finance Officer 
 
Argued  that  imprisonment  and other tough action 
can only bring transitory change, not a permanent 
change. 
 
RES-12 
 
Tax Commissioner, 
Chittagong 
 
Hierarchical  tax  bureaucracy  and  tax  audit 
problems;  focused  on the necessity  for  simplified 
tax law and reducing knowledge gaps. 
 
RES-13 
 
Commissioner, LTU 
 
Acknowledged the issue of transfer pricing among 
large corporate taxpayers. 
 
RES-14 
 
Addl. Commissioner- 
 
Concentrated on mutual understanding and their 
probable impact on tax laws; supported the 
persuasive mode of inducing tax compliance. 
 
RES-15 
 
Chief Finance Officer 
 
Complex and costly tax laws make bribery likely 
and stimulate non-compliance. 
 
RES-16 
 
Deputy Commissioner, 
LTU 
 
Focused on the issues of corporate sector affiliation 
and compliance behaviour. 
 
RES-17 
 
Managing Director 
 
Discussed conflicting local and international 
accounting standards; and tax officials‟ inefficiency, 
mistrust and lack of mutual understanding. 
 
RES-18 
 
Chief Finance Officer 
 
Argued that financial audit is corrupt and a strong 
source of tax non- compliance. 
 
RES-19 
 
Income Tax 
Practitioner 
 
Disbelief, trust and negative attitude of the tax 
administration  in  creating  tax  non-compliance 
issues; tough laws cannot bring the desired outcome 
– you need to persuade. 
 
RES-20 
 
First Secretary, NBR 
 
Explained  why  services  may  fail  and  persuasive 
measures become ineffective. 
 
RES-21 
 
Deputy Commissioner, 
LTU 
 
Audit selection process and its impact on filing 
compliance; political vengeance and patronage as an 
explanation for tax compliance. 
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RES-22 
 
Member, NBR 
 
Explained how political intervention becomes a 
factor in the compliance process and service 
provisions  become  ineffective  in  creating 
compliance. 
 
RES-23 
 
Joint Commissioner, 
LTU 
 
Inefficient and complex tax law discourages 
taxpayers   from   being   compliant   and   indirectly 
makes  them  unreceptive  to  coercive  actions; 
complex tax laws affect the trust-building process. 
 
RES-24 
 
Former Member, NBR 
 
Tax  officials‟ inefficiency and  chaotic  procedures 
make taxpayer service fail. 
 
RES-25 
 
Chartered Accountant 
 
Argued for coercive actions and focused on 
increasing  penal  actions  and  strengthening 
regulation. 
 
RES-26 
 
Chartered Accountant 
 
Taxpayer service and simplified tax law can be great 
good source of high corporate tax compliance. 
 
RES-27 
 
Second Secretary- 
NBR 
 
Explained   why  mutual  understanding   fails   and 
complicates the compliance process. 
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